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Abstract 
Few studies deal with the Saudi Arabian labour market and most of them have paid 
little attention to wage structure and differentials. This study is concerned with the 
determinants of wage differentials in Al-Sharkiyah (the Eastern Province of Saudi 
Arabia). Therefore, the aim of this study is to fill a research gap and contribute to the 
empirical work on the Saudi Arabian economy. 
A survey of previous economics research reveals that there are several theories and 
approaches which have been used to explain wage determination and differentials. 
This study involves the identification of some of these theories and approaches 
which, it is believed, should be helpful in explaining the determinants of wage 
differentials in this part of the country. These include 1) The human capital theory-; 
2) The segmentation (dual) theory; 3) The discrimination theory, and 4) Other 
factors that are theoretically relevant to the determination of wage differentials. 
These theories are explained and tested by statistical techniques, including regression 
analysis. Wages in both the formal and informal sectors are tested using a Logistic 
model. 
In the light of these theories and approaches, the aim of this study is to provide a 
theoretical and empirical analysis, focusing on economic and non-economic factors 
which directly and indirectly influence wage determination and differentials in the 
study area. In order to accomplish this objective, models are selected based on the 
above-mentioned theories and approaches to wage determination and differentials. 
The empirical analysis is based on cross-sectional data which were collected by 
means of a questionnaire. 
This study should prove valuable in explaining the existing pattern of employment 
and determinants of wage differentials in the private sector of the Eastern Province 
of Saudi Arabia. In addition, it should be of considerable assistance in rationalising 
the labour market's wage policies, improving the position of low-wage workers and, 
of major importance to the Saudi Arabian government, in assisting their Saudiisation 
programme. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Background: Wages and Salaries Differentials 
Wages continue to account for a large portion of government spending in Saudi 
Arabia, estimated at between 50 and 60 per cent of total current expenditure (Bin- 
Abied and Al-Gawad, 1998). The differences in wages among workers have been 
noted in many previous wage studies. The reasons for the differences in workers' 
wages are complex and controversial. As a result, many economists have produced 
different theories to explain why workers receive different wages and salaries in 
similar situations (see Chapter Four). 
It is very important to clarify that which determines 'wage differentials'. They may be 
due to different levels of skill, different levels of formal education, differences 
between formal and informal firms, and differences in age, sex, nationality or ethnic 
group. Stiglitz (1993, p. 529), when referring to wage differentials, stated that: 
The basic competitive model suggests that if the goods being sold are the same, 
prices will also be the same. Wages are the prices in the labour market; but 
differences in wages are conspicuous and widespread. Even in the absence of 
unions, similar types of workers performing similar types of jobs are 
sometimes paid at quite different wages. For example, some secretaries are 
paid twice as much as others. How can economists explain differences? 
This quotation illustrates the reality of wage differentials in the labour market. 
Stiglitz suggested several factors which account for wage differentials: 
1. Unions: they may succeed in obtaining higher wages for their workers. 
2. Compensating differentials: wage differences may correspond to differences in 
the nature of the job. 
3. Productivity differentials: wage differences may correspond to differences in 
productivity between workers. 
4. Information-based differentials: wage differences may reflect the fact that 
workers do not have sufficient information about the opportunities available in 
the market. 
5. Imperfect labour mobility: individuals rarely move between jobs, so wage 
differentials will persist. 
6. Discrimination: wage differentials can sometimes be traced to nothing more than 
racial or gender differences. Discrimination once took the more obvious form of 
employers refusing to hire certain groups; today it is more subtle. 
This study seeks to explain wage differentials in the private sector of Saudi Arabia's 
Eastern Province by using: 1) the 'human capital theory', which takes investment in 
human capital as the basic determinant of personal wages; 2) the 'segmentation 
theory', which shows the determinants of wage differentials in both the informal and 
formal sectors; and 3) the 'wage discrimination theory', which determines whether 
there are any wage differentials in existence among Saudis themselves, and between 
Saudi and non-Saudi workers in the same situations. This study, therefore, will focus 
on the human capital, segmentation and discrimination theories, and other 
determinants that are theoretically relevant to the determination of wage differentials. 
In addition, this thesis examines the low-wage workers in the Eastern Province of 
Saudi Arabia and wage policies in Saudi Arabia as a whole. These two subjects are 
of major importance to this thesis, and complement the main subject of study, i. e.. 
determinants of wage differentials. 
1.1.1 Low-Wage Workers 
Low-wage workers, both Saudi and non-Saudi, in the Eastern Province of Saudi 
Arabia will be examined in order to determine what constitutes and characterises a 
low-wage worker. This forms an essential part of the subject of this thesis, i. e., the 
determinants of wage differentials. The present study seeks to discover whether the 
distribution of wages in the private labour market of Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province 
is skewed more positively towards non-Saudi than towards Saudi employees (see 
Appendix F). 1 This study demonstrates that there are many- Saudi and non-Saudi low- 
wage workers, and many more poor than rich individuals in the Eastern private 
labour market. 
In this section another problem is also highlighted. In the near future. the present low 
paid non-Saudisjobs are most likely to be those which provide opportunities for new 
Saudi entrants to the labour market during the Saudiisation process. Thus, the 
Kingdom must pay serious attention to the low wages of many workers in order to 
remedy the present skewness and encourage Saudis to take over non-Saudi jobs. 2 
1.1.2 Wage Policies 
This study examines the wage policies which have been introduced in various 
countries, e. g. the United States and certain European Union countries, that could 
help to narrow the wage gap between low-wage workers and those with higher wages 
in Saudi Arabia. The aim is also to decrease wage inequality, in particular for those 
who have different wages and yet have similar qualifications and do similar jobs. 
Raising wages for low-wage Saudi workers, however, will give rise to additional 
business costs and make businesses less competitive. The payment of subsidies, or 
other wage policies, will have to have a time limit set, or else this will exacerbate the 
present problem and reduce incentives to increase wages. This important issue will 
be discussed in detail in the final part of Chapter Eight. 
1.2 The Statement of the Problem 
Al-Hammed (1996) stated that the main obstacles to Saudiisation in the private 
sector are: 
1. High wages demanded by Saudi employees as compared with low wages paid to 
non-Saudi employees, which accounts for wage differentials. 
t When wages are positively skewed, this means that relatively high wages are not offset by 
correspondingly low wages (Freund, 1979). 
2 Although a wage subsidy for low-wage workers was introduced in the year 2000, no minimum wage 
was set. 
-, 
2. Low productivity of Saudi employees compared with higher productivity of non- 
Saudi employees. 
In other words, due to the general low productivity and high wage levels of most of 
the Saudi labour force, Saudiisation has not progressed as quickly as had been hoped. 
The researcher believes that government programmes and policies could go some 
way towards overcoming these two obstacles. The issue of low productivity has been 
paid much attention by the Saudi government. For instance, the government is 
continuously reforming the education system and providing more training 
programmes in order to improve skills. On the other hand, high wages and "tage 
differentials are not accorded adequate attention by the Saudi government. For 
example, there is no established minimum wage, although the government has 
increased the cost of non-Saudi employment in a bid to create more job opportunities 
for the growing number of Saudis entering the labour market. In addition, under 
Decree no. 50, published by the Council of Ministers in 1995, Saudi nationals must 
make up at least 5 per cent of the workforce in any company which employs more 
than 20 workers. Companies that do not comply with this ruling will not be given 
visas for expatriate workers. Government subsidies and allowances will be dependent 
on the positive steps taken in the Saudiisation progress. 
The policies already introduced to solve the second obstacle - that of high wages or 
wage differentials - are believed to be insufficient. These policies can prevent firms 
in the private sector from achieving their main goal of maximising profit. It is an 
economic fact that a firm with low profits will employ fewer workers and, therefore, 
will not aid Saudiisation. In other words, the potential high cost of employing Saudis 
relative to non-Saudis will slow down the implementation of Saudiisation in the 
private sector, especially for labour-intensive activities in the service sectors. 
In this study, attention will be given to determinants of wage differentials in the 
segmented labour market of Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province. Thus, the main wage 
theories, such as the human capital theory, the segmented labour theory, and the 
nationality (discrimination) approach are explained and tested by statistical 
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techniques such as regression analysis. In addition, wages in the formal and informal 
sectors will be tested using a Logistic model. The results of the stud` may provide 
support for recommended Saudi policies, the aim of which is to solve the problem of 
the high wages involved in employing Saudis, and to assist low-wage Saudi workers. 
To summarise, this study will focus on determinants of wage differentials in the 
segmented private labour market of Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province. The results 
should help to suggest measures for reducing the gap between the cost of employing 
Saudis and that of employing non-Saudis. This should have a positive impact on 
Saudiisation rates in the private sector. In addition, the position of lo« -wage workers 
and wage policies will be analysed, as these are complementary aspects to the 
determinants of wage differentials. 
1.3 The Purpose and Importance of the Study 
The Sixth and Seventh Development Plans emphasise the importance of human 
capital development as a prerequisite for a more equitable distribution of wages. This 
study aims principally to identify the major factors influencing wage distribution and 
differentials in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the importance of 
this study lies in the author's belief that factors such as an individual's province of 
birth, nationality (Saudi or non-Saudi), and the size of firms largely explain the wage 
differentials. 
Given the fact that the Kingdom lacks research in this area, this study is expected to 
be helpful to Saudi policy makers dealing with these important issues. In addition. 
the study aims to present results, recommendations and policy implications, which 
should encourage further research and provide valuable insights for policy makers in 
the future. 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
The main objectives of this study are as follows: 
1. To provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of economic and non-economic 
factor that directly and indirectly influence wage differentials and structures in 
the private sector in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. 
5 
2. To determine to what extent the labour market is segmented. 
3. To categorise Saudi low-wage workers and examine how support could he 
provided. 
4. To aid the process of Saudiisation, which has been a major goal in Saudi Arabia's 
recent Five-Year Development Plans. 
5. To suggest and support wage policies that would encourage Saudis to work in 
what are, at present, low-wage jobs, thus furthering the Saudiisation process. 
1.5 Research Questions (Hypotheses) 
Taking into account the objectives of the study, the researcher is seeking to provide 
answers to the following questions: 
1. How important are background variables, such as marital status, urbanisation. 
place of birth/province of origin and age, in explaining the wage differentials 
between Saudis and non-Saudis in the labour market of the Eastern Province. 
2. To what extent do human capital variables, including knowledge of English and 
computer skills, explain wage differentials between Saudis and non-Saudis? 
3. Does nationality affect wage differentials in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia' 
4. How important is the combination of all the above variables in relation to Saudi 
Arabia's Eastern segmented labour market? 
5. Which types of worker are in the informal sector, and which are in the formal 
sector? Saudi or non-Saudi or both? 
6. What determines who becomes a low-wage worker? 
7. Can this study suggest policies that would be useful in addressing the 
Saudiisation problem and, ultimately, reduce Saudi unemployment? 
1.6 Other Issues Related to Wage Differentials, Low-Wage Workers 
and Wage Policies 
Providing some insight into four related areas- the Saudi private sector. the informal 
sector, Saudiisation and unemployment - may help in explaining how vage 
differentials occur. 
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1.6.1 The Saudi Private Sector 
The Saudi government expects the private sector to play a key role in the economy. 
The Seventh Development Plan emphasises the role of the Saudi private sector in 
achieving development objectives. The plan lists the main objectives that will guide 
future policies for the private sector: 
1. Accelerate private sector growth to ensure more job opportunities for Saudi 
nationals, thereby improving the performance of the national economy and 
raising the standard of living for the lower paid workers. 
2. Further diversify the economic base, with particular emphasis on increasing non- 
oil exports. 
3. Increase the Kingdom's capacity to be more flexible in response to rapidly 
changing technological and economic conditions at the global level. 
4. Raise the overall level of efficiency of the national economy through a more 
efficient use of resources. 
An extensive privatisation process is expected to enhance the private sector's 
economic role and increase the opportunities available for private investment, both 
national and foreign. 
1.6.2 The Informal Sector (Small Scale Enterprises) in the Saudi Private Sector 
Every private sector has small and large-scale enterprises. In Saudi Arabia, small- 
scale enterprises are defined as those employing fewer than 20 workers. Small-scale 
enterprises comprise the majority of private establishments and absorb about 98 per 
cent of the foreign labour force (Al-Saud, 2002). These enterprises could provide an 
appropriate target for the Saudiisation programme. 
The Kingdom emphasises the essential role of small and medium scale enterprises in 
providing job opportunities for Saudis. Therefore, the Seventh Development Plan 
makes several recommendations, aimed at supporting small and medium scale 
enterprises by: 
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1. Streamlining procedures for establishing small and medium scale enterprises. so 
as to eliminate associated routine constraints and increase technical and 
administrative support for these firms. 
2. Studying the possibility of establishing a special fund, with government and 
private sector participation, to facilitate access to loans for small and medium 
scale enterprises and develop Islamic financing instruments such as Musharaka. 
Murabah and Mudaraba further to broaden financial opportunities available to 
these enterprises. 
3. Expanding the lending activities of the Saudi Credit Bank. 
1.6.3 Saudiisation 
The Saudiisation programme means the replacement of non-Saudi labour by Saudi 
nationals. Although the Kingdom has made great efforts in its Saudiisation 
programmes, the number of Saudi nationals constitutes only a modest percentage of 
the total employed in the private sector. For instance, the private sector provided 
about 473,500 jobs for Saudis during the Sixth Development Plan (1995-2000) 
compared with about 154,700 jobs provided by the government sector. Thus, greater 
efforts are needed during the Seventh Development Plan (2000-2004) to encourage 
the private sector's capacity to provide job opportunities for the continuously 
growing number of new potential Saudi entrants to the labour market, especially as 
their absorption into the government sector will be difficult. 
Studies prepared by the Manpower Council in Saudi Arabia indicate that the majority 
of foreign workers in the Kingdom work in establishments employing fewer than 20 
workers (Mahdi, 2000). Therefore, the Kingdom has asked all those establishments 
in the private sector which employ 20 workers or more to increase the number of 
Saudi workers by an annual rate of 5 per cent. It is notable that the private 
establishments that have applied this rate of increase represent only a modest 
proportion of the total. Accordingly, the Kingdom continues to emphasise the 
essential role of small and medium scale enterprises in providing job opportunities 
for Saudis. 
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The Seventh Development Plan recommends many measures to help in increasing 
the level of Saudi employment, such as: 
1. Encouraging the private sector to provide job opportunities for Saudi citizens and 
continuing with Saudiisation in government agencies. 
2. Identifying appropriate mechanisms for follow-up and implementation of 
Saudiisation plans in different occupations and sectors according to their 
importance by setting specific priorities for the Saudiisation of some sectors and 
occupations in the private sector. 
3. Concentrating recruitment of foreign labour on those who are qualified, by setting 
specific criteria to control the number of recruited workers. 
4. Continuing to make intensive efforts to control work permits and enforce 
residence regulations. 
5. Increasing investments in small enterprises and enhancing the role of the Saudi 
Credit Bank in this context. 
6. Implementing directives of the Manpower Council by the government agencies. 
7. Enhancing awareness through the public media, stressing the religious and social 
value of work. 
8. Making maximum use of the available female labour force and increasing job 
opportunities for Saudi women in accordance with the teachings of Islam. 
9. Reviewing articles of the Labour and Employment Law to ensure their conformity 
with the Kingdom's development requirements and to attain consistency and 
integration between the social insurance schemes and the civil retirement systems. 
10. Ensuring that the education system meets labour market requirements, and 
emphasises technical and practical skills so as to ensure the availability of 
qualified Saudis. 
11. Giving high priority to the expansion of training centres and the organisation of 
special evening training courses offered by private business consulting firms. 
These facilities will target, in particular, owners and managers of small and 
medium scale firms. 
12. Giving high priority to the launching of a national information campaign to 
demonstrate the significance of work as a religious and social value, with the aim 
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of changing attitudes towards professions and trades which are deemed 
undesirable by some citizens. 
13. Reviewing the costs of recruiting foreign labour. while raising penalties for 
illegally employing foreign nationals and establishing a fund for the training of 
Saudis. 
Moreover, a key policy aims to support the role of the Saudi Human Resources 
Development Fund (HRDF) by helping new Saudi entrants to the labour market. The 
HRDF's main goal is to support the Saudiisation programme. It provides grants for 
qualifying, training and recruiting national manpower in the private sector. 
1.6.4 Unemployment 
The Kingdom faces a rising unemployment problem and a rapidly expanding 
population. Unemployment has become a major issue with a large number of social 
and security implications. There are no official unemployment statistics: most 
estimates put the rate at 15 - 20 per cent. Thus, providing job opportunities for young 
Saudis is a very important challenge facing the Kingdom. It is regarded as the major 
concern in the government's economic agenda. 
Oil revenues have fluctuated over the last few years, and this has been the main 
reason behind the rise in unemployment. Moreover, the growth of the non-oil sectors 
of the economy has been insufficient to provide opportunities for the growing 
numbers of job-seekers. The Kingdom has to achieve higher rates of economic 
growth in order to provide enough employment opportunities for an increasing 
number of unemployed Saudis and new graduates seeking jobs. 
It is hoped that this study will contribute to the literature on how to solve the 
unemployment problem in Saudi Arabia by suggesting wage policies that should 
decrease wage differentials between employees. 
1.7 Organisation of the Thesis 
The study is organised into nine chapters. Chapter One, the introductory chapter. 
provides a framework for the study, gives a statement of the problem, states the 
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study's objectives, and outlines the research questions and other issues relevant to 
this study. This chapter introduces the subject of wage differentials, lo«-wagte 
workers and policies relating to wages. 
Chapter Two focuses on the economy of Saudi Arabia, with the aim of providing a 
broad view of the Saudi economy. First, a general overview of the basic structure of 
the Saudi economy is provided, followed by a brief survey of planning and 
development in the country. Special attention is paid to the Saudi labour market and 
wage issues. 
Chapter Three provides a detailed analysis of wage structure and wage policies. The 
many definitions of what constitutes wages are examined. This chapter refers, also, 
to wage definition in the UK (ERA 1996 s. 27) and discusses wage theories, wage 
determination factors, and wage structures. 
Chapter Four contains a discussion of most major theories and factors relating to 
wage differentials. It examines certain empirical studies of the economics of wages 
and wage differentials in other countries and in Saudi Arabia specifically. 
Most of the well-known theories and methods used in determining wage differentials, 
as well as wage policies, will be discussed in Chapter Four. The corresponding 
research methods used to apply these theories are explained in Chapter Five. In this 
chapter, the methods used for data collection and the selection of appropriate 
statistical techniques are presented. Consideration is also given to the wage function 
form and appropriate econometrics models, and the analysis of the data using the 
Logistic model is presented. 
Chapter Six presents the findings of the wage survey administered to both Saudi and 
non-Saudi employees in the private sector of the Eastern Provinces of Saudi Arabia. 
The chapter provides a detailed description of the sample under study. In particular, 
in this chapter, an attempt is made to examine the distribution of the variables and to 
obtain summary measures, as well as to explore the strength and direction of the 
linear relationship between the variables, and to assess differences between groups 
and conditions. 
The first six chapters attempt to specify suitable theoretical models of wage 
determinants, the findings of the wage survey conducted on both Saudi and non- 
Saudi employees in the private sector of the Eastern Province are presented. Chapter 
Seven provides more empirical evidence for the determinants of and differences in 
wages in the private labour market of the Eastern Province by using multiple 
regression models. This chapter applies many regression models that correspond, in 
the main, to the theories of wage differentials and determination, as mentioned 
earlier in this study. Moreover, these regression models show econometric 
estimations of the relationship between annual wage as a dependent variable, and a 
set of independent variables, such as background, human capital and segmented 
variables. 
In Chapter Eight an examination is made of low-wage workers in the Eastern 
Province of Saudi Arabia, and of wage policies as a complementary aspect of wage 
differentials and determination. It will refer to the many different definitions of low- 
wage workers. In this chapter, policies which could be introduced to decrease wage 
differentials, encourage low-wage Saudi workers and stimulate the economy to 
reduce unemployment are suggested. 
Finally, Chapter Nine presents the conclusions of this study. The main findings and 
results are summarised, the limitations of the study are discussed, and some 
recommendations for Saudi policy makers are put forward. There are also 
suggestions made concerning areas where further research is needed. 
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Chapter Two 
The Saudi Arabian Economy and Labour Market 
2.1 Introduction 
In order to achieve the objectives of this research, it is necessary to provide some 
background information about the country with which it is concerned. This chapter 
will focus on the economy of Saudi Arabia. The aim is to provide a broad picture 
of the Saudi economy by outlining its basic characteristics, and the government's 
attempts to put into practice a series of development plans. Special attention is also 
paid to the role of the Saudi private labour market and its wage structure. 
2.2 The Characteristics of the Saudi Economy 
Prior to the discovery of oil in the 1930s, the Saudi economy depended mainly on 
trade, agriculture, animal husbandry and services to pilgrims who visited the holy 
cities of Makkah and Madinah. After the end of World War II in 1945, oil quickly 
replaced these activities as the main source of revenue. By the early 1970s, the 
Saudi government had launched a long-term programme to use its oil revenues to 
build the infrastructure to facilitate the diversification of the economy. The 
government invested heavily in order to modernise the country by establishing 
electricity, telecommunications, road, rail networks and its airline and airports. 
Unfortunately, the fall in the price of oil in the mid-1980s drastically reduced 
revenue from oil and brought this stage of infrastructure expansion to an end. This 
economic slowdown led companies in the private sector to reduce their reliance on 
government contracts (Bourland, 2002). 
In the 1990s, as Saudis were moving in larger numbers through the educational 
system and into the workforce, the government shifted the focus of its spending 
away from military purchases and infrastructure development towards education, 
health care, and social programmes. Moreover, the Gulf War period resulted in 
substantial budget deficits, as had also occurred in the mid-to late-1980s. In 1993- 
1995, government expenditure was reduced by approximately 24 per cent from S522 
billion to around $40 billion, as another downturn occurred in the oil market. A 
significant fiscal imbalance was starting to appear, and in particular an increasing 
debt burden, by 1995. The government considered this deficit seriously and. 
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therefore, took steps to eliminate it by, for example. encouraging privatisation. 
believing that the private sector would be an engine for future growth. As a result. 
the deficit had declined by just under 3 per cent of GDP by 1997. 
From 1998 to 1999, a further downturn occurred in the oil market and oil prices fell 
drastically. The budget of 1998 showed that although the government had cut 
spending by 15 per cent from 1997 to offset the decline in revenue, there was still a 
budget deficit of over $12 billion, i. e., close to 10 per cent of the GDP. The budget 
deficit of 1999 was $3 billion less than that of the previous year. From the 
beginning of the second quarter of 1999, oil prices began to recover, which allowed 
the government to reduce its deficit still further. The 2000 fiscal balance showed a 
$6.1 billion surplus, the first since 1982. In 2001 and 2002, however, the budget 
slipped again into deficit. 
The Kingdom has emphasised the development of non-oil industries. According to 
the Ministry of Industry, by 1980 Saudi Arabia had 730 industrial plants with a 
total invested capital of $6.3 billion. At the end of 2000, the number of plants had 
grown to 4,836, with a total invested capital of $71.9 billion. In addition, the 
government has been encouraging foreign investment in Saudi Arabia. A new 
foreign direct investment law came into effect in April 2000. This reduces tax rates 
on a foreign owner's corporate profits from a maximum of 45 per cent to a 
maximum of 30 per cent, in order to allow foreigners to own the land where they 
do business and to sponsor their own foreign employees (ibid. ). 
For the past 30 years, economic development has been largely governed by five- 
year development plans. The current development plan, which began in 2000. 
emphasises the importance of employing young Saudis and increasing the private 
sector's role in the economy. 
2.3 Planning and Development in Saudi Arabia 
The rise in the accumulation of surpluses from oil sales after the early 1970s 
(1390s H) enabled the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to decide to use these surpluses 
for the Kingdom's development, according to methods laid out in a series of five- 
year development plans. Over the past thirty years, six development plans have 
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been put into practice. The first, second and third plans emphasised the 
development of the Kingdom's infrastructure, with later plans focusing increasingly 
on human resources, private sector development and a reduction in the country's 
dependency on oil. The Seventh Development Plan is being implemented during 
the period 1420-1425H (2000-2004). This plan emphasises the importance of 
employing young Saudis and increasing the private sector's role in the economy.. 
The following sections provide a brief overview of the last six plans. 
2.3.1 Directions of Planning 
The long-term strategic objectives for Saudi development were first conceptualised 
during the preparation of the First Development Plan in 1390/1391H (1970). Each 
plan has adopted objectives, programmes and policies that are aimed at achieving 
substantial developments at each stage, thus preparing the way for the next plan. 
The Ministry of Planning in Saudi Arabia intended that each individual plan would 
cover the basic dimensions of development, which are: 1) the social dimension, 
with an emphasis on safeguarding Islamic values, developing manpower and 
improving the social welfare of citizens by upgrading the health, education and 
cultural aspects of their lives; 2) the economic dimension, focusing on supporting 
the economic base, diversifying sources of income, realising the balanced growth 
of the various economic sectors, seeking optimal utilisation of economic resources 
and achieving high productivity of human and economic resources; and 3) the 
institutional dimension, directed at raising the efficiency of government services by 
amending inadequate administrative regulations, restructuring certain government 
agencies and establishing new ones, in order to enhance the government's 
performance and upgrade the productivity of government agencies entrusted with 
serving the economy and society. 
The Ministry of Planning in Saudi Arabia summarised the major strategic 
objectives of the development plans as follows: 
- To safeguard Islamic values and confirm Allah's Sharia. 
- To defend the Faith and the Nation; to uphold security and social stabilit` : 
and to deepen the values of national loyalty and belonging. 
- To improve the standard of living and the quality of life. 
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- To develop human resources, increase productivity and replace non-Saudi 
manpower with qualified Saudis. 
- To realise balanced growth throughout all regions of the Kingdom. 
- To diversify the economic base and to reduce dependence on the production 
and export of crude oil through the development of other natural resources 
and the promotion of other economic activities. 
- To provide a favourable environment for the activities of the private sector, 
and to encourage it to invest and to play a leading role in the development 
process. 
- To enhance the Kingdom's position within the global economy, promote 
economic integration among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries 
and strengthen economic cooperation with other Arab and Islamic countries. 
2.3.2 Saudi Development Plans 
Within the perspective of these objectives, each of the past six development plans 
built, sequentially, on the accomplishments of the earlier plans and laid the 
groundwork for further achievements in the following stage. The First 
Development Plan (1970-1975) placed emphasis on the groundwork necessary for 
the Kingdom's rapid transformation into a more advanced nation by focusing on the 
infrastructure and basic public services, such as the water supply and electricity 
generation, along with the expansion of social programmes and the development of 
Saudi human resources. 
The Second Development Plan (1975-1980) was prepared under more 
advantageous economic conditions, since the Kingdom's oil revenues had increased 
significantly due to the increase in crude oil prices on the worldwide market. No 
financial limitations, such as those that had influenced the preparation of the First 
Plan were present. This financial abundance enabled the Second Plan to focus on 
four major areas: maximum possible expansion of the transport, electricity, water 
and housing infrastructure; conservation of hydrocarbon resources; encouragement 
of energy-intensive industries; and export of their high value added products. The 
establishment of a Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu gave support to those 
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areas. Moreover, the establishment of a number of special credit funds at that time 
gave encouragement to the private sector. 
The preparation of the Third Development Plan (1980-1985) coincided with large- 
scale development in the national economy and an increase in oil revenues that 
made the Kingdom one of the most financially powerful countries in the world. 
The Third Development Plan focused on achieving structural changes in the 
national economy by controlling oil and gas production levels in order to maintain 
national resources, by continuing to build hydrocarbon industries, and by 
completing infrastructure projects. The plan also aimed to support developments in 
all regions of the Kingdom, and to enhance management efficiency by improving 
administrative organisation and government procedures. 
The Fourth Development Plan (1985-1990) constituted a new model, in terms of 
planning methodology. With this new methodology, the plan shifted from a central 
planning and projects-based approach towards a programme planning methodology 
that would ensure greater flexibility for government agencies. The plan focused on 
efficiency of operations and of usage of the Kingdom's resources and facilities; a 
diversification strategy for the development of producing sectors to enable the 
private sector that would play a substantial role in the economic development 
process; and a labour policy to reduce the number of unskilled and manual foreign 
workers in the Kingdom by more than half a million. 
During the Fifth Development Plan (1990-1995), the private sector was encouraged 
to increase its participation in some areas where the government typically provided 
services, such as some public utilities and the transport sector. It focused on 
achieving balanced development among the different regions of the Kingdom, 
improving the technical base in many economic sectors, and achieving economic 
and social integration between the Arab Gulf Co-operation Council countries. 
However, the execution of the Fifth Plan was to some extent adversely affected by 
the Gulf War (1991), which required some adjustments to be made in the priorities 
for government expenditure, which, in turn, affected private sector investment. 
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The Sixth Development Plan (1995-2000) was prepared under exceptional 
domestic and global conditions. The Gulf War and low growth in the world oil 
market put some limitations on the plan's preparation. However, the achieved plan 
attempted to realise its objectives by boosting the role of the private sector and 
reducing dependence on oil revenues. It emphasised the need to achieve the 
following objectives: 
- To continue supporting the ongoing development of the Kingdom's own defence 
capabilities. 
- To rationalise Government expenditure and make the national economy more 
dependent on the private sector. 
- To develop human resources by increasing the absorptive capacity of universities, 
educational institutions, and vocational training and technical colleges, with due 
emphasis on quality at all levels of education and training, in order to meet the 
needs of the private sector. 
- To develop the necessary policies for the Saudiisation programme. 
The Seventh Development Plan (2000-2004) emphasised the important goals of 
diversifying government sources of revenue, creating jobs for Saudis, giving 
priority to privatisation, improving the efficiency of the government rather than 
increasing its size, developing technical training and job skills for Saudis, joining 
the WTO, promoting investment and growth, and expanding the infrastructure in 
line with population growth and in order to facilitate economic development. 
2.4 The Oil Sector 
The Kingdom currently has the world's largest oil reserves: it has about 261 billion 
barrels of proven crude oil reserves. On the basis of an International Energy 
Agency (IEA) report, this represents more than 25 per cent of the world's oil 
reserves. Early in 2002, The Saudi British Bank (SABB) stated that the rate of new 
discoveries of oil reserves has surpassed the depletion rate; oil reserves in 2000 
were higher by almost 95 billion barrels than 15 years earlier. This high volume of 
reserves represents over 90 years of production at current levels. Moreover, on the 
basis of Bourland's calculation (2002), this volume of reserves could allow the 
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continuation of current oil production for 102 years. Despite the diversification that 
is taking place, the oil sector still determines the underlying power and growth 
prospects of the Saudi economy. The oil sector contributed an estimated 44 per 
cent of nominal GDP in 2000, which represented almost 81 per cent of the 
government's total revenues. 
The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was established in 
1960 to co-ordinate the petroleum-related policies of its members. Saudi Arabia. as 
a founding member, restricts its crude oil production output under the current 
OPEC crude oil production quota, which is 7 million barrels per day for Saudi 
Arabia as of January 1,2002. Saudi Arabia is a very strong competitor in the oil 
market. For instance, the year-end 2001 price for Saudi oil was $17.5 per barrel on 
average, while its production cost was only $1.50 per barrel, compared with a 
global average cost of $5-10 per barrel. In addition to this, it costs Saudi Arabia 
less than 10 cents per barrel to discover new well reserves (Bourland, 2002). 
Oil and gas exploration, production, refining, marketing and distribution are 
managed by ARAMCO. In 1978, the government of Saudi Arabia purchased the 
shares held by foreign shareholders and the company was renamed Saudi 
ARAMCO. Recently, Shaybah, a major new field, was opened up and put into 
production by Saudi ARAMCO. This field produces 500,000 barrels per day. One 
main goal of Saudi ARAMCO is to develop fields of high-grade crude, so that the 
5 types of crude sold (Arab Heavy, Arab Medium, Arab Light, Arab Extra Light, 
and Arab Super Light) would tend to have a higher quality and thus be higher 
priced under existing production quotas. Another important long-term goal is to 
shift the domestic uses of energy from oil to gas, thus freeing more oil production 
for export. In this regard, the Kingdom has opened up some investment 
opportunities for foreign oil companies to develop gas in the Kingdom for domestic 
use. 
The prosperity of the oil sector, through its impact upon government revenues, has 
important implications for government spending in crucial areas like health, 
education, defence and social services. Basically, oil has two effects, one positive 
and the other negative. The positive benefit comes with more oil revenue, which 
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allows for a greater proportion of capital expenditure and more government 
spending. The negative effect comes with less oil revenue «-hich diverts spending 
from private sector development, if borrowing has to be undertaken in the domestic 
market. This situation damages the economy in the long term, as the national and 
foreign private sector needs a stable economic environment in which to invest. For 
these reasons the Kingdom has tried to pursue a policy of oil price stability on the 
world stage. This allows greater certainty that sustainable development can be 
achieved by predicting a reasonable level of oil exports and government oil 
revenues. 
2.5 The Non-Oil Sector 
The previous section showed that the primary objective of the Saudi Kingdom is 
the reduction of its dependence on oil revenues by focusing on industrial 
diversification. This section discusses various aspects of this strategy and provides 
statistics that indicate some of the achievements (reported by SAMA, 2001). For 
instance: 
2.5.1 Petrochemicals 
The petrochemical industry of Saudi Arabia relies on gas and natural gas liquids for 
industrial feedstock for other oil and gas derivatives. The Saudi petrochemical 
company SABIC is the largest publicly-listed company in the Middle East and one 
of the top 25 chemical companies in the world. SABIC holds a vital position in the 
world markets for petrochemicals. Most of SABIC's companies are joint ventures, 
for the most part multinational companies. 
2.5.2 Mining 
Saudi Arabia has significant deposits of minerals such as gold, copper and 
phosphates, but these remain largely unexplored. The development of the 
Kingdom's mineral deposits is now seen as important to the economy. The country 
is rewriting the Mining Investment Regulations. In 1997, a new government-owned 
mining company, Ma'aden, was set up to carry out investigations of base metals 
and industrial minerals, and to participate in joint local and foreign private sector 
ventures. 
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2.5.3 Air Transportation 
Saudia, the national carrier, with a monopoly of domestic routes. has been provided 
with the latest modern aircraft to complete the upgrading of its fleet. The number of 
new aircraft received by Saudia up to the end of 2000 stood at 58, of which four 
were Boeing 747-400,21 were Boeing 777-200,29 were MD-90 and four were 
MD-11 for cargo. It is planned to privatise Saudia which is currently at the 
introductory stages of outlining a privatisation plan. Saudia has made good 
progress in replacing non-Saudi staff with Saudis. A high level executive 
committee was established to review the strategic plan and to achieve a higher rate 
of Saudiisation. National employees currently represent 88 per cent of the total. 
2.5.4 Construction 
The construction industry is starting to depend increasingly on the private sector 
and semi-government companies projects, as the government role in the economy 
was reduced many years ago. Petrochemicals, electrical power, water, and the 
telecommunications sectors are now undertaking major projects. In addition, the 
construction of houses and other buildings continues, in line with the growth in 
population. The prosperity of this sector is related to oil revenue levels in the 
Kingdom. As a result, 2001 was a good year for profitability, the cement industry 
being an example. 
2.5.5 Telecommunications 
Telecommunications is one of the strongest growth areas in the Kingdom. The 
Saudi Telecommunications Company, STC, operated 2.96 million fixed lines and 
1.36 mobile lines by the end of 2000. Moreover, internet services are now widely 
used, with over 20 internet service providers. 
2.5.6 Agriculture 
Agriculture in Saudi Arabia has grown rapidly since the Kingdom has been aiming 
at self-sufficiency in many agricultural products. This sector had been aided 
significantly by the government, but suffered major subsidy reductions between 
1993 and 1995. Although subsidies have continued to decline since then, the 
agricultural component of GDP has remained steady, at between $8 and $9 billion. 
or 5.3 per cent of GDP in 2000. Although there are generous agricultural subsidies, 
21 
Saudi Arabia still remains the largest food importer in the Middle East. In 2000 it 
imported $5.4 billion in foodstuffs. 
2.5.7 The Financial System 
The central bank of Saudi Arabia is the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SANIA), 
which, as the government's bank, monitors and regulates commercial banks. 
manages the government's foreign assets, carries out Saudi monetary policy and 
issues the country's currency, the Saudi Riyal (SR). In addition to the commercial 
banks, there are several government credit institutions. They give loans and 
advances on soft terms for special purposes to Saudi individuals and companies. 
These are the Saudi Agricultural Bank, the Public Investment Fund, the Saudi 
Credit Bank, the Saudi Industrial Development Fund, and the Real Estate 
Development Fund. At mid-year 2001, the value of their loans had reached $39.3 
billion. 
2.6 Government Finances 
The Minister of Finance and National Economy, in conjunction with the various 
ministries, proposes Saudi Arabia's budget. Before approval by the Council of 
Ministers, it has to be reviewed by the Supreme Economic Council and the Majlis 
al-Shoura. The fiscal year runs from 1 January to 31 December and the new budget 
announcement is typically made in December of each year. 
Three imbalances exist in Saudi government finances, which its fiscal policy is 
trying to eliminate (Bourland, 2002). These are: 
1. High government debt. 
2. Low capital expenditure relative to current expenditure. In other words, the 
investment in infrastructure is less than the combined cost of salaries, operations 
and maintenance. This imbalance forces the government to make further efforts to 
encourage privatisation. 
3. High dependence on oil for revenues. Saudi Arabia receives 81 per cent of its 
revenues from oil sales. The Kingdom is planning to introduce new taxes and 
increase fees. This is intended to lessen its dependence on oil revenues (Arab. Vetit's, 
26th October 2002). 
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2.7 Balance of Payments 
Saudi Arabia's trade picture is generally a healthy one. However, there have been 
some periods of stress. Its balance of payment went deeply into deficit during 
1991-92 because of the high cost of the Gulf War. In 1993-94. oil prices fell. facing 
the Kingdom into another difficult situation, but it benefited from oil price rises in 
1995 and 1996. 
Although 1996 and 1997 were strong years for oil revenue, only a small current 
account surplus resulted. In 1998 the current account recorded a $13 billion deficit. 
In 1999 it jumped back to record a small surplus because of the increase in oil 
revenue. 2000 and 2001 saw surpluses of $14.8 billion and $8.3 billion respectively 
(Bourland, 2002). 
The major source of payment inflows to the current account are oil revenues, while 
the major outflows are non-Saudis' remittances and payments for imports. 
2.8 Privatisation 
Privatisation is the process of transferring the ownership or management of public 
establishments, projects and services from the government sector to the private 
sector, relying on market mechanisms and competition, and using a number of 
methods, including contracts for managing, operating, financing or selling all or 
part of each of the government's assets to the private sector. 
The decision of the Saudi government to move forward with the privatisation of a 
number of public enterprises is a strategic one. It will encourage the continued 
expansion of the role of the private sector in economic activity. The Supreme 
Economic Council (SEC) is entrusted with the task of supervising the privatisation 
programme in co-ordination with government authorities. The SEC was called 
upon to set out a strategic plan and a timetable for the privatisation. 
The Supreme Economic Council approved the privatisation strategy for Saudi 
Arabia. The SEC mentions many basic objectives, such as: increasing the capacity, 
of the national economy; encouraging private sector investment: expanding the 
ownership of productive assets by Saudi citizens; encouraging local investments of 
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domestic and foreign capital; increasing employment opportunities and optimising 
the use of the national work force; ensuring the continued equitable increase in 
individual income; providing services to citizens and investors in a timely and cost- 
effective manner; rationalising public expenditure and reducing the burden on the 
government budget by giving the private sector opportunities to finance; operate 
and maintain certain services which it is able to provide by increasing government 
revenues from returns on its participation in activities transferred to the private 
sector, and from the sale of shares in Saudi government-owned companies (SANTA. 
2001, and Bourland, 2002). 
The following is a list of public enterprises that are being prepared for 
privatisation: 
1. The telecommunications sector. 
2. Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia). 
3. The postal services. 
4. The electricity sector. 
5. The railways. 
6. Some services of the General Port Authority. 
2.9 Population 
SAMA (2001) reported that the latest official estimate by the Central Department 
of Statistics of the total population of the Kingdom was 22.01 million in 2000, as 
compared with 21.33 million in 1999. This indicates a rise of 0.68 million, or an 
annual growth rate of 3.1 per cent. This rate is equal to the average annual growth 
rate of the Kingdom's population during the period 1995-2000. 
As shown in Table 2.1, the Saudi population stood at 16.21 million 
in 2000. This 
represented 73.6 per cent of the total population of the Kingdom, as compared to 
15.66 million in 1999. This increase has been calculated as 3.5 per cent, which 
is 
equal to the average annual growth rate of the Saudi population 
during the period 
1995-2000. On the other hand, the non-Saudi population grew by 2.2 per cent from 
5.68 million in 1999 to 5.80 million in 2000.5.80 million represented 26.4 per cent 
of the Kingdom's total population. The growth rate 
in the non-Saudi population 
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during 2000 was a little higher than its average annual growth rate of 2.1 per cent 
in 1995-2000. 
There are certain factors which have caused this high rate of population growth in 
the Kingdom. First, the birth rate exceeded 5.5 infants per woman in 2000. The 
average birth rate in the rest of the world is 2.7. 
Table 2.1 Population Structure of the Kingdom during 1995,1999 and 2000 
1995 1999 2000 
Total population (million) 18.80 21.33 22.01 
Annual growth rate (%) 3.6 3.2 3.1 
Average growth rate in the period 1995-2000 (%) 3.1 
Saudi population (million) 13.59 15.66 16.21 
Annual growth rate (%) 3.6 3.5 3.5 
Ratio to total population (%) 72.3 73.4 73.6 
Average growth rate in the period 1995-2000 (%) 3.5 
Non-Saudi population (million) 5.21 5.68 5.80 
Annual growth rate (%) 1.7 2.4 2.2 
Ratio to total population (%) 27.7 26.6 26.4 
Average growth rate in the period 1995-2000 (%) 2.1 
Source: SAMA reports 2001. 
Secondly, improvements in living conditions, health and educational facilities in 
the Kingdom have led to a decrease in the mortality rate and a rise in life 
expectancy in the Saudi population. The life expectancy of a Saudi citizen is 
estimated at 72 years, compared with the world average of 67 years. Thirdly, an 
external factor, the continual heavy influx of non-Saudi labourers and their families 
has helped to make the rate of population growth in the Kingdom one of the fastest 
in the world. 
2.9.1 Age Structure of the Saudi Population 
Saudi Arabia has a large percentage of young people. Table ?.? shows that in 2000, 
the age structure of the Saudi population was such that the number of people below 
30 years of age was 11.9 million, which accounted for 74 per cent of the total Saudi 
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population. This ratio exceeded the 55.6 per cent for the world population as a 
whole. The group aged between 12 and 64 years accounted for 59.0 per cent of the 
total Saudi population. The Saudi youth expansion represents both an enormous 
challenge and an opportunity for the country. 
Table 2.2 Saudi Population by Age Group, Sex, 
and Relative Distribution in 2000 
Saudi population Relative distribution of Saudi 
population % 
Age group Total Male Female Total Male Female 
Total 16,208 8,151 89057 100.0 100.0 100.0 
0-4 2,820 1,436 1,384 17.4 17.6 17.2 
5-9 2,459 1,250 1,209 15.2 15.3 15.0 
10-14 2,109 1,071 1,038 13.0 13.1 12.9 
15-19 1,799 911 888 11.1 11.2 11.0 
20-24 1,513 765 748 9.3 9.4 9.3 
25-29 1,212 608 604 7.5 7.5 7.5 
30-34 965 481 484 6.0 5.9 6.0 
35-39 805 402 403 5.0 4.9 5.0 
40-44 653 326 327 4.0 4.0 4.1 
45-49 489 242 247 3.0 3.0 3.1 
50-54 378 185 193 2.3 2.3 2.4 
55-59 298 143 155 1.8 1.8 1.9 
60-69 419 198 221 2.6 2.4 2.7 
70 and over 289 133 156 1.8 1.6 1.9 
Source: SAMA reports, 2001. 
The Saudi government has to respond to these challenges by providing more 
education, training, health, and housing facilities as well as by setting up 
programmes that aim to create appropriate job opportunities for Saudi young 
people. The Seventh Development Plan (2000-2004) focuses on how these 
challenges may be addressed. 
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2.9.2 Future Estimates of the Kingdom's Population in 2020 
The Seventh Development Plan expects that the Saudi population Will increase 
from 16.2 million in 2000 to 29.7 million by 2020. This gives an average annual 
growth rate of 3.0 per cent during the period 2000-2020. Moreover, if this occurs. 
the Kingdom's total population (Saudis and non-Saudis) will increase from 22.0 
million in 2000 to about 33.4 million by the year 2020, i. e., an average annual 
growth rate of 2.1 per cent. In 2020, the total non-Saudi population is predicted to 
be only 3.7 million, or 11.1 per cent of the Kingdom's total population. 
Previous estimates indicate that the size of the labour force will be 10.7 million 
workers by 2020. About 9.6 million members of this labour force are expected to 
be working in the private sector by that time. The Saudi labour force is expected to 
increase from 3.17 million in 1999 to about 8.26 million in 2020. On the other 
hand, the non-Saudi labour force will decline from 4.0 million in 1999 to about 2.5 
million in 2020. 
2.10 The Labour Market 
2.10.1 Labour Market - Overview 
The financial wealth from oil, coupled with a labour deficiency in terms of skill 
levels means that Saudi Arabia has a serious problem. The short-term solution to 
the problem of the shortage in national labour was, and still is, to bring in foreign 
labour to meet the need for appropriate skills. The long-term solution to the 
problem of the national labour shortage has always been gradually to replace non- 
Saudi labour with a growing youth and productive Saudi workforce. To achieve 
this aim, ever since it began to derive revenue from oil production, the Kingdom 
has put human resource development at the forefront of its policy-making agenda. 
The hope is that Saudi labour will take over, significantly, through natural market 
forces. However, in the current economic environment, it is doubtful that this can 
happen without some regulation of the labour market to help the process along. 
Presley (2000) showed that by 1999, total civilian employment stood at 7.2 million. 
up from 6.0 million in 1990, and projected that it would be over 7.5 million in 
2000, of which only 2.5 million would be Saudi, putting the Saudi share of the 
workforce at only 34.7 per cent. 
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In 2000, the expatriate workforce constituted over 65 per cent of the total 
workforce. This indicates that reversing these proportions will be a long process. 
The Sixth Development Plan (1995-2000) showed that the private sector has failed 
to employ Saudi nationals largely because of the availability of cheaper and better 
qualified foreign labour. Moreover, Saudi nationals generally express a preference 
for working in the public sector, where wage and salary levels have been higher. 
Almost 95 per cent of non-Saudi labourers work in the private sector. whereas 
around 80 per cent of the working Saudi population have jobs in the public sector. 
The Seventh Development Plan (2000-2004) aims to develop human resources, to 
upgrade their efficiency by means of training in order to meet the requirements of 
the national economy, and to replace non-Saudi labour with Saudi. It estimates that 
the total numbers of the labour force in Saudi Arabia stood at 7.2 million in 1999. 
Saudis accounted for 3.2 million, or 44.2 per cent of the total, while non-Saudi 
workers accounted for 4.0 million, or 55.8 per cent of the total. The plan also 
mentions that the number of workers in the government sector was estimated at 0.9 
million, out of which 0.7 million were Saudi employees, i. e., 78.2 per cent of the 
total, while non-Saudi employees were estimated at 0.2 million, i. e., 21.8 per cent 
of the total. On the other hand, the number of employees in the private sector was 
estimated at 6.3 million, and Saudi employees at 2.4 million, i. e., 38.7 per cent of 
the total labour force in the private sector. Non-Saudi employees therefore 
accounted for 3.8 million or 61.3 per cent of the total. The number of Saudi 
nationals in employment is thus lower than the government considers satisfactory, 
in view of its aim to lessen dependence on foreign workers. 
The Seventh Development Plan mentions that the number of Saudis of working age 
(12 years and above) was 9.7 million in 1999. This represents an annual growth 
rate of 3.9 per cent, as against 2.6 per cent for the population under the working age 
(below 12 years). Therefore, the Kingdom should plan for a structural change in 
favour of the population of working age, which represents some 62.0 per cent of 
the total Saudi population. Moreover, students constitute the majority of the 
population of working age. 
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The Kingdom is aware of the need to provide more jobs for those reaching working 
age. In its latest plan, it shows that 328,600 new job opportunities should be 
provided. The private sector is expected to supply 311.000 jobs, 94.6 per cent of 
the total. Moreover, 488,700 job opportunities are projected to be made available as 
a result of the Saudiisation programme. This means the government anticipates that 
12.1 per cent of all non-Saudi manpower will no longer be needed during this plan 
period. The Saudiisation programme, it is hoped, will raise the share of Saudi 
labour in the total manpower from 44.2 per cent in 1999 to 53.2 per cent by 2004. 
Thus, the total labour force will rise from 7.2 million in 1999 to 7.5 million by the 
end of the Seventh Plan period in 2004. 
2.10.2 Employment Structure 
2.10.2.1 Employment Structure by Economic Activity 
The Seventh Development Plan indicates, as shown in Table 2.3, that employment 
in the non-oil private sector is expected to rise from 6,161,200 in the base \'ear 
1999 to 6,472,200 by the end of the Seventh Plan period in 2004. Hence, 311,000 
new job opportunities will be created in the private sector. This represents 94.6 per 
cent of all new opportunities forecast for the plan period. 
In the production sectors, 81,400 new jobs will be created in construction, 72,000 
in the manufacturing sector and 24,400 in agriculture. The forecast for employment 
increase in private sector services is almost equally distributed among its sectors. 
With the rationalisation of its expenditure, the Saudi government aims to provide 
only 16,100 new job opportunities in the public sector during the plan period. 
Therefore, the share of government employment is expected to decrease slightly, 
from 12.8 per cent of total employment in the base year 1999, to about 12.4 per 
cent by the end of the plan period in 2004. 
2.10.2.2 Employment Structure by Occupation 
During the period of the Seventh Plan (see Table 2.4) the expected annual growth 
rates of employment by main occupational categories will range from 1.4 per cent 
for production, construction, and transport workers, to 0.5 per cent for service 
workers. 
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Table 2.3 Employment Structure by Economic Activity 
(Inrinci thn Qavn.. +h il%nnn inn A" -- -_. vav a 
Employment 
( Thousand) 
uýu% i awu (rV 
Share (%) 
V-bVV-f 
Change 
Description 
1999 2004 1999 2004 Thousand % 
Average 
annual 
growth 
1. Private non-oil sector : 6,161.2 6,472.2 85.9 86.2 311.0 94.6 1.0 
1.1 Private producing sectors: 2,273.3 2,760.6 31.7 32.8 187.3 57.0 1.6 
- Agriculture 557.9 582.3 7.8 7.8 24.4 7.4 0.9 
- Non-oil mining 13.2 14.7 0.2 0.2 1.5 0.5 2.2 
- Manufacturing: 589.0 661.0 8.2 8.8 72.0 21.9 2.3 
* Oil refining 21.5 21.8 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 
* Petrochemicals 9.4 10.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.2 1.4 
* Other industries 588.1 629.1 7.8 8.4 71.0 21.6 2.4 
- Electricity, gas & water 93.5 101.5 1.3 1.4 8.0 2.4 1.7 
- Construction 1,019.7 1,101.1 14.2 14.7 81.4 24.8 1.5 
- 1.2 Private services sectors: 3,887.9 4,011.6 54.2 53.5 123.7 37.6 0.6 
- Trade 1,036.6 1,071.2 14.4 14.3 34.6 10.5 0.7 
-Transport & communication 299.2 310.1 4.2 4.1 10.9 3.3 0.7 
- Finance and real estate 334.9 375.2 4.7 5.0 40.3 12.3 2.3 
-Community & personal 
services 
2,217.2 2,255.1 30.9 30.0 37.9 11.5 0.3 
2. Government services 916.2 932.3 12.8 12.4 16.1 4.9 0.3 
Total of Non-oil sectors 7,077.4 7,404.5 98.6 98.7 327.1 99.5 0.9 
3. Crude oil & natural gas 98.9 100.4 1.4 1.3 1.5 0.5 0.3 
Total of all sectors 7,176.3 7,504.9 100.0 100.0 328.6 100.0 0.9 
Source: The Seventh Development Plan (2002-2004). 
Moreover, the share of production, construction and transport workers' 
employment should increase slightly, from 30.5 per cent in the base year 1999 to 
around 31.2 per cent by the end of 2004. On the other hand, the share of service 
workers should decline from 29.8 per cent to 29.3 per cent, while the share of other 
occupational categories should remain at approximately their 1999 base year levels. 
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Table 2.4 Employment Structure by Occupation 
during the Seventh Development Plan (2000-2004) 
Description 
1999 2004 1999 2004 Thousand % 
. &%erage 
annual 
growth 
rate % 
Professional and technical 1,122.4 1,159.9 15.6 15.5 37.5 11.4 0.7 
Management 1,33.9 142.9 1.9 1.9 9.0 2.7 1.3 
Clerical 5,34.4 558.4 7.4 7.4 24.0 7.3 0.9 
Sales personnel 507.6 528.2 7.1 7.0 20.6 6.3 0.8 
Services personnel 2,138.1 2,196.6 29.8 29.3 58.5 17.8 0.5 
Agricultural and related 551.0 575.1 7.7 7.7 24.1 7.3 0.9 
Production, construction, 
and transportation 
2,188.9 2,343.8 30.5 31.2 154.9 47.1 1.4 
Total 7,176.3 7,504.9 100.0 100.0 328.6 100.0 0.9 
Source: The Seventh Development Plan (2000-2004). 
2.10.3 Saudi Labour Force Supply 
The Seventh Development Plan (2000-2004) aims to increase the supply of Saudi 
labour by implementing policies aimed at the development of the Kingdom's own 
human resources. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 confirm this, as shown by the following 
analysis. 
2.10.3.1 Labour Force by Age Groups 
Table 2.5 shows that the average annual growth rate of the working age population 
during the period covered by the Seventh Development Plan is expected to be 
about 3.9 per cent, compared to 2.6 per cent for the population below working age. 
The plan assumes, also, that the aggregate participation rate will increase from 32.8 
per cent in the base year 1999 to around 34.1 per cent of the total working-age 
population by the end of the plan in 2004. In addition, the cumulative increase in 
the workforce (new entrants to the labour market) during the period of the Seventh 
Development Plan is estimated to be about 817,300 workers, who will be employed 
in the new jobs. 
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2.10.3.2 New Entrants into the Labour Market by Level of Educational 
Attainment 
Table 2.6 shows that around 760,000 graduates from the education and training 
systems are expected to enter the labour market. This represents 93 per cent of the 
total number of new entrants during the Seventh Development Plan period. On the 
other hand, only 57,300 of the rest are considered as 'other' new entrants to the 
labour market (see Table 2.6). This represents 7 per cent of the total number of new 
entrants during the plan period. The Seventh Development Plan shows that the 
share of new entrants to the Saudi labour market graduating from education and 
training systems is high compared to the rate from other sources. This comparison 
indicates an improvement in the educational and training profile of the Saudi 
labour force. 
Table 2.5 Labour Force Projections in 
the Seventh Development Plan (2000-2004) 
Description 1999 2004 Change % 
Population below Number (Thousand) 5,996.2 6,814.8 818.6 --- 
working-age Average Annual Growth Rate (%) --- 2.6 
Working-age Number (Thousand) 9,662.2 11,705.5 2,043.3 --- 
population Average Annual Growth Rate (%) --- 3.9 
Total population Number (Thousand) 15,658.4 18,520.3 2,861.9 --- 
Average Annual Growth Rate (%) --- 3.4 
Dependency ratio 62.1 58.2 3.9 3.9 
Aggregate labour 
force participation 32.8 34.1 1.2 1.2 
rate (%) 
Population in work- Number (Thousand) 3,172.9 3,990.2 817.3 --- 
force Average Annual Growth Rate (%) --- 4.7 
Adapted from: The Seventh Development Plan (2000-2004). 
2.10.4 Labour Demand 
Table 2.7 shows, as it is shown in the Seventh Development Plan, the number of 
new entrants into the labour market by main occupational categories. and their 
distribution according to sources of demand, new jobs and replacement jobs. It is 
notable that the main job opportunities for new entrants will be replacement jobs. 
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For instance, 197,600 jobs will be for service workers, 197,000 for professional 
and technical workers, and 111,800 for clerical workers. 
Table 2.6 New Entrants into the Labour Market (Graduates of Education and Training Systems) during the Seventh fl w Inr 1r+ DI (Innn Inn 41 
Description Number 
(Thousand) 
Share 
(%) 
Higher level Universities 178.6 
-11.9 
Teacher Training Institutes 36.7 4.5 
Intermediate Technical Colleges 16.7 2.0 
Sub-Total 232.0 28.4 
Secondary level Secondary Education (General) 213.9 26.2 
Technical Education and Vocational Training 78.7 9.6 
Sub-Total 292.6 35.8 
Primary level Intermediate 143.1 17.5 
Elementary 92.3 11.3 
Sub-Total 235.4 28.8 
Total number of entrants from graduates of education and training 
systems 
760.0 93.0 
Other entrants 57.3 7.0 
Total number of new entrants 817.3 100.0 
Source: The Seventh Development Plan (2000-2004). 
In other words, increases in Saudi employment brought about by replacing non- 
Saudis with Saudis in the same occupational categories represent about 77.2 per 
cent, 84 per cent and 82.3 per cent of total expected job opportunities respectively. 
Consequently, the expected decline in the number of non-Saudis in these three 
categories will add up to 506,400 during the period covered by the plan. 
Moreover, the number of expected new job opportunities for Saudis will amount to 
12,700 in the management and administration category, 35,500 for sales workers 
and 44,100 for agricultural and related workers. Therefore, the expected decline in 
the number of non-Saudis in these three categories will amount to 92,300 during 
the plan period. 
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Table 2.7 New Entrants into the Labour Market by Source of Demand during 
the Seventh Develnnment Plan Onnn_Innd\ 
Sources of Demand 
( Job Opportunities) 
Description New New Replacement Total 
Entrants Jobs Jobs 
Professional Number (Thousand) 234.6 37.6 19-1.0 2 34.6 
and Technical Distribution according to 16.0 84.0 100.0 
available job opportunities (%) 
Management Number (thousand) 12.7 9.1 3.6 12.7 
and Distribution according to 71.7 28.3 100.0 
Administration available job opportunities (%) 
Clerical Number (thousand) 135.8 24.0 111.8 1 35.8 
Distribution according to 17.7 82.3 100.0 
available job opportunities (°/a) 
Sales Number ( thousand) 35.5 20.0 14.9 3 5.5 
Personnel Distribution according to 58.0 42.0 100.0 
available job opportunities (%) 
Services Number (thousand) 256.1 58.5 197.6 256.1 
Workers Distribution according to 22.8 77.2 100.0 
available job opportunities (%) 
Agriculture and Number ( thousand) 44.1 24.1 20.0 44.1 
Related Distribution according to 54.6 45.4 100.0 
Workers available job opportunities (%) 
Workers in the Number ( thousand) 98.5 154.7 -56.2 98.5 
Production, Distribution according to 157.1 -57.1 100.0 
Construction available job opportunities (%) 
and Transport 
Activities 
Total Number (thousand) 817.3 328.6 488.7 817.3 
(all occupations) Distribution according to 40.2 59.8 100.0 
available job opportunities (%) 
Source: The Seventh Development Plan (2000-2004). 
The production, construction and transport category gives a different result from 
the other categories. In this category, since the output from the technical education 
and vocational training system represents only about 9.6 per cent of the total 
number of new entrants, the expected cumulative increase in Saudi employment 
during the plan period will be insufficient to meet the demand from projected 
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economic growth. As a result, 56,200 additional non-Saudi workers will be needed 
to fill the gap between supply and demand in this occupational category 
The conclusion is that expected job opportunities for new entrants into the labour 
market through the replacement of non-Saudis will amount to 488,700 jobs, or 12.1 
per cent of the total number of non-Saudis employed at the beginning of the plan. It 
should also increase the relative share of Saudis in total employment from 44.2 per 
cent in the base year 1999 to about 53.2 per cent by the end of the plan in 2004. 
2.10.5 Unemployment 
Providing job opportunities for young Saudis is a major challenge facing the 
Kingdom. Unemployment becomes a serious issue with its large number of social 
and security dimensions. It is at the top of the government's agenda. 
The weak growth rate of the Saudi economy over the last few years, resulting from 
falling oil prices, has been the main reason behind the fast rise in unemployment. 
Moreover, the growth of the non-oil sectors of the economy has not been fast 
enough to provide opportunities for the increasing number of job-seekers. The 
Kingdom has to attain higher rates of economic growth in order to provide enough 
employment opportunities for the growing number of unemployed Saudis and new 
graduates seeking jobs. 
There are no official unemployment statistics, but most estimates put the rate at 
between 15 and 20 per cent. Table 2.8 shows how Bourland (2002) has attempted 
to calculate the unemployment rate in the Kingdom with the available data. His 
idea was to calculate the difference between the number of jobs expected to be 
available in a period and the actual number of jobs filled. He assumed that the 
number of unemployed Saudis, as a base figure, was at a structural low of about 4 
per cent, in 1994. This low percentage would give 96,000 unemployed Saudis out 
of a total Saudi labour force of 2.4 million at that time. He then used the available 
official data from the Central Department of Statistics (CDS) as follows: 
1. The five-year plan (1995-1999) reported that Saudi entrants to the labour market 
over the plan period would total 659,900. 
ýJ 
2. The General Organisation of Social Insurance (GOSI) data indicate that about 
220,000 Saudis were added to private sector payrolls in firms with more than 20 
employees between 1995 and 1999. Another 50,000 were added to provide for a 
possible undercount of the total private sector job additions. Thus. the total in the 
private sector would be 270,000. 
Table 2.8 Unemployment Calculation 
Unemployment base, year-end 1994 
Saudi Labour Force 2,400,000 
Unemployment Rate (at structural low of 4%) 4.0% 
Number of Unemployed, 1994 96,000 
Employment developments, 1995-1999 
Entrants to Labour Force, 1995-1999 659,900 
Private sector jobs created -270,000 
Government civilian jobs created -148,570 
Addition to unemployed, 1995-1999 241,330 
Unemployed, 1994 96,000 
Total unemployed, year-end 1999 337,330 
Saudi Labour force, year-end 1999 2,890,000 
Unemployment rate, 1999 11.67% 
Employment developments, 2000-2001 
Entrants to Labour Force, 2000-2001 326,000 
Private sector jobs created -100,000 
Government civilian jobs created -60,000 
Addition to unemployed, 2000-2001 166,000 
Total unemployed, year-end 1999 337,330 
Total unemployed, year-end 2000 503,330 
Saudi Labour force, year-end 2001 3,300,000 
Unemployment rate, 2001 15.25% 
Source: Bourland (2002). 
3. Ministry of Civil Service data revealed that 118,570 Saudi employees were 
added to government payrolls during the period 1995-1998. Bourland estimated 
the figure for 1999 by adding 30,000 as the yearly average during 1995-1998. As 
a result, the total number of jobs available to Saudis in the government sector 
over the 5-year period ending in 1999 was 148,570. 
4. The number of additional government and private sector jobs available to Saudis 
in the period 1995-1999 was about 418,570. 
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5. The difference between the total planned jobs, (659.900). and the actual jobs 
(418,570) was 241,330. This shows how many Saudis were added to the roll of 
the unemployed between 1995 and 1999. 
6. Added to the 1994 base of 96,000, this would put the total of unemployed 
Saudis at 337,330 at the end of 1999. 
7. According to the CDS, the Saudi labour force stood at 2.89 million in 1999. 
With 337,330 of that labour force unemployed, the unemployment rate at the 
end of 1999 would have been approximately 12 per cent. 
2.10.6 Employment Regulations in the Saudi Labour Market 
This section focuses on the regulations that apply to the Saudi labour market, 
where labour unions are non-existent and the mobility of foreign workers is strictly 
controlled. Saudi labour regulations cover pay, working conditions and relations 
between employers and employees. One of the principal missions of any union is to 
enter into negotiations with employers over workers' rights, but the situation in 
Saudi Arabia is different, as there are no labour unions. Unionising of labour is 
forbidden by the labour law. Labour unions and incitement to strike have been 
prohibited since 1958. Many Saudi labourers prefer to work in the public sector 
rather than the private sector, as public sector labour regulations do give them a 
variety of privileges and rights. This indicates that there is much labour regulation 
in the Saudi labour market. Some of it only applies to labour in the private sector 
and the rest applies only to labour in the public sector. 
Mahdi (2000) stated that the labour regulations that regulate work in the private 
sector are different from those in the public sector. The statement of a personal 
contract between the employer and the employees is the cornerstone of work 
relations in the private sector. The existence of wage differentials between workers 
of the same occupation and experience, whether in the same firm or different firms. 
is one of many indicators that show that the statement of a personal contract 
between the employer and the employee is not a standardised contract. This was 
highlighted in a study made by the High Commission for Riyadh Development, in 
1996. This study showed that there were significant income differentials among 
Saudi and non-Saudi households in the Riyadh area. It indicated that 38.3 per cent 
of Saudi households had an average annual income of $32,000 dollars and above, 
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whilst only 15.8 per cent of non-Saudi households were in this income category. 
The same study also looked at the mean wages for different occupations for both 
Saudi and non-Saudi households. Wage dissimilarity was clear between the two 
groups in different occupations. For instance, a previous study has shown that a 
Saudi production manager received an average annual wage of $32.700 dollars. 
while his non-Saudi counterpart received only $13,400 dollars. Moreover, a Saudi 
engineer received an average annual wage of $31,000 dollars, while a non-Saudi 
engineer received $21,100 dollars. This report also showed that average annual 
wages for the two groups were also different to a certain extent. The mean wage 
was about $35,300 dollars for Saudi labour and only $5,400 dollars for non-Saudi 
labour. 
The Residency Regulations (Iqama), which apply only to foreign workers, play' a 
crucial role in the Saudi labour market. According to Iqama (work permit) 
regulations, non-Saudi labourers are only allowed to work if they first have a work 
contract with a Saudi who acts as the worker's sponsor (Kaffel), and this must be 
arranged before the foreigner enters the country. Once the Iqama is issued, the non- 
Saudi has the right to reside in the country and the obligation to work. No non- 
Saudi person can stay in the country unless he/she has a sponsor, with the 
exception of pilgrims who are allowed to enter and visit only the Holy Places for a 
short period and have no right to go to other cities or places in the country. 
The Social Insurance Law applies to labour in the private sector. The General 
Organisation for Social Insurance (GOSI) provides insurance against occupational 
diseases and work risks and provides a pension for workers. A non-Saudi labourer 
is only covered for occupational diseases and work risks. Thus the insurance 
subscription rates are different for Saudi and non-Saudi labourers. 
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2.11 Human Resources Development 
The Kingdom has given special weight to the human resources sector in all its 
development plans. It has paid great attention to the fields of education and 
training. Therefore, general schools, technical institutes, universities, higher 
institutes and specialised colleges have been established to satisfy the Saudi labour 
market's need for skilled labour. 
2.11.1 General Education 
In 2001, the SAMA reported that the total number of both male and female 
students enrolled in government and other private schools, at the three levels of 
general education-the primary, intermediate and secondary levels-rose by, 2.9 per 
cent to more than 4.11 million during the academic year 2000, as compared with 
about 3.99 million in the preceding academic year (see Table 2.9). The total 
number of male students enrolled at different levels of general education in the 
Kingdom went up by 2.6 per cent, from 2.02 million in the preceding year to 2.16 
million. This represented 52.5 per cent of the total number of students enrolled. Of 
these, 1.19 million were at the primary level, indicating a rise of 1.2 per cent over 
the preceding year, 581,900 at the intermediate level, a rise of 3.2 per cent, and 
389,900 were at the secondary level, showing an increase of 6.5 per cent. In 
addition, 8,344 students were enrolled in special education schools and 33,536 in 
adult education schools. 
Table 2.9 General Education in the Kingdom 
1999 2000 
Number of 
Students Total Male Female Total Male Female 
Primary 2,259,849 1,175,556 1,084,293 2,285,328 1,189,364 1,095,964 
Intermediate 1,035,363 563,624 471,739 1,073,175 581,864 491,311 
Secondary 704,566 366,121 338,445 755,419 389,860 365,559 
Total 3,999,778 2,015,301 1,894,477 4,113,922 2,161,088 1,952,834 
Source: SAMA report, 2001. 
The number of female students enrolled in schools providing general education 
totalled 1.95 million, reflecting an increase of 3.0 per cent. This indicates that 47.5 
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per cent of the total number of male and female students was provided with a 
general education. Of these, 1.09 million were at the primary level. an increase of 
1.1 per cent over the preceding academic year, 491,300 were at the intermediate 
level, an increase of 4.1 per cent, and 365,600 were at the secondary level. a rise of 
8.0 per cent. In addition, 365 were enrolled in female teacher training institutes. 
4,277 in vocational institutes and centres, 3,706 in special education schools and 
75,359 in adult education schools. 
Table 2.10 Graduates in the Kingdom during the Last Five Years 
Graduates 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
General Education 
(Secondary) 
109,726 125,191 146,664 165,030 188.55 1 
Higher Education 28,918 30,720 36,977 49,497 51,080 
Technical 
Education 
12,500 12,610 11,891 11,924 12,596 
Source: SAMA report, 2001. 
2.11.2 Higher Education 
Table 2.11 shows that the number of students (male and female) enrolled in the 
universities and colleges in the Kingdom during the academic year 2000 was 
399,300. From the figures shown in Table 2.12 it may be seen that 190,500 male 
and female students were studying at the Kingdom's universities. This represented 
47.7 per cent of the total number of students in higher education. Tables 2.11 and 
2.12 indicate that male and female enrolment in other specialised colleges was 
208,900. 
Table 2.11 Number of Students Enrolled in the Kingdom 
during the Last Five Years 
Number of Students 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
General Education 3,633,499 3,756,256 3,867,585 3,999,778 4,11 3.92 
Higher Education 237,340 282,956 316,228 371,522 399.338 
Technical Education 37,019 35,369 37,295 46,187 50,004 
Source: SAMA report, 2001. 
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The number of graduates of universities and other specialised colleges during 2000 
was more than 54,000. Of these, 22,600 were male and 31.400 female. The number 
of female graduates has increased at a higher rate than that of male graduates. 
Female graduates represented 58.1 per cent of the total (ibid. ). 
2.11.3 Technical Education and Vocational Training 
Technical education and vocational training have been given a high priority in the 
Kingdom's development plans. This type of education is of vital significance for 
the preparation of a highly trained national labour force that will fulfil the need for 
national skilled labour and achieve the Saudiisation of various occupations. Thus. 
many technical colleges and vocational training centres have been established in 
order to increase the number of trainees. 
Table 2.12 Education in Universities and Specialised Colleges 
during the Academic Year 2000 
No. of Enrolled Students No. of Graduates 
Total Male Female Total Male Female 
Total University Students 190,478 132,259 58,219 23,488 15,940 7,548 
Teacher Training Colleges 24,655 24,655 ---- 4,021 4,021 ---- 
Girls' Colleges 159,660 ---- 159,660 23,579 ---- 23,579 
Health Colleges and Institutes 4,612 3,049 ---- 982 695 287 
Technical Colleges 19,933 19,933 ---- 1,977 1,977 ---- 
Total 399,338 179,896 219,442 54,047 22,633 31,414 
Source: SAMA report, 2001. 
All three previous tables indicate that the total number of students enrolled in the 
77 colleges, institutions and centres of the General Organisation for Technical 
Education and Vocational Training grew by 3,817 (8.3%) to more than 50,000 in 
2000. The number of graduates from the same institutions and organisation during 
the academic year 2000 rose by 8.0 per cent (12,600) (see Table 2.10) (ibid. ). 
2.12. Economic Reform Programme 
A package of reforms was devised for the Saudi economy to increase private sector 
growth and create more jobs for Saudis. Some of the reforms, listed below, have 
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been ongoing for several years and further new developments are being introduced 
(Bourland, 2002): 
1. Corporatisation of the Saudi Telecommunications Company (1998). 
2. Establishment of the Supreme Economic Council (August 1999). 
3. Opening up the stock market to foreigners for them to invest through mutual 
funds (November 1999). 
4. Royal decree outlining restructuring and corporatisation of the electricity sector 
(December 1999). 
5. Establishment of the Supreme Council for Petroleum and Mineral Affairs 
(January 2000). 
6. Foreign Investment Law and creation of the Saudi Arabian General Investment 
Authority (April 2000). 
7. Real Estate Law allowing foreigners to own real estate, except in Makkah and 
Madinah (October 2000). 
8. Creation of a Human Resources Development Fund for job skill training for 
Saudis (November 2000). 
9. Creation of a Supreme Tourism Authority for maximising growth of tourism in 
Saudi Arabia (November 2000). 
10. Transfer of privatisation responsibility to the Supreme Economic Council. The 
SEC was required to produce a plan and a timetable for privatisation (February 
2001). 
11. Guidelines for transparency of economic and fiscal data (May 2001). 
12. Reductions in tariffs from 12 per cent to 5 per cent (May 2001). 
13. Establishment of the telecommunications regulator (May 2001). 
14. Establishment of the electric power regulator, the Electricity Services 
Regulatory Authority (November 2001). 
In addition, there are more ongoing reforms, including: 
1. The Gas Initiative, allowing foreign oil companies to develop the gas industry 
and to promote domestic use of gas. 
2. Privatisation, at varying stages, of telecommunications, electric power. the 
national airline, postal services, railways, port services, and many other smaller 
state-owned assets. 
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3. A Capital Market Law, in draft, to modernise the regulation of the stock market 
and fixed-income markets. 
4. An Insurance Law, in draft, to provide a legal regulatory framework for 
insurance activities. 
5. A Mining Law, in draft, to facilitate investment in mineral sectors. 
6. WTO accession negotiations are under way. 
7. A Competition Law, in draft, to establish anti-trust regulations that are «'TO- 
compliant. 
8. A Labour Law, in draft, to modernise labour procedures and increase labour 
force mobility. 
This list of reform activities indicates that the government is trying to encourage 
the private sector to be active in creating jobs for Saudis. 
2.13 Wage Indicators in the Saudi Arabian Private Sector 
This section highlights some related indicators of wage levels in the Saudi Arabian 
labour market. A study of these indicators should provide an insight into the 
prevailing wage structure in the Saudi private sector. 
2.13.1 General Average Monthly Wages for all Labour in the Saudi Private 
Sector 
In Table 2.13, the general average monthly wage data for all labour in the Saudi 
private sector have been compiled from several annual reports issued by the 
General Organisation for Social Insurance in Saudi Arabia. The data used here are 
real data, i. e., they do not differ from the raw data. They can be seen as time series 
data, because each row in the table represents an observation at a different time. 
These time series data were collected between 1973 and 1999. It is important to 
note that they relate to both Saudi and non-Saudi workers. 
Wages in the Saudi private sector depend mainly on government contracts. Figure 
2.1 shows the trends of general average monthly wages for all labour in the Saudi 
private sector. Table 2.13 shows that wages in the private sector rose sharply from 
the early 1970s until the early 1980s, because during this period the Kingdom 
invested heavily in modernising the country. The fall in the price of oil in the mid- 
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1980s substantially reduced government expenditure, and the subsequent economic 
slowdown led companies in the private sector to reduce reliance on government 
contracts. During that time wages rose slowly, with some modest decrease between 
1985 and 1986. However, at beginning of 1987, wages began to decrease slightly. 
and then sharply at the beginning of 1988. After that they remained stable for more 
than two years, then increased again to the previous peak level for one year from 
1991 to 1992. The Gulf War, in 1990-1991, resulted in a visible increase in 
defence-related spending which, in turn, increased government business with the 
private sector. In this period, wages recovered. In 1992 they again sank to the 
previous low and remained there for almost three years, from 1993 to 1996, as 
another downturn occurred in the oil market and government budget expenditure 
was reduced by approximately 24 per cent. 
Table 2.13 Average Monthly Wages (SR) for all Labour in 
the Saudi Private Sector 
Year General Average 
of Monthly Wages 
Year General Average 
Of Monthly Wages 
Year General Average 
of Monthly Wages 
1973 1,156 1982 2637 1991 2294 
1974 1,238 1983 2,785 1992 2860 
1975 1,406 1984 2,844 1993 2,294 
1976 1,784 1985 2,888 1994 2,320 
1977 2,210 1986 2,839 1995 2,346 
1978 2,311 1987 2,848 1996 2,355 
1979 2373 1988 2,825 1997 2,852 
1980 2506 1989 2,313 1998 2,672 
1981 2696 1990 2295 1999 2,594 
Sources: Several reports by the General Organisation for Social Insurance. 
In 1996 the Kingdom planned to improve fiscal discipline in order to eliminate its 
deficits and encourage privatisation. This caused the average wage to jump for the 
second time to the previous peak. In 1998, wages began to decrease slightly as oil 
prices dropped drastically, reaching historic lows by the year-end. The top line in 
Figure 2.1 is taken as the mean for average monthly wages in general. In Table 
2.14, it appears that the data are concentrated towards the lower end of the scale. 
indicating that they are positively skewed. The mean, median and mode, as 
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measures of the central 
distributions. 
tendency, represent the average monthly age 
The final figure in this chapter, Figure 2.2 on p. 50. shows the trend of the general 
monthly wage in the Saudi private sector using the differences between these 
wages. SPSS is used to calculate the differences between the successive values of 
this variable. In other words, it takes the current value minus the previous value as 
the difference of order 1. This figure shows that there were small to medium 
fluctuations between 1973 and 1988. After 1988 the fluctuations started to increase 
in size. The difference between the highest positive and negative is about SR600. 
This figure suggests the prevailing wage in the Saudi labour market. 
Table 2.14 Descriptive Statistics for the General Monthly 
Wage (SR) in the Saudi Private Sector. 
Mean 2,390.41 
Median 2,373.00 
Mode 2,294.00 
2.13.2 Suggested Starting Wage 
There were 181 employers, 138 Saudi employees and 192 non-Saudi employees 
who responded to the question concerning suggested starting wage levels in the 
survey. This section displays both the Saudi employers' and Saudi and non-Saudi 
employees' attitudes towards the suggested wage levels as a justification for 
reforming the Saudi labour market. Table 2.15 summarises the results from all 
suggested starting wage levels. This table details the opinions of the employers and 
the employees in the private sector of Eastern Saudi Arabia. In the statistical 
analysis, a mode is cited as the longest bar in the histogram, since it shows the 
highest frequency number (Freund, 1979). The highest frequency number is the 
important one here as it best represents a central value in the distribution. Note, 
also, that it was not possible to calculate a mean or a median here with a coded 
number. In addition, each suggested starting wage can be explained separately, as 
follows: 
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1. It should be noted that while 35.5 per cent of Saudi employees support a starting 
wage of SR2,000-3,000 for Saudis with less than a high school qualification. 
almost 38 per cent of Saudi employers and 32.8 per cent of non-Saudi 
employees showed their support for paying a lower wage, i. e., SR1,000-1.500. 
Moreover, fewer than four out of ten (35.5%) Saudi employees supported a 
suggested starting wage, coded 4, and fewer than four out of ten (3 8° o) Saudi 
employers and about three out of ten non-Saudi employees supported coded 2. 
The highest percentage of Saudi employees indicated that their wage was low 
and that they deserved a higher wage. A comparison of all respondents' opinions 
reveals that there is no clear wage system in the Saudi Arabian labour market. 
2. Table 2.15 shows that all respondents supported a wage of less than SR1,000 for 
non-Saudis without a high school education. The highest responses (66% and 
46.4%) were from Saudi employers and Saudi employees respectively. The 
lowest response (40%) was from non-Saudi employers. The Saudi employees' 
responses indicated that most of them wanted to pay less than SR 1,000 for non- 
Saudis with less than a high school qualification. 
3. A reasonable percentage of both Saudi and non-Saudi employees supported the 
suggestion that a Saudi with a high school qualification should receive between 
SR3,001-4,000. On the other hand, Saudi employers suggested only SR1,501- 
2,000. How should this huge disparity be dealt with? The best method would be 
to apply wage policies, such as a minimum wage and a wage subsidy. Applying 
appropriate wage policies could encourage companies to employ Saudis who are 
seeking higher wages. 
4. Table 2.15 shows that all respondents supported the SR1,000-1,500 for non- 
Saudis with a high school qualification. The highest responses (41% and 30.4%) 
were from both Saudi employers and Saudi employees respectively. The lowest 
response (26.6%) was from non-Saudi employees. The non-Saudi employees' 
responses indicate that most of them were not happy with a wage of SR 1,000- 
1,500 for a non-Saudi with a high school qualification. This result indicates that 
their wages should be improved. 
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5. A reasonable percentage of both Saudi and non-Saudi employees supported the 
view that Saudis with a college degree should receive a higher wage than that 
suggested by the Saudi employers. The Saudi employers suggested onl% 
SR3,001-4,000. 
6. The table also shows that both Saudi and non-Saudi employees supported having 
a wage of SR3,001-4,000 for non-Saudis with a college degree. In other words, 
28.3 per cent and 22.4 per cent of Saudi and non-Saudi employees. respectively. 
supported the idea that employees with college degrees should receive at least a 
wage of SR3,001-4,000. Saudi employers, however, did not support this as a 
starting wage and wished to pay less than that. In fact, 31 per cent of them 
suggested SR2,001-3,000 as a suitable wage for employees with a college 
degree. 
Table 2.15 Saudi Employers' and Employees Attitudes towards Suggested 
Starting Salary in the Private Sector 
Employers Saudi Non-Saudi 
Employees Employees 
(Mode) ( Mode) (Mode) 
1. Saudi with no high school qualification Code =2 Code =4 Code =2 
#=68 #=49 #=63 
%= 38 %= 35.5 %= 32.8 
2. Non-Saudi with no high school qualification Code =I Code =1 Code =1 
#= 119 #=64 #=77 
%=66 %=46.4 %=40.1 
3. Saudi with high school qualification Code =3 Code =5 Code =5 
#=55 #=46 #=43 
%=30 %=33.3 %=22.3 
4. Non-Saudi with high school qualification - Code =2 Code =2 
Code =2 
#=74 #=42 #=51 
%=41.5 %=30.4 %=26.6 
5. Saudi with college qualification Code =5 Code =8 
Code =6 
#=38 #=54 =50 
%=21 %=39.1 %=26.0 
6. Non-Saudi with college qualification Code =4 Code =5 Code =5 
#=56 =39 
%=31 °0=28.3 °o='2'. 4 
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Key to the codes in Table 2.15: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 789 
Less SR SR SR SR SR SR More Other 
than 1,000 1,501 2,001 3,001 4,001 5,001 than SR (specify. ) 
SR1,000 - - - - - - 6,000 SR - 1,500 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 
From the data shown in Table 2.15, it appears that SR3,000 is seen as a suitable 
wage for high school graduates. The reason behind this particular figure is that 
both Saudi and non-Saudi employees support it as a suitable minimum wage for 
such employees. This is above the suggested minimum wage of SR2,000 which 
was suggested by some Saudis (Al-Saudani and Al-Kain, 2001). If wages are 
subsidised by the Saudi Fund for Human Resources, the SR3,000 should not be 
too costly for Saudi employers. 
2.13.3 Types of Low-Waged Jobs 
Table 2.16 lists some low-waged jobs in the private sector of Eastern Saudi Arabia. 
This may help the policy makers in devising a list of low-waged jobs. This list 
might aid them in proposing any wage policy which could increase the Saudi 
employment level in the Saudi economy. 
2.14 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the economic environment of Saudi Arabia. In 
particular, it has drawn attention to two of the main problems facing the Kingdom. 
First, it has been shown that in the past, the country has depended heavily on its oil 
revenue to establish and modernise its basic infrastructures. Unfortunately, the fall 
in the price of oil in the mid-1980s reduced the revenue from oil and brought the 
infrastructure expansion to an end. The continuing fall in the price of oil and the 
Gulf War, have resulted in a substantial budget deficit. The government has 
considered this deficit seriously and taken steps to eliminate it by, for example, 
encouraging privatisation and foreign investment. 
Secondly, it has been shown that a shortage of labour, in terms of numbers and skill 
levels, forced the Kingdom to bring in foreign labour as a short-term solution. The 
long-term solution is to replace non-Saudi employees with the growing number of 
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Saudi youth in the workplace. However, providing reasonable jobs in the private 
sector for the large number of young Saudis moving through the educational 
system and into the workforce seems impracticable, without motivational po licies 
and regulations to remove potential obstacles. This study examines one possible 
obstacle, that of wage differentials and their causes. The results, if acted upon, 
should have a positive impact on Saudiisation rates in the private sector. 
Table 2.16 Low-Waged Jobs 
Job Name Monthly Wage 
A/C Technician 2,000 
Inspector 1,558 
Machinist 1,000 
Administrator 3,000 
Accountant 2,000 
Entry Clerk 2,800 
Treasurer 1,200 
Purchases Representative 1,800 
Sales Representative 1,200 
Public Relations Manager 2,500 
Warehouse Manager 1,800 
Pursuer* /representative 1,000 
Administrative Staff 1,200 
Operator 15800 
Other Low-Waged Jobs 800 
* An intermediary who deals with official documents 
on behalf of the general public in Saudi Arabia. 
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Figure 2.1 Trends of General Average Monthly Wages 
In the Saudi Private Sector 
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Chapter Three 
Wage Theory and Policy 
3.1 Introduction 
Wages are of the utmost importance to everyone. To employees. wages represent 
income, to businesses they represent costs, and to the government they represent 
potential taxes. This chapter begins by examining the definitions of wages. as there 
are many. Then, nominal wages and real wages will be discussed and contrasted. 
Wage theories and the results of intensive studies by economists regarding wages 
will be examined. Finally, efforts will be made to identify wage policies which could 
be effective in narrowing wage differentials in Saudi Arabia, in order to assist in the 
process of Saudiisation. 
3.2 Definition of Wages 
It is very important to understand fully what is meant by wages. 
The UK Employment Rights Act 1996 s. 27 (ERA 1996 s. 27) has produced a good 
definition of wages. It states that: 
The basic definition of wages is simply any sum payable to the worker by his 
employer in connection with his employment (other than specified exceptions 
such as refund of expenses or pensions) and specifically including any fee, 
bonus, commission, holiday pay or other emolument referable to his 
employment, whether payable under his contract or otherwise. 3 
Backman (1959) provided another definition. He mentioned that the term 'wages' 
refers to the actual income received by the worker from his employer. It includes 
cash income as well as income in kind -that is, room and board- where these are 
provided. Figure3.1 was used by Ehrenberg and Smith (1994) to show the 
distinctions among wages, earnings, total compensation and income. This is 
reproduced here, as it is significant in this research. In Figure 3.1. the term 'w, ages' 
refers to the payment for a unit of time, while earnings refer to wages multiplied by. 
the number of time units (typically hours) worked. 
3See Appendix A for a lengthy definition of wages in the Employment Rights Act, 1996 s. 27. 
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Thus, earnings depend on both wages and the length of time the employee works. 
Income includes both earnings and unearned income. which includes dividends or 
interest received on investments and transfer payments received from the 
government in the form of food stamps, welfare payments. unemployment 
compensation and the like. 
It should be noted that both wages and earnings are normally defined and measured 
in terms of direct monetary payments to employees (before any taxes for which the 
employee is liable). Total compensation, on the other hand, consists of earnings plus 
employee benefits. Those benefits may either be payment in kind, or deferred. 
As there are so many definitions available in the current literature, for the purposes 
of this study, the term wages will refer mainly to the definition provided by the UK 
ERA, 1996 s. 27, presented above. 
3.3 Kinds of Wages 
Wages can be defined in many ways. First, one should distinguish between nominal 
wages and real wages. The nominal wage is what workers get paid per hour in 
current currency terms; nominal wages are most useful when comparing the pay of 
various workers at a given time. Real wages, that is, nominal wages divided by some 
measure of prices, suggest how much can be purchased with a worker's nominal 
wage. The wage rate is the price of labour per working hour. In addition, wages may 
be estimated at time rates, piece rates, or incentive rates. The time rate is also 
known 
as the day rate, flat rate, or hourly rate. Workers are simply paid a predetermined rate 
per week, day or hour, for the actual time they have worked. Workers on piece rates 
are paid uniformly for each unit output. With incentive rates workers are paid 
according to formulae that relate output to earnings in ways 
designed to produce 
higher production (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994). 
3.4 Wages Theories 
The most important aspects of the labour field to be dealt with here are \t aue s and 
any subject related to wages. Wages have been studied 
intensively by economists, 
and wage theories are the result of these studies. Wage theories 
help any researcher 
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to understand more precisely the functions determining wages. The main wage 
theories are explained below. 
3.4.1 Subsistence Theory 
Subsistence theory is the first and oldest of the wage theories. It was introduced by 
Adam Smith (1723-1790) and is associated most closely with David Ricardo 01772- 
1823). Elements of a subsistence theory appear in the Wealth of Nations, where 
Smith wrote that the wages paid to workers had to be enough to allow- them to live 
and to reproduce. David Ricardo implied that, at least in a growing economy, the 
wage levels would have to be above the subsistence level, in order to permit the 
population to increase sufficiently to supply the additional workers needed. He also 
wrote that the average level of wages would conform to the subsistence level in the 
long run. 
Figure 3.1 
Relationship between Wages, Earnings, Compensation, and Income 
Wage Rate X Units of Earnings 
(Pay per unit of time) Time Worked 
+ Employee Benefits 
(In-kind or deferred payments) 
Total 
Compensation 
+ Unearned Income 
(Interest, dividends, government 
transfer payments) 
_ Income 
Source: Ehrenberg and Smith (1994, p. 34). 
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Ricardo's view of the average wage level was consistent with the Malthusian theory 
of population, which held that population adjusts to the means of supporting it. 
Hence, in the short term, if wages fell below subsistence level, the number of 
workers would decrease and, consequently, wage rates would rise. 
Conversely, if wages were to rise above subsistence level, the birth rate and, 
therefore, the supply of labour, would increase and this would bring the wage rate 
down. This sequence of events would bring the wage rate back up to the subsistence 
level. This conclusion earned the theory the name of the "iron law of wages". In 
addition, Ricardo contended that the subsistence wage theory depends on the habits 
and customs of the people. The subsistence theory has been criticised, because it 
focuses on the supply aspects and neglects the demand aspects of the labour market. 
It holds that changes in the labour supply are the basic force that drives real wages to 
the subsistence level (ibid. ). 
3.4.2 Wage-fund Theory 
The wage-fund theory was developed in the early nineteenth century. It held that the 
average wage rate is determined by 'supply and demand'. In John Stuart Mill's words 
(1878, pp. 420-421 and 549-55, quoted in McConnell, 1970): 
Wages.... depend mainly upon the demand and supply of labour, 
or.... on the proportion between population and capital. 
This theory held that a predetermined fund of wealth exists for the payment of 
wages. The average wage could be determined simply by dividing the fund by the 
number of workers. This theory encountered extensive criticism. For instance, when 
the population increased too rapidly in relation to food and other necessities, wages 
would be driven down to the subsistence level. It followed, also, that a trade union 
could not raise wages with only a fixed fund to draw upon. If some workers were 
able to achieve a high wage rate, this, consequently, would reduce the average wage 
rate of the others. Moreover, many economists pointed out that the demand for 
labour was not determined by a fund but was derived from the consumer demand for 
products. The wage-fund theory, however, continued to exert an important influence 
until the end of the 19th century, in spite of these criticisms (ibid. ). 
54 
3.4.3 Marxian Surplus-value Theory 
McConnell (1970) mentioned that Karl Marx combined the notion of a subsistence 
wage with the labour theory of value. Marx asserted that labour is the sole source of 
economic value, and that capitalists are in a position to pay workers a daily wage rate 
much smaller than the value of their daily output. The difference is "profit" to the 
capitalists. Also, the capitalist could force the worker to spend more time at his job 
in order to earn his subsistence. Suliman (1974) pointed out that Marx suggested that 
all workers have to be united in their efforts, if they wish their . vages to rise beyond 
the subsistence level. 
3.4.4 Marginal-productivity Theory 
John R. Hicks also examined the functioning of the labour market (McConnell, 
1970). He highlighted two necessary conditions for labour market equilibrium: first, 
that every worker should receive the same wage and, second, that the wage rate must 
equal the value of the labour's marginal product. According to this theory. employers 
would hire workers until marginal product (MP) equals marginal cost (MC). The 
theory also provides an explanation of wage differentials. The wages of unskilled 
workers are lower than those of skilled workers because their marginal product is 
less. In other words, wage differentials are caused by differences in the marginal 
product. 
3.4.5 Bargaining Theory 
Wages, hours and working conditions are determined by the bargaining strength of 
the employers and employees. Davidson (1898) argued that the determination 
process of wages involves many factors that interact to establish the relative 
bargaining strength of the parties (ibid. ). The price of labour is determined 
somewhere between the estimate of the employers and the estimate of the 
employees. The estimate of the employees depends on two factors: the utility of the 
reward and the disutility of the labour, while the estimate of the employers depends 
on the indirect utilities provided by the employees. 
Should the employee place too high an estimate upon what he offers to sell, or the 
employer too low an estimate on what he wishes to buy', such considerations as the 
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productivity of the workers, the competitive situation. and the size of the im estment 
must be examined. On the other hand, the estimate of the employees is influenced by 
such factors as minimum wages legislation, the worker's cost of living and rates paid 
to others. The value of labour will generally be determined neither by one estimate 
nor the other, but somewhere between the two. 
3.5 Wage Determination Factors 
The theories described above are general principles, and therefore not to be used in 
determining labour wage. All these theories can be seen as guides to understanding 
the general wage level (Suliman, 1974). For instance, the labour unions follow 
certain factors/guidelines in their negotiations to raise wages and do not follow any 
of these theories. There are many factors that determine wages, some of which are 
dealt with below: 
3.5.1 Cost of Living 
The population will not reproduce itself unless wages are sufficient to pay the cost of 
sustaining the workers and their children. The government of Saudi Arabia has to 
consider the cost of living, as do other countries, in reforming their salary scale or 
wage rate. For instance, SAMA (1998) reported that the cost of living index of all 
Saudi Arabian cities rose at an average annual rate of 1.51 per cent during 1988-97. 
Table 3.1 
Comparative Cost of Living 
Country Value 
Bahrain 87.26 
New York 100.00 
Frankfurt 100.68 
Paris 106.33 
Jeddah 100.43 
London 116.05 
Dubai 105.00 
Kuwait 99.45 
Source: PE INVUXON Ltd. (1998, p. 4). 
A study carried out by PE INVUXON Ltd. (1998) compares the cost of living in a 
number of cities, with New York City being used as a base. It found that the cost of 
living in Jeddah, the commercial capital of Saudi Arabia, was 100.43 per cent of the 
cost of living in New York. Table 3.1 shows the results of this study. 
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3.5.2 The Relative Supply of Labour 
Sometimes, the ratio of labour to other resources is not high. For example. in the 
United States in the 19'' century, demand for labour exceeded supply, which helped 
to raise the general wage level, whereas in present day India, the ratio of labour to 
other resources is high, which helps to depress the general wage level (Suliman. 
1974). In the Saudi Arabian labour market, the supply of Saudi labour exceeds the 
demand, the result of a rapid population growth rate and a cheap foreign labour 
supply. This tends to depress the general wage level in the Saudi Arabian labour 
market. 
3.5.3 The Relative Value of Product 
Skilled workers, who produce a more valuable output than unskilled workers are 
worth more to firms and, therefore, are usually paid more. The ILO (1998) examined 
the highest and lowest average salary, per skill classification, of newly recruited 
Philippino workers in Saudi Arabia, 1992-1995. In 1995, for instance, Philippino 
professional and technical workers were paid between SR472 and SRI, 143. On the 
other hand, Philippino sales workers received between SF-201 and SR646. In the 
Saudi labour market, young Saudis do not want to undertake manual labour and 
professionals demand higher wages than foreigners. 
3.5.4 Bargaining Power 
The organisation of labour enhances its relative bargaining power to raise wages for 
its workers, especially in times of deflation. Hence, a union may lift the wages of its 
members above the scales paid to unorganised workers of equal skill. Saudi 
government decrees prohibit the establishment of labour unions and any strike 
activity. Collective bargaining is also forbidden (Saudi Labour and Workmen Law, 
1981). 
3.5.5 Comparative Attractiveness of Occupations 
For disagreeable or dangerous jobs the pay is usually higher than for normal jobs. 
This is confirmed in Saudi labour law (1981, p. 47): 
With regard to workmen who perform work in exploration areas and live in 
camps, the employer shall also provide his workmen, gratuitously and free of 
charge, with camps suitable for living, and shall provide them potable water 
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and three meals a day at work places, meeting sanitary- conditions which he 
shall establish for the purpose. The kinds and quantities of food in each meal 
shall be determined by a decision of the Minister, and these meals may not be 
replaced by any financial allowance. 
Thus, those who work in remote areas receive more benefits than those in more 
convenient areas. 
3.5.6 Mobility of Labour 
Where the working population is immobile, wage differentials are wide: on the other 
hand, movement of workers over long distances to better-paying positions tend to 
narrow wage differentials among firms, occupations and communities. Mobility of 
labour may be between industries, provinces and income groups For instancc, a 
study undertaken by El-Beshir and Auda (1980s), called "Labour Mobility in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" included a section entitled "Income Mobility". They 
established seven "monthly income groups" in order to trace the movement between 
them. The groups were: less than SR1,000, SR1,000-2,000, SR2,000-3,000, 
SR3,000-5,000, SR5,000-7,000, SR7,000-10,000, and more than SR 10,000. Their 
results showed that movement out of income groups generally declines with an 
increase in income level. Thus, movement is at a maximum for the lowest income 
group (i. e. < SR1,000) and at a minimum for the highest group (> SRI 0,000). They 
concluded that Saudi workers are most mobile with respect to income and less so 
with respect to industries and provinces, etc... 
3.5.7 Custom and Legislation 
Many wage differentials are rooted in custom or legislation. For example, in the US 
Hispanic workers are lower paid than white workers. On the other hand, 
governments and unions do act to eliminate wage differentials based on race, sex, 
and other irrelevancies and to standardise wages generally. Custom and legislation 
also affect wages in the Saudi labour market. For instance, Heisler (1989) found in 
his study of nationality and wages in Riyadh in 1986 that Western labourers are paid 
the highest wages of all nationalities, including Saudis. The Saudi Arabians ranked 
second and Arab groups followed. Asians were the lowest paid. Table 3.2 shows 
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mean monthly income in Riyadh, in 1986, for all workers, according to country of 
origin. 
Table 3.2 
Estimated Mean Current Monthly Income (SR) 
According to Country of Origin 
Nationality Estimated Mean Current Monthly 
Income 
Western 9,508 
Saudi 7,112 
Other Nationalities 5,991 
Yemeni 5,872 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi 5,388 
Indian 5,275 
Korean, etc. 5,096 
Indonesian, etc 5,089 
Other Arabs 5,075 
Turkish 4,377 
Lebanese, etc. 4,184 
Egyptian 3,830 
Source: Heisler, D. W. (1989, p. 133). 
3.6 The Wage Structure 
This section focuses on the wage structure generated by the labour market and 
factors that interact to produce wage differentials. Some cases will be presented 
below, which will help to facilitate an understanding of wage structures and wage 
differentials. 
3.6.1 First Case: Perfect Competition: Homogenous Workers and Jobs: 
If all jobs and workers are homogeneous and there is perfect competition and 
mobility, then workers would move among the various jobs until the wages paid 
in 
all markets were identical. 
3.6.2 Second Case: The Wage Structure in Saudi Arabia's Private Sector: 
Many studies reveal that wage differentials exist in developing countries. In 
Saudi 
Arabia, itself a developing country, wage differentials exist in its private sector. 
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Table 3.3 shows an overview of occupational wage differentials in the Saudi labour 
market, according to the Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry. RCCI, (1995). 
It is notable that the average monthly earnings of Saudi and non-Saudi managerial 
workers in 1992 were SR13,000, while technical and scientific workers received 
SR9,000 for Saudis and SR6,000 for non-Saudis. Managerial and professional 
workers received the highest earnings, while farming, forestry and fishing workers 
were paid the lowest. 
Table 3.3 
Average Monthly Earnings for Saudi and non-Saudi Workers 
in the Private Sector, 1994 
Occupational Saudis Non-Saudis 
Group 
Quantity Earnings Average Quantity Earnings Average 
(thousand) (million) Earnings (thousand) (million) Earnings 
(thousand) (thousand) 
Technical and 9 81 9 58 334 6 
Science Workers 
Managerial & 3 41 13 3 43 13 
Professional 
Workers 
Secretarial 29 183 6 36 125 3 
Workers 
Sales & 1 7 7 12 31 3 
Purchases 
Workers 
Service Workers 11 49 4.5 30 33 1 
Farming, 0.2 1.2 7.1 4 3 0.8 
Forestry & 
Fishing Workers 
Operators and 79 554 7 793 15.5 2 
Labourers 
Total 132.2 916 6.9 936 2074 2.2 
Source: Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1995, p. 79). 
Abdurahman (1988), studied wage level differences between the public and the 
private sectors in Saudi Arabia. He found that there are wage differentials between 
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the public and private sectors. This wage gap can be seen clearly in Table ; . 4. 
By- 
analysing the data in this table, he found that the wage gap between the two sectors 
decreased during the period 1979-1984. 
3.6.3 Third Case: Wage Differentials: Heterogeneous Jobs (Employers) 
In real life, employers are not homogenous; they vary in many aspects, such as union 
status, firm size and location. Jobs are also heterogeneous rather than homogenous. 
They have differing wage and non-wage attributes. Employers must pay more to 
compensate a worker for an undesirable job characteristic that does not exist in other 
jobs. This is called compensating wage differentials. Compensating Nvagc 
differentials deter employees from shifting to higher paying jobs, thereby causing 
wage rates to move towards equality. 
Table 3.4 
Average Monthly Earnings (SR) 
Years Public Sector Private sector 
1979 945 2,318 
1980 1,371 2,508 
1981 1,649 2,696 
1982 1,820 2,637 
1983 2,286 2,785 
1984 2,459 2,844 
Source Abdurahman (1988, p. 68). 
There are many sources of compensating differentials, such as 1) fringe benefits, 2) 
risk of job-related injury and death, 3) job status, 4) job location, and 5) regularity of 
earnings. These sources influence supply decisions in ways which generate 
compensating wage differentials. These are called the non-wage aspects of jobs. 
McConnell and Bure (1992) explained these as follows: 
1. Fringe Benefits 
Total compensation consists of earnings plus employee benefits. Employee benefits 
are either payment in kind or deferred. Examples of payment in kind are: health care. 
health insurance, sick leave, and time off in lieu of cash. Deferred payments are any 
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form of employer-financed retirement benefits. Those firms which do not provide 
fringe benefits have to pay compensating wage differentials in order to equalise the 
wage differentials between firms and to attract qualified employees. 
2. Risk of Job-Related Injury or Death 
There will be compensating wage differentials for a negative job characteristic. This 
compensation encourages more people to work in this kind of job, since, if any job is 
classified as undesirable work, the labour supply for this job will be low. 
3. Job Status 
Prestigious firms should find it easier to attract workers than their less prestigious 
counterparts. For example, in Saudi Arabia there is more status attached to being a 
semi-skilled worker in the petroleum industry than to being a semi-skilled worker in 
the construction industry. Compensating wage differentials may emerge between low 
and high prestige work to equalise the wage differentials between these two 
industries. 
4. Job Location 
The differences in living costs between the cities of a country may bring about the 
need for compensating for wage differentials. The capital of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, is 
a good example. It has a high cost of living. The nominal wage rate in Riyadh is not 
equal in purchasing power to the same rate in small cities such as Al-Hassa. 
Differentials in nominal wage rates are needed to equalise the wage rates gap 
between the labour markets of the two cities. 
5. Job Security: Regularity of Earnings: 
Some jobs provide long-term job security, whereas others, such as commissioned 
sales and construction, provide only short-term security. Fewer workers may find 
these occupations attractive because regular payment is not assured throughout the 
year. Compensating wage differentials may be paid to attract more labour to these 
kinds of job. There are other factors that produce wage differences, such as skill 
requirements, efficiency wage payment, firm size, union status, and discrimination. 
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1 Skill Requirements 
As stated earlier, jobs are not homogenous. Assuming other things to be equal, lobs 
that require a high level of skill would pay a higher wage rate than those that do not. 
Differing skill (education and training) requirements for various jobs constitute a 
major source of wage differentials in the economy. McConnell and Bure (1992) 
mention that wage differentials caused by greater education and training can either 
increase, lessen, or reverse wage variance produced by differences in the non-wage 
aspects of jobs. 
Thus, in order to attract skilled workers to an occupation that requires a high level of 
skill, employers must pay those workers more than less skilled workers. 
2. Efficiency Wage Payment 
An efficiency wage means a wage above the market-clearing wage. It may help in 
explaining wage differentials among workers possessing similar qualifications. This 
theory explains pay differences within and among industries and it predicts that 
wages will be higher where it is difficult to monitor the performance of employees. 
McConnell and Bure (1992) highlighted the fact that many efficiency ideas are 
related to efficiency wage payment, such as: 
2.1 Shirking Model of Efficiency Wages 
Some employers prefer to pay efficiency wages to avoid the high cost of monitoring 
the performance of employees. Without efficiency wages the probability is that 
employees would shirk their responsibilities. Firms may pay above the market - 
clearing wage in order to counteract this possibility. This higher wage increases the 
relative value of the job. Thus, the productivity of work will improve. As a result, 
efficiency wages create wage differentials that are unrelated to skill differentials or 
to differences in non-wage amenities. 
2.2 Turnover Model and Wage Differentials 
Employers may pay wages above the market-clearing wage in order to reduce the 
rate at which employees quit their jobs, especially in circumstances in which hiring 
and training costs are large. If the efficiency wage is sufficient, the productivity and 
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the average level of job experience should both rise. The main point is that wage 
may vary both across and within industries according to this model. 
3. Firm Size 
Several studies have shown that large firms pay higher wages than smaller firms. 
There are many reasons for this. For example, a large firm's employees are more 
likely to belong to a union, for them, a better quality of capital exists and a 
significant amount of training is available which creates higher productivity. Firm 
size will be discussed, in detail, in Chapter Seven and this will provide an insight 
into the wage structure and differentials in formal (large) firms and informal (small) 
firms in Saudi Arabia. 
4. Union Status 
Many studies have tried to determine how much more union members get paid than 
do non-union workers in the private sector. The estimate of the union relative wage 
advantage lies in the range of 10 to 20 per cent (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994). 
5. Discrimination 
Wages of blacks, females and Asians have been tested in many studies. The results 
of those studies indicate that there are wage differentials between male and female, 
white and black, and national and non-national employees. The reason is that some 
employers are biased towards or against hiring certain classes of employee (ibid. ). 
3.6.4 Fourth Case: Wage Differentials: Heterogeneous Workers: 
Wage differentials are also created by differences in terms of human capital and 
individual preferences. People possess differing stocks of human capital, and it is the 
type and quality of education and training that cause these differences in human 
capital stock. This human capital heterogeneity produces wage differentials. In 
addition, people are also heterogeneous with regard to their preferences for various 
non-wage aspects of work (e. g. some people value job safety highly. while others do 
not). People are heterogeneous with regard to present versus future income and 
various non-wage aspects of work. Differences in both human capital and individual 
preferences are considered to be major sources of wage disparities (McConnell and 
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Bure, 1992). 
3.6.5 Fifth Case: Wage Differentials: Labour Market Imperfections 
The heterogeneous nature of employers and workers can explain wage differences to 
some extent, but not fully. Labour market imperfections can create wage differences 
because they impede labour mobility. Many factors maintain wage differentials 
throughout labour markets, such as imperfect information, costly migration or 
immobility. In reality there is no such thing as perfect information. Labour market 
information, in general, is imperfect and costly to obtain. For instance. firms have to 
search for, or employ an agent to find, workers who are best suited to fill their 
vacancies. Similarly, workers attempt to gather information about job opportunities. 
This search by employees and firms is costly to undertake. In short, imperfect 
information in the labour market has an important implication for wage structure. 
The second factor is immobility, defined as any impediment to the movement of 
labour. There are geographic, institutional and sociological barriers to labour 
mobility. These barriers create wage differences between workers (ibid. ). 
3.7 Wage Policies 
This section will detail a number of related wage policies which can be effective 
tools for labour market reforms (narrowing wage differentials), and provide some 
opportunity for unemployed and low-wage workers to advance into the economic 
mainstream. Policies that are related both directly and indirectly to this study will 
be 
examined. 
3.7.1 Minimum Wage Policy 
The situation regarding the minimum wage in various countries will 
be explored in 
this section, including the legal framework governing minimum pay rates, to whom 
these apply, and the ways in which rates are set and updated. There are many wage 
regulatory mechanisms within countries, resulting from segmented 
labour markets 
and other socio-economic and institutional conditions. The aims of these vage 
regulatory mechanisms are to provide a type of security net for the most 
insecure of 
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employees, such as those just entering the labour market, and to assist with social 
integration. 
Eurostat (1997) summarised three regulating minimum wage mechanisms and gave 
some example of types of minimum wage. These mechanisms and examples are as 
follows: 
1. A statutory national minimum wage: the basic minimum wage is fixed at an 
hourly, weekly or monthly rate by the government, in most cases after 
consultation with concerned bodies, and this minimum wage is enforced by law. 
Spain, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal follow this method. 
Belgium employs a similar system, whereby a central agreement fixes 'an average 
minimum monthly income' applicable to all industries' wage levels. In addition, 
collective agreements fix a minimum above the threshold within the branches of 
industry. It usually applies to all employees in the economy and all occupations. 
Age, length of service, skills, and economic conditions affecting the firm and 
changes in prices measured by the consumer price index or by growth may be 
considered when fixing the minimum wage. 
2. Minimum rates of payment and other working conditions in certain sectors are 
regulated by government intervention, as in Ireland. In this area, occupations such 
as agricultural workers, retail grocery workers, and hotel and catering workers are 
covered by this kind of procedure. This method is similar to the first but less 
comprehensive in its coverage. It covers only a minority of employees. 
Elsewhere, minimum wage rates vary among sectors and are determined by 
collective bargaining or individual contracts. 
3. Wage determination is left to individual contracts or to collective bargaining 
between employers and employees, representatives in individual sectors. This 
method is adopted by governments in other countries such as Austria, Finland. 
Sweden, and Norway. The agreements may be legally enforceable and usually 
regulate a range of working conditions, including levels of remuneration. 
Agreements may be made at national, regional or sector level. 
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The United States and Canada have statutory minimum wage regulations. They have 
state statutory minimum wages in addition to the Federal minimum wages. U 
employers pay higher wages than the Federal or State minimum wage to almost all 
workers. This indicates that the Federal minimum wage is too low. In Canada. the 
rural minimum wage covers most rural workers. In Japan the government establishes 
regional minimum wages that apply to all workers in each province. 
3.7.1.1 Minimum Wage Law in the UK 
Jackson (1970) mentioned that long before the 1970s the imposition of a national 
minimum wage had not found favour with the British government. They had 
preferred to allow wages to be fixed largely as a result of collective bargaining. and 
would only impose a minimum wage in limited areas where collective bargaining 
was weak or non-existent. The main instrument of minimum wage regulation used to 
be the Wages Council. The Wages Council was seen as a means of protecting low 
paid employees who lay outside the scope of collective bargaining. The origin of the 
Wages Council system is to be found in the Trade Boards Act, 1909. The Wage 
Council did not cover all business sectors and provinces of the country and its power 
was reduced by the Wage Act 1986. This Act helped to remove employees aged less 
than 21 from minimum wage provision. Thus, the Council lost its power to 
determine non-pay conditions such as holidays. In November 1993, the Wage 
Council was abolished. The Low Pay Commission was established as a result of the 
National Wage Act 1998 to advise the British government about a national minimum 
wage, which has now been implemented. 
3.7.1.2 Minimum Wage System in OECD Countries 
In 1997, the economics department of the OECD issued a useful working paper. 
no. 185, entitled "OECD Submission to the UK Low Pay Commission". This paper 
provided a brief factual survey of statutory minimum wage systems in 
OECD 
countries. The majority of OECD countries have some form of minimum wage 
setting arrangement in accordance with the ILO conventions regarding minimum 
wages. 
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Table 3.5 
Summary of Minimum Wage Systems in OECD Countries 
with 9 N7*; f .I XÄi-.. r...... 
Country Name and Type of 
aý. lvll 
Employees Excluded 
4l AVllllllll Uall 
Rates for Indexation or "Up rating" Other Comments Determination Younger Procedures 
Employees (age 
and % Adult 
Minimum) 
Belgium The minimum Public sector workers, 20.94%; RNININIG, like all pay, is Since Iyß)1. 
monthly wage -- apprentices, trainees 19.88%; indexed to consumer prices. It additional 
garantie du revenue and workers in 18.82%; is also increased when the to the RMM\IG 
minimum mensuel sheltered workshops 17.,, 76%; and central agreement is have been added 
moyen (RMMMG)--is under 17.70% renegotiated, usually eher for adult %%orkers 
set by a national two years. with more than n 
collective agreement to 12 months' 
tenure 
Canada Statutory minimum Certain groups of Lower Federal No automatic indexation for Since July PNo. 
hourly wages are set agricultural, hunting and provincial general price or Ns age the federal rate 
at both the federal and and fishing workers rates for under inflation has been aligned 
provincial levels under provincial 17s and, in with the rate in 
regulations some provinces, each province and 
under 18s territory. 
Czech - A basic minimum MWTs only apply to No automatic indexation for Lower rates than 
Republic wage and Minimum employees not general price or wage the basic 
Wage Tariffs covered by collective inflation minimum are set 
(MWTs), on an agreements. Public for disabled 
hourly and monthly sector pay levels are employees. 
basis, are set by set separately by the M WTs N ar\ 
statute. government according to 
complexity, 
responsibility and 
physical difficulty 
of job erformed. 
France The minimum hourly General government 17 and 18.90% The SMIC is indexed to Apprentices and 
wage-salaire workers and disabled and under consumer prices (for rises of trainees entitled to 
minimum workers (who are 17.80%. 2% or more) and must rise by 30% to 75 % of 
interprofessionnel de covered by separate at least half the rise in manual the SMIC, 
croissance (SMIC) - rules). hourly wages. It can be raised depending on age 
is set by statute by more than this amount by and stage of 
decree and is also reviewed training. 
annually by the National 
Collective Bargaining Board. 
Hungary The minimum hourly 
(and monthly 
equivalent) wage is 
set by statute. 
Japan Statutory minimum Disabled workers Minimum wages are revised Minimum wages 
daily wages are set for every year, taking into are also set for 
each of the 47 account increases in wages selected industries 
prefectures and commodity prices and within each 
after consultation with local prefecture and at a 
tripartite minimum wage national le\ el for 
councils. the coal and metal 
mining industries 
Korea The minimum hourly There is no automatic 
wage is set by statute. indexation. The minimum 
wage is regularly adjusted by 
the Minister of Labour after 
consulting the tripartite 
Minimum Wage Council 
Luxe- The minimum Only covers private 17.80%; The SSM is indexed to 
mbourg monthly wage- sector employees 16.70%; and consumer prices. Also 
salaire social 15.60% reviewed biennially in line 
minimum (SSM) -is with economic and pay 
set by statute growth 
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Mexico Daily minimum No reduced rate 
wages for broad for youth 
geographical zones 
are fixed by the 
tripartite Council of 
Representatives of the 
National Minimum 
Wage Board. 
Nether- The minimum weekly 22.85%; Former link with collectiý elý 
lands wage - Minimumloon 21.72.5%; agreed vage rate index 
- is set by statute. 20.61.5%; abolished in 1991. Since 1984 
19.52.5%; has been frozen in nominal 
18.45.5%; terms for periods covering 
17.39.5% and several years. 
16.34.5%. 
New The minimum weekly Apprentices and other Under 20.60% No automatic indexation for 
Zealand wage is set by statute. trainees. general price or ýk age 
inflation. 
Poland The minimum wage is 
set by statute 
Portugal The minimum Under 18,75% Updated annually by law after Lower rates are 
monthly wage- Disabled workers are tripartite consultation, taking set for domestic 
remuneracao minima covered under into account Inflation and staff and 
mensal garantida separate regulations economic performance apprentices. 
(RMMG) -is set by 
statute. 
Spain The minimum Apprentices Under 18,89% Updated annually by law after 
monthly wages - tripartite consultation, taking 
salario minimo into account inflation and 
interprofesional economic performance 
(SMI) - is set by 
statute 
Turkey The minimum Apprentices. Lower rate for 
monthly wage is set workers under 
by the tripartite 16. 
Minimum Wage 
Setting Commission. 
United Federal and State Form: Federal No reduced No automatic indexation for Subject to certain 
States minimum hourly minimum, executive, Federal rate for general price or wage conditions, 
wages are set by administrative and younger inflation. employers may 
statute. professional workers over pay trainees 85° o 
employees and certain legal minimum of the federal rate 
other specific, but working age. as well as lower 
small, groups of rates for full-time 
workers. students and 
disabled workers. 
Source: Income Data Services of the Economics Department of the U UD (iyy I). 
In general, minimum wages are only set by the government in 15 OECD countries. 
Greece and Belgium have a different system, in which the minimum wage is set 
through a national agreement between the social partners. Table 3.5 summarises the 
minimum wage systems in OECD countries with a national minimum. This table 
shows many important points, such as: 
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1. Trainees, younger workers and public servants are not covered by minimum 
wages. Disabled workers are often not covered or come under the scope of 
separate regulations. 
2. Minimum wages are determined by many factors such as inflation, overtime. 
age, province, benefit and tax. 
3.7.1.3 Minimum Wage in the United States 
A minimum wage of $0.25 per hour was established by the Fair Labour Standards 
Act 1938. This Act was the first major step towards protecting low-waged workers 
in the United States. Minimum wage provisions were needed to ensure that each 
worker received a reasonable wage for his or her work effort, and to provide full- 
time workers with an annual income sufficient to buy the necessities of life. In 1990, 
the new law also established, for the first time, a sub-minimum training wage for 
teenagers: $3.62 per hour to workers aged 16-19 in their first jobs, rather than $4.25 
for the first three months of employment and for an additional 90 days if the 
employment is in a formal training programme. Table 3.6 shows minimum wage 
rates in the US from 1939 to 1997 (Labour Standards Act, US, 1938-1996). 
Moreover, the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress provided a 
useful study, in 1995, on minimum wages which summarised 50 years of research. 
This study comprised two parts. The first consisted of studies that partly support a 
minimum wage, such as those of David Card and A. Krueger, (1994) and Lawrence 
Katz et al., (1992). Their studies found no loss of jobs among fast food restaurants 
that were surveyed before and after the increase. The second part shows that the 
minimum wage has wide-ranging negative effects. These negative effects are 
summarised in Table 3.7. 
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Table 3.6 
HISTORY OF FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE RATES 
UNDER THE FAIR LABOUR STANDARDS ACT, 1938 - 1996 
Minimum hourly wage of workers in jobs first covered by -- 
Effective Date 1938 Act - 1961 Amendments 1966 and Subsequent 
Amendments' 
Non- 
farm Farm 
Oct 24,1938 $0.25 
Oct 24,1939 $0.30 
Oct 24,1945 $0.40 
Jan 25,1950 $0.75 
Mar 1,1956 $1.00 
Sep 3,1961 $1.15 $1.00 
Se 3,1963 $1.25 
Sep 3,1964 $1.15 
Sep 3,1965 $1.25 
eb 1,1967 $1.40 $1.40 $1.00 $1.00 
Feb 1,1968 $1.60 $1.60 $1.15 $1.15 
Feb 1,1969 $1.30 $1.30 
Feb 1,1970 $1.45 
Feb 1,1971 $1.60 
May 1,1974 $2.00 $2.00 $1.90 $1.60 
Jan. 1,1975 $2.10 $2.10 $2.00 $1.80 
Jan 1,1976 $2.30 $2.30 $2.20 $2.00 
Jan 1,1977 $2.30 $2.20 
Jan 1,1978 $2.65 for all covered, non-exempt workers 
an 1,1979 $2.90 for all covered, non-exempt workers 
an 1,1980 $3.10 for all covered, non-exempt workers 
an 1,1981 $3.35 for all covered, non-exempt workers 
r 1,19904 $3.80 for all covered, non-exempt workers 
r 1,1991 $4.25 for all covered, non-exempt workers 
Oct 1,1996 $4.75 for all covered, non-exempt workers 
Sep 1,1997- $5.15 for all covered, non-exempt workers 
Source: Labour Standards Act, 1938-1996, US. 
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1 The 1938 Act was applicable generally to employees engaged in interstate 
commerce or in the production of goods for interstate commerce. 
2 The 1961 Amendments extended coverage primarily to employees in large retail 
and service enterprises as well as to local transit, construction, and gasoline service 
station employees. 
3 The 1966 Amendments extended coverage to State and local government 
employees of hospitals, nursing homes, and schools, and to laundries and dry 
cleaners, and to large hotels, motels, restaurants and farms. Subsequent amendments 
extended coverage to the remaining Federal, State and local government employees 
who were not protected in 1966, to certain workers in retail and service trades 
previously exempted, and to certain domestic workers in private household 
employment. 
4 'Grandfather clause' - This term is used for employees who do not meet the tests for 
individual coverage, and whose employers were covered by the FLSA on March 31, 
1990, and failed to meet the increased annual dollar volume (ADV) test for enterprise 
coverage, who must continue to receive at least $3.35 an hour. 
5A sub-minimum wage -- $4.25 an hour -- is established for employees under 20 
years of age during their first 90 consecutive calendar days of employment with an 
employer. 
----------------------------------------- 
3.7.1.4 Minimum Wage in Canada 
The first attempts at regulating a minimum wage resulted in the payment of 'fair 
wages' to persons engaged in all public works and government contracts. Male 
Minimum Wage Orders only began to appear in the 1930s and became popular in the 
mid-50s. The Minimum Wage Board or other labour boards are authorised by law to 
recommend, after the necessary inquiries, investigation and research into minimum 
rates of wages with the approval of the Lieutenant Governor. The rates are reviewed 
and increased from time to time by minimum wage orders to the provinces which are 
termed Employment Standards Acts, which are approved by governmental order. 
The boards are usually controlled by members who represent the interests of 
employers and employees and in some cases the public sector, with an impartial 
chairman and, usually, an officer of the department of labour. The job of this board is 
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to fix a basic wage, taking into account the cost of living, economic conditions and 
other relevant factors. The aim of setting a minimum wage is mainly to protect 
unorganised and unskilled workers (Eurostat, 1997). 
Table 3.7 
Summary of Research on the Minimum Wage 
Results of the Study Number of 
Studies 
The minimum wage reduces employment 5 
The minimum wage reduces employment more among teenagers that 
adults 
14 
The minimum wage reduces employment most among black teenager 
males 
7 
The minimum wage helped white South Africans at the expense of 
blacks 
1 
The minimum wage hurts blacks generally 
The minimum wage hurts the unskilled 1 
The minimum wage hurts low-waged workers 3 
The minimum wage hurts low-waged workers particularly during 
cyclical downturns 
2 
The minimum wage increases job turnover I 
The minimum wage reduces average earnings of young workers 1 
The minimum wage drives workers into uncovered jobs, thus lowering 
wages in those sectors 
3 
The minimum wage reduces employment in low-wage industries, such 
as retailing 
5 
The minimum wage hurts small businesses generally I 
The minimum wage causes employers to cut back on training 4 
The minimum wage has long-term effects on skills and lifetime earnings 2 
The minimum wage leads employers to cut back on fringe benefits 2 
The minimum wage encourages employers to install labour-saving 
devices 
I 
The minimum wage hurts low-wage provinces, such as the South and 
rural areas 
3 
The minimum wage increases the number of people on welfare 2 
The minimum wage hurts the poor generally 1 
The minimum wage does little to reduce poverty 6 
The minimum wage helps upper income families 4 
The minimum wage helps unions 2 
The minimum wage lowers the capital stock l 
The minimum wage increases inflationary pressure 4 
The minimum wage increases teenage crime rates 2 
The minimum wage encourages employers to hire illegal aliens 1 
A few workers are permanently stuck at the minimum wage 2 
The minimum wage has had a massive impact on unemployment in 
Puerto Rico. 
The minimum wage has reduced employment in foreign countries 4 
Characteristics of minimum wage workers 7 
Source: Joint Economic Committee (1995, February 15). 
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3.7.1.5 Minimum Wage in Japan 
In 1959, a Minimum Wage Law was introduced in Japan. This law provided that a 
minimum wage be determined by three methods: 1) businessmen's agreements. 2) 
extension of collective agreements of minimum wage provisions to all workers of the 
same type in a province, and 3) deliberation of wage councils at both central and 
prefectural levels. The third method was first used in 1966 and the practice quickly 
grew. In 1969, this law was amended. 
The Minister of Labour or the Head of the Prefectural Labour Standards Office is in 
charge of minimum wages based on recommendations by Central and Prefectural 
Minimum Wage Councils or by the extension of collective agreements. In 1970 the 
Central Minimum Wage Council advocated the promotion of regional minimum 
wages. By 1976, regional minimum wages were established in all prefectures. There 
are two kinds of minimum wage agreements in Japan, namely regional minimum 
wages and industrial minimum wages. Regional minimum wages are applied to all 
workers and all employers, regardless of industry or occupation, in a specified area. 
The industrial minimum wage can be divided into two types. First, it is determined 
for a specified industry in a prefecture, such as the Tokyo Iron and Steel Industry. 
Second, it is determined for specified industries, such as mining, for the whole 
country. In addition, the minimum wage should be fixed by taking into consideration 
the cost of living of workers, wages of similar workers and the normal capacity of 
industries to pay wages (ibid. ). 
3.7.2 Wages Subsides /Employment Tax Credit 
Wage subsidies are a system of payments by governments to firms for increasing 
their employment levels. When the payment is made directly to employers, it is 
called a wage subsidy. If the payment is indirect, it is called an Employment Tax 
Credit. Both types of payment programme have identical effects. The subsidies can 
be either general or targeted (selective). A general subsidy is aimed at reducing 
demand (deficient unemployment), while a target is designed to lessen the extent of 
structural unemployment. 
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Both general and selective programmes have been tried in European nations and in 
the United States. For instance. a New Jobs Tax Credit was part of the 1977 
economic stimulus package passed by the US Congress. In this programme. an 
employer could receive the equivalent of 50 per cent of each worker's annual 
earnings up to a maximum earning ceiling of $4,200. This programme stimulated 
employers to hire more unskilled and part-time workers. In 1979. this programme 
was replaced by a Targeted Jobs Tax Credit. The new programme provided tax 
subsidies for firms hiring unemployed youths (18 to 24), handicapped persons. and 
welfare recipients. (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994, and McConnell and Bure, 1992). 
In July 1996, the Canadian government put in place a programme called Active- Re- 
employment Benefits. This is a set of proven to be effective return-to-work tools 
such as Targeted Wage Subsidies, Self-Employment Assistance, Job-Creation 
Partnership, Targeted Earnings Supplements and Skills Loans and Grants. Two of 
these programmes will be explained here because they are highly relevant to this 
study. Targeted Wage Subsidies help people who have been unemployed for a long 
time or face specific barriers to finding jobs. In addition, Targeted Earnings 
Supplements provide a supplement to encourage them to take work that pays less 
than their previous job. Both programmes encourage employers to hire individuals 
whom they would not normally hire in the absence of a subsidy (Human Resources 
Development, Canada, 2001). 
The OECD (1995) stated that the United Kingdom has recently launched several 
initiatives to increase the labour market attachment of the unemployed such as 
'Workstart' and 'Jobmatch'. The Workstart scheme provides wage subsidies to any 
employer who recruits an unemployed person for more than two years. The 
Jobmatch scheme pays an allowance for six months to those unemployed for more 
than two years who take a part-time job while continuing to look for full-time or 
additional part-time employment. 
The Welfare Information Network, on the Internet, summarises many subsidy 
schemes in the US. It points out that subsidising private sector employers is one 
vehicle for creating jobs for welfare recipients under the Personal Responsibility and 
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Work Opportunities Act of 1996 (PRWORA). Tax credit is taken as a form of 
employer subsidy. The Work Opportunity Tax Credit (`VOTC) is a federal income 
credit available to an employer who hires welfare recipients. In addition. some states 
offer state tax credits to employers who hire welfare recipients. In other words, a 
variety of supportive services, that would facilitate job retention, can be paid by- 
states to increase employment levels. For instance, long-term welfare recipients can 
earn their employers a Welfare-to-Work Tax Credit of up to $3,500 for their first. 
and $5000 for their second year of employment. Other welfare recipients can earn 
employers a WOTC of up to $2,400 for their first year of employment. There are 
many programmes related to employment subsidies in the US, examples of which 
include: 
Florida has a Grand Diversion or Wages Work Supplementation programme. This 
programme will pay a participant's temporary cash assistance benefits to an 
employer for up to six months if he meets two conditions: 1) Employment must be 
full-time and pay more than the federal minimum wage; 2) The employer must keep 
the labourer as a regular employee for at least 12 months. 
Since 1998, Kansas has had a programme called Ageing Mentoring Works. This 
programme uses retired, successful business people to provide guidance and 
counselling to welfare clients in their transition to becoming self-sufficient. It has 
been employed by large employers such as General Electric and United Parcel 
Service and has also been used by some small firms. This programme uses in-house 
mentors to recruit, hire and counsel clients on the job so as to reduce turnover. The 
Metropolitan Community Colleges Business Technology Center teaches welfare 
recipients to work at customer service centres throughout the Kansas City area. Since 
the programme began in 1997, nearly 190 former welfare recipients have completed 
training and now work in full-time positions paying between $8.25 and $14.00 an 
hour. Over 85 per cent of those placed in jobs are still working after the probationary 
period. In addition, there is another programme in the state of Missouri called the 
21St Century Communities Programme. Under this programme, Welfare and Food 
Stamps grants are used as wage supplements to help welfare recipients get jobs. 
Wage supplements are paid to employers who create jobs in low-income 
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neighbourhoods, and childcare and health care are paid for by the state for a limited 
time. The state also provides services such as job readiness training, counselling on 
job progression, education, and housing assistance. Moreover, several states and 
localities have taken the opportunity to create publicly-funded jobs programmes. 
Positions are usually temporary and reserved for Temporary- Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) recipients who do not find jobs after a specified period of job- 
search. These programmes are often called Community Service Employment or 
Community Service Jobs. Publicly-funded jobs are eligible for the Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC) and their wages are subject to payroll taxes. This Community 
Service Job programme is different from the unpaid Community Service Jobs 
programme. In the latter, participants receive only their welfare payment, which is 
not subject to payroll or income tax but cannot be used as a basis for EITC 
eligibility. 
Other similar assistance programmes exist, e. g.: 
1. The state of Oregon has a programme called Jobs Plus. In this programme 
employers provide short-term employment for welfare recipients. Employees in 
Jobs Plus positions receive a pay cheque from their employer, who is then 
reimbursed by the state using public assistance funds. Moreover, this 
programme is a subsidised work activity for recipients of Unemployment 
Insurance, Food Stamps or TANF in Oregon. Employers are subsidised up to 
the state minimum wage for each placement with cash from TANF and 
food 
stamp benefits. The employer, in turn, pays each participant a salary equivalent 
to that paid for similar jobs, adjusted for experience and training. 
This 
programme began in 1994 under 1115 Waiver Authority and was extended 
widely in July 1996. An employee may stay in this programme 
for a maximum 
of six months. 
2. The state of Minnesota has a programme called Fostering 
Action to Help 
Earnings and Responsibility (FATHERS). This state is launching a nevti 
programme that uses publicly-funded jobs and a variety of other strategies 
to 
boost employment rates. Participants are placed in full-time. minimum wage 
jobs in non-profit making agencies that agree to provide close supervision at 
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the work site. The participants will move into unsubsidised employment after 
staying in the scheme for six months. There is per hour as a cash bonus in 
addition to the minimum wage for participants who successfully complete their 
publicly-funded jobs and remain in unsubsidised private employment for a 
minimum of six months. 
3. In the late 1990s, the New York City Council introduced the Transitional Jobs 
Programme. This programme provides subsidised wage-paving jobs with training 
for those low-income families in New York who are having a difficult time 
finding employment. It will create 7,500 placements over the next three years in 
public and non-profit sector jobs. In contrast to workfare placements, the 
programme substitutes a pay cheque for a welfare cheque and provides jobs 
lasting 12 months. Employees are paid $7.50 an hour, which is half of what the 
Federal Labour Department has determined as a family's 'lower living' budget in 
New York City, for those working in full-and part-time jobs. The employees wi ll 
then qualify for the federal Earned Income Tax Credit. 
4. Vermont's Welfare Employment Programme requires welfare recipients to work 
after reaching a time limit in jobs provided in public non-profit agencies by 
Community Service Employment (CSE). CSE serves as a training programme as 
well as a way of meeting the work requirement. The TANF payment that the 
family would have received before reaching the time limit is diverted and paid as 
wages that count as earned income under law. Participants are paid the minimum 
wage for each hour they work and receive worker's compensation and Social 
Security coverage. Each employee can remain in a CSE-provided job for no 
longer that 10 months. If he or she can find a job within two months, another CSE 
placement will be developed. 
5. In Washington there is a programme to help TANF recipients who are long-term 
unemployed. Each recipient works for 20 hours a week, receives a pay cheque for 
hours worked, and receives one-to-one support and mentoring to overcome 
barriers to working. 
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3.7.3 Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
Governments can use various approaches to supplement the earnings of the working 
poor. Earned Income Tax Credit can reduce poverty and increase the incentive to 
work for welfare recipients. In the US, EITC was established by Congress in 1975. 
Federal earned income tax credit and similar state credits use the tax system to 
increase the income of the working poor. Most taxpayers file returns in the interval 
between 1St January and 15th April. The EITC Campaign 2001 stated that EITC is a 
federal income tax credit that is refunded to qualified taxpayers after their taxes have 
been paid. Even if a person does not have to pay any tax on his/her income, he,, she 
may still qualify for a refund. In addition, the Advance EITC (AEITC) allows 
taxpayers who expect to qualify for the EITC, and have at least one qualifying child, 
to receive part of the credit in each pay cheque during the year. 
The UK has had an in-work benefits programme since 1971 (Dilont and McCare, 
2000). This programme was called Family Credit (FC) from 1988 to 1999. In 
October 1999 FC was replaced by a more generous programme called Working 
Families Tax Credit (WFTC). It is a form of Negative Income Tax (NIT). People 
whose incomes are below a personal allowance level do not pay income tax. On the 
other hand, a NIT would pay money to people whose income was below their 
personal allowance level. This programme will make entering the labour market 
more attractive to lone parents. 
Walker and Wiseman (1997) wrote a convincing article about Earned Income Tax 
Credit in the UK. They point out that the Department of Health and Social Security, 
1985, showed that Family Credit had multiple objectives, such as to provide extra 
support for families, to ensure that UK families were better off 
in work than not, and 
to reduce the marginal tax rate. They stated that Family Credit 
does indeed appear to 
work well in a number of respects: 
Family credit provides work incentives and support for family income: 
Family Credit ensures that the vast majority of recipient families' incomes 
in 
work are above those when not working and hence contributes 
directly and 
immediately to higher nominal living standards (p. 402). 
79 
3.7.4 Investment Tax Credit to Reduce Unemployment 
An investment tax credit allows firms to subtract from their tax bills a certain per- 
centage of the investments they make in new capital equipment and assets. This 
policy is an implicit subsidy given to firms for increasing their capital stocks. It may 
stimulate employment growth and reduce the unemployment rate or it might 
encourage capital to be substituted for labour 
Many countries apply this kind of policy. For instance in the UK, the BBC 
announced (2001) that Chancellor Gordon Brown has promised to make more tax 
cuts and to provide new funds to boost investment in UK industry. He announced 
that there would be a 20 per cent reduction in Capital Gains Tax for business assets 
held for more than one year, and a 10 per cent reduction for business assets held for 
two years. Small UK firms could receive some cash help if they move their payroll 
and tax system online. Moreover, there is to be support through a Community 
Investment Tax Credit for areas suffering from high unemployment. These areas are 
to get one pound of government money to complement every four pounds of private 
investment. 
In 2001, the Blair Area Chamber of Commerce (USA) announced online that the 
`Employment and Investment Growth Act' (LB775) could save a company millions 
of dollars in state and local taxes. This Act stated that: 
For a qualified firm that invests at least $3 million and creates 30 new jobs in 
an approved project, the benefits include: 
1. Refund of all sales and use taxes on purchases of depreciable property used 
as part of the project. 
2. Five per cent tax credit on total compensation on additional Nebraska jobs 
each year for seven years, essentially a 35 per cent payroll credit. 
3. Ten- per cent tax credit for total investment made. 
In addition, for a qualified firm that invests at least $10 million and adds 
100 new jobs in an approved project, benefits include all of the above 
plus: 
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1. Fifteen-year personal property tax exemption on mainframe computers and 
certain peripheral components used in the project. 
2. Fifteen-year personal property tax exemption for equipment used in 
processing agricultural products. 
Moreover, for a qualified firm that invests at least $20 million in an approved 
project, benefits include the refund of all sales and use tax on purchases of 
depreciable property used in connection with the project. 
Saudi Arabia paid a great deal of attention to this policy many years ago in order to 
stimulate the economy. Dahlan (1993) mentioned that Saudi Arabia has a similar 
kind of investment tax credit. Industrial projects, in which Saudi shareholders on 
25 per cent or more of the capital, are exempt from taxation for 10 years from the 
start of the operation. In addition, national and joint venture investments enjoy 
customs exemptions, when important equipment and materials are required by an 
industrial project. 
3.7.5 Income Replacement Programmes 
Unemployment insurance, workers' compensation, and disability insurance are called 
Income Replacement Programmes. Unemployment insurance benefits are paid to 
workers who have been laid off, permanently or temporarily, by their employers. 
Workers' compensation is paid to employees who have been insured for the work. 
Disability benefits are paid to former employees whose physical or mental 
disabilities are judged severe enough to prevent their holding down a job. All three 
programmes are intended to compensate workers for earnings lost owing to their 
inability to work. 
Unemployment insurance is a new concept in Saudi Arabia's labour market. Stiglitz 
(1993) stated that an unemployment insurance programme is the most important one 
for providing assistance to the unemployed worker. The US regulated this policy in 
1935 in the midst of the Great Depression with the passage of the Social Security 
Act. This programme pays, typically, up to 50 per cent of a worker's former salary 
for twenty-six weeks. The cover has now been extended to thirty-nine weeks or 
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longer with an increase in the unemployment rate. New x- orkers are not covered by 
unemployment insurance because the workers must have worked for a minimum 
number of weeks, such as four out of the previous fifty-two. 
This policy has been criticised for many reasons. For instance, it helps to reduce 
worker's incentives to work hard or to search for a new job. Moreover, it does not 
provide enough support for either the long-term unemployed or new entrants into the 
labour force (ibid. ). 
In the UK, there is a programme called Employers' National Insurance contributions. 
The OECD (1995) stated that the November 1994 budget introduced changes to 
employers' national contributions and that this change will further favour the part- 
time, the low paid and the long-term unemployed. 
3.8 Wage Rigidities 
There are many reasons for wage rigidities. First, it is necessary to explain why there 
is wage rigidity in a labour market and second, to explain what kind of policies the 
government should apply when attempting to deal with it. 
3.8.1 Explanation of Wage Rigidities 
Stiglitz (1993) pointed out that there are many types of unemployment. The types 
mainly related to wages are involuntary and voluntary unemployment. Involuntary 
unemployment exists when the supply of labour exceeds the demand for workers at 
the prevailing market wage. This happens because demand for labour shifts but 
wages do not decline. It could be argued that all unemployment is voluntary. 
Workers can always find work at a lower wage or in a different field, but the cost of 
moving to a new job's location is great, and accepting a low-wage job might send the 
wrong signals in the future to potential employees. In general, when wage-related 
unemployment, fails to adjust sufficiently in response to a shift in the supply or 
demand for labour, economists say that wages exhibit downward rigidity or 
stickiness. There are four major reasons why wages may not fall enough to eliminate 
unemployment quickly (ibid. ). 
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1. Union Wage Adjustments 
Stiglitz (1993) further stated that, in the long run. unions are not successful in 
obtaining higher wages for their members, but are probably successful in slowing 
down the process of adjustment of wages to changed economic circumstances. He 
gives as an example, that when a person has signed a three-year contract, before an 
economic downturn then it may be more than two years before the ne«- economic 
circumstances are reflected in the wages. In addition, contract provisions rely' on the 
cost of living at the start of the contract, which means that wages are relativ elv' 
unaffected by the level of inflation. Moreover, wages do not decline rapidly in 
response to unemployment, even if the unions are sensitive, in their wage bargaining, 
to the unemployment rate. Thus, adjustment of union wages must be slow. In several 
European countries, union bargaining occurs at the national level, and the number of 
workers belonging to unions is much higher than in the United States, thus the 
statement that unions have played an important role in wage rigidities seems more 
valid for Europe than it does for the United States. 
2. Insider-Outsider Theory 
The question has been asked: why do firms not decide to pay lower wages to new 
employees? The Insider-Outsider theory provides an answer. Insiders are those with 
jobs at particular firms, while outsiders are people who want jobs at that firm. This 
theory focuses on the cost of training. Each firm would like a labour force trained in 
the special way in which it operates. Most of the training is done by insiders. They 
recognise that their bargaining position with the firm will be reduced by training new 
employees. Thus, the firm may promise to continue to pay them higher wages than 
outsiders, but insider/current employees know that this promise could be broken. 
After all, they are training their own replacements. In future bargaining situations, 
the employer can use the availability of these lower-wage workers to apply 
downward pressure on the wages of the current employees. The result is that the 
insiders refuse to cooperate in training the outsiders. The firm can rectify this only 
by offering similar pay, but these results in wage stickiness, i. e.. the wages offered to 
new workers cannot be lowered to a level at which the demand for new workers 
equals the supply; therefore, unemployment can persist. In general, firms do not like 
two-tier wage systems. For instance, Ford undertook an experiment in 1982 which 
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allowed the company to sign a contract with new workers that provided only 85 per 
cent of the wages previously-hired workers received. This experiment «-as 
unsuccessful and was abandoned in 1984. 
3. Minimum Wage 
The minimum wage is a government-enacted price floor. It keeps the demand for 
labour from equalling supply. Many studies show that a minimum wage causes 
higher unemployment, and when most workers earn considerably more than the 
minimum wage, minimum wage legislation probably contributes to some 
unemployment. Even if it has a negative affect on employment many countries apply 
it as a 'fair wage' policy. Minimum Wage is explained in detail in Section 3.7.1. 
4. Efficiency Wage Theory 
Some firms may find that they make more profit by paying a wage higher than the 
going wage in the labour market. In 1914, Ford paid $5 per day, more than double 
the going wage. He knew that with his assembly line and high payments the worker 
would work harder. This would result in more products and, therefore, more profit. 
Many modern companies apply the same philosophy. This theory can answer the 
very important question regarding how much productivity depends on wages. 
Economists have identified three main reasons why firms may benefit if they pay 
high wages: wages affect the quality of the workforce, they affect the level of effort 
and they affect the rate of labour turnover. Each of these three reasons is discussed 
below. 
1. The Quality of the Labour Force 
It is common for firms to discover, after a wage cut, that they have lost the best of 
their workers. In other words, there is concern that if a firm cuts wages for all 
workers, as a result of a decrease in demand for workers, the best qualified 
workers are most likely to leave. Indeed, this is the reason frequently given by 
firms for not cutting wages. 
2. The Level of Effort 
There is a generally held belief that workers paid a higher wage than the market- 
clearing wage will make more effort to keep their work and will not shirk. Firms 
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would apply a penalty for shirking, if they pay a higher wage than the market- 
clearing wage. There are two reasons why firms follow this practice: first, if their 
workers are fired because they are caught shirking, then the workers will ha" e to 
accept the lower wage jobs being offered by other firms, and second, with higher 
wages than market-clearing wages, firms will hire fewer workers and 
unemployment will result. A worker who is fired may have to remain unemploý cd 
for a long period. 
3. The Rate of Labour Turnover 
If firms pay lower wages, the workers will quit the work and find another job 
more to their liking, either because it pays a higher wage or for some other reason. 
Economists refer to this rate as labour turnover. So firms trey to pay a higher wage 
than the market-clearing wage. 
Finally, the efficiency wage theory provides a significant part of the explanation for 
wage rigidities. Its considerations are likely to be less important where workers are 
paid piece rates, or in a situation where training costs are low and monitoring is easy. 
3.8.2 Policies to Combat Wage Rigidities 
There are two wage rigidity policies: unemployment insurance and increasing wage 
flexibility. The first policy has been mentioned in a previous section and the second 
policy will be explained below. 
3.8.2.1 Increasing Wage Flexibility 
Increasing Wage Flexibility is a policy used if unemployment is caused by wage 
rigidities. Wage rigidities may be due to any or all of these three reasons: 1) firms 
may not be allowed to pay lower wages because of either union pressure or 
government legislation; 2) firms may not choose to pay lower wages; 3) wages may 
fall, but prices may fall at the same time and at the same rate, so the real wages, in 
relation to purchasing power, do not fall. 
When a firm bases wages on its profits it follows a wage flexibility policy. In Japan. 
large companies have long-term implicit contracts with their workers, but their 
workers receive a substantial fraction of their pay in the form of annual bonuses. The 
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workers receive various amounts from year to year depending on the profit of the 
firm. Many economists believe that the reason there is less unemployment in Japan 
compared to other countries is flexible wages. Others do not support this policy 
because workers would get an income reduction in hard times. In addition, some 
firms can only expect a small profit if they give large profit shares to their workers 
(ibid. ). 
3.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the following important points have been made: 
1. Although there are many definitions of the term wage in the literature, in this 
study, we refer mainly to the definition provided by the UK ERA 1996 s. 27, 
which is any sum payable to the worker by his employer in connection with his 
employment. 
2. In this research, only nominal wage is dealt with, i. e., what employees get paid per 
hour in current currency terms, as this is the most useful basis on which to 
compare the pay of various employees at a given time. 
3. As a result of intensive research into wages, economists have produced various 
wage theories, among which the Marginal Productivity Theory is the most 
important. It provides a good explanation of wage differentials. Unfortunately, 
this theory is only used as a guide to understanding general wage levels. In fact, 
there are many factors which affect wage determination and differentials, e. g., the 
cost of living, the relative value of products, bargaining power, the comparative 
attractiveness of occupations, the mobility of labour and custom and legislation. 
This study will also consider other factors, including the background of actual 
employees and human capital variables. 
4. Narrowing the wage differentials in the Saudi labour market will require the 
introduction of some standard wage policies. The choice of appropriate wage 
policies depends on many factors, and this research attempts to identify the 
policies. 
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Chapter Four 
Theories of Wage Differentials 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter first provides a review of the major theories of «wage differentials, 
among which the human capital theory is the most dominant economic theory of 
wage determinants and differentials. Second, the segmented labour market theory 
will be applied to the Saudi situation to determine whether a wage gap exists 
between the formal and the informal sectors. Third, the wage discrimination theory 
will be applied in order to ascertain whether there are any wage differentials in 
existence among Saudis themselves, and between Saudi and non-Saudi employees. 
in the same occupations. Finally, this chapter surveys some empirical studies 
concerned primarily with the economics of earnings, and also a number of Saudi 
Arabian empirical studies of wages. 
4.2 Human Capital Theory 
As stated above, the human capital theory is the most dominant economic theory of 
wage determination. Its development was aided by important contributions from 
Jacob Mincer (1957,1958, and 1962), Theodore Schultz (1960,1961) and Gary 
Becker (1962,1964). However, modern human capital theory has its roots in the 
classic eighteenth-century writings on equalising differentials by Adam Smith. This 
section therefore begins with a review of Smith's notion of equalising differences. 
4.2.1 Literature Review 
4.2.1.1 Adam Smith and Equalising Differences 
Adam Smith (1973) argued that the wages paid to workers should compensate for 
the differences in workplace amenities and disamenities. If two jobs requiring 
identical skills vary in the non-monetary amenities provided, the employer providing 
fewer non-monetary amenities would be forced to pay higher wages; otherwise. it 
would be difficult for him to hire workers. In Smith's words (1776), cited in 
Polachek (1993, p. 174): 
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The whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employment 
of labour and stock must, in the same neighbourhood, be either equal or 
continually tending to equality. If in the same neighbourhood there was any 
employment evidently either more or less advantageous than the rest, so 
many people would crowd into it in one case, and so many would desert it in 
the other, that its advantages would soon return to the level of other 
employment. 
Smith implies that workers whose jobs have undesirable aspects should be paid more 
by their firm and that this will also attract more labour to these jobs in a competitive 
market. His theory of equalising differentials has been used to explain, in part, a 
substantial number of observed occupational wage differentials, for example, 
workers holding jobs that have good conditions, command sizeable wage premiums, 
as do workers in positions that have extremely poor working conditions. 
Polachek (1993) stated that Adam Smith (1776, p. 112ff) identified five job 
characteristics, which would require compensating pay: 
1. the "agreeableness or disagreeableness" of the job; 
2. the "difficulty and expense" of learning the job; 
3. the "constancy or inconstancy" of employment in the job; 
4. the "great trust" required of the person doing the job; 
5. the "probability or improbability of success" in the job. 
This theory has, in principle, important empirical implications. Hence, Smith's 
concept of equalising differentials has formed the basis of the modern theory of 
human capital. 
4.2.1.2 Education as Investment 
The wage implications of investment in human capital, such as schooling, on-the-job 
training, job-seeking, and migration are an extension of Smith's notion of equalising 
differences. It is important to recognise the human capital implications of education. 
The idea of education as an investment in human beings has been evident in 
economic literature for a long time. Polachek (1993) mentioned also that Adam 
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Smith (1776, ch. 10, p. 11) likened an educated person to an expensive machine. 
stating that 
Work which he learns to perform, it must be expected, over and above the 
usual wages of common labour, will replace to him the whole expense of his 
education, with at least the ordinary profits of an equally valuable machine. 
Despite these earlier references to human capital, the full formulation of the theory 
awaited the publication of the pioneering work by Gary S. Becker (1964). Becker 
assessed the implications of investment in schooling for the distribution of personal 
earnings. According to him, in a perfectly competitive market, everyone will invest 
in himself to the point where the expected marginal rate of return from the 
investment becomes equal to the marginal cost of financing such an investment. 
Mincer (1974) made some simple assumptions when attempting to derive an 
estimable earnings function, related to years of schooling, as an explanatory variable. 
These assumptions were that: 
1. Neither any post-schooling investment in human capital nor any depreciation of 
human capital takes place; 
2. There are only indirect costs of schooling in the form of foregone earnings; 
3. The length of an individual's earning life is the same irrespective of the number of 
years of schooling acquired; 
4. The present value of life-long earnings of those with greater schooling is equal to 
the present value of the earnings of those with less schooling, due to competition 
on the supply side. 
Based on these assumptions, he derives the following earnings function: 
Ln YS = Ln Yo + rs 
where: 
Ln = natural log. 
YS = earnings of the individual with s years of schooling. 
Yo = earnings of the individual with no schooling 
r= rate of return on schooling. 
s= the number of years of schooling. 
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Thus, the wage differences between the more and the less educated are simply 
compensating wage differentials, this compensation being required to adjust for the 
extra cost incurred in becoming educated. 
4.2.1.3 On-the-job Training as Investment 
Although formal schooling is one way in which human capital may be accumulated. 
it is not the only route. Many labour market skills are acquired through on-the-job 
training. Becker (1964) classified such training into general and specific training. 
General training refers to the creations of skills or characteristics, which are equally 
usable in any firm or industry. Thus, general training increases the productivity of a 
worker at any task. One important feature of general training is that if labour markets 
are competitive, firms may be unwilling to assume any of the training costs. The 
reason for this is that general training provides a worker with skills which are 
transferable; that is, they may be sold to other firms at a higher wage rate. So the 
worker who receives general training paid for by the firm could quit upon 
completion of training, and the firm would be unable to recoup any of its general 
training investment in the worker. Hence, the worker will pay for general training by 
receiving lower wages during the period of training. 
A polar contrast to general training is specific training. It refers to on-the-job training 
that can be used only in the particular firm providing the training. Specific training 
provides a worker with skills which are not transferable. The worker has gained 
nothing of value to show in the labour market if he is fired or laid off later. This 
training, therefore, raises the productivity of a worker only at that firm. 
Specific training raises some interesting issues in terms of who bears the cost of 
training and who recoups the gains from the investment. Firms might be willing to 
bear the entire cost of specific training to prevent trained workers from moving 
elsewhere. In other words, if trained workers were mobile, firms would find it in 
their interest to share some of the returns from specific training with their trained 
workers by paying them a wage that was slightly higher than they could earn 
elsewhere. General and specific on-the-job training are polar extremes, and in many- 
cases, investments in workers represent a mix of these two types of training. 
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Regardless of the mix, human capital theory assumes that additional human capital 
may be accumulated by incremental job experience. 
On average, those individuals who receive the largest amount of formal education 
also tend to receive more on-the-job training. This may reflect. in part, employers' 
beliefs that individuals with less formal education may only be trained at a high cost, 
and that individuals with more formal education may be trained at less cost, since 
they have already demonstrated an ability to learn. It is noted that if the more 
educated also become the more trained, then their human capital will accumulate 
very rapidly, resulting in a steeper experience-earnings profile than that of less 
educated workers. 
Mincer (1974) accepts Becker's argument that a part of the cost of training is borne 
by workers. However, this cost of training, or the amount of investment in on-the-job 
training, is such that it is not generally observable. 
4.2.1.4 Screening as an Alternative to Human Capital Theory 
Although the human capital theory of wage determination is widely accepted, it has 
its detractors. According to Kenneth Arrow (1973) and Michael Spence (1973, 
1974), education may serve only as a filter for individuals with greater abilities, 
instead of augmenting the productivity of those acquiring it. 
Firms view educational degrees and diplomas as signals indicating that the holders 
of those degrees have superior abilities and, therefore, greater potential productivity. 
In such a case, educational degrees provide a signal and serve as a convenient screen 
but do not directly affect workers' productivity. This notion is called the screening 
hypothesis of education. 
This raises the question: Why might employers use education as a screen? There are 
at least two reasons. First, it may be very costly for firms to determine the abilities 
and productivity of individuals. Using educational degrees as a screening 
device may 
be a cost-effective way of identifying high-quality workers. Second, it may in 
fact be 
91 
the case that on average, holders of educational degrees have greater abilities and 
skills. 
According to the screening hypothesis, an educational degree is an admission ticket 
to a higher-paying job in which there are attractive opportunities for further training 
and promotion. On the other hand, less educated workers are excluded from such 
positions. 
4.2.2 Selected Empirical Results on Determinants of Wages 
Human capital variables, such as schooling and on-the-job training, are the most 
commonly used explanatory variables in earnings functions. The empirical literature 
on returns to education and to on-the-job training is extremely large, and it is 
impossible to provide a comprehensive survey of that literature. The modest goal in 
this section is, therefore, to consider those sources and studies, which provide typical 
results. This section begins with an overview of the results concerning returns to 
education, then will examine returns to training. 
4.2.2.1 Rates of Return to Education4 
The early empirical research on returns to education was for the most part non- 
econometric. Researchers such as Jacob Mincer (1957,1958,1962), W. Lee Hansen 
(1963), and Gary Becker (1964), cross-classified annual earnings from a cross- 
sectional sample of the US population census by age and years of schooling, and 
assumed that differentials by level of educational attainment remained constant over 
the remaining work-lives of individuals. They used this average earnings data to 
estimate average foregone earnings for individuals who missed out on earning 
because they attended school, and then used a standard formula to compute internal 
rates of return. 
One very simple way to calculate the internal rate of return to a college education is 
to use the formula, 
(1 +r)n-YI/Yo 
where 
Many studies in this field employ this term `Return to Education' so it is used here instead of 
Returns from/on Education. 
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Y1= the mean earnings of college graduates; 
Yo = the mean earnings of high school graduates; 
n= the number of years required in high school to obtain a college degree (usually 
four years); 
r= the real before-tax internal rate of return. 
Becker (1964) computed the rates of return for males with both a college and a high 
school education based on data from the 1950,1960 and subsequent surveys. The 
earnings of college graduates were higher than those of high school graduates at all 
ages after 22 in 1939 and after the age of 24 in 1949. The peak of the differential was 
reached between the ages of 45 and 54. On the basis of these earnings differentials 
and estimates for the cost of education, Becker estimated the rate of return for a 
college education at 14.5 per cent for 1939,13 per cent for 1949,12.2 per cent for 
1956, and 14.8 per cent for 1958; analogous estimates for high school graduates 
were 16 per cent, 20 per cent, 25 per cent, and 28 per cent respectively. 
Giora Hanoch (1967) did the earliest econometric study of returns to education. 5 He 
estimated the rates of return on schooling for a sample of more than 57,000 males 
over 14 years old, taken from the 1960 census of the US population. He assumed that 
net earnings during school years were zero, since positive earnings during those 
years simply cancelled out the direct costs of education. To eliminate the influence 
of a number of non-human capital variables, he divided his sample into 24 groups 
defined by race (white, non-white), province (South, non-South), and six age groups 
(14-24,25-34,35-44,45-54,55-64 and 65 and over). He then ran separate 
regressions (not log earnings) on earnings for each of these groups, using 23 
explanatory variables, most of which were in dummy form. From these equations, he 
estimated the earnings for each school-age group by using the appropriate values of 
other explanatory variables. 
Then he calculated the earnings differentials between adjacent school levels of 
various ages. His rates of return, like those of Becker, were generally higher for 
lower levels of schooling and lower for higher levels of schooling. In particular. the 
5 The earliest econometric study of returns to education was a 1965 University of Chicago Ph. D. 
dissertation, eventually published as Hanoch (1967). 
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marginal rates of return to college education (16 years) were smaller than for those 
having a high school diploma (12 years), which in turn were smaller than for those 
who had only completed elementary school (8 years). The marginal rates of return 
for whites in the North ranged from 7 per cent for 17 and more `ears of schooling to 
22 per cent for 8 years of schooling. In the South, the rates were somewhat lower. 
Freeman (1975) found that rates of return for men in college training were 11 per 
cent in 1959,11.5 per cent in 1969, and 10.5 per cent in 1972. but only 8.5 per cent 
in 1974. He argued that rates of return fell sharply in the 1970s because of huge 
subsidies provided for college training, which increased the supply of graduates at 
that time. 
George Psacharopoulos (1981) found similar results to those of Freeman and 
Hanoch. His results showed that while rates of return to secondary education varied 
modestly around a mean of about 12 per cent from 1939 to 1976, rates of return to 
college education remained relatively constant at about 11 per cent from 1939 to 
1969, but then began falling sharply. In 1999, Rischall raised a pertinent question 
about the effects of education and skill on income. He asked how education and skill 
could explain much of the correlation across generations. He found that if one 
believes that family background variables are valid instruments for education, then 
one sees that the returns to schooling are small otherwise, the returns to schooling 
are large. 
The National Centre for Policy Analysis, NCPA (1996), reported some results taken 
from a number of studies relating to the United States. These results were published 
in its report of February 1996 and may be summarised as follows: 
- In 1994, a full-time male worker over the age of 25 with a 
four-year college 
degree earned 89 per cent more per year on average than a similar worker 
with only a high school degree. 
- Each year of formal schooling after high school added 5 to 
15 per cent more 
to annual earnings later in life. 
- 35 per cent of those in the 18-24 year-old age group enrolled in college. 
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In June, 1996, the NCPA confirmed these results and made the following 
observations: 
- Graduates earn about 80 per cent more than someone with just a high school 
degree and more than three times as much as a high school dropout. 
- Half of those in the top fifth of incomes had a college degree while just 2 per 
cent in the top tier were high school dropouts. 
- One fifth of those in the lowest income bracket were high school dropouts 
while 4 per cent went to college. 
4.2.2.2 Returns to On-the-job Training and Experience 
According to the human capital approach, education and training can provide 
productive skills that may be rented out to employers. 
The earliest study on the subject of human capital was by Mincer (1958) in the 
Journal of Political Economy. His study argued that variations in income among 
individuals were due primarily to differences in ability and luck. 
In 1960, Schultz focused on five major forms of human capital investment: health 
facilities and services; on-the-job training by firms; formal school education and 
higher education; adult study programmes; and migration to adjust to changing 
employment opportunities. He argued that in the absence of human capital 
considerations, it was difficult to explain the unexpectedly rapid post-war recovery 
in Europe. 
It was Gary Becker, however, who in 1964 undertook the most rigorous treatment of 
the subject of human capital. In this work, Becker formulated a model of on-the-job 
training, which he defined as training received from the person's employer while 
they are in work. He also extended his model to include schooling and other forms of 
human capital. Becker's model recognised that an individual's human capital is 
affected more by the level of education they have invested in: ability and on-the-job 
training will also play a part. 
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A classic econometric study of returns to on-the-job training was carried out by 
Mincer in 1974. Mincer reported results from a number of regressions. each based on 
the assumption that all training is general. He used 1959 data on 31,093 white, non- 
farm workers, non-student males up to the age of 65, from the 1960 census. Mincer 
began by running a simple least squares regression of log earnings on schooling. and 
found that the estimated schooling coefficient implies a7 per cent annual return to 
schooling and is highly significant. However, the proportion of variation in log 
earnings on schooling is small, since the R2 is only 0.067. 
When experience (X) and its square (X2) are added as regressors, where (X) equals 
age minus years of schooling minus 6 years, the goodness of fit improves 
enormously from 0.067 to 0.285. The estimate of the returns to schooling increases 
to 10.7 per cent, as predicted by human capital theory, and returns to experience are 
positive, but decline with increases in experience. 
The NCPA (1997) reported that workers need skills and training not college 
education. The report gives the following results that show the importance of 
training. First, labour market analysts contend that skills show a stronger correlation 
with future employment and earnings potential than does formal education. Second, 
the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) research established that high school 
graduates whose jobs required specific training earned slightly more than college 
graduates who had not obtained any type of training. Third, a 1995 US Trust survey 
found that fewer than half of America's top wage earners had completed college and 
almost 30 per cent had never attended college. 
4.3 Segmented (Dual) Labour Market Theory 
4.3.1 Segmented (Dualistic) Structure of Labour Markets 
The labour market is characterised by the coexistence of a formal and an informal 
sector. This dualism has for a long time been a permanent feature of the market in 
developing countries. The following sections will first examine the informal sector 
then the formal sector. 
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4.3.1.1 The Informal Sector 
The term 'Informal Sector' was given prominent attention in the ILO (1979) report 
on Kenya. Since then, significant studies have been conducted in many developing 
countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa. The informal sector is an umbrella 
term, which describes a variety of small-scale units, often called micro-enterprises. 
There are different and conflicting schools of thought regarding the informal sector. 
According to the 'optimistic' school, the informal sector is a transitional sector where 
rural migrants and youths are waiting to find employment in the formal sector. For 
the 'pessimistic' school, the informal sector is a'dead end'. 
According to the ILO (1972) report on Kenya the main features of the informal 
sector are: 
1. Ease of entry to the sector; 
2. Reliance on indigenous resources ; 
3. Family ownership of units; 
4. Small-scale operations; 
5. Labour-intensive and adapted technology; 
6. Skills acquired outside the formal school system; and 
7. Unregulated and competitive markets. 
The ILO report is not the only one which lists such features. Santos (1972) listed 
about 16 variables, as shown in Table 4.1. 
According to a study carried out by the Georgia Institute of Technology (1975). 
labour in the informal sector includes traditional artisans, repair workers, market and 
street vendors, and workers involved in small construction, petty trades, transport, 
and small-scale processors of primary products. 
In 1972 the ILO reported that the informal sector included: small-scale units 
producing and distributing goods and services, and consisting 
largely of 
independent, self-employed producers in urban and rural areas of developing 
countries, some of which also employed family labour and a few hired workers. 
It 
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stated that the informal sector operated with very little capital or none at all. and it 
included activities carried out without formal approval from the authorities. (ILO 
South East Advisory Team 1998). 
This definition does not capture the importance of the informal sector, which is a 
major provider of urban jobs. In urban areas, the informal sector's enterprises 
encompass a very wide range of industries, occupations and working situations. The 
labour force includes street food or market vendors, small automotive and machine 
repair shops, small-scale manufacturers, for example of garments and shoes, «aste 
recyclers and transport drivers, amongst others. 
The report on Thailand (1994) stated that the largest proportions of employment in 
the formal sector were to be found in the electricity, gas, water and sanitary services, 
services and manufacturing, while in the informal sector they were in the agriculture, 
commerce, transport and construction industries. 
4.3.1.2 The Formal Sector: 
According to the ILO (1972) report, the formal sector has the following basic 
characteristics: 
1. Difficult entry; 
2. Frequent reliance on overseas resources; 
3. Corporate ownership; 
4. Large-scale operations; 
5. Capital-intensive and often imported technology; and 
6. Protected markets (through tariffs, quotas, and trade barriers). 
The formal sector's labour force comprises workers in large-scale manufacturing 
enterprises, financial institutions, and large service firms in the private sector, and all 
public-sector employees. This sector is subject to minimum-wage legislation and 
labour welfare regulations. It employs most of the educated work force. The 
prospects of job advancement and higher wages motivate workers to acquire new 
skills. The workers remain in their jobs for life, partly because of the pension and 
provident-fund benefits that they can accumulate by doing so. Labour is usually 
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organised into unions. In addition, the regulations governing the relationship 
between workers and employers provide extensive protection to workers against 
being fired. The employment is stable and there is a tendency to see workers as 
'reliable'. Enterprises in the sector have easy access to formal capital markets 'where 
they can obtain credit at interest rates below the market rate. 
Table 4.1 Characteristics of the Two-Sector Economy 
Characteristic Formal Sector Informal Sector 
Technology Capital intensive Labour-intensive 
Organisation Bureaucratic Family-based 
Capital Abundant Scarce 
Working hours Regular Irregular 
Wages Normal (regular) Rare (irregular) 
Inventories Large; high quality Small; low-grade 
Prices Often fixed Often negotiable 
Credit From banks and similar institutions Personal; non-bank 
Profits Large on high turnover Low on small turnover 
Client relations Impersonal Personal 
Fixed costs Large Negligible 
Publicity Necessary Little or none 
Re-use of goods None; wasteful Frequent recycling 
Overhead capital Indispensable Dispensable 
State aid Large Almost none 
Foreign dependence Great; often export-oriented Small 
Source: Santos, Milton (1979, p. 38). 
Due to the greater amount of physical capital, the power of the unions, the minimum 
wage and other labour welfare regulations and oligopolistic product markets, 
workers in the formal sector earn more than their counterparts in the informal sector. 
However, labour is used economically in the formal sector. 
In the public sector part of the formal sector, workers' earnings may be even greater 
than in the formal private sector, for two main reasons. First, governments try to play 
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the role of a model employer, and secondly, profit is not a consideration for the 
public administration operations as their wages and salaries are paid out of taxes and 
do not have to depend upon productivity. 
In addition to the two dichotomies, formal/informal and public/private sectors, there 
is a third one, that of urban/rural labour markets. Earnings in the urban sector are 
higher than in the rural sector, because of the large number of employers to choose 
from, as compared with the very monoposonistic nature of the village labour market. 
In addition, the differences in the cost of living between rural and urban areas 
necessitate the differences in personal earnings. 
4.3.2 Review of Empirical Literature 
This section contains: 
4.3.2.1 An overview of the informal sector; 
4.3.2.2 The allocation of the labour force using other variables; and 
4.3.2.3 The effect of this allocation upon personal earnings. 
4.3.2.1 An Overview of the Informal Sector 
A large number of studies have appeared in developing countries since the ILO study 
on Kenya (1972) highlighted the importance of the informal sector. Almost all of 
them give an estimate of both the size of the informal sector and the size of the 
formal sector, since they are complementary. The criteria used for classification in 
these studies differ somewhat from one to another. Some studies do not even make 
explicit the rules used for demarcation. Those using an explicit rule for classifying 
criteria for inclusion in the formal sector have used the application of minimum- 
wage legislation, the size of the establishment, registration of the establishment with 
the government, type of economic activity and contribution to social security. 
According to the ILO (1997), Asian cities have the greatest concentration of people 
in the informal sector, with 50-60 per cent of the urban labour force estimated to be 
engaged in informal sector activities. Therefore, in most developing countries in 
Asia, the informal sector has been a viable source of employment for those who have 
been unable to find employment in the formal sector. Only countries with very rapid 
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economic and employment growth, such Malaysia and Singapore, have experienced 
a reduction in this sector. 
The total number of employed persons in Thailand, using 1994 Labour Force Sure cy- 
data, was about 32.1 million and of these, 23.2 per cent were employed in the formal 
sector and 76.8 per cent in the informal sector. During the period 1988-1994. formal 
sector activities increased, causing a slight decrease in unemployment (Social 
Statistics Division in Thailand). 
The clear-cut selectivity in the sectoral allocation of the labour force, if ignored in 
the analysis of personal earnings, might give a biased estimate of the effect of the 
sectoral allocation on earnings. 
4.3.2.2 The Sectoral Allocation of the Labour Force 
There are several empirical questions to be answered in segmented labour market 
studies: 1) Is the labour market segmented? 2) What is the nature of these segments? 
3) Are there significant worker outcome differences, such as earnings, employment 
stability, etc., in different markets, even after controlling for individual 
characteristics? 4) Are there different earnings determination processes in the 
different segments? 
Most empirical studies on labour market segmentation have focused on industrial 
segmentation, using such variables as market concentration, capital, economic scale, 
etc. (Tolbert, Horan and Becker, 1980). However, there are some conceptual 
problems in using industry as a unit of analysis. The key actor in the economy is the 
firm, and different firms may often operate in many industries. Therefore, data on 
industries, as aggregations of firms, cannot reveal the earnings determination process 
of individuals in firms, since industry data represent an aggregation of information 
on all firms in an industry (Baron and Bielby, 1980). 
The most frequently used firm variable in segmented labour market studies is firm 
size, which is usually measured by the number of employees, since 1) data on firm 
size may be more easily available than those on other indicators, such as capital, and 
2) firm size can be a good proxy for other variables (for example, the correlation 
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between firm size, measured by the number of employees, and capital is usually yer. 
high). 
Another firm variable used in segmented labour market studies is firm location. 
Firms can be segmented according to firm location. Firms in the core sector, which 
have large product markets and complex technologies, tend to be located in large 
metropolitan areas, since 1) they need to be close to major suppliers and markets, 2) 
they must have ready access to good transportation facilities, and 3) they need 
complex supportive services and highly trained, disciplined labour forces (Bibb and 
Forum, 1977). 
On the other hand, other researchers, e. g., Osterman (1975), argue that labour 
markets are segmented according to occupation, and the processes governing level of 
earnings attainment vary from one occupation to another, because of the 
occupationally specific nature of worker investments. 
Human capital theorists argue that worker outcome differences among segmented 
markets are simply artefacts resulting from different individual characteristics such 
as education, IQ, experience, etc... However, many studies of segmented labour 
markets find that there are significant differences in earnings between the segments, 
even after allowing for individual characteristics. However, there are disagreements 
about the relative importance of individual characteristics and segmented labour 
market variables, both of which explain earnings differences in markets. For 
example, some studies, e. g., that of Bibb and Forum (1977), found that market 
structure variables explain more variances of earning differences than do individual 
characteristics. However, Kalacheck and Raines (1976) found that individual human 
capital variables are more important in explaining earnings differences than labour 
market structural variables. The different findings of these studies are due mainly to 
the different statistical methods used. The Bibb and Forum (1977) study ignored the 
indirect effect of individual human capital variables on earnings via market structure 
variables. In other words, since human capital variables affect the initial allocation of 
individuals into different labour markets, the effect of market structure variables on 
earnings differences includes part of those effects. However, other studies, taking 
into account these indirect effects, find that market structure variables affect earning 
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differences independently of individual characteristics (Kallerberg. Wallace. and 
Althauser, 1981). 
There is believed to be great selectivity in the allocation of workers to the formal and 
informal sectors, based on age, sex, education, position in the household. and 
migration status. Workers outside the prime age group, females, non-heads of 
households, illiterate and less-educated workers, and migrants, especially recent 
migrants, are more likely to be found in the informal than in the formal sector. 
Some segmented labour market studies divide labour markets according to worker 
characteristics such as earnings, job stability, etc., which are endogenously 
determined, and use these variables as dependent variables. Therefore, the worker 
outcome differences between primary and secondary labour markets are shown 
largely to reflect the original differences in individual characteristics. 
4.3.2.3 The Effect of Sector Allocation upon Personal Earnings. 
The inclusion of structural factors, such as the segmentation of the labour market, in 
the earnings function is potentially significant. For a study of personal income 
distribution, the relative amount of employment provided by each sector is a good 
measure of its importance. 
All the studies on the sectoral dichotomy show that personal earnings in the informal 
sector are lower than in the formal sector. A study in Thailand (1994) found that 
workers in the formal sector had higher average monthly wages than those in the 
informal sector. 
Very few of these studies looked at the effect on earnings of the sector as such, after 
allowing for the differences in education; sex, and migration status, which may be 
expected to affect earnings. Among the few that did is that of Mazumdar (1981), 
who made attempts to estimate the net effect of the employment sector on earnings. 
He carried out a multiple classification analysis of the earnings of urban-sector male 
workers in Malaysia. He used education, age, race, province, and size of enterprise 
as explanatory variables, although age and education, the two human capital 
variables, dominate the explanatory power of the model. Size of enterprise. one of 
the criteria used for dividing the labour market into the formal and informal sectors. 
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also affects earnings significantly. However, Mazumdar's coefficients for age and 
age2 in the regression analysis of wage earnings, refute the conventional hypothesis 
of a flatter age-earnings profile for workers in the informal sector as compared with 
the formal sector. As a matter of fact, blue-collar workers in small enterprises show 
greater growth of earnings with age. 
Marcouiller, Castilla and Woodruff (1995) used comparable micro-level data from 
El Salvador, Peru and Mexico. He investigated what type of people worked in the 
informal sector, and whether informal workers earned lower wages than equivalent 
workers in the formal sector. The results were as follows: the young and the old were 
more likely to be in the informal sector than were prime-aged workers; formal 
workers, generally, had more schooling than did informal workers, and construction, 
transportation, personal services and the retail trade were largely informal activities. 
After running an OLS wage regression for men and women separately in each sector, 
the returns to schooling and experience were found to be of the expected signs and 
magnitude in all cases. The main results showed that there was a significant wage 
premium associated with formal employment in El Salvador and Peru, but a 
premium associated with work in the informal sector in Mexico was found when 
personal characteristics were controlled for. This result shows that by considering the 
effect of sector allocation on earnings, one could obtain an unbiased estimate that 
supports the findings of this study. 
Tansel (1999) confirmed that the labour market of developing countries is 
characterised by duality. His study stated that a social security programme covers the 
formal sector in Turkey, but that the informal sector is excluded. A social security 
programme could be used to differentiate between the formal and informal sectors in 
different countries, although more studies would be needed. The results of the 1994 
Household Expenditure Survey indicate that wage earners with more education are 
likely to be in the formal sector and those with less education are more likely to be in 
the informal sector. 
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4.4 Nationality and Wages 
4.4.1 Overview 
The Saudi Arabian private sector is dominated by expatriates who hold around 94 
per cent of the jobs. This is due to an imbalance between labour supply and demand 
that dates from the discovery of oil in 1938. 
This characteristic divides the labour market into Saudis and non-Saudis (including 
both Arabs and non-Arabs) in the private sector. The main questions to be asked are: 
Who enjoys higher wages and salaries? Why is this? Is there inequality of earnings 
distribution in the Saudi private labour market? 
Becker (1971) cited discrimination in the labour market as an explanation of the 
earning-differentials between blacks and whites (racial discrimination) and between 
males and females (sex discrimination). The discrimination in some Western 
economies has been directed mainly against minorities, but in Saudi Arabia the 
private sector is different. The researcher believes there are many cases of 
discrimination, including the following: 
1. In the informal sector, discrimination is directed against Saudi workers. 
2. In the formal sector, there are no significant pay differences between Saudis 
and non-Saudis. 
The purposes of this section are, first, to provide a theoretical framework identifying 
discrimination against Saudis both in the formal and informal sectors of the private 
labour market; and, second, to review some of the studies on determinants of wages 
by nationality in the Saudi Arabian labour market. 
4.4.2 Discrimination Theories 
There are several kinds of discrimination in the labour market, including wage 
discrimination and employment discrimination. Here the only aspect examined on is 
that of wage discrimination. 
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4.4.2.1 Becker's Theory of Discrimination 
In the neo-classical labour market, wages vary only in relationship to the worker's 
talents, experience and productivity. Here, workers have complete information about 
employment opportunities and move freely to maximise income. Howe evver. when 
employees are not completely informed and mobile and are, therefore, restricted to a 
given labour market, the employer may discriminate. 
Discrimination is found in the labour market when the employer pays different 
wages for the same job to workers with the same qualifications. This definition of 
discrimination assumes that the human capital of each worker is the same and, 
therefore, the productivity of the workers is equal (Becker, 1971). However, the 
human capital of two workers is difficult to compare, as components such as 
education and experience may nominally be the same, while the actual quality and 
contribution to productivity of different employees'experience, training or academic 
education may differ substantially. 
Discrimination is a characteristic of segmented labour markets because they depend 
on restricted mobility and reflect a range of attitudes and decisions that are more than 
economic. Becker (1971, p. 312) states: 
Discrimination by employers based on their own tastes and prejudices thus 
implies they do not maximise money profits. Instead they maximise utility in 
order to indulge their tastes about the composition of the labour force. 
Labour market discrimination, that is, the payment of different wages to workers 
with the same productivity, can be either to the advantage or disadvantage of a 
worker, or group of workers with a specific characteristic, and, according to Fleisher 
and Kniesner (1984, p. 393), it results from: 
1. Incorrect information concerning the productivity of minority workers; 2 
A desire (by employers) to make themselves better off at the expense of 
labour market minorities; and 3) A dislike of associating with minority 
workers. 
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4.4.2.2 The Statistical Theory of Discrimination 
Becker's theory assumes that employers have perfect information about employees' 
productivity. As a matter of fact, employers do not possess such information and 
discrimination is often based on imperfect information about the labour market as the 
statistical theory asserts (Arrow, 1973). 
According to this theory, employers cannot assess the true productivity of employees 
because only imperfect information is available to them regarding the employee's 
characteristics. Therefore, employers should invest in information, which is costly in 
the market, to determine the productivity or qualifications of an employee. However. 
to minimise cost, employers usually depend on a cheap source of information, such 
as skin colour, sex, ethnic background, etc. to 'determine' the employee's 
productivity. If the employer believes that a particular group, such as black people or 
women, is less qualified than white people or men, then he will discriminate against 
the unfavoured group regardless of an individual's more relevant characteristics. As 
stated by Arrow (1973, p. 23): 
If employers have the preconceived idea that black workers have lower 
productivity than white workers, they may be expected to be willing to hire 
them only at lower wages. 
4.4.3 Empirical Results on Determinants of Wages by Nationality and other 
Variables in the Saudi Arabian Labour Market 
Heisler (1989) described the population and labour force in Riyadh in 1986, and 
estimated the wage differences by nationality after controlling for other variables. 
His study was based on the Riyadh Development Authority's October 1986 random 
sample survey of 5,009 occupied dwelling units in Riyadh, which included 2.736 
Saudi and 2,273 non-Saudi households. He found that there were significant 
differences in wages based on employee's nationality, when the effects of all other 
variables were controlled for. 
It follows that one should expect to find each occupation in the private sector to be 
dominated by migrant workers from a single country that can supply the required 
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skills at an acceptable level of quality for the reservation wage. He actually found 
foreign workers from several nations in each occupation. 
In 1996, Kadah's study computed many variables, such as education, age. 
experience, nationality, sex, economic sector, and occupation. Each variable 
included in his multi-regression model had some effect on the determination of the 
individual's earnings in Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, among these variables, he found 
that the nationality factor played the most important role. The study proved that, on 
average, Saudis receive higher earnings than non-Saudis. However, this study covers 
only two groups of people, the Saudis and the non-Saudis from only a few 
developing countries (LDCs), particularly from Arab countries. Kadah also included 
public and private sectors in his study. There are many differences to be found 
between the methodology of his research and that of this study. This study, when 
compared with that of Kadah: 
1. Applies more new variables, such as computer skills and second language in 
current employment. 
2. Adds another group of people, that is non-Saudis from developed and developing 
countries, in addition to the Saudi and Arab employees; 
3. Focuses only on private sector companies; 
4. Pays more attention to the segmented labour market, especially in the informal 
sector; 
5. Pays more attention to the low-waged workers; 
6. Suggests policies that may help to solve the unemployment problem in the Saudi 
Arabian labour market. 
Al-Towajari (1992) argued that cultural factors, 
6 in particular familial relationships, 
influence wages in the Saudi Arabian labour market. Saudi workers may 
be reluctant 
to leave their families in order to work in the major cities in Saudi Arabia. 
This 
factor is as important as training and education in terms of increasing the 
productivity of national workers. 
6 The teachings of religion, tradition, and the education system persuade national workers to stay near 
to their families and in their hometown. 
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He suggested, following the theory of compensation wage differentials, that Saudi 
workers must be compensated for working a long distance from their families, 
because working far away from the family residence is a job disamenit`v. Therefore, 
his wage equation incorporates the influence of family on wages by including 
distance. The findings of his research show that family factors influence Nvages. and 
he recommends that Saudi workers be compensated by the Saudi government for 
working away from their family residence. 
In 1970, a report was prepared by Industrial Export Surveys for the British National 
Export Committee for Middle East Trade. This report was the only study of income 
distribution in Saudi Arabia at that time. It found that approximately 76 per cent of 
the population were then living outside the towns, and were not yet fully integrated 
into the money economy. Few people in this sector were regular wage earners. 
In the towns, incomes were low except for a small minority of persons. A town 
planning study of Riyadh, prepared for the Ministry of the Interior by Doxiadis 
Associates in May 1968, indicated that there was considerable inequality in income. 
On the basis of a survey of households in Riyadh, the study shows that 50 per cent of 
the city's households had an annual income of under SR6,000 (£561). The complete 
breakdown of incomes in Riyadh is estimated in Table 4.3. 
Sirageldin (1984, p. 11) refers to a joint Saudi Ministry of Planning/ World Bank 
study of the regional distribution and mobility of labour and the determinants of 
wages. This study was based on national establishment and household surveys in 
1978. The World Bank household sample was described as: 
An independent national sample of households stratified according to 
province and by urban and rural residence.... All (male) heads of selected 
households and additional adult males, if available, were interviewed. 
Of the 867 Saudi males interviewed nationwide, 186 were from the Central Province 
which includes Riyadh. Women were not included in the study; no data on foreign 
workers were published beyond the sample size; and urban/rural location was not 
distinguished. When multiple classification analysis was used to adjust monthly 
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salaries for the effects of age, education, public/ private sector, prior training and 
employment status, no significant salary difference was found by, occupation. This 
finding may be due to the small sample size, so it is not supported in this 
dissertation. 
Table 4.2 Income in Riyadh (1968) 
Annual Income SR Household in Riyadh 
Under 2,400 (£224) or ($640) 12 
2,401-3,600 £2244336 or $640-960 18 
3,601- 4,800 (f336-449) or ($960-1280) 12 
4,801-6,000 (£449 -f561) or ($1280-1600) 8 
6,001-8,400 (£5614785 or ($1600-2240) 12 
8,401-12,000 (£785-£ 1,121) or ($2240-3200) 11 
12,001-18,000 £1,121-£1,682 or $3200-4800 13 
18,001-24,000 (£1,68242,243) or ($4800-6400 7 
24,001-60,000 (£ 2,243-f5,607) or ($6400-16000) 6 
Over 60,000 £ 5,607) or over ($16000) 1 
Source: A report prepared by Industrial Export Surveys for the British National 
Export Council Committee for Middle East Trade (1970). 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has pointed out that the human capital theory is the most important 
economic theory of wage determination and differentials. Smith's concept of 
equalising wage differentials provided the basis for the modern theory of human 
capital. This theory confirms that investment in human capital, such as schooling and 
on-the-job training equates with wage differences. The chapter has referred to the 
large number of studies have carried out the ILO study on Kenya (1972) which 
emphasised the importance of the informal sector in the economy of a country. It 
was necessary to distinguish clearly between the informal and formal sectors so that 
the wage differentials between these sectors of the Saudi Arabia's Eastern labour 
market could be highlighted. Wage discrimination exists if employees with the same 
economic characteristics receive different wages, and if these differences are 
correlated with particular non-economic factors. These findings could be used to 
detect any wage gap between Saudi and non-Saudi employees. 
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Chapter Five 
Research Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
Most of the prominent theories utilised in the determination of earnings, as well as 
the wage policies, were discussed in Chapters Three and Four of this study. The 
corresponding research methodology employed to apply these theories is explained 
in this chapter. It will describe how the data were collected, test the choice of 
suitable statistical methods for determining the wage function form, and for applying 
appropriate models. A list of abbreviations for the variables used is provided in 
Appendix C. 
5.2 Questionnaire Design 
Designing the questionnaire is one of the most critical stages in the process of a 
research survey. Zikmund (2000), citing Paul Erdos, wrote, "A good questionnaire 
appears as easy to compose as does a good poem". Many researchers believe that 
good grammar and common sense are all that are needed to design a questionnaire, 
but the art of questionnaire design requires more than this: above all it needs not only 
to elicit useful answers to the questions but also to elicit comments which may 
provide valuable insights into the situation, which were unknown or unexpected by 
the compiler. 
5.2.1 Questioning Methods 
Asking for the information needed is the most commonly used method of collecting 
data. The most common questioning methods that may be used to secure this 
information are mail, fax, telephone, person-to-person, online, and through a survey 
team. The advantages of the different methods vary with circumstances. The best 
method to use is that which will secure the information needed with the greatest 
degree of accuracy, at the lowest cost, and often in the least amount of time. Two 
methods have been used in this study, mailed questionnaire and survey team. The 
mail method was not very successful in obtaining the information needed from every 
individual. On the other hand, the survey team was much more successful in 
procuring the information by personal contact, but it was much more expensive than 
using mail. Use of a survey team also enabled the researcher to obtain information 
from a much higher percentage of targeted respondents than did the mail method. 
A total of 2,000 questionnaires were distributed to Saudi and non-Saudi employees 
in all major cities of the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. The characteristics of the 
respondents were as follows: 138 respondents were Saudis 192 respondents were 
non-Saudis. In addition, 1,000 questionnaires were distributed to Saudi employers. 
but only 181 responded (see Appendix B). 
5.2.2 Questionnaire Construction 
The kind of questions used and the construction of a questionnaire vary according to 
the type of information required. Thus, the questions must be phrased carefully in 
order to be certain that the desired information is secured. Many steps are involved 
in the construction of a questionnaire. The researcher begins with the research 
objectives, then goes through the process of preparing the questions. 
The main objectives of this study are to explore the structure, determinants and 
differences of wages in Saudi Arabia's Eastern private labour market, to indicate 
how many employees are in the low wage level, and to explore the attitudes and 
perceptions of employees and employers towards certain wage policies. 
The questionnaire was designed with two goals in mind: relevance and accuracy. A 
questionnaire is relevant if no unnecessary information is collected. For instance, a 
fringe benefits question was considered irrelevant to this study's objectives, and was 
thus omitted from the questionnaire. Accuracy means that the information is reliable 
and valid. So the sequence and elicit wording of the questions were designed in such 
a way as to promote accuracy and informative answers from the respondents. The 
reliability and validity of the answers are discussed in subsequent sections of this 
chapter. 
As a result of the sensitivity of this topic, several principles were adapted from those 
employed by other researchers, such as Zikmund (2000). These may be summarised 
as follows: 
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1) The questions asked should be relevant to the research problem. 2) Questionnaires 
should be as short as possible. 3) Avoid ambiguity, confusion. and vagueness. 4) 
Avoid leading questions. 5) Avoid asking questions that are beyond the respondents' 
capabilities. 
The questionnaire used in this study consists of 8 pages, including the covering letter 
that briefly states the objectives of the questionnaire and also assures the respondents 
that all the information they provided would be treated with strict confidentiality (see 
Appendix B). The questionnaire was divided into four parts. The first part dealt with 
the respondent's personal details. The variables in this part are considered as 
independent variables that will be used in the regression model to explore the 
relationship between these and the dependent variables. 
General information about the respondent's firm was requested in part two. This part 
provided four criteria: firm ownership, type of firm, number of employees and firm 
grade. All of these criteria help to distinguish between the formal and informal sector 
in terms of wages in the labour market of the Eastern Province. 
Part three of the questionnaire was designed to focus on the most sensitive and 
important dependent variable. It contained six questions which were concerned with 
wage variables as dependent variables. The purpose of questions 1,4,5 and 6 was to 
obtain, directly and indirectly, information about wages from the respondents. 
The final part asked for the attitudes and opinions of the Saudi respondents regarding 
which suggested wage policies that should be applied to help Saudis who are at a 
low wage level. 
5.2.3 Selecting The Pilot Test Sample 
It is common practice to pre-test the questionnaire with a small sample prior to 
starting the survey proper, as this minimises the problems that may arise when 
producing the final draft. 
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Thus, once the initial draft of the questionnaire has been designed, each question and 
the questionnaire as a whole should be tested and evaluated. One of the main 
objectives of pilot testing is to refine the wording, filtering, and ordering, and to 
control the questionnaire length (Zikmund, 2000 and McAllister, 1975). In addition. 
a pilot study is very useful in making sure that the translation of the questionnaire 
will not lead to any misunderstanding of the questions. 
At least three drafts were made before the final draft. Three lecturers from King 
Faisal University, two lecturers from Imam University, and a small number of 
employers and employees were asked to complete the first draft of the questionnaire 
and to state their opinions. Their answers and opinions provided valuable feedback, 
especially with regard to the translation from English language into Arabic and the 
suitability of some questions. Their opinions also gave strength to the final 
questionnaire. 
The pilot study was undertaken after correcting the initial draft of the questionnaire. 
This was to ensure that the testing of the questionnaire achieved its intended 
objective. The questionnaire was distributed manually to 30 employees in the 
Eastern private sector, who were asked to respond. 
5.3 Sample Designs 
This section explains the nature of sampling and the methods used to determine the 
appropriate sample design for our study. 
5.3.1 Population and Sample Frame 
A population is a group of persons, institutions, or events that one wishes to describe 
or study, or about which one wants to generalise results by studying a sample that is 
meant to be representative of that population. 
Nachmias (1996) mentioned that a population is the aggregate of all cases that 
conform to some designated set of specifications. For instance, the term 'residents of 
Saudi Arabia', used in this study, defines a population consisting of all the people. 
both nationals and non-nationals, who reside in the country. Correspondingly the 
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term 'employed in Saudi Arabia', is used to define a population consisting of all 
employees working in the Saudi Arabian labour market. 
The sampling frame is the list or other record of the population from which the 
sampling units are drawn. Note that not all members of the population of interest are 
included in the sampling frame. The sampling frame may be based on telephone 
directories, city directories, or membership lists of private organisations. The 
sampling frame in this study embraces all employees working in the Eastern private 
sector of Saudi Arabia. Zikmund (2000) stated that if a complete list of population 
elements is not available, materials such as maps might be utilised to identify 
selected areas as a sampling frame. In addition, he states, a sample of more than 30 is 
thought to be a good estimate of the population. For this study the sample was much 
larger than 30. 
5.3.2 Sample Size 
Different authors tend to give different guidelines concerning the number of cases 
required for multiple regressions. Tabachnick and Fidell (1996, p. 132) produced a 
formula for calculating sample size requirements, which considers the number of 
independent variables in the study (Pallant, 2001). This formula is N> 50 + 8m 
(where N= sample size and m= number of independent variables). This study has 
one independent variable as the lowest event and less than 10 independent variables 
as the highest. For instance, the lowest event needs 50 + 8(1) = 58 cases and the 
highest needs 50 + 8(10) = 130. According to Roscoe (1975), sample sizes larger 
than 30 cases and smaller than 500 cases are suitable for most research. In this study, 
the sample size that has been used is 330 cases. In addition, the larger the sample the 
more accurate the research, while increasing the sample size decreases the width of 
the confidence interval at a given confidence level. 
5.4 Data 
5.4.1 The Sampling Procedures 
The data were collected from the private sector of the labour market in the Eastern 
part of Saudi Arabia by employing the following methods: 
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1. The questionnaire was given to employees by the researcher and/or the 
survey team. 
2. The questionnaire was given to students in academic institutes which had on- 
the job training programmes. This was very important since these academic 
institutes send their final year students to the private sector for training as a 
requirement of graduation every second term of each year, or in the summer 
term. The students' task was to distribute the questionnaires to employees and 
explain the purpose of this study. 
3. The questionnaires were sent by mail to large firms in the Saudi Arabian labour 
market. 
A survey team was organised to distribute the questionnaire forms to employees and 
employers in the Eastern private sector. This team was headed by the researcher and 
consisted of about 50 Imam University students living in different cities, 24 teachers 
from the Commercial High Schools in Al-Hassa and Dammam, each one 
accompanied by 25 trainees, 20 helpers from the Saudi Electrical Company, 10 
helpers from SABIC, Education Directors in Al-Hassa, other helpers from the Al- 
Hassa and Dammam branches of the Commercial and Industrial Council, and the 
Saudi Communication Company, and five branches of an Islamic teaching 
organisation. 
The researcher initially held a short meeting with each group. At the meeting, the 
researcher explained in detail each part of, and the actual questions in, the 
questionnaires. In addition, a general instruction sheet was distributed to help in 
explaining how to deal with different situations which could arise when conducting 
the survey. 
The Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia is most important for its oil reserves, the 
largest in the world. Both Saudi and multinational employees work in this province. 
This makes it a good location in which to study wage structures, wage determination 
and differentials. 
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5.4.2 Manipulating the Data 
Once the questionnaires had been collected and once the data had been entered and 
the data file has been checked for accuracy, the next step involved manipulating the 
raw data into a form that could be used to conduct analyses and to test the research 
hypotheses. Pallant (2001) demonstrated some effective procedures which can be 
used to manipulate data sets. 
1. Calculating total scale score 
This will create a new variable at the end of the data set. If any items had missing 
data, the overall score will also be missing. The created variable, with its full 
details, should be recorded for a clear guide to the study. 
2. Transforming variables 
The distributions of scores on a scale or measure often do not fall in a normally 
distributed curve. Sometimes scores will be positively skewed, where most of the 
respondents record low scores on the scale. Sometimes the scores will end with a 
negatively skewed distribution, where most scores are at the high end. Parametric 
statistical tests cannot be used with these skewed distributions. Non-parametric 
tests, such as Spearman's rho and the Kruskal-Wallis tests can be used here. 
Another alternative with a non-normal distribution is to transform this variable. 
This involves mathematically modifying the scores using various formulae until 
the distribution looks more normal. There are a number of different types of 
transformation, depending on the shape of the distribution. The logarithm formula 
will be used in our study because the shape of this formula is the closest one to our 
data. Mincer used a logarithm formula as well in most of his studies about earnings 
structure and determination, and it was his model which was employed in the 
present survey. 
3. Collapsing a continuous variable into groups 
This allowed the researcher to divide the sample into equal groups accordin<g to 
respondents' scores on some variables. For example, wage as a continuous variable 
could be divided into two groups using the median as the cut-off point (SR3,000). 
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This creates a new variable that has only two possible values (1 and -'). Each 
person in the sample will be reclassified by wage into one of these groups 
5.4.3 Measuring Data Reliability 
When data estimates are obtained from sample survey data there is often a possibility 
that the estimates might differ from the true figures that could be obtained from the 
entire target population. This difference is referred to as "sampling error". Many 
statistical texts have stated that the accuracy of survey data could be interpreted by- 
application of several useful rules, such as: 
1. Number of Observations 
The aim of a survey is to contact only as many individuals as are necessary to 
produce estimates that closely approximate the actual characteristics of the target 
population. In this study, the sample size section indicates that with more 
individuals surveyed, the greater the accuracy of this study. 
2. Data Variance and Coefficient of Variance 
The closer the data values are to one another the greater the likelihood that the 
estimated average of those values will be very close to the actual average for the 
target population. The variance of the data is the measure of this closeness. The 
coefficient of variance (CV) is a ratio of the variance over the data estimate. This 
measure indicates how far out the estimated value could be from the actual value 
for the target population. Chapter Six details numerous tests regarding the 
coefficient of variance. 
These two rules may be used with various statistical tests to interpret the accuracy 
and normality of the data of this survey. These will be applied and discussed in the 
next chapters. Cases in each variable will be independent, errors will be uncorrelated 
between items, and each pair of items will have a bivariate normal distribution. In 
addition, all the required assumptions of regression: linearity, normality. constant 
variance, and independence of observations, will be followed. 
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5.5 Data Analysis 
5.5.1 Choosing the Right Statistical Technique 
Choosing the correct statistical technique to analyse data is one of most difficult 
parts of the research process. When making this selection, a number of different 
factors have to be considered, such as: the type of question, the type of scales. the 
nature of the data for each variable and the assumptions that must be met for each of 
the different statistical techniques. Identifying the statistical techniques used in other 
related studies should also help in choosing the correct one. 
There are a number of steps that can help the researcher to navigate through the 
decision-making process for the questionnaire (ibid. ). 
Step 1. What questions does the researcher want to address? 
Any researcher should write a full list of all the questions, he or she would like to 
have answered in his or her research. Some questions could be asked in a number of 
different ways. These alternatives can help to cover each of the areas of interest. For 
instance, the effect of education or age on wage level could be asked about different 
ways, such as: 
- Is there a relationship between age and level of wages? 
- Do older employees receive higher wages level than younger employees? 
These two different questions require different statistical techniques. 
Step 2. Identify the nature of each variable 
The next step is to identify the nature of each variable. The researcher should 
determine whether each of the variables is an independent, or a dependent variable. 
These determinations come from an understanding of the topic area, relevant theories 
and previous research. In addition, it is not necessary to specify which variables are 
independent and dependent for analyses such as correlation. For other analyses such 
as regression, it is important to make this clear. 
Knowing the level of measurement for each variable is very important. Different 
statistics are required for variables that are categorical and continuous. Variables 
may be categorical (also referred to as nominal level data, e. g., nationality: Saudi 
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non-Saudi), ordinal (rankings: 1St, 2nd 3rd), or continuous (also referred to as interval 
level data, e. g., age in years, wage in currency, or scores on the attitude scale). 
Step 3. Draw a scatter-plot for each research question 
A diagram guides researchers in trying to explain what they are researching. Three 
key issues should follow with this step. The first key issue which should be 
addressed is whether the researcher is interested in the relationship between two 
variables, or comparing two groups of subjects? The second key issue is whether 
information which has been collected can be summarised and a scatter-plot drawn 
for each question. 
Step 4. A parametric or a non-parametric statistical technique 
Statistical techniques are classified into two main groups: parametric and non- 
parametric. Parametric techniques assume that the underlying distribution of scores 
is normal. In addition, each of the different parametric techniques contains other 
additional assumptions that must be checked before carrying out the analyses. The 
specific assumptions are listed for each of the techniques used in Table 5.1. Both 
parametric and non-parametric statistical techniques were used in this study. 
What should the researcher do if the assumptions for the statistical technique cannot 
be met? Unfortunately, in social science research this is a common situation. In this 
case, a number of choices are available, such as: 
Option 1. Parametric techniques may be used while hoping that this will not 
seriously invalidate the findings. Some statistics writers assert that most approaches 
using a good size sample will tolerate minor violations of assumptions. 
Option 2. Transforming the data if their distribution is not normal so the assumptions 
of the statistical test are met. 
Option 3. Using a corresponding non-parametric technique as an alternative when 
the parametric assumptions are not met. Non-parametric techniques tend to be not as 
powerful, and less sensitive in detecting a relationship or a difference among groups. 
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Step 4. Making the final decision 
Taking into account the steps described above and other studies on "vage 
determination and differences, the researcher selected various statistical techniques 
as being appropriate for this study. These are: 
1. Techniques used to explore relationships among variables. 
A. Chi-square for independence 
B. Correlation 
C. Multiple Regression 
2. Techniques use to explore differences among groups. 
A. Independent-samples t-test 
B. One-way analysis of variance between groups (ANOVA) 
5.5.2 Justification for the Choice of Statistical Techniques 
Each test will be explained separately in detail, then all tests will be summarised in 
Table 5.1. 
A. Chi-square for independence 
The explanation of the Chi-square by Pallant (2001) is very useful. He stated that the 
chi-square test for independence is used to determine whether two categorical 
variables are related. It compares the frequency of cases found in the various 
categories of one variable across the different categories of another variable. Two 
categorical variables with two or more categories in each are needed. The lowest 
expected frequency in any cell should be 5 or more for the main assumption. In 
addition, the significant value needs to be . 
05 or smaller, otherwise the result is not 
significant. This test is used in Chapter Six. 
B. Pearson Correlation: 
This is used to explore the strength of the relationship between two continuous 
variables. The results of this technique indicate both the strength of the relationship 
and the direction (positive or negative). A positive correlation indicates that as one 
variable increases, so does the other. A negative correlation indicates that as one 
variable increases, the other decreases. 
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Table 5.1 
Summary Table of the Characteristics of the Major Statistical Techniques Used 
Purpose Example of Parametric Non- Independent Dependent Essential 
question Statistic Parametric Variable Variables Features 
Alternative 
Exploring What is the None Chi-square One One The number Relationships relationship categorical categorical of cases in between variable: Sex; variable each 
gender and M/F Dropout' category is 
dropout rates complete considered, 
from therapy? therapy: not scores 
Yes No 
Is there a Pearson Spearman's Two One sample 
relationship correlation Rank order continuous with scores 
between age coefficient (r) correlation variables: on two 
and optimism (rho) Age, different 
scores? Optimism measures, of 
scores the same 
measure at 
time 1 and 
time 2. 
How much of Multiple None Set of two or One One sample 
the variance in regression more continuous with scores 
life continuous dependent on all 
satisfaction independent variable: life measures 
scores can be variables: self- satisfaction 
explained by esteem, 
self-esteem, perceived 
perceived control, 
control and optimism 
optimism? 
Which of these 
variables is the 
best predictor? 
Comparing Are males None Chi-square One One You are 
Groups more likely to categorical categorical interested in 
drop out of independent dependent the number 
therapy than variable: Sex variable: of people in 
females? Dropout / each 
complete category, 
therapy not scores 
on a scale. 
Are males Independent Mann- One One Two groups: 
more samples Whitney U categorical continuous different 
optimistic than t-test Test independent dependent people in 
females? variable (two variable: each group 
levels): Sex Optimism 
scores 
Is there a One-way Kruskal One One Three or 
difference in between Wallis categorical continuous more 
optimism groups independent dependent groups: 
scores for ANOVA variable (three variable: different 
people who are or more optimism people 
in 
under 35 levels): Age scores each group 
years, 36-49 group 
years and 50+ 
years? 
Source: Pallant, (2001). 
1 2? 
It is advisable to generate a scatter-plot before performing a correlation analysis. 
This enables one to check for violation of the assumption of linearity and 
homoscedasticity. In addition, it helps to check a number of aspects of the 
distribution of two continuous variables. The distribution of data points can tell us a 
number of things, such as: 1) If the data points are spread all over the place. this 
indicates a very low correlation. 2) If all the points are neatly arranged in a narrow 
cigar shape, this indicates quite a strong correlation. 3) If the line is curved. 
indicating a curvilinear relationship, then the Pearson correlation should not be used. 
The Pearson correlation assumes a linear relationship. 4) If the shape of the cluster 
starts off narrow and then gets fatter, the data may be violating the assumption of 
homoscedasticity. 
A correlation of 0 indicates no relationship at all, a correlation of 1.0 indicates a 
perfect positive correlation, and a value of -1.0 indicates a perfect negative 
correlation. Pallant (2001) listed guidelines that interpret the values between 0 and 1. 
*r =. 10 to . 29 or r=-. 10 to -. 29 small 
*r = . 
30 to . 
49 or r=-. 30 to -. 49 medium 
*r = . 50 to 
1.0 or r=-. 50 to -. 1.0 large 
Spearman's Rank Order Correlation (rho) is also used to calculate the strength of the 
relationship between two continuous variables. It is the non-parametric alternative to 
Pearson's correlation. Both tests are applied in Chapter Six. 
C. Multiple Regression 
Multiple regressions are a more sophisticated extension of correlation. They are used 
to explore the predictive power of a set of independent variables on one continuous 
dependent measure. The researcher should have a sound theoretical or conceptual 
reason for the analysis and the order of variables entering the equation. Multiple 
regression with its actual application are explained in detail in Chapter Seven. 
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5.5.3 Techniques Used to Explore Differences Among Groups. 
A. The Independent-samples t-test 
This is used to compare the mean scores. It compares the values of certain 
continuous variable for two groups, or on two occasions, of two different groups of 
subjects. When applying the t-test, the output box of the independent sample t-test 
shows the results of Levene's test for equality of variances. This tests whether the 
variance (variation) of scores for the two groups is the same. If the significance value 
is larger than . 
05, equal variances are assumed as the first line, then the box should 
be used. On the other hand, if the significance level of Levene's test is . 05 or less, 
equal variances are not assumed and the variances for the two groups are not the 
same. The significant (2-tailed) result helps to determine whether there is a 
significant difference between two groups. Two values are placed in this box with 
significant (2-tailed) column, one for equal variance, and the other for unequal 
variance. Which one is chosen depends on the previous step. If the value in the 
significant (2-tailed) column is equal or less than . 
05, then there is a significant 
difference in the mean scores of the dependent variable for each of the two groups, 
otherwise, there is no significant difference between the two groups (Pallant, 2001 
and Brown, 1991). This test will be conducted in Chapter Six. 
B. One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
This is similar to a t-test, but is used with more than two groups to compare their 
mean scores on a continuous variable. It is called one-way because it measures the 
impact of only one independent variable on the dependent variable. It compares the 
variance between the different groups, with the variability within each of the groups. 
The variance between the groups is given by an F ratio. A large F ratio indicates that 
there is more variability between the groups. In this case, the null hypothesis that 
states that the population means are equal can be rejected (ibid. ). An ANOVA test is 
applied in Chapter Six. 
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5.6 Function Form? 
The previous chapter presented the main theories of wage determinants, with no 
discussion of mathematical derivations or exact functional forms. To implement 
these theories empirically, one must use specific functional forms. The econometric 
literature on earnings has been based for the most part on regression equations of the 
form 
LnYj=f(si, xi, z) + u; i =1,...... n 
where: 
Ln y; = the natural log of earnings or wages for the ith individual: 
S=a measure of schooling or level of educational attainment; 
x; = the human capital stock of experience; 
(ý. 1) 
z; = the factors affecting earnings, such as race, province of residence of the 
individual/province of origin, formal or informal sector and nationality: 
u; =a random disturbance term reflecting unobserved ability characteristics. 
It is possible to obtain some guidance on functional form by using the human capital 
framework and assuming that the foregone earnings are only costs of schooling. The 
rate of return on the first year of education, rl, is computed as incremental benefits 
divided by incremental costs, that is, 
r1= (Yi - Yo)/Yo (5.2) 
where Yl is earnings after one year's education and Yo is earnings without education. 
Equation (5.2) can be rewritten as 
Yi = Yo (1 + rj) 
Similarly for year 2 of schooling, the rate of return r2 is defined as 
r2 = 
(Y2 - yi)/Y1 
where Y2 is earnings after two years' education. This implies that 
YZ =YI(1 +r2)= 
Yo (1 + ri) (1 + r2) 
After s years of schooling, it follows that 
This section is summarised from Berndt, E. R. (1991, pp. 161-167). 
(5.3) 
(5.4) 
(5.5) 
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'S=Yo(1+rl) (1+rz) 
................. (1±r) (5' . 
6) 
If one assumes that the rate of return to education is the same for all levels of 
schooling, that is, ri = r2=........ = rs = r, and if one approximates (1 + r) by e', as one 
can, provided that r is small, then Eq. (5.6) becomes 
ýrs = Yoers (5.7) 
This, with a multiplicative disturbance term eu appended, can be rewritten in 
logarithmic form as 
LnYS=In Yo+rs+u; (5.8) 
Equation (5.8) is the most basic form of the earnings function. Notice that if this 
equation is fitted by least squares to data on schooling and the logarithm of earnings, 
the estimated slope coefficient provides an estimate of r, the private rate of return to 
schooling, and the estimated intercept indicates the predicted level of log earnings in 
the absence of schooling. 
This simple specification of the earnings function has been generalised by Jacob 
Mincer (1974) to take into account the effects of general on-the-job general training. 
One possibility is to illuminate Eq. (5.8) to have the form 
Ln Y; = In Yo +ßjs; +ß2X; + u; (5.9) 
where ßßl is the rate of return to schooling, 
ß2 is the rate of return to on-the-job 
training, and X; is the ith worker's years of labour market experience, usually 
measured as age minus s; minus six years. Further, the human capital theory suggests 
that earnings should, in general, not be constant after leaving school but should 
follow an oval-shape, peaking somewhere in mid-life. This has led Mincer and 
others to suggest Eq. (5.9) to have a form that is linear in schooling, but quadratic in 
experience: 
LnY; =1nYo+ßls; +ß2X; +ß. X2+u; 
(5.10) 
If the earnings function is concave in experience, as is suggested by the human 
capital theory, then estimates of ß2 should be positive, while those of ß3 should be 
negative. Further, to calculate the years of experience for which 1nß'; is greatest. one 
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can differentiate Eq. (5.10) with respect to X;, set the result equal to zero. and then 
solve for X*- This yields that level of experience for which InY; is maximised. 
-ß2/2ß3 (5.11) 
which is independent of the level of schooling S. 
Dummy variables are often used in wage determination. To see how dummy 
variables are applied, recall that in an equation such as Eq. (5.10), the intercept term 
lnYO represents the log of earnings of an individual with no schooling and no 
experience. For a variety of reasons, regardless of the level of schooling or 
experience, suppose that the earning levels of A group were always a constant 
percentage less than those for B group or in other words, that the logarithm of 
earnings for these two groups always differed by a constant absolute amount. If it is 
assumed that differences between group A and sub-group B are constant and 
independent of schooling and experience, it may also be assumed that the rates of 
return on schooling or experience are identical for both groups and that all members 
of these groups have the same slope parameters, ßl, ß2 and ß3, in Eq. (5.10). Despite 
this, the intercept terms will differ. 
The earnings function (5.10) can be modified to incorporate these effects by defining 
a dummy variable called Cl; that takes on the value 1 if the individual is a member of 
the determined group, and, which otherwise is zero. This productive is 
LnY, =1nYo + ajCli +ßjs; +ß2X; +/33X2 + u; (5.12) 
where al represents the constant difference in log earnings for being a member of 
group A rather than being from the remaining population, regardless of the level of 
schooling or experience. 
This simple dummy variable specification can be expanded. Suppose, for example, 
that all individuals were in either the informal or the formal sector and that it is 
hypothesised that the earnings effects of the informal sector are different from those 
of the formal sector, but that rates of return to schooling and experience are identical 
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for all individuals. In addition, the dummy variable can be applied for gender. race. 
nationality, and occupation or industry. 
5.7 Variables 
5.7.1. Dependent Variable: Earnings (Wages) 
Many studies on earnings inequalities seem to prefer the natural logarithm of 
earnings to the actual amount of earnings since the coefficients of variables in terms 
of proportional change may be interpreted more clearly. Gujarati (1988, p. 147) stated 
that 
In the log-line model, lnY; = al + a2 X; + u,, the slope coefficient a2 measures 
the constant proportional or relative change in Y for a given absolute change in 
X, that is: a2 = relative change in Y/absolute change in X If we multiply the 
relative change in Y by 100, this equation will then give the percentage change 
in Y for an absolute change in X In addition, using differential calculus it can 
be shown that a2 = d(In Y)/dX = (1/Y)(dY/dX) _ (dY/Y)/dX which is nothing but 
the previous equation. For small changes in Y and X this may be approximated 
by [(YY -Yi- j)/Yi-rJ/(Xr X1_ j), the subscript t indicating the current value and the 
subscript t-1 indicating the previous value. 
It is very difficult to obtain information about earnings, especially in a country such 
as Saudi Arabia. The researcher may choose one of two methods for collecting 
wages data. The first, is one in which the wages variable is treated as a series of 
classes, such as SR1,000-2,000, SR2,001-3,000 and so on. This method is not 
accurate. The second method is where the wages variable is treated as single or 
individual figures, such as: less than SR1,000, SR1,000, SR1,500 and so on. This 
method that is more accurate and helps one to apply extension econometrics models, 
e. g., the Logit (Logistic) model. This will be explained later in this chapter. 
5.7.2. Independent Variables 
Explanatory variables in this study fall into three main categories: human capital, 
segmented labour market variables, and miscellaneous variables. All these variables 
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to be included will be based on the theoretical literature review (Chapter Four). A 
complete list of the variables and an explanation of each given below: 
A) Human Capital Variables 
1. Education 
The human capital theory states that the education factor is a very important variable 
in determining the earnings model. It maintains that the level of personal earnings 
increases more for those with a higher educational level than it does for those with a 
lower level of education. The following number of years of schooling will be used to 
measure the effect of school years on personal earnings levels in the Saudi Arabian 
labour market: 
6 years for those who completed elementary school. 
9 years for those who completed middle school. 
12 years for those who completed high school. 
14 years for those who completed Polytechnic Institute course. 
16 years for those who completed graduate and postgraduate studies. 
However, a dummy variable method might be applied in order to measure the effects 
of school level on personal earnings. These dummy variables are defined as follows: 
DUMYPRIM = if workers graduated with less than a high school degree; otherwise 
=0, 
DUMYHIGH = if workers graduated with a high school degree; otherwise = 0, 
DUMYDIPL = if workers had a Polytechnic Institute degree; otherwise = 0, 
DUMYCIN = if workers graduated from a college of science; otherwise = 0. 
DUMYART = if workers graduated from a college of art; otherwise = 0. 
DUMYPHD = if workers graduated with a Ph. D. degree; otherwise = 0. 
The elementary school level will be considered as the intercept term or the base 
earnings level of the education factor. 
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2. Experience Factor 
Experience is another important human capital variable. It has been found that the 
years of experience have some effect on personal earnings. Mincer (1974) used age 
as a proxy for experience (age -6 years - schooling years) because of a lack of direct 
information regarding experience. The data in this study contained direct information 
about years of experience. This allowed for computing the years of experience by the 
following methods. Experience may be divided into two types: general and specific. 
While general experience refers to the creation of skills which may be used in any 
firm, specific experience refers to the creation of characteristics or skills which are 
used only in a particular firm. In this study, general experience is computed by 
taking years of total working experience minus years of working experience with the 
current employer, whereas specific experience is computed using years of working 
experience with the current employer. 
Multicollinearity may be an issue since these two experience variables are highly 
correlated with age. Mincer (1974) stated that the quadratic form shows that the best 
fit to the age-earnings profile, thus the square of the general experience, would be 
included in the model. 
3. Training 
In addition, training is a very important factor in determining the earnings model. In 
this study, training is treated as a dummy variable (TRAND = if the worker is having 
training in his/her firm; otherwise = 0). 
B) Segmented Labour Market Variables 
1. Firm Size 
Firm size is widely used in segmented labour market studies because it can be easily 
assessed, relative to other information on firm characteristics. In this study, the 
number of employees is used as a proxy for firm size and is represented as follows: 
1-9,10-19,20-39,40-59,60-79,80-99,100-199,200-299,300-399,400-499, and 
more than 500. The researcher will use 20 workers as the cut-off point for the 
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formal/informal sector classification, on the basis of Decree 50, of 1995, which 
required all firms with more 20 employees to allocate 5 per cent of the number of 
employee openings to Saudi Arabian nationals. 
2. Firm Location 
In general, all firms with large production and high technology tend to be located in 
major industrial areas, close to major suppliers, markets, transportation facilities and 
services. Firms in Dammam, Jubaill, and Al-Hassa; major cities in the Eastern 
Province of Saudi Arabia, will be considered to be in the formal sector. Other« ise. 
firms will be treated as being in the informal sector. By using a dummy, variable the 
formal and informal classification will be easy to apply in this study (1 for firm 
location in a major city; 0 for firm location in a small city or rural area). In other 
words, if the firm is in a big city, FBIGCD = 1; otherwise = 0. 
3. Firm Ownership 
There are many firms in Saudi Arabia owned by both Saudis and non-Saudis. The 
Saudi Commercial Law insists that the ownership of a firm must be 51 per cent 
Saudi and 49 per cent non-Saudi8 .A 
dummy variable, 1 for workers in mixed 
ownership (Saudi with non-Saudi ownership) companies, 0 for workers in full Saudi 
ownership companies. In another words, if the firm is a joint venture, FIRMOWNR 
= 1; otherwise = 0. 
4. Industry 
The Saudi industrial market may be classified into several industries, such as: 
utilities, construction, transportation, communications, wholesale and retail, finance 
and insurance, services, agricultural, oil and petrochemical, and, finally, 
manufacturing. Each of these industries has its own characteristics, which may affect 
personal earnings. To measure the relative effects of the economic industry factor on 
personal earnings levels, the dummy variable method will be used in this study. 
8This Saudi commercial law will be changed soon. The new Saudi commercial law will allow a non- 
Saudi to own 100 percent of a firm as agreed with the WTO. 
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The Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry, RCCI (1995) stated that the 
percentage of Saudi workers in construction was very low. Thus. this will be taken to 
be an intercept term representing the initial earnings level of the industry. This studs' 
will use nine dummy variables to capture a possible industrial segmentation. These 
nine dummy variables are created as follows: if workers are working in utilities 
industries, UTILD = 1; otherwise = 0; if they are in transportation industries. 
TRSPD = 1; otherwise = 0; if they are in the communications industry, COMMD = 
1; otherwise = 0; if they are in wholesale and retail industries, WHRTD =l ; otherwse 
= 0; if they are in financial industries, FIND = 1; otherwise = 0; if they are in 
services industries, SERVD = 1; otherwise = 0; if they are in oil and petrochemical 
industries, OILD = 1; otherwise = 0; if they are in manufacturing industries . 
MAFD 
= 1; otherwise = 0. 
5. Occupation 
The RCCI (1995) found that occupation has an impact on the determination of levels 
of personal earnings. As with the industry data, occupations appear in only five 
classifications: professional or technical, administrative, clerical, sales and service. 
This study will use only four occupation dummy variables. These four dummy 
variables for occupations are created here as follows: if workers are professional or 
technical, PROFD = 1; otherwise = 0; if they are administrative, ADMD = 1; 
otherwise = 0; and if they are sales workers, SALED = 1; otherwise = 0; if they are 
service workers, SERVD = 1; otherwise = 0. 
C. Background Variables 
1. Nationality 
In the Saudi Arabian labour market, nationality is a very important factor in 
determining personal earnings. The researcher believes that there are many cases of 
discrimination, including the following: 1). In the informal sector, discrimination is 
directed against Saudi workers 2). In the formal sector, there are no significant pay 
differences between Saudis and non-Saudis. Therefore, the dummy variable method 
is used to measure the effect of the nationality factor on personal earnings 
levels. If 
the workers are of Saudi nationality, NAT = 1; otherwise = 0. 
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2. Age 
By including age in the models, this study can examine the importance of age in 
determining earnings levels in Saudi Arabia. Age is sometimes used as a proxy' to 
represent experience. For instance, experience equals age minus schooling minus the 
starting age in primary education. 
3. Relevant Additional Variables/ Background Variables 
Two other relevant variables will be examined: marital status and province of origin 
(Eastern Province, Western Province, Southern Province, Northern Province and 
Central Province; and this only for Saudi workers). As mentioned above, all 
independent variables are listed in Appendix C. These independent variables are very 
important in any wage study. Marital status is applied to show the difference in wage 
levels between single and married persons, and province of origin is used to indicate 
the wage inequality between provinces. 
5.8. Regression Model-OLS 
Brown (1991) stated that econometrics is a set of statistical techniques used in the 
analysis of empirical data. Econometricians use a variety of statistical techniques, 
but the main tool is regression analysis. The basic objective of regression analysis is 
to test hypotheses regarding the statistical relationship between two or more sets of 
data. While regression analysis cannot be used to prove that a causal relationship 
exists between the data, regression models are always constructed with the idea of 
causality in mind. That is, we must assume that one variable is affected (caused) by 
the other variables. The causal variables are called independent variables or 
regressors; the variable affected by the independent variable is called the dependent 
variable. 
5.8.1. Major Models 
- Miscellaneous (Background) Variables 
Model: 
Model 1: Ln W= Bo +Bl NAT! + B2 MARSTAT; + B3 URBAN; + B4 PBIRTH; + 
BSAGE, + E1 
13 3 
- Human Capital Mode: 
Model 2: Ln W= Bo +B j ED UCl + B2 ENGLISHL; + B3 COMPL'TRL; + 
B4 CURR TEXPi + E; 
- Segmented Labour Market Model: 
Model 3: Ln W= Bo + Bl NAT; + B2 MARSTAT1 + B3 URBAN1 + B4 PBIRTH; 
+ BSAGECATTI + B6 EDUCI + B7ENGLISHL; + B8 COMPUTRL; 
+ B9 CURRTEXP; + Ei 
Models 1 and 2 represent the background and the human capital models for wage 
determination in the present study. By employing these models, one can estimate the 
total effect of background and human capital variables on wage levels. Model 3 
consists of a combination of Models 1 and 2. In applying Model 3, many aspects, 
such as 1) Nationality (Saudi and non-Saudi), 2) Job Category, 3) Job Skill, 4) Firm 
Ownership, 5) Economic Sector, 6) Employment Category, 7) Province of Origin, 
and 8) Wage Category will be used to determine whether there are any wage 
differences in the segmented labour market, in Saudi Arabian's Eastern private 
sector. Model 3 represents, also, the segmented labour market model of wage 
determinants. From this model, one can further estimate the total effects of the 
segmented labour market variables on wage levels. Moreover, by observing the 
difference in the coefficients for human capital variables in Model 2 and Model 3, it 
is possible to estimate the extent to which the coefficients of human capital variables 
are affected by segmented labour market variables. This procedure is based on the 
assumption that human capital variables affect the segmented labour market 
variables, and not vice versa. This assumption is widely supported in terms of 
theoretical argument and temporal order. (see Abbreviation list for all variables in 
Appendix Q. 
5.8.2. Sub-Major Model 
In this study, there are other new models which may be added to fulfil the needs of 
the study, such as: 
Model 4: Ln W= Variables in Model 1+ NATI 
Model 5: Ln W= Variables in Model 2 +AGE, 
Model 6: Ln W= Variables in Model 2 +AGE, + MARSTAT; + URBAN; 
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Model 7: Ln W= Variables in Model 2 +AGE1 + MARSTAT1 + URBAN + 
PBIRTH, 
5.9 Extension: Logistic Regression9 
In the previous sections it was assumed that the dependent variable 1 was 
quantitative, whereas the explanatory variables were either quantitative or qualitative 
or a mixture of both. The model used in this sub-section shows that the dependent 
variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if formal sector (high wage 
level), and 0, if informal sector (low wage level). Here the dependent variable may 
be dichotomous in nature, taking a1 or 0 value. 
Thus, the Logistic regression model as a standard approach will be used to answer 
the questions: Is the Eastern private labour market in Saudi Arabia segmented? Who 
is in the formal sector and who is in the informal sector? In this section, on 
extension, the Logistic regression model will be used to estimate the likelihood of a 
worker's being in the formal (high wage level) or the informal (low wage level) 
sector. The data and the abbreviation of variables used here will be the same as used 
in the previous models. 
The major change will be in the wage variable which, as a dependent variable should 
be dichotomous. The wage variable was transferred to a dummy variable by using an 
arbitrary annual wage of SR60,000, as a cut-off between the formal sector (high 
wage level) and the informal sector (low wage level). The dummy variable will 
replace the original variable. Logistic regression is useful for positions in which one 
wants to be able to predict the presence or absence of a characteristic of, or outcome 
based on, values of a set of predictor variables. 
The Logistic regression model has the following functional form: 
Ln [P; / 1-P; ] =a+ b; X; +U (5.13) 
N. 9 This part is summarised from Gujarati, Damodar (1999, p. 449), and from Gujarati, Damodar 
(1988, pp. 467-491). 
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where Pi is the probability of being in the formal sector and (1-P, ) is the probability 
of being in the informal sector (or the probability of not being in the formal sector). 
In other words, P; is the probability of being at a high wage level and (1-P, ) is the 
probability of not being at a high wage level. The ratio Pi / (1-P; ), known as the odds 
ratio, is simply the odds in favour of being in formal sector. The natural log of this 
odds ratio is called the Logit, and the model (5.13) is called the Logistic model. The 
Logistic model implies that the log of the odds ratio is a linear function of 
explanatory variables, Xi. The slope coefficient, B;, gives the change in the log of the 
odds ratio per unit change in the Xi. The special feature of the Logistic model is that 
the probabilities are guaranteed to lie within the logical bounds of 0 and 1. 
In addition, the estimate of the Logistic model is carried out two methods. If the 
available data are individual, one can use the method of maximum likelihood (ML) 
to estimate the model. On the other hand, if there is grouped observation, one can 
then use OLS. Brown (1991) confirmed that SPSS has the ability to estimate 
Logistic routines. 
5.10. Conclusion 
The methodology employed in this thesis was for obtaining sufficient information to 
satisfy the basic requirements of the thesis. In the case of the questionnaire used the 
number of respondents, although not any many as was hoped, nevertheless should 
prove adequate for interpreting the situation. The final questionnaire benefited 
greatly from the pilot study, which proved invaluable for framing the appropriate 
questions. The success of the statistical analyses can be judged from the results 
obtain in Chapter Six and Seven which should enable the significant variables to be 
determined and to judge their affects on the wage determinants in the segmented 
labour market. The next chapter (Chapter Six) will present the finding of the survey 
using descriptive statistics. 
1 36 
Chapter Six 
Descriptive and Inferential (Analytical) Statistics 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of the survey which was administered to both 
Saudi and non-Saudi employees in the Eastern private sector of Saudi Arabia. It aims 
to provide a detailed description of the sample under study; so as to enable the reader 
to appreciate the characteristics of the respondents involved. Therefore, many 
descriptive procedures will be explored so that some useful preliminary steps may be 
undertaken before the regression analysis is attempted. Precisely, the main aims are 
to examine the distributions of the variables, to obtain summary measures, to explore 
the strength and direction of the linear relationship between the variables, and to 
assess differences between groups or conditions. 
This chapter is divided into four sections that correspond in the main to the theories 
of wage determinants and differentials mentioned earlier in this study. Within each 
section there may be two different ways of presenting the findings of the survey, one 
that is more suitable for categorical variables (e. g., nationality) and the other for 
continuous variables (e. g., age and wages). For instance, frequencies, percentages of 
responses for each categorical variable, and the mean and the standard deviation for 
each continuous variable are analysed. The reason for the different approaches is that 
some statistics are more appropriate for certain variables than others. Then, 
univariate and bivariate analyses, with some appropriate procedures for testing 
hypotheses, will be used to establish whether there is a statistically significant 
difference between groups, and to determine the strength and direction of the 
relationship between the variables. Although descriptive statistics serve only as a 
first step, they are essential for the development of further inferential analysis. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, when choosing the appropriate statistical test, 
the researcher had to consider the type of questions, items and scales to be included 
in the questionnaire, the nature of the data and the assumption that must be met for 
each of the different statistical techniques. 
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In summary, each term or variable in the following sections will be tested by at least 
three statistical procedures: 
I. Univariate analysis. 
II. Bivariate analysis. 
III. Testing hypotheses. 
All three statistical procedures were explained, in detail, in Chapter Five. Univariate 
analysis describes frequency distributions which researchers use to organise their 
data for statistical analysis. It focuses on measures of central tendency and measures 
of dispersion, which may be used to describe distributions. Bivariate analysis 
examines the relationships between two variables. In addition, the nationality 
variable is used in the bivariate analysis as the control variable. This enables the 
Cross-Tabulation method to be used in this study. The last statistical procedure is the 
testing of hypotheses, which deals with the problem of evaluating population 
characteristics when only the sample evidence is available. This enables the 
researcher to evaluate the accuracy of the estimates. Consequently, parametric and 
non-parametric tests are employed for testing the hypotheses. These methods of 
testing hypotheses were also summarised, together with statistical procedures, in the 
preceding chapter. 
Applying all three statistical procedures to the variables will help to achieve the 
aforementioned main objectives. Note that only univariate tables are presented in this 
chapter, while the others are organised in Appendix D, and the list of abbreviations is 
to be found in Appendix C. The main sections of this chapter are as follows: 
1. Respondents' background variables. 
2. Human capital variables. 
3. Segmented labour market variables. 
4. Current and starting wage variables. 
5. Conclusion. 
6.2. Respondents' Background Variables 
This section analyses the characteristics of the sample in terms of nationality, marital 
status, urbanisation, age category, province of origin, occupational category-, job title 
and level of occupational skill as categorical variables, and age as a continuous 
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variable. It shows that frequencies and percentages provide descriptive statistics of 
categorical variables, and the mean, median and standard deviations describe the 
characteristics of continuous variables. In addition, other statistical tests indicate 
whether there is a statistically significant difference between groups. and what kind 
of relationship exists among the variables. The main categories and the distribution 
of scores on continuous variables are described below. 
6.2.1 Nationality of Employees 
Nationality is a very important factor in determining personal wages. By applying 
statistical tests on the nationality variable, and then on both the nationality and the 
wage variables, significant results were obtained. 
I. Table 6.1 presents the nationality of the respondents. 
Table 6.1 Nationality 
Frequency Per cent 
Saudi 138 41.8 
Non-Saudi 192 58.2 
Total 330 100.0 
Saudis make up 138 respondents (41.8% of the survey). Non-Saudis make up 192 
(58.2% of the survey). This justifies the choice of province, that is the Saudi Eastern 
Province. Saudi and multinational employees work in this province, which makes it 
a good location for collecting data on wages. It also provides a good opportunity to 
study wage structure, determination and difference in Saudi Arabia's labour market. 
II. The W2CT*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table summarises the relationship between 
current annual wage category and nationality. The current wage as a continuous 
variable has been transformed (recoded)10 into a categorical variable. This 
transformation provides a continuous variable with some categorical statistical 
procedures. W2CT 1 refers to a lower annual wage level and W2CT 2 refers to an 
upper annual wage level or category. 
10 Discrete values are assigned to a continuous variable, e. g, current annual wage has been assigned to 
the lower level, which is coded 1 and the upper level coded 2. The wage amount of SR60,000 is taken 
to be a cut-off point. This annual wage is higher than the current annual wage average in this stud> . 
which is SR56,274. 
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This table shows that there are only 46 Saudi employees but more than triple that 
number, 165 of non-Saudi employees, at the lower wage level. On the other hand. 
there are 91 Saudi employees and less than one-third that number, 27. non-Saudi 
employees, at the upper wage level. This suggests that Saudi employees are paid 
higher wages than non-Saudis. 
Next, the appropriate tests for comparing groups are the independent-samples t-test 
(parametric statistic) and its alternative the Mann-Whitney U Test (non-parametric 
statistic). Both these tests require one categorical variable (e. g., nationality) and one 
continuous variable (e. g., current wage). The independent-samples t-test and the 
Mann-Whitney U Test determine whether the two variables in a Cross-Tabulation 
are related or not. 
111.1 The W*NAT Independent Sample Test Table shows that where the significant 
value is less then . 05, then equal variances will not 
be chosen. In addition, where the 
value in the significant (2-tailed) column is less than . 05, then there 
is a significant 
difference in the mean of the annual wage variable (W) as a dependent Variable for 
each of the Saudi and non-Saudi groups. This result is obtained by applying the 
interpretation guide of the output from the independent-samples t-test, as explained 
in the previous chapter. 
111.11 The W*NAT Mann-Whitney U Test is the non-parametric alternative to the t- 
test for independent samples. It shows that when the significant (2-tailed) value is 
less than . 
05, the result is significant. Hence, there is a statistically significant 
difference between the current annual wages of Saudi and non-Saudi employees. 
6.2.2 Marital Status 
1. Table 6.2 shows how many employees are single and how many are married. 
Single employees comprise only 80 respondents (24.2% of the survey), while those 
who are married comprise of 250 respondents (75.8% of the survey). 
These findings 
may be attributed to the importance of marriage in Islam (the religion of 
Saudi 
Arabia), and to Islamic laws, which prohibit sexual relationship outside marriage. 
Therefore, Saudi and non-Saudi employees are encouraged to marry at an early age. 
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Table 6.2 Marital Status 
Frequency Per cent 
Single 80 24.2 
Married 250 75.8 
Total 330 100.0 
II. The relationship between current wage category and marital status is summarised 
in the W2CT*MARSTAT*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table. Nationality is considered 
an additional variable or a control variable. The current wage categories fall into just 
two categories: upper and low wage categories. This helps to show the relationship 
between these two variables. 
As can be seen from the total in each row, 33.3 per cent of the Saudi sample are in 
the lower wage category and 66.7 per cent of the same sample are in the upper one. 
The number of Saudis in the upper wage category is double that in the lower wage 
category, while 51.9 per cent of the single Saudi sample and 28.8 per cent of the 
married Saudi sample are in the lower wage category. This leaves more than 71 per 
cent of married Saudi employees in the upper category. On the other hand, 85.9 per 
cent of the non-Saudi sample are in the lower wage category and only 14.1 per cent 
of this sample are in the upper wage category. This gives an indication as to why the 
Saudiisation process has not progressed as quickly as was hoped. The researcher 
believes that in order to speed up the Saudiisation process it is necessary to take 
account of present wage levels and categories and close the gap between the upper 
and lower wage categories. There are 94.3 per cent of the single non-Saudi and 82.7 
per cent of the non-Saudi married samples in the lower wage category. This leaves a 
small percentage of non-Saudis at the upper level. 
111.1 In the W*MARSTAT Independent Sample Test Table, equal variances are not 
assumed and will not be chosen because the significant value is less than . 
05. 
Likewise, the value in the significant (2-tailed) column is less than . 
05, so there is a 
significant difference in the mean of the annual wage variable (R as a dependent 
variable for both single and married groups. 
111.11 The W*MARSTAT Mann-Whitney U Test shows that the significant (2- 
tailed) value is less than . 05, therefore the result is significant. In other words the 
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difference between the current annual wages of single and married groups is 
statistically significant. 
6.2.3 Urbanisation 
I. From the results shown in Table 6.3, it appears that 258 employees (78.2 % of the 
survey) live in urban areas and seventy-two employees. (21.8% of the survey) live in 
rural areas. 
This suggests that many Saudis have left their hometown to work in the city. This 
raises the following questions: why do Saudis leave their hometown? Why do non- 
Saudis come to Saudi Arabia, especially to the major cities? Are they trying to find a 
better job or a higher wage than in their hometown or country? These important 
questions will be answered below. 
Table 6.3 Urbanisation 
Frequency Per cent 
Urban 258 78.2 
Rural 72 21.8 
Total 330 100.0 
II. The relationship between their current wage category and their urbanisation is 
shown in the W2CT*URBAN*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table. Nationality is taken to 
be a control variable. The 'current wage' had to be reclassified into upper and lower 
categories. These two categories provide more flexibility for Cross-Tabulation 
analysis. 
More upper category Saudi employees live in urban than in rural areas, whereas 
lower category Saudi employees live more in rural areas than in the city. There is no 
significant difference when making the same comparison for non-Saudi employees. 
111.1 In the W*URBAN Independent Sample Test Table, where the significant value 
is less than . 05, then equal variances not assumed are chosen. 
However, where the 
value in the significant (2-tailed) column is less than . 
05, there is a significant 
difference in the mean of the annual wage variable (W) as a dependent variable for 
each of the urban and rural groups. 
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111.11 The W*URBAN Mann-Whitney U Test shows that the significant (2-tailed) 
value is less than . 
05, therefore the result is significant. This leads to the conclusion 
that there is a difference between the current annual wages of urban and rural groups. 
6.2.4 Age Category 
I. The results presented in Table 6.4 show the number of respondents in each a`e 
category. The highest frequencies are in the 25-29 and 30-34 age categories. This 
indicates that most private sector employees in Saudi Arabia are between 25 and 39 
years of age. The frequency decreases after 40 years old for many reasons, such as 
some employees requesting early retirement, others leaving the company and 
opening their own businesses and, in some cases, the companies ending work 
permits for non-Saudi employees because they are over-budget. 
Table 6.4 Age Category 
Age Category Frequency Per cent 
20-24 27 8.2 
25-29 75 22.7 
30-34 79 23.9 
35-39 55 16.7 
40-44 44 13.3 
45-49 31 9.4 
50-54 17 5.2 
55-59 1 0.3 
60-64 1 0.3 
Total 330 100.0 
II. The relationship between the current wage category and the age category is 
summarised in the W2CT*AGECATT*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table. Once more, 
the current wage category falls into just two categories, upper and lower. Nationality 
is taken as the control variable. Hence, the relationship between these two variables 
has improved. The percentage of lower-waged Saudi employees (73.7%) aged 20-24 
years old is almost triple the percentage of upper-waged Saudi employees (26.3%) in 
the same age category. Almost 94 per cent of Saudi employees aged between 40 and 
44 are in the upper wage category, whereas most non-Saudi employees over the 
entire age range are in the lower wage category. 
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111.1 In the W*AGECATT*NAT ANOVA Table, the null hypothesis is rejected. and 
there is a difference in wages or wage level between age groups because the F value 
is far from 1. The overall significant value is less than . 05, therefore there is a 
significant difference in the mean scores on annual wage variable (if) for all age 
groups. 
111.11 In the W*AGECATT*NAT Kruskal-Wallis Test Table, the significant value is 
less than . 05, and there is a statistically significant difference in the (W) variable 
across the age groups (AGECATT). 
6.2.5 Province of Origin/Place of Birth 
I. The results in Table 6.5 show that the highest frequency is for those born in the 
Eastern Province, followed by the Central and Southern Provinces. The lowest 
frequency is for those born in the Western and Northern Provinces. The province of 
origin variable was compared with the wage variable to determine whether the 
Eastern Saudi employees have the highest wage on average. Stiglitz (1993) stated 
that wage discrimination exists if individuals with the same economic characteristics 
receive different wages and the differences are systematically correlated with certain 
non-economic (e. g., province of origin) characteristics of the individual. Note that 
non-Saudi employees are not singled out by country, as they came from so many 
different countries, which makes applying such a statistical test very difficult. 
Table 6.5 Province of Origin/Place of Birth 
Province of Origin Frequency Per cent 
Eastern Province 82 24.8 
Western Province 6 1.8 
Southern Province 15 4.5 
Northern Province 5 1.5 
Central Province 14 4.2 
Other Country 208 63.0 
Total 330 100.0 
II. The relationship between current wage category and province of origin is 
highlighted in the W2CT*PBIRTH*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table. The question of 
possible wage discrimination between non-Saudi employees is ignored here for the 
above reasons stated above. Employees born in the Eastern Province obtained the 
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Lowest and highest percentages (40 % and 60%) in the lower and upper wage levels 
respectively, likewise the other provinces obtained their lowest and highest 
percentages in the lower and upper wage levels respectively. 
111.1 In the One Way Analysis of the Variance Table (W*PBIRTH*N. AT ANO'. A). 
the F value confirms that there is a difference in wage between province of origin 
groups. The significant value is less than . 05. Therefore, there is a significant 
difference in the mean of the annual Saudi wage variable (W), according to province 
of origin (PBIRTI- ). 
111.11 The W*PBIRTH*NAT Kruskal-Wallis Test Table shows that the significant 
value is less than . 
05, and so there is a statistically significant difference in the 
continuous variable (W) according to the province of origin for Saudi employees 
(PBIRTB). 
6.2.6 Occupational Category 
I. Table 6.6 charts differences in the frequencies of all employees. There are five 
occupational categories. The highest frequency is professional or technical and the 
lowest is sales marketing. Ehrenberg and Smith (1994) showed that the highest 
paying occupations are executive and professional. On the other hand, machine 
operators and assemblers receive the lowest pay. Using statistical techniques to 
compare wage and occupation categories or actual occupation name in Saudi 
Arabia's Eastern market, attempts were made to determine whether the Saudi 
Arabian sample would confirm Ehrenberg and Smith's result. 
Table 6.6 Occupational Category 
Occupational Category Frequency Per cent 
Professional or Technical 131 39.7 
Administrative 76 2 3.0 
Production Worker 40 12.1 
Accounting or Financial 35 10.6 
Other 29 8.8 
Sales and Marketing 19 5.8 
Total 330 100.0 
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II. The W2CT*JOBCATT*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table summarises the 
relationship between current wage category and job category. Saudis who work as 
professional; accountants and production workers are mainly at the upper wage lev e1. 
Others are at the lower wage level. On the other hand, most non-Saudi employees are 
at the lower wage level, no matter what kind of occupational category they are in. 
111.1 Next, the appropriate tests for comparing more than three groups are the 
ANOVA Test (parametric statistic) and its alternative, the Kruskal-Wallis Test (non- 
parametric statistic). Both these tests require one categorical variable with more than 
two groups (i. e., JOBCATT) and one continuous variable (i. e.. current wage). The 
ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis Tests determine whether the two variables in a Cross- 
Tabulation are related or not. 
The W*JOBCATT*NAT ANOVA Table shows that the null hypothesis is rejected 
and there is a difference in wages between job category or type. The F value is 3.77 
and the significant value is less than . 05. Therefore, there are significant differences 
in the mean scores on the annual wage variable (W) for all occupational category 
groups. 
111.11 The W*JOBCATT*NAT Kruskal-Wallis Test Table shows that the significant 
value is less than . 05, and there is a statistically significant difference in the 
continuous variable (W) across the occupational job category groups (JOBCATT). 
6.2.7 Job Title 
A list of job titles for most of the employees in the survey is presented in Table 6.7. 
It shows that this survey covers many job levels. For instance, it includes high paid 
jobs such as general manager, down to lower paid jobs such as cook/chef. It shows 
that the highest frequencies are accountants, inspectors, administrative staff and 
mechanical engineers. On the other hand, the lowest frequencies are many, such as 
general manager, and deputy general manager. Fifty-four job titles are not on the list 
either because the respondents did not give an answer, or because their current job 
title is not included in the list in the questionnaire. These fifty-four jobs were 
therefore classified as "other" jobs in order to include them in the study. The whole 
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list should be very useful for the Saudi Ministry of Labour and Social affairs in 
planning for future needs. 
6.7 Job Title 
Job; Title °t "` rs 're üen 74'. -ob Title Fr uen C-Y -T Other 54 16.4 Purchases 5 1.5 
Representative 
Inspector 20 6.1 Branch Manger 5 1.5 
Accountant 20 6.1 Computer 5 1.5 
Engineer 
Administrative 19 5.8 Purchases 4 1 
Staff Manager . 
Mechanical 16 4.8 A/C Technician 4 1 
Engineer . 
Mechanic 14 4.2 Public Relations 4 1 2 
Technician Manager . 
Electrical 13 3.9 Sales Manager 3 0.9 
Technician 
Machinist 11 3.3 Architect 3 0.9 
Computer 10 3.0 Carpenter 3 0.9 
Operator 
Secretary 10 3.0 Operator 2 0.6 - 
Sales 9 2.7 House 2 0.6 
representative Kee er/Janitor 
Electrical 9 2.7 Construction 2 0.6 
Engineer Inspector 
Pursuer/ 8 2.4 Plumber/Pipe 2 0.6 
Representative Fitter 
Warehouse 7 2.1 Builder 2 0.6 
Manager 
Treasurer 7 2.1 Heavy Equipment 2 0.6 
Drive 
Civil Engineer 7 2.1 General Manager 2 0.6 
Chief 6 1.8 Filings Employees 1 0.3 
Accountant 
Mechanic 6 1.8 Electrical 1 0.3 
Ins ector 
Programmer 6 1.8 Deputy General 1 0.3 
Manager 
Cook/Chef 6 1.8 Administrator 1 0.3 
Driver 6 1.8 Director of 1 0.3 
Finance 
Entry Clerk 5 1.5 Expeditor 1 0.3 
Welder 5 1.5 Total 330 100.0 
147 
Job titles are introduced so as to describe the nature and characteristics of the sample 
gathered from the survey. Moreover, they enable the researcher to understand and 
appreciate the type of respondents included in the sample. 
6.2.8 Level of Occupational Skill. 
I. The results shown in Table 6.8 show that there are four categories: skilled. semi- 
skilled, unskilled and unknown. From the survey results obtained it may be seen that 
out of a total of 330 employees, the professional skilled (197) have the highest 
percentage and the unskilled the lowest (4). Later in this section more detailed 
information will be given about the Saudi and non-Saudi employees in each 
category. 
Table 6.8 Level of Occupational Skill 
Level of Occupational Skill Frequency Per cent 
Professional/ Skilled 197 59.7 
Semi-Skilled 113 34.2 
Unskilled 4 1.2 
I Don't Know 16 4.8 
Total 330 100.0 
II. The W2CT* JOB SKILL *NAT Cross-Tabulation Table shows that at the upper 
wage level, the percentage of skilled and semi-skilled Saudis is greater than the 
percentage of unskilled Saudis. At the lower wage level, the percentage of semi- 
skilled and other non-Saudis is higher than the percentage of skilled non-Saudis. 
111.1 Is the null hypothesis true? Is there no wage difference between the levels of 
occupational skill? A large value for the F ratio indicates that the sample means vary 
more than one would expect if the null hypothesis were true. A small significant 
value indicates that the null hypothesis is not true. The W*JOBSKILL*NAT 
ANOVA Table shows that the value of F is smaller than 1 and the significant value 
is larger than . 05. In this case one cannot reject the null 
hypothesis and there is no 
difference in wage or wage level according to level of occupational skill. 
111.11 The W*JOBSKILL*NAT Kruskal-Wallis Test Table shows that the 
significant value is larger than . 
05, which indicates that there is not a statistically 
significant difference in the continuous variable across the four groups. 
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6.2.9 Age 
1. Age is considered as a continuous variable. At this stage it would be meaningless 
to compute the frequency distribution. Age, as actual data, would be measured at the 
interval level. Therefore, mean and variance or standard deviation should be 
computed here. Table 6.9 shows that there are 329 respondents. this means that one 
value is missing. The range of ages is from 21 to 62 years, with a mean of 34.90 and 
a standard deviation of 8.33. 
Table 6.9 Descriptive Statistics for Age 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
AGE 329 21 62 34.90 8.33 
111.1 The strength and direction of the linear relationship between two variables is 
described by correlation analysis. The Pearson product-moment coefficient is used 
because age and wage variables are continuous (interval level). Its alternative, the 
Spearman rank order correlation, is used also. 
The size of the value of Pearson correlation (r) can range from -1.00 to 1.00. This 
range indicates the strength of the relationship between two variables. As is known, a 
correlation of 0 indicates no relationship at all, a correlation of 1.0 indicates a perfect 
positive correlation and a value of -1.0 indicates a perfect negative correlation, 
following Pallant's (2001) guidelines, as mentioned in Chapter Five. The W* AGE 
Person Correlation Table shows that there is a medium positive correlation between 
age and wage variables. 
111.11 Moreover, in W*AGE Spearman's rho Correlation Table confirms that there is 
a medium positive correlation between the two variables. 
6.3 Human Capital Variables. 
The human capital theory is the most dominant economic theory of wage 
determination. Most research related to the human capital theory has used variables 
such as education, experience and training to illustrate this theory. Education, 
level 
of English, level of computer skills, and current and previous experience are 
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analysed in this section to show the human capital character of the sample in the 
Saudi labour market. 
6.3.1 Education 
The results presented in Table 6.10 show the number of employees in the sample. at 
each education level, for both Saudis and non-Saudis. Education is a very important 
factor in determining the earnings model. In Table 6.10 it is treated, as a categorical 
variable, which means one has to use dummy variables to run a regression. Some 
studies have used years of education instead. For instance, 12 years is used to 
indicate the employees having a high school qualification and 16 years indicates that 
he has a Bachelor's degree. This helps in the use of the education variable as a 
continuous variable. Thus, there is no need for a dummy variable to run a regression. 
Table 6.10 Education Level 
Educational Level Frequency Per cent 
Primary School 6 1.8 
Elementary School 17 5.2 
High School 86 26.1 
Diploma 68 20.6 
Bachelor of Science 109 33.0 
Bachelor of Art 30 9.1 
Master's Degree 13 3.9 
Ph. D. Degree 1 0.3 
Total 330 100.0 
I. Table 6.10 shows that 109 employees have Bachelor of Science degrees and only 
thirty employees have a Bachelor of Art. That suggests that graduates with a 
Bachelor of Science have a better chance of getting a job. The number of employees 
who have a high school and diploma is greater than those with a Bachelor of Art 
degree. Is the return to education, therefore, large or small in the Eastern labour 
market of Saudi Arabia? Cross-tabulation and regression analysis are employed in an 
attempt to answer these questions. 
II. The W2CT*EDUC*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table shows that on the whole the 
percentages of Saudis at the upper level are greater than the percentages of Saudis at 
the lower level, except in the Master's category. The percentage of Master's debgrees 
at the upper wage level is only 33.3, that is half the percentage at the lower wage 
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level. By contrast, all the percentages of the non-Saudis at the lower wage level are 
greater than those at the non-Saudi upper wage level. 
111.1 Does the W*EDUC*NAT ANOVA Table show any wage difference between 
the various education levels? A small value for significant and a high value for F 
indicates that the null hypothesis is not true. Here the F value is 1171 which is 
greater than 1 and the significant value is . 037, which is smaller than . 
05, therefore 
the null hypothesis is rejected. The large F value indicates that the sample means 
vary more than one would expect if the null hypothesis were true. The small 
significant value also indicates that the null hypothesis is not true. 
111.11 The W*EDUC*NAT Kruskal-Wallis Test Table shows that the significant 
value is smaller than . 05, which indicates that there is a statistically significant 
difference in the continuous variable across all education levels or groups in this 
sample. Would the results be the same if one treats education as a continuous 
variable? An analysis of the current wage as compared with the number of years of 
education should answer this question. 
Ii. In Table 6.10i education is considered as a continuous variable. Education, as 
actual data, is measured at the interval level. Therefore, mean and variance or 
standard deviation is computed here for all 330 respondents with no missing value. 
This table indicates that most employees, in so far as the sample is representative, 
have a higher than diploma level of education and that the average time spent in 
education is 14.5 years. 
Table 6.10i Education as a Continuous Variable 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
EDUCONT 330 6.00 22.00 14.4697 2.7950 
Ili. The relationship between current wage category and education category is 
summarised in the W2CT*EDUCONT*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table. Again, the 
current wage has two levels, upper and lower. Nationality is considered an additional 
variable or a control variable. This helps to show the relationship between those two 
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variables more clearly. With an increasing number of years of education there is an 
increase in those at the upper wage level and a decrease in the proportion at the 
lower wage level for both Saudi and non-Saudi employees. 
HIM The Pearson product-moment coefficient is used to show the strength and 
direction of the linear relationship between the variables for current wage and 
number of years of education. Again, following Pallant's (2001) guidelines, the 
W*EDUCONT Person Correlation Table presents the Pearson correlation and shows 
that there is a medium positive correlation between the number of years of education 
and the wage category variables. 
III. II1 The alternative, the Spearman rank order correlation, is also used. The 
W*EDUCONT Spearman rho Table confirms that there is a medium positive 
correlation between the variables for wage and the number of years of education. 
6.3.2 Level of English 
1. Table 6.11 indicates that most employees in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia 
have an intermediate level of English. This reflects the fact that the main business 
language in the Eastern Province is English. Is there any kind of relation between 
wages and level of English? What is the English level of Saudis and non-Saudis? 
Applying cross-tabulation to these two variables will clarify some issues. The level 
of English is treated here as a categorical variable. In addition, analysis of variance 
as a parametric test and the Kruskal-Wallis Test as a non-parametric test are used, as 
these should provide relevant answers. 
II. The W2CT*ENGLISHL*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table shows that for lower 
wage level Saudis the percentages of intermediate and advanced English levels are 
lower than for other groups. There is no substantial difference at percentages of 
English levels for lower wage non-Saudis except in the advanced English level. At 
the advanced level, 31.9 per cent of non-Saudis are at the upper wage level and 68.1 
per cent of them are at the lower wage level. 
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Table 6.11 Level of English 
Level of English Fri n. Pnrv 
None 7 jv ýl L 
Beginner 35 10.6 
Intermediate 175 53.0 
aavancea 113 34.2 
Total 330 100.0 
111.1 Does the W*ENGLISHL*NAT ANOVA Table show no wage difference 
between English levels? If so, the null hypothesis would be rejected. A large F value 
and a small significant value indicate that the null hypothesis is not true. Here the F 
value is 13.190, that is bigger than 1, and the significant value is less than . 
05. so the 
null hypothesis is rejected. The large F value indicates that the sample means vary 
more than one would expect if the null hypothesis were true. 
111.11 The W*ENGLISHL*NAT Kruskal-Wallis Test Table shows that the 
significant value is less than . 05, which indicates that there is a statistically 
significant difference in our continuous variable across the four English groups. 
6.3.3 Level of Computer Skills 
1. Level of computer skills is also treated as a categorical variable. Are Saudi 
employees more skilled than non-Saudis? Is there any kind of relation between level 
of computer skill and wages? Table 6.12 indicates the number of employees at each 
level. The intermediate level has the highest number of employees. There is no great 
difference in the number of employees with beginner and advanced levels of 
computer skills. Therefore, there is a demand for computer skills in the Eastern 
labour market of Saudi Arabia. 
II. The W2CT*COMPUTRL*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table shows, in general, that 
the percentages increase with an increase in computer skill for all Saudi and non- 
Saudi employees at the upper wage level. On the other hand, the percentages 
decrease with an increase in computer skill for Saudi and non-Saudi employees at 
the lower wage level. 
111.1 Does the W*COMPUTRL*NAT ANOVA Table show the null hypothesis to be 
true? Is there no wage difference according to level of computer skills? .\ 
large F 
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value indicates that the sample means vary more than one would expect if the null 
hypothesis were true. A small significant value indicates that the null hypothesis is 
not true. The ANOVA Table shows that the F value is large and the significant value 
is less than . 
05. In this case one may reject the null hypothesis. There is a difference 
in wages according to level of computer skills. 
Table 6.12 Level of Computer Skills 
Level of Computer Skills Frequency Per cent 
None 54 16.4 
Beginner 77 23.3 
Intermediate 127 38.5 
Advanced 71 21.5 
Missing 1 0.3 
Total 330 100.0 
111.11 The W*COMPUTRL*NAT Kruskal-Wallis Test Table shows that the 
significant value is less than . 05, 
indicating that there is a statistically significant 
difference in the continuous variable across the four groups of computer skills. 
6.3.4 Experience 
1. As mentioned earlier, many studies have used age as a proxy for experience (age - 
years of schooling -6 years). For instance, Mincer (1974) used this formula in his 
study because of a lack of direct information on experience. Number 6 is equated 
with 6 years old, the age for enrolling in primary school. The data collected from the 
survey gave direct information concerning years of experience. The mean and 
standard deviations are calculated in Table 6.13 because the experience variable is 
considered to be a continuous one. This table shows two kinds of experience: current 
and previous experience. Current experience ranges from 0 to 30 years with a mean 
of 7.7 years and a standard deviation of 6.6. Previous experience ranges from 0 to 28 
years with a mean of 5.1 years and a standard deviation of 5.9; zero means that there 
is no experience. 
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Many studies have found that years of experience have some effect on personal 
earnings. Does the experience variable collected in this survey show any effect on 
personal wages in Saudi Arabia? 
111.1 Because experience and current wage are continuous variables (interval level), 
the Pearson product-moment coefficient and the Spearman rank order correlation are 
used for correlation analysis. Correlation analysis shows the strength and direction of 
the linear relationship between the two variables. 
Table 6.13 Experience 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
How many years of 330 0 30 7.68 6.54 
experience do you have in 
your present position? 
How many years of 330 0 28 5.03 5.85 
previous experience before 
present occupation? 
Following Pallant's (2001) guidelines, as mentioned in the methodology chapter of 
this thesis, the W*CURRTEXP Pearson Correlation Table indicates that there is a 
medium positive correlation between the current wage and current experience 
variables and also between the current wage and previous experience variables. 
Moreover, The W*CURRTEXP Spearman's rho Table confirms that there is a 
medium positive correlation between them. 
111.11 The strength of the relationship between the current wage and previous 
experience is shown by the W*PREVEXP Pearson Correlation Table. It shows that 
the two variables have a medium positive correlation. The W*PREVEXP 
Spearman's rho Table confirms this result. 
6.4 Segmented Labour Market Variables 
The labour market is characterised by the coexistence of a formal and an informal 
sector. Many studies have taken place in developing countries since the ILO study on 
Kenya emphasised the importance of the informal sector. In the present study. four 
criteria were applied in order to distinguish between the formal and the informal 
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sectors in the Saudi labour market. This provides the opportunity to study wage 
differences between the two sectors. The criteria used were: 
6.4.1 Firm Ownership 
1. From the output shown in Table 6.14, it appears that 236 employees (71.5 % of the 
survey) work in Saudi firms and 84 employees (25.5 %) work in joint venture firms. 
Only ten employees work in non-Saudi firms. Fewer employees work for joint 
venture and non-Saudi firms than for Saudi firms. 
Table 6.14 Firm Ownership 
Firm Ownership Frequency Per cent 
Owned by Saudis 236 71.5 
Owned by Non-Saudis 10 3.0 
Joint Venture 84 25.5 
Total 330 100.0 
Does this distinction of firm ownership help to distinguish between the formal and 
the informal sectors of the Saudi labour market? Does the wage differential go along 
with other studies, which found personal wages in the informal sector to be lower 
than those in the formal sector? Are all joint venture and non-Saudi firms in the 
formal sector? Are some Saudi firms in the informal sector? All these questions will 
be dealt with, in detail, below. The sample is taken as representative of the Eastern 
Province of Saudi Arabia's private sector labour market. 
II. The W2CT*FIRMOWNR*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table shows that more Saudi 
and non-Saudi employees who work in joint ventures are at the upper wage 
level 
than are at the lower wage level. Moreover, there is a slight difference between upper 
and lower levels for Saudi employees in Saudi firms. There are more non-Saudi 
employees at the lower wage level than the upper wage level in both 
Saudi and non- 
Saudi firms. 
111.1 Looking at the W*FIRMOWNR ANOVA Table, the null hypothesis would be 
rejected. A large F value and a small significant value indicate that the null 
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hypothesis is not true. Here the F value is 60.148, that is bigger than 1. and the 
significant value is less than . 
05, so the null hypothesis is rejected. There is a 
difference in wages across the three kinds of firm ownership. 
111.11 In the W*FIRMOWNR Kruskal-Wallis Test Table, the significant value is less 
than . 
05, which indicates that there is a statistically significant difference in our 
continuous variable across the three kinds or groups of firm ownership 
6.4.2 Type of Firm 
1. Table 6.15 indicates that the highest number of employees is to be found in 
industry and the lowest is in insurance and transportation. The service sector is 
placed after the industrial sector. It has 69 employees. There is almost no difference 
between the commercial sector and the agricultural sector in terms of employee 
numbers. Each of these sectors has its own characteristics, which could affect 
personal earnings. 
II. The W2CT*FIRMTYPE*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table shows that at the lower 
wage level, there are a high percentage of Saudi employees in the commercial, 
agricultural and services sectors, although non-Saudis are found in all the sectors. At 
the upper wage level, with the exception of the commercial and agricultural sectors, 
Saudi percentages are high, and percentages of non-Saudi employees are low in all 
sectors except the industrial. 
111.1 Is there a wage difference between sectors? Would the null hypothesis be 
rejected? The W*FIRMTYPE ANOVA Table reveals a large F value and a small 
significant value. This indicates that the null hypothesis is not true. Here the F value 
is 14.281 which is larger than 1 and the significant value is less than . 
05. Therefore 
the null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 6.15 Type of Firm 
Type of Firm Frequency Per cent Industrial 113 34.2 
Commercial 38 11.5 
Agricultural 35 10.6 
Finance and Insurance 5 1.5 
Transportation 6 1.8 
Construction 37 11.2 
Services 69 20.9 
Others 27 8.2 
Total 330 100.0 
111.11 The above results are confirmed by the W*FIRMTYPE Kruskal-Wallis Test 
Table. This shows that the significant value is less than . 05, which 
indicates that 
there is a statistically significant difference in the continuous variable across the 
sectors. 
6.4.3 Number of Employees 
1. Number of employees is widely used in segmented labour market studies because 
this information can be obtained easily compared with other information or criteria 
regarding a firm's characteristics. More than 20, more than 40 and equal and more 
than 500 employees will be used as the cut-off points for the formal and informal 
sector classification. Decree 50 (1995) requires all firms with more than 20 
employees to allocate 5 per cent of the number of employee openings to Saudi 
Arabian nationals. This implies that it is appropriate to consider 20 employees as the 
cut-off point in this study. The second cut-off point, which is 40 employees, was 
chosen because the Saudi Chamber of Commerce and Industry used it in 1992 to 
distinguish between large and small firms. More than `500 employees' is taken as the 
third cut-off point, but many studies have used only 300 employees. However, in the 
sample area some firms had more than 500 employees (see Table 6.16). so 500 
seemed a more suitable choice. The number of employees in the informal sector was 
32 in the 20 category and 58 in 40 category. The strength of the relationship between 
wage and number of employees as polling data will be analysed. This variable, i. e., 
'number of employees', has been transformed into a category variable, number 1 
being employees in the informal sector and number 2 being employees in the formal 
sector. This should help to distinguish between the formal and informal sectors and 
ascertain the wage differences between sectors. 
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II. In all W2CT*EMYCAT (20,40 or 500)*NAT Cross-Tabulation Tables. 
percentages of Saudi and non-Saudi employees at the lower wage level are greater in 
the informal sector than in the formal sector. On the other hand, their percentages at 
the upper wage level are greater in the formal sector than in the informal sector. 
111.1 Is there any wage difference between the employees groups? Does the 
W*EMYCAT ANOVA Table show the null hypothesis to be true? Sample means 
vary more than would be expected. The ANOVA Table shows that the value of F is 
large and the significant value is less than . 05. In this case one can reject the null 
hypothesis and there is a wage difference between the employees groups. 
Table 6.16 Number of Employees 
Employees Category Frequency Per cent 
1-9 18 5.5 
10-19 14 4.2 
20-39 26 7.9 
40-59 14 4.2 
60-79 11 3.3 
80-99 19 5.8 
100-199 15 4.5 
200-299 18 5.5 
300-399 6 1.8 
400-499 22 6.7 
500-more 165 50.0 
Unknown 2 0.6 
Total 330 100.0 
111.11 The W*EMYCAT Kruskal-Wallis Test Table shows that the significant value 
is less than . 05, which 
indicates that there is a statistically significant difference in 
our continuous variable across the employees groups. 
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6.4.4 Firm Classification" 
I. The Saudi Chamber of Commerce and Industry reclassifies each firm every year. 
This classification depends on many factors such as capital, ownership. number of 
employees and revenues. There are three categories: high, medium and lo«. 
according to the fees they pay to the Saudi Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 
Depending on the level of fees, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry publicises 
details of the company, with the largest firms which pay the highest fees getting the 
most publicity and receiving the highest level of service from the chamber. These 
categories may be used to distinguish between large and small firms, with the lowest 
category applying to the small firms. 
Table 6.17 shows that 124 employees (37.6 % of the survey sample) work in higher 
firms and 89 employees (27% of the survey sample) work in medium firms. Only 30 
employees (0.9% of the survey sample) work in low firms. This thesis uses the high 
and medium categories as the cut-off point for the formal and the informal sectors. 
What will the wage level be in the formal and informal sectors in the Eastern 
Province of Saudi Arabia? Is there a wage difference between these two sectors? 
Attempts will be made, below, to answer these questions. 
II. The W2CT*FIRMGRAD*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table shows that, at high and 
medium levels, the percentages of Saudis at the upper wage level are much higher 
than the percentages at the lower wage level. On the other hand, non-Saudi 
percentages at the lower wage level are higher than the percentages at the upper 
level. 
111.1 Is there a wage difference among grade levels? Should the null hypothesis be 
rejected? In the W*FIRMGRAD*NAT ANOVA Table, a large F value and a small 
significant value indicate that the null hypothesis is not true. The F value is 12.716, 
which is greater than 1, and the significant value is less than . 
05, so the null 
hypothesis is rejected. 
"The Saudi Chamber of Commerce and Industry directory has many levels, but for simplicity only 
three classification levels (high, medium, and low) are considered here. 
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111.11 The W*FIRMGRAD*NAT Kruskal-Wallis Test Table shows that the 
significant value is less than . 
05, which indicates that there is a statistically 
significant difference in our continuous variable across the grade levels. 
Table 6.17 Firm Classification 
Firm Categories Frequency Per cent 
High 124 37 
Medium 89 27 
Low 30 0.9 
Unknown 87 26.1 
Total 330 100.0 
6.5 Current and Starting Wages (Salaries) Variables 
1. Wages are an important issue for everyone. To the firms wages represent cost. to 
the worker they represent income and to the whole country they represent potential 
taxes. Three kinds of wages are explained in this section: current, without fringe 
benefits and actual starting wages. 
Table 6.18 Current and Starting Wage Variables 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
SR SR SR Deviation 
SR 
What is your current 329 500 24,000 4,881.10 4,664.79 
monthly wage? 
What is your current 301 500 18,810 4,130.97 3,615.71 
monthly wage without 
fringe benefits 
How much was your 317 150 120,000 3,397.39 7,383.18 
starting (first) wage? 
In Table 6.18 the information for each of the wage types is summarised. All the 
variables are continuous. A mean and standard deviation plus minimum and 
maximum are the appropriate tests for these continuous variables. 
With regard to 
current monthly wage, this ranges from SR500 to SR24,000 with a mean of 
SR4,881.10 and a standard deviation of SR4,664.79. The mean of the current 
monthly wage is higher than the mean of the current monthly wage without 
fringe 
benefits. In addition, the mean of the actual starting wage is smaller than other means 
in the table. Are the above tests sufficient for our study? Is there any kind of 
correlation? What test should be chosen cross-tabulation, and non-parametric or 
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parametric tests? The answers to most of these questions have been provided in the 
previous sections so there is no need to repeat tables that indicate the relationship or 
differences between wage variables (as dependent variables) and closely related 
variables (independent variables). The next chapter will examine these variables by 
using a regression procedure in order to answer any questions that remain. 
111.1 Because the annual current wage and first wage are a continuous variable 
(interval level), a Pearson product-moment coefficient and a Spearman rank order 
correlation are used to show the strength and direction of the linear relationship 
between them. Following Pallant's (2001) guidelines, the W*ANLFTWAG Pearson 
Correlation Table indicates that there is a medium positive correlation between the 
current wage and the first wage variables. 
111.11 Moreover, the W*ANLFTWAG Spearman's rho Table confirms that there is a 
large positive correlation between the two variables. 
6.6 Conclusion 
The results of each variable have been organised in a simple form that is suitable for 
use in addressing the research questions. The first procedure summarised patterns 
in 
the responses of people in the sample. The second procedure examined bivariate 
relationships between variables. The results have been shown 
in the Cross- 
Tabulation Tables. These tables have revealed that most Saudis in the Eastern 
Province are paid a higher wage than non-Saudis. When using testing hypothesis as 
the third procedure, this revealed whether there was a significant relationship or a 
difference between the dependent variable and the independent variables. 
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Chapter Seven 
Wage Regression Models 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters the theoretical models of wage determination and the 
findings of the wage survey administered to both Saudi and non-Saudi employees in 
the Eastern private sector of Saudi Arabia were presented. The present chapter 
provides more empirical evidence for the wage structure. its determinants and the 
differences in Saudi Arabia's Eastern private labour market by, using multiple 
regression models. 
In order to discover relevant empirical results, several regression models were 
applied that corresponded to the theories of earning determination mentioned earlier 
in this study. These regression models show econometric estimations of the 
relationship between annual wage as a dependent variable and a set of independent 
variables such as background, human capital and segmented variables. Only 
predicted wage regression tables are presented in this chapter. The list of 
abbreviations and figures are to be found in Appendices C and E, respectively. The 
main sections of this chapter are headed as follows: 
1. Applying general assumptions of multiple regression 
2. Respondents' background variables 
3. Human capital variables 
4. Segmented labour market 
5. Appropriate econometrics models 
6. Conclusion 
For consideration: 
1. Most sections include some econometric linear and natural log models. Violations. 
detection and correcting of regression assumptions are also included. 
2. There are some wage studies that use, in their regression models, both age and 
experience variables, and other studies that use age as a proxy for experience, 
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because finding precise data for experience is not easy. This study uses both age 
and experience for the reasons given below: 
- Data on age and experience are available, so there is no need to use a proxy. 
- There is no strong correlation between these two variables shorn in this chapter. 
- Age has been split up into categories, so if there are any indications of 
correlations between them, these categories will reduce their effect on «ages. 
- Age and experience are included when selecting an appropriate model (see 
Section 7.6) which indicates that both are considered as variables. 
3. Moreover, some wage studies use a form that is quadratic in experience 
(CURRTEXP2). This transformed variable indicates that the returns due to 
experience decline with an increase in experience (Mincer, 1974). Adding this 
variable when choosing an appropriate model (see also Section 7.6) will give a 
negative sign, as its coefficient does not contribute significantly to the model 
under consideration. So its null hypothesis cannot be rejected. As a result, this 
variable was omitted from this study. 
4. In Chapter Five, on methodology, a dummy variable is used in order to measure 
the effects of school level on personal wages. For simplicity, these dummy 
variables are not applied in the wage model. 
7.2 Applying General Assumptions of Multiple Regression 
Multiple regression involves making a number of assumptions about the data, which 
must be adhered to for meaningful results. The major assumptions are as follows: 
7.2.1 Sample Size 
Different authors tend to provide different guidelines as to the number of cases 
required for multiple regression. As mentioned earlier in this study, Tabachnick and 
Fidell (1996, p. 132) provided a very useful formula for calculating sample size 
requirements (Pallant, 2001). This formula takes into account the number of 
independent variables in the study. In this formula, N> 50 + 8m (where N= sample 
size and m= number of independent variables). This study has one independent 
variable as the lowest event and less than 10 independent variables as the highest. 
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For instance, the lowest event needs 50 + 8(1) = 58 cases and the highest needs 50 
8 (10) = 130. According to Roscoe (1975), sample sizes larger than 30 cases and less 
than 500 cases are suitable for most research. In this study, the sample size contained 
330 cases, so it was satisfactory for this purpose. 
7.2.2 Outliners 
Multiple regression is very sensitive to outliners. Extreme scores should be checked 
for all the continuous variables. Pallant (2001) mentioned that outliners can either be 
deleted from the data set or given a score that is high, but not too different from the 
remaining cluster of scores. Table 7.1 confirms that SPSS is able to provide an 
extreme values table for the highest and lowest values recorded for continuous 
variables. SPSS also gives the ID number of the case with that score. In this study, 
continuous variables that will be checked for outliners are: CURRTEXP, W, «'IJ'FB 
and AGE. Outliners in each variable will be given as an average, which is a common 
solution in many studies. 
7.2.3 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity refers to the relationship between the independent variables. It 
exists when the independent variables are highly correlated (r = 0.9 and above), as 
suggested by Pallant (2001). Multicollinearity does not contribute to a good 
regression model; hence checks should be made for this problem as one of the first 
steps. On other hand, independent variables should show at least some relationship 
with dependent variables (above 0.3 preferably), as Pallant (2001) also suggested. In 
order to check this assumption, a correlation matrix and collinearity diagnostics are 
applied here. SPSS provides a tolerance column as part of a collinearity diagnostics 
table. This column is calculated by the formula 1-R2 for each variable. Pallant (2001) 
noted that if the result of this formula is very low (near 0), then this indicates that the 
multiple correlation with other variables is high, suggesting the possibility of 
multicollinearity. Multicollinearity will be checked later in Sections 7.3 and 7.4. 
Moreover, Tabachnick and Fidells' suggestion, as mentioned by Pallant (2001), is 
that if the correlation between independent variables is 0.7 or above, then the 
researcher has to think carefully before including those variables in his model. 
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Table 7.1 Extreme Values 
Case Number 
Highest 1 133 
2 253 
2 120 
4 125 
5 123 
W Lowest 1 247 
2 234 
3 287 
4 199 
5 289 
Highest 1 86 
2 49 
2 114 
4 181 
5 6 
CURRTEXP Lowest 1 -57 2 312 
3 134 
4 143 
5 160 
Highest 1 85 
2 299 
2 278 
4 63 
5 205 
AGE Lowest 1 196 
2 166 
3 45 
4 238 
5 8 
Highest 1 253 
2 71 
2 123 
4 34 
5 122 
WWFB Lowest 1 276 
2 49 
3 233 
4 91 
5 275 
7.2.4 Normality, Linearity and Homoscedasticity of Residuals 
These assumptions can be checked from the residual scatter-plots, which are 
generated as part of the multiple regression procedure. Residuals are the differences 
between the obtained and the predicted dependent variable scores. These 
assumptions may be explained as follows: 
1. Normality: the residuals should normally be distributed about the predicted 
dependent variable scores; 
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2. Linearity: the residuals should have a straight-line relationship with predicted 
dependent variable scores; and 
3. Homoscedasticity: the variance of the residuals about predicted dependent 
variable scores should be the same for all predicted scores. 
7.3 Respondents' Background Variables 
Background variables are very important when studying the determinants of wages. 
It identifies the difference between one employee and another. Fundamentally, this 
section shows how nationality, marital status, urbanisation, province of origin and 
age as respondents' basic background variables affect the wage levels in the Saudi 
private labour market. 
7.3.1 Applying Related Assumptions: Multicollinearity 
A. Correlation Matrix. 
Table 7.2 shows that each independent variable has some correlation with annual W 
as a dependent variable. These correlation values are quite respectable, so this 
assumption appears not to be violated. On the other hand, there is no large inter- 
correlation between the independent variables. This indicates that there is no 
multicollinearity. 
Table 7.2 Correlation Matrix 
W NAT MARSTAT URBAN PBIRTH AGE 
w 1.000 -. 501 . 
233 -. 182 -. 332 . 150 
NAT -. 501 1.000 -. 093 . 106 . 782 . 
225 
MARSTAT 
. 233 -. 
093 1.000 -. 063 -. 042 . 380 
URBAN -. 182 . 
106 -. 061 1.000 . 179 . 
059 
PBIRTH -. 332 . 
782 -. 042 . 
179 1.000 . 
204 
AGE 
. 150 . 225 . 
380 . 059 . 
204 1.000 
B. Collinearity Diagnostics 
Table 7.3 shows that the tolerance values are quite respectable. Some values in the 
tolerance column are quite far from 0 and others are very far from 0. This indicates 
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that the multiple correlation with other variables is low, suggesting the possibility of 
no multicollinearity. 
Table 7.3 Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance 
Constant 
NA T 
MARSTAT 
----- 
. 
374 
. 
816 
URBAN 
. 
958 
PBIRTH 78 
AGE 
. 784 
7.3.2 Estimating Respondents' Background Variables 
7.3.2.1 Reporting the Results 
The next thing to establish is which of the background variables, included in the 
model, contribute to the prediction of the dependent variables. Table 7.4 shows that 
the coefficients for the independent variables are listed in the column labelled B. The 
estimated regression model could be constructed easily by using these coefficients. 
W is the predicted wage level for Saudi and non-Saudi employees. Generally, in the 
multiple regression model, the partial regression coefficient for a variable indicates 
how much the value of the dependent variable changes when the value of that 
independent variable increases by one unit and the values of the other independent 
variables remain constant In this linear regression model the largest beta coefficient 
is BAJ which is for Nationality (NAT). This means that this variable makes the 
strongest unique contribution in predicting the dependent variable (wage level). This 
shows that a non-Saudi employee is paid SR66,565 less per year than a Saudi. 
URBAN, as the second contribution, shows that an employee working in a rural area 
is paid annually SRI 8,125 less than an employee working in an urban area. The third 
contribution is MARSTAT This indicates that a married employee receives SR8,785 
more than a single employee per year. PBIRTH is the fourth contribution which 
indicates that some Saudi employees are getting SR3,836 more per year than other 
employees because of their province of origin of birth. Using a dummy variable with 
PBIRTH is very useful; it helps to determine which province, as place of birth. has 
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the greatest impact on wage level. The beta for AGE indicates that it contributed less 
to predicted wage level. 
Table 7.4 Predicted Wage Regression Model for Background Variables 
B1 t-test Sig 
Constant 96,483 6.497 
. 000 
BI NAT -66,565 -9.098 . 000 
B2 MARSTAT 8,785 1.542 
. 124 
B3 URBAN -18,125 -3.322 . 001 
B4PBIRTH 3,836 2.316 
. 021 
B5AGE 1,568 4.860 
. 000 
F-test 36.040 
. 000 
R . 36 
The significance column shows whether these variables make a statistically 
significant contribution to the wage regression model. All significant values, except 
the MARSTAT significant value, are less than . 05, which means that those variables 
make a significant contribution to the prediction of the wage variable. That means 
that the null hypothesis for NAT, PBIRTH, URBAN and AGE coefficients can be 
rejected. The MARSTAT coefficient does not contribute significantly to the model 
being considered, therefore its null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
All of the variables except NAT and URBAN have positive coefficients, which 
means that wage expectancy increases with increasing values of the variables. All 
signs of coefficients are as expected. The estimated intercept, B"0, is SR96,483. 
Econometricians differ in their opinions about the interpretation of the intercept. In 
Brown's opinion, an intercept of SR96,483 appears to imply that NA will equal 
SR96,483, even if all independent variables are zero. Others believe that this 
intercept is a result of the combined effect of omitted independent variables. The 
intercept value is very high, which gives an indication that the linear wage regression 
model is not suitable. 
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An F-test is used to test several equivalent null hypotheses. Brown (1991) stated that 
in multiple regression models, the F-test is used to test the overall significance of the 
regression. In other words, it tests the joint significance of all of the independent 
variables except for the intercept, BO. It detects if there is no linear relationship in the 
population between the dependent variable and the independent variables. If the 
observed significance level is less than . 05, the null hypothesis can be rejected. What 
will the result be if this is applied to the above wage model? The null hypotheses for 
the wage model cannot be rejected. At least one of the population regression 
coefficients is not 0. 
The coefficient of determination, R2, determines how well the model fits the data. It 
lies between 0 and 1, with a higher value indicating that more of the variation of the 
dependent can be explained by the independent variables. For this application, the 
coefficient variation was only 0.357 which indicates that barely 36 per cent of the 
variation in W can be explained by the NAT, MARSTAT, URBAN, PBIRTH and 
AGE independent variables. A low R2 and a high intercept imply that the model 
could be improved. Using dummy variables makes the linear regression model a 
flexible tool that is capable of handling many empirical regression problems. 
7.3.2.2 Using Dummy Variables for PBIRTH 
All the above included independent variables are qualitative in nature, except AGE, 
which is quantitative. The qualitative variables should indicate the presence or 
absence of a "quality ", such as Saudi or non-Saudi, married or single, and urban or 
rural. Gujarati (1988) stated that one method of quantifying such qualities is by 
structuring moulded or coded variables that take on values of 1 or 0,0 indicating the 
absence of a quality and 1 indicating the presence of that quality. NAT. MARSTAT 
and URBAN have been treated already by entering our data from the wage survey. 
In 
this section, PBIRTH is our main concern. It has to be coded again as a qualitative 
variable with six categories: DUMYEAST, DUMYEAST, 
DUMYSOTH, 
DUMYNRTH, DUMYCNTR and DUMYOTHR. 
12 Following the rule that the 
number of dummies be one less that the number of categories of the variables. 
five 
12 For more information on these abbreviations see Chapter Five and Appendix C. 
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dummies are introduced to take care of the six categories of the PBIRTH variable. 
DUMYEAST will be excluded and treated as the base category. 
The OLS method is used to run the wage regression model with six categories of the 
PBIRTH variable. The wage model 'W' with its estimated results is depicted below: 
W= Bo + B1 NA T1 + B2 MARSTA Tl + B3 URBAN; + B4 D UMYWEST; + 
B 
.s 
DUMYSOTH1 + B6 DUMYNRTH1 + B7DUMYCNTR; + B8 D UM}"OTHR; 
+ B9AGE, + Ei 
Table 7.5 Predicted Wage Regression Model for Background Variables 
Using Dummv Variables for PBIRTH 
W^ B; t-test Sig 
Constant 83,436 5.231 
. 000 BI NAT 52,164 -6.327 . 000 B2 MARSTAT 10,210 1.826 
. 069 B3 URBAN 15,668 -2.911 . 004 
B4DUMYWEST 52,333 2.909 . 004 
B5DUMYSOTH 16,651 1.511 . 132 
B6DUMYNRTH 73,945 4.034 . 000 
B7DUMYCNTR 28,261 2.503 . 
013 
B8DUMYOTHR 9,864 1.115 . 266 
B9 AGE 13,360 4.136 . 000 F-R2 
. 399 
Again, using dummy variables for PBIRTH categories helps to determine which 
province, as place of birth, has the highest effect on wages. The results in Table 7.5 
confirm that there are wage differences among Saudi employees themselves and that 
these are due to their original place of birth/ province of origin. Employees born in 
the Northern Province receive the highest wage and employees born in the Eastern 
Province receive the lowest. 13 After the employees born in the Northern Province, 
the wages of those born in the Western, Centre, Southern, and "Other" countries 
decrease gradually. 
All significant values except MARSTAT, DUMYSOTH and DUMYOTHR are less 
than . 
05 which means that more than half the included variables make a significant 
13 There is no clear result in the table for Eastern Province employees because they are considered as 
the base category. Following the dummy variable rule this category is considered as a constant in the 
regression model. 
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contribution to the prediction of the wage level. The null hypothesis for the . 
N: -4 T, 
AGE, URBAN, DUMYWEST, DUMYNRTH and DUVIYC, V"TR coefficients can he 
rejected. The MARSTAT, DUMYSOTH and DUMYOTHR coefficients do not 
contribute significantly to the model being considered, so. their null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. 
The coefficient of determination, R2, is 0.399, which is slightly higher than the 
previous estimate. It indicates that 40 per cent of the variation in If" can be 
explained by the independent variables listed. 
7.3.3 Applying Related Assumptions: Normality, Linearity, and 
Homoscedasticity of Residuals 
As mentioned in Section 7.2.4, these assumptions may be checked in the residual 
scatter-plot and the Normal Probability Plot following the above mentioned rules. 
The scatter-plot of the standardised residuals shows that there is a clear pattern for 
the residuals. Deviations from a centralised rectangle suggest some violation of the 
other assumptions. For instance; 
1. Checking Normality 
The normality assumption is violated if the Normal Probability Plot shows that the 
points are not in a reasonably straight diagonal line from bottom left to top right. In 
Figure 7.1, the Normal Probability Plot as a normality test indicates a violation of the 
normality assumption because the points do not lie in a reasonably straight diagonal 
line from bottom left to top right. 
2. Checking Linearity. 
There are two methods for checking linearity. The first method is to plot the 
dependent variable against the independent variables. The second method detects the 
linearity assumption by plotting the residuals against the predicted values. In this 
scatter-plot, the residuals should be roughly rectangularly distributed with most of 
the scores concentrated at the centre (Pallant, 2001). In Figure 7.2, the residual 
scatter-plot shows that the residuals are not rectangularly distributed, so the 
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relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables is not 
linear. 
3. Checking for Constant Variance: Homoscedasticity 
The homoscedasticity assumption indicates that the variance of the dependent 
variables is the same for all values of the independent variables. Plotting the 
standardised residuals against the predicted values checks whether the residuals. 
variance is homoscedastic or constant. In Figure 7.2, the variability of the residuals 
increases with increasing predicted values. That means the variance of the residuals 
is smaller for small values of the predicted dependent variable than it is for larger 
values. This result indicates that there is a heteroscedasticity problem. 
What should the researcher do if there are violations of regression assumptions? As 
mentioned earlier, there are two solutions: one is very general, and requires the 
transformation of the values of the dependent variable or independent variable. In 
this study the dependent variable is transformed to the natural log following the 
Mincer model as explained in the methodology in Chapter Five of this thesis. The 
second method is more specific and is usually used by econometricians. They use 
WLS to solve for heteroscedasticity. 
7.3.4 Corrections 
7.3.4.1 Transforming the Dependent Variable into the Natural Log (As a 
General Solution) 
Most wage studies use a linear regression model, or a natural log regression model, 
or both models. Transforming the dependent variable to the natural log might 
help to 
provide good results. 
Ln W= Bo + BI NAT, + B2 MARSTAT; + B3 URBAN, + B4 PBIRTH; + 
BSAGEI + Ei 
In Table 7.6, the natural log wage regression model shows that all independent 
variables make a statistically significant unique contribution to wage 
level. In other 
words, significant values are less than . 
05, which indicates that almost all variables 
make a significant contribution to the prediction of the wage 
level. Transforming it 
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to the natural log allows MARSTAT to contribute significantly in affecting the wage g 
variable. In other words, MARSTAT is insignificant, but after transformation it 
becomes significant. 
Moreover, looking at each Normal Probability Plot and scatter-plot after running Ln 
wage regression model in Figure 7.3, the Normal Probability Plot shows that almost 
all points lie in a reasonably straight diagonal line from bottom left to top right. In 
Figure 7.4, the scatter-plot shows that there is not a clear pattern to the residuals. 
Therefore, one may conclude that there is no major violation of these assumptions 
after the data are remedied by using transformation of the wa`; e variable. The 
coefficient of determination, R2, is 41 per cent. 
Table 7.6 Predicted Wage Regression Model for Background Variables using 
the Natural Log Wage as Dependent Variable, and Comparison between OLS 
and OLS using the Natural Log 
OLS OLS using the Natural Log 
Wage 
Bi t- test Sig B; t- test Sig 
Constant 96,483 6.497 . 000 11.292 44.822 . 000 
Bl NAT -66,565 -9.098 . 000 -1.135 -9.146 . 
000 
B2 MARSTAT 8,785 1.542 . 124 
0.272 2.818 . 005 
B3 URBAN -18,125 -3.322 . 
001 -0.404 -4.367 . 000 
B4 PBIRTH 3,836 2.316 . 021 
0.050 1.787 . 
075 
B5AGE 1,568 4.860 . 000 . 
0247 4.516 . 000 
R . 
36 . 41 
This indicates that 41 per cent of the variation in Ln TA can be explained by all the 
background variables. A comparison of OLS and OLS using the natural log for the 
wage variable, as a dependent variable is very important. Table 7.6 also shows that: 
1. Some of the corresponding t-test scores rose higher, which indicates that OI_S 
with the natural log has given a more efficient estimate of the slope parameters. 
2. R2 rose from 36 per cent to 41 per cent. 
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7.3.4.2 Correction for Heteroscedasticity: 
This is an alternative correction for the original background regression model. 
Residual variances are required to be homoscedastic or constant. If they are not 
constant ((Y, # (T2 Vi, j) then heteroscedasticity exists, which is most common in 
cross-sectional analysis. Brown (1991) mentioned that heteroscedasticity is 
suspected to exist in many cases and for various reasons such as: 
1. In a cross- sectional study. 
2. Errors increase as X (independent variable, AGE) increases, as shown in Figure 
7.2. 
3. The omission of variables can sometimes result in errors that appear 
heteroscedastic. So there are major variables omitted from this wage regression 
model. 
4. Both R2 and the F- test are adequate. 
Table 7.7 
OLS and WLS Regression Methods 
OLS WLS 
Bi West Sig Bi t-test Sig 
Constant 96,483 6.497 . 
000 99,823.32 7.805 . 000 
NAT -66,565 -9.098 . 000 -56,209.77 -8.148 . 
000 
MARSTAT 8,785 1.542 . 124 
21,029.91 4.586 . 000 
URBAN -18,125 -3.322 . 
001 -11,238.68 -2.129 . 034 
PBIRTH 3,836 2.316 . 
021 4,102.66 2.681 . 0077 
AGECATT 1,568 4.860 . 
000 ---------- ------- ------ 
R . 
36 . 31 
Source 
Variable 
A GECA TT 
Heteroscedasticity does not bias parameter estimates, but it does make them 
inefficient relative to alternative estimates. Heteroscedasticit) could 
be eliminated by 
Weighted Least Squares (WLS) as the most common method.. comparison of OLS 
and WLS results is crucial. Table 7.7 shows some important 
differences. 
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1. The corresponding t-test rose higher. This indicates that the WLS transformation 
model has generated a more efficient estimate of the slope parameters. 
2. R2 fell from 36 per cent to 31 per cent. 
7.4 Human Capital Variables 
It was indicated in the literature review of this study that the human capital theory is 
the most dominant economic theory of wage determination. In this section this 
theory will be mainly applied in econometric models in order to determine how 
human capital variables such as education and experience affect the wage level in the 
Saudi private labour market. English and computer skill levels will also be tested. In 
other words, human capital and background variables will be combined to see how 
respectable effects may be obtained. 
7.4.1 Applying Related Assumptions: Multicollinearity 
A. Correlation Matrix. 
Table 7.8 shows that there is no great inter-correlation between the independent 
variables. In addition, it shows that each independent variable has a respectable 
correlation with annual W as a dependent variable. Therefore, this indicates that 
there is no multicollinearity. 
Table 7.8 Correlation Matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 1.000 -. 501 . 233 -. 182 . 175 . 123 . 296 . 335 . 313 
2 -. 501 1.000 -. 093 . 106 . 260 . 194 . 
085 -. 146 -. 041 
3 . 233 -. 093 1.000 -. 061 . 419 . 043 . 
096 . 031 . 319 
4 -. 182 . 106 -. 
061 1.000 . 
041 -. 142 -. 114 -. 333 -. 044 
5 . 175 . 260 . 
419 
. 
041 1.000 . 
054 . 165 -. 
133 . 
517 
6 . 123 . 194 . 
043 -. 142 . 
054 1.000 . 
421 . 
363 -. 126 
7 . 
296 
. 
085 
. 
096 -. 114 . 165 . 
421 1.000 . 
465 . 
036 
8 . 
335 -. 146 . 
031 -. 333 -. 133 . 
363 . 465 
1.000 -. 014 
9 . 313 -. 041 . 319 -. 044 . 517 -. 
126 . 036 -. 014 1.000 
1=W, 2=NAT, 3=MARSTAT, 4=URBAN, 5=AGECATT, 6=EDUC. 7 
ENGLISHL, 8= COMPUTRL, 9= CURRTEXP. 
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B. Collinearity Diagnostics 
Table 7.9 shows that all values in the tolerance column are far from 0. This indicates 
that the multiple correlation with other variables is low. Because tolerance values are 
quite respectable, this suggests the possibility of no multicollinearity. 
Table 7.9 Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance 
Constant ------ 
NAT 
. 800 MARSTAT 
. 767 URBAN 
. 877 AGECATT 
. 532 EDUC 
. 721 ENGLISHL . 666 
COMPUTRL . 616 
CURRTEXP . 668 
7.4.2 Estimating Human Capital Wage Linear Regression 
7.4.2.1 Reporting the Results 
The ways in which the variables of the human capital theory, such as education level, 
years of experience, level of English and computer skills, plus the variables referred 
to in the previous section, affect the wage levels in the Eastern private labour market 
of Saudi Arabia are explored below. 
W= Bo + Bl NAT1 + B2 MARSTA TT +B3 URBAN; + B4 A GECA TT, + BS ED UC; 
+ B6 ENGLISHLI +B7 COMPUTRLI+ B8 CURRTEXP1+ E; 
In Table 7.10, the significant column shows that all included independent variables, 
except 11IARSTAT and URBAN, are significant in contributing to the prediction of 
the wage level. Thus, their null hypothesis can be rejected. On the other 
hand, the 
null hypothesis of MARSTAT and URBAN cannot be rejected. 
The coefficient of 
determination is 0.499 which indicates that 50 per cent of the variation in i' can be 
explained by the listed independent variables. 
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7.4.3 Applying Related Assumptions: Normality, Linearity and 
Homoscedasticity of Residuals 
1. Checking Normality 
In Figure 7.5, the Normal Probability Plot shows that the points are not in a 
reasonably straight diagonal line from bottom left to top right. This indicates a 
violation of the normality assumption. 
2. Checking Linearity 
The standardised residuals are plotted against the predicted values in Figure 7.6 in 
order to check the linearity assumption. This shows that the relationship between the 
dependent variable and the independent variables is not linear. 
3. Checking for Constant Variance: Homoscedasticity 
By again plotting the standardised residuals against the predicted values, Figure 7.6 
shows that the error variance is not constant. It shows that the variability of the 
residuals increases with the increase in predicted values. This result indicates that 
there is no homoscedasticity. By following the same solutions mentioned in the 
previous section, the problems should be solved. 
Table 7.10 
Predicted Wage Regression Model for Human Capital Variables 
B, t-test Sig 
Constant 31,321 1.997 . 047 
BI NAT -55,829 -12.570 . 000 
B2 MARSTAT 700 . 
134 . 
893 
B3 URBAN -4,472 -. 883 . 
378 
B4AGECATT 6,039 3.757 . 000 
B5 EDUC 4,116 2.311 . 
021 
B6 ENGLISHL 12,971 3.804 . 000 
B7 COMPUTRL 7,257 2.887 . 004 
B8CURRTEXP 1,581 3.919 . 000 
R . 50 
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7.4.4 Corrections: 
7.4.4.1 Transforming the Dependent Variable into the Natural Log (As a 
General Solution). 
Many studies have used the natural log regression to obtain a good result. The Ln «' 
regression model shows that all independent variables offer a statistically significant 
contribution to the wage variable. Moreover, significant values are less than or 
almost equal to . 
05, giving an indication that almost all variables listed in the table 
make a significant contribution to the prediction of the wage variable. In Figure 7.7. 
the Normal Probability Plot shows all points lying in a reasonably straight diagonal 
line from bottom left to top right. The scatter-plot in Figure 7.8 shows that there is 
not a clear pattern to the residuals. Using the transformation of wage variable 
remedied the violation of the assumption. 
LnW=Bo+BINATl+B2MARSTAT1+B3URBAN, +B4AGECATT; +BSEDUC; + 
B6 ENGLISHLI +B7 COMPUTRLi+ B8 CURRTEXP; + E; 
Table 7.11 Predicted Wage Regression Model for Human Capital Variables 
using the Natural Log Wage as Dependent Variable, and Comparison between 
OLS and OLS using the Natural Loe 
OLS OLS using the Natural 
Log Wage 
Bi t- test Sig Bi t- test Sig 
Constant 31,321 1.997 . 
047 9.996 38.842 . 000 
Bl NAT -55,829 -12.570 . 000 -1.021 -14.007 . 
000 
B2MARSTAT 700 . 134 . 
893 . 132 
1.542 . 124 
B3 URBAN -4,472 -. 883 . 
378 -. 167 -2.006 . 
046 
B4AGECATT 6,039 3.757 . 000 . 097 
3.669 . 000 
BS EDUC 4,116 2.311 . 
021 . 
082 2.811 . 
005 
B6ENGLISHL 12,971 3.804 . 
000 . 272 
4.855 . 
000 
B7 COMPUTRL 7,257 2.887 . 004 . 
122 2.952 . 003 
B8 CURRTEXP 1,581 3.919 . 000 . 
024 3.575 . 000 
R . 
50 . 57 
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A comparison of OLS and OLS using the natural log for a wage variable a; a 
dependent variable is very important. Table 7.11 also shows some important points. 
1. Some of the corresponding t-test scores rose higher. This indicates that OL S 
using the natural log gives a more efficient estimate of the slope parameters. 
2. R2 rose from 50 per cent to 57 per cent. 
7.4.4.2 Correction for Heteroscedasticity 
Heteroscedasticity is suspected to exist in original linear wage regression model 
output. The evidence is that the residuals increase as predicted values increase and 
both R2 and F-test are adequate. As a result of heteroscedasticity the parameters are 
biased. This problem could be eliminated by WLS. This method shows that some t- 
test values become slightly higher and others become lower. In addition, R2 does not 
change at all. A comparison of OLS and WLS results is crucial. Table 7.12 shows 
some important differences. 
1. The corresponding t-test rose slightly. This indicates that the WLS transformation 
model has generated a more efficient estimate of the slope parameters. 
2. R2 does not change. 
Table 7.12 
OLS and WLS Regression Methods 
OLS WLS 
T B; t-test Sig B; t-test Sig 
Constant 3,1321 1.997 . 047 32,238.20 2.131 . 0339 
BJ NAT -55,829 -12.570 . 000 -53,436.97 -12.083 . 
000 
B2MARSTAT 700 . 134 . 
893 1,594.63 . 306 . 7601 
B3 URBAN -4,472 -. 883 . 378 -5509.71 -1.127 . 
2605 
B4 AGECATT 6,039 3.757 . 000 5,831.78 
3.665 . 0003 
BS EDUC 4,116 2.311 . 021 
3,847.34 2.190 . 0293 
B6 ENGLISHL 12,971 3.804 . 000 
13,040.51 3.951 . 0001 
B7 COMPUTRL 7,257 2.887 . 004 
6,479.18 2.617 . 0093 
B8 CURRTEXP 1,581 3.919 . 
000 1,472.04 3.694 . 0003 
R 
. 50 . 
50 
Source Variable EDUC 
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To conclude, the first correction method produces more significant results than the 
second. The first correction method will be the main correction method in the 
following sections. 
7.5. Segmented Labour Market Variables 
Virtually all labour market studies have shown that the labour force is segmented in 
some sense. In Chapter Four it was stated that there are many criteria that could be 
used to segment the labour market. Moreover, Osterman (1977) stated that the labour 
force could be segmented, effectively, into three parts: secondary, lower tier and 
upper tier. The previous author mentioned in his study that Piore summarised the 
differences between jobs in the primary and secondary markets in 1972. In fact, there 
are many studies of the segmentation of the labour market. The pertinent question 
now is not whether the labour market is segmented, but what criteria are being used? 
The second important question is, are there any wage differences between the 
segmented labour markets in the private sector of the Eastern Province? These "'erg, 
important questions will be answered in this section. Many standard segmented 
points or lines could be used, such as: 1) Saudi and non-Saudi (Nationality). 2) Job 
category. 3) Job skill. 4) Firm ownership. 5) Sectors. 6) Employees number. 7) Place 
of birth (original province of birth). 8) Wage category. There are two ways of 
explaining the empirical results. First, holding each sub-segmented labour market 
constant and then indicating all the independent variables that affect it significantly. 
Second, holding each independent variable constant and then indicating all the sub- 
segmented labour markets which are affected significantly. Both methods, will be 
used in this section. The organisation of this section follows the above standard 
segmented points. 
7.5.1 Saudi and Non-Saudi (Nationality) 
The Saudi labour market is segmented into two the-Saudi and non-Saudi markets. 
This method shows that almost all independent variables except AGECATT 
have 
some effect on Saudi wage level. 
On the other hand, only three independent variables affect the non-Saudi wage level. 
It is apparent from the results that the wage-setting process differs substantially 
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between the segments. In Table 7.13, most of the beta values in the Saudi labour 
market are higher than in the non-Saudi labour market and this confirms that there is 
a wage difference between the two markets. These results should be of considerable 
value when initiating a wage policy and restructuring the labour market. 
Table 7.13 Nationality 
Saudi Non-Saudi 
Ln iA B; Sig B; Sig 
Constant 8.652 
. 000 8.066 . 000 
Bl NAT ------- ----- 
B2MARSTAT 
. 349 . 014 . 041 . 907 
B3 URBAN -. 293 . 040 -. 12 2 . 2' 37 
B4AGECATT 
. 082 . 115 . 102 . 001 
BS EDUC . 100 . 027 . 091 . 024 
B6ENGLISHL . 241 . 004 . 287 . 000 
B7 COMPUTRL . 166 . 013 . 094 . 083 
B8CURRTEXP . 030 . 007 . 018 . 058 
R . 44 . 39 
The highest coefficient of determination, R2, is 44 per cent for the Saudi labour 
market and 39 per cent for the non-Saudi labour market. This indicates that more 
independent variables affect the Saudi wage level than the non-Saudi wage level. 
7.5.2 Job Category 
Following the significant rule with the results in Table 7.14, the NAT coefficient for 
all job categories makes a significant contribution to the prediction of wages as a 
dependent variable. On the other hand, the MARSTAT coefficient for the same job 
categories does not make a significant contribution in predicting the dependent 
variable. The contributions of the other independent variables vary from one to 
another. For instance the coefficient of URBAN only indicates a significant effect for 
one category: the production category. AGECATT and EDUC have more effects 
than URBAN. 
182 
Table 7.14 Job Category 
Ln Tip 
Professional Administrative Accounting & 
Financial 
B; Sig B, Sig B; Sig 
Constant 10.770 
. 000 9.349 . 000 8.740 . 000 
Bl NAT, -1.003 . 000 -1.009 . 000 -1.110 . 000 
B2MARSTAT 
. 037 . 794 . 138 . 439 . 622 . 086 
B3 URBAN -. 234 . 085 . 069 . 729 -. 155 .553 
B4AGECATT 
. 095 . 024 . 137 . 020 . 125 . 115 
BS EDUC . 007 . 890 . 120 . 053 . 336 . 076 
B6ENGLISHL . 204 . 035 . 132 . 353 . 242 . 122 
B7COMPUTRL . 201 . 002 . 207 . 120 . 018 . 292 
B8 CURRTEXP . 017 . 085 . 035 . 014 . 028 . 765 
R 
. 
59 
. 
54 
. 
71 
Table 7.14 Contd. (Job Category) 
Sales and Marketing Production Worker Other 
Ln T' B; Sig B; Sig B; Sig 
Constant 9.061 . 000 10.306 . 000 9.135 . 000 
Bl NAT -1.318 . 002 -1.152 . 
000 -. 879 . 
013 
B2MARSTAT . 481 . 119 -. 
167 . 550 . 153 . 
610 
B3 URBAN . 
604 . 241 -. 
541 . 028 . 149 . 
584 
B4AGECATT . 
058 . 641 . 
072 . 529 . 114 . 
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BS EDUC . 
311 . 104 . 
689 . 005 . 104 . 
550 
B6ENGLISHL . 
038 . 750 -. 
060 . 675 . 
232 . 158 
B7 COMPUTRL -. 012 . 724 -. 
002 . 973 . 029 . 384 
B8 CURRTEXP . 
107 . 489 . 
135 . 
398 . 139 . 
044 
R . 
75 . 
65 . 56 
AGECATT and EDUC significantly affect the administrative category. In addition, 
AGECATT and EDUC also significantly affect the professional and production 
categories respectively. Moreover, ENGLISHL and COMPUTRL make a significant 
contribution to the professional category. Finally, the coefficient of CURRTEXP is 
significant for the administrative and "other" categories. In sum, most of the jobs that 
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are significantly affected by the independent variables are professional and 
administrative. The null hypothesis would be rejected because this study proves that 
at least one of the independent variables has a significant effect on wage. A 
comparison of beta values across these job categories shows that they cam- different 
weight from one job to another but the main beta value is beta of Nationality. , N. 4 T. 
As a result, there is a wage difference associated with job category. 
The highest coefficient of determination, R2, is 75 per cent for a marketing job, and 
the lowest is 54 per cent for an administrative job. This indicates that there are some 
job categories that have to be paid more attention than others when policy makers are 
constructing wage systems or initiating wage policies in the Saudi private market. 
7.5.3. Job Skill 
Unskilled and unknown sub-segments of the labour market are excluded from the 
regression model because the former only has four cases and the latter has mixed 
skill levels that would produce inaccurate results. 
Table 7.15 Job Skill 
Skilled Semi-Skilled Unskilled Unknown 
LnW Bi Sig Bi Sig Bi Sig B; Sig 
Constant 9.761 . 000 10.466 . 000 -- -- 12.263 . 000 
Bl NAT -. 913 . 000 -1.127 . 000 -- -- -1.391 . 000 
B2MARSTAT . 135 . 245 . 200 . 191 -- -- -. 
0321 . 756 
B3 URBAN -. 221 . 079 -. 081 . 522 -- -- -. 
520 . 012 
B4AGECATT . 151 . 000 . 
023 . 669 -- -- . 
011 . 813 
B5 EDUCI . 195 . 019 . 319 . 
004 -- -- . 396 . 
001 
B6ENGLISHL . 183 . 001 . 
002 . 976 -- -- -. 
040 . 537 
B7 COMPUTRL . 024 . 004 . 027 . 
038 -- -- . 014 . 
365 
B8 CURRTEXP . 072 . 065 . 
043 . 466 -- -- -. 
021 535 
R . 53 . 
60 ----- . 97 
In Table 7.15, the coefficients of NAT, EDUC and COMPUTRL have the most 
significant effect on the skilled and semi-skilled categories. On the other hand, there 
are no significant affects by the MARSTAT, URBAN and CURRTEXP coefficients. 
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The coefficients of the remaining independent variables only make a significant 
contribution in the skilled category. The skilled and semi-skilled beta values show a 
slight difference. Thus, the wage difference between skilled and semi-skilled is 
confirmed by their beta values. 
The coefficient of determination, R2, is 60 per cent for semi-skilled and 53 per cent 
for skilled. Therefore, the decision-makers in the decisions in the Saudi labour 
market should principally consider the independent variables NAT, ED 11 C and 
COMPUTRL, when introducing a wage system or policy. 
Table 7.16 Firm Ownership 
Saudi Firms Non-Saudi Firms Joint Venture 
Ln NA B; Sig B; Sig B; Sig 
Constant 9.863 
. 000 8.584 . 176 10.004 . 000 
BJ NAT -. 860 . 000 --- --- -1.010 . 000 
B2MARSTAT . 103 . 286 -. 843 . 649 . 148 . 326 
B3URBAN -. 076 . 411 . 425 . 818 -. 132 . 467 
B4AGECATT . 065 . 031 -. 199 . 602 . 186 . 000 
BS EDUC . 103 . 002 . 299 . 701 . 126 . 007 
B6ENGLISHL . 197 . 003 . 295 . 791 . 246 . 005 
B7 COMPUTRL . 029 . 079 -. 193 . 722 . 087 . 193 
B8 CURRTEXP . 03159 . 000 . 238 . 121 . 003414 . 706 
R . 46 . 91 . 62 
7.5.4 Firm Ownership 
There are only 10 cases in the non-Saudi firm sub-segment of the labour market. No 
accurate results could be obtained from just 10 cases. Thus, this sub-segment can be 
excluded. Table 7.16 shows that the coefficients of NAT, AGECATT, EDUC and 
ENGLISHL have the most significant effect on the Saudi and joint venture firm 
categories. There are no significant affects shown by the MARSTAT, URBAN and 
COMPUTRL coefficients. The coefficients of the CURRTEXP variable only make a 
significant contribution to the Saudi firm category. Comparing beta values between 
the firm ownership categories shows that there is a difference. As a result, there is a 
wage difference between them. 
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The coefficient of determination, R2, is 62 per cent for joint venture firms and 46 per 
cent for Saudi firms. This indicates that 46 per cent and 62 per cent of the variation 
in Ln W can be explained by the listed independent variables for Saudi and joint 
venture firms respectively. 
7.5.5 Economic Sectors 
The second method for explaining the coefficients (see above) can be used here. 
Table 7.17 shows that the significant coefficients of each sub-segment of the labour 
market vary from one to another. For instance, the industrial category is only 
affected significantly by the coefficients of NAT, AGECATT ED1 C and 
ENGLISHL. 
Table 7.17 Economic Sectors 
Industrial Commercial Agricultural 
LnW Bi Sig B; Sig B; Sig 
Constant 10.040 . 000 9.452 . 000 7.987 . 000 
BI NAT -1.267 . 000 -. 808 . 026 -. 296 . 186 
B2MARSTAT . 093 . 591 . 299 . 310 -. 837 . 007 
B3 URBAN -. 099 . 584 -. 311 . 213 . 608 . 021 
B4AGECATT . 152 . 003 . 134 . 083 . 065 . 418 
BS EDUC . 119 . 048 . 072 . 396 . 150 . 148 
B6ENGLISHL . 039 . 002 . 160 . 
340 . 641 . 005 
B7 COMPUTRL . 086 . 307 . 170 . 
208 . 166 . 190 
B8 CURRTEXP . 020 . 073 . 
013 . 571 . 
063 . 003 
R . 60 . 
54 . 64 
The commercial and construction sectors are affected significantly by NA T and 
AGECATT respectively. The fourth, fifth and sixth independent variables in the 
agricultural, services and "other" categories respectively do not make any significant 
contribution to the predicted wage. A comparison of beta values in these economic 
sectors shows that they differ from one sector to another but the main beta value is 
the beta of Nationality (NAT) in all sectors and the beta of MARSTAT in the 
agricultural sector only. As a result, wage differences exist among economic sectors. 
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Table 7.17 Contd. (Economic Sectors) 
Construction Services Other 
Ln NA B; Sig B; Sig B; Sig 
Constant 9.179 000 8.687 
. 000 9.648 . 000 
BI NAT ---- ---- -1.089 . 000 -. 427 . 082 
B2MARSTAT 
. 108 . 614 . 405 . 041 -. 364 . 171 
B3URBAN -. 324 . 098 . 154 . 476 . 194 . 544 
B4AGECATT 
. 126 . 097 . 129 . 041 . 116 . 148 
B5EDUC 
. 184 . 046 . 119 . 103 . 149 . 047 
B6ENGLISHL 
. 071 . 674 . 342 . 010 . 054 . 758 
B7 COMPUTRL 
. 031 . 812 . 134 . 136 . 198 . 144 
B8CURRTEXP -. 016 . 414 . 018 . 248 . 060 . 00 
R . 32 . 62 . 66 
The highest coefficient of determination, R2, is 66 per cent for the "other" sectors 
while the lowest is 32 per cent for the construction sector. If the subsidised wage 
policy now being applied in Saudi Arabia is to be successful, then the significant 
independent variables identified in this section need to be taken into account. 
7.5.6 Employment Category 
In Table 7.18, all coefficients, except URBAN and MARSTAT, can be seen to make 
a statistically significant and unique contribution to the prediction of wage variables 
in the formal sector. As predicted, with the informal sector many coefficients do not 
make any significant contribution, these being MARSTAT, URBAN, EDUC and 
CURRTEXP. 
Note the differences in magnitude between the two sectors. For example, NAT has 
more effect on wages in the formal sector than in the informal sector. In general, the 
beta values of the formal sector are higher than the beta values of the informal 
sector. Thus, wage differences between the formal and informal sectors are 
confirmed by the differences in their beta values. 
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Table 7.18 Employment Category 
Less than 300 Employees 
(Informal Sector) 
300 and more Employees 
(Formal Sector) 
Ln N' B; Sig B; Sig 
Constant 9.590 
. 
000 10.391 
. 000 
BJ NAT -. 652 . 000 -1.001 . 
000 
B2 MARSTAT . 150 . 
225 
. 064 . 561 
B3 URBAN -. 230 . 076 -. 182 . 075 
B4AGECATT . 141 . 000 . 069 . 050 
BS EDUC . 
026 
. 120 . 
092 
. 022 
B6ENGLISHL . 
111 . 196 . 226 . 003 
B7 COMPUTRL . 
157 . 
022 . 142 . 
003 
B8CURRTEXP . 004 . 
747 . 029 . 000 
R . 
64 . 59 
The coefficient of determination, R2, is 64 per cent for the informal sector and 59 per 
cent for the formal sector. This indicates that 59 per cent and 64 per cent of the 
variation in Ln W can be explained by the listed independent variables for the 
formal and informal sectors respectively. 
7.5.7 Province of Origin/Place of Birth (Discrimination Theory) 
Table 7.19 shows that none of the coefficients for those born in the Southern 
Province makes a statistically significant contribution to the prediction of the wage 
variable. On the other hand, with regard to "Other" countries, they make a 
statistically significant contribution, except for MARSTAT and 
EDUC. This leaves 
only the Eastern and Central Provinces to examine. A comparison 
between them 
might show some discrimination with regard to wages. There are three 
independent 
variables that make a significant contribution in the Eastern 
Province and only two in 
the Central Province. 
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Table 7.19 Province of OriginfPlace of Birth 
Eastern 
Province 
Southern 
Province 
Central 
Province 
Other 
Countries 
LnW B; Sig B; Sig B; Sig g Sig 
Constant 8.513 
. 000 12.15 . 000 11.53 . 
000 9.762 
. 000 
BI NAT -. 561 . 171 -1.671 . 081 -2.384 . 
001 -. 792 . 000 
B2 MARSTAT 
. 498 . 
008 
. 
316 
. 552 . 164 . 
389 
. 001 . 990 
B3 URBAN 
. 
050 
. 
816 
. 498 . 424 . 09 . 
738 -. 191 . 055 
B4 AGECATT 
. 116 . 150 -. 009 . 959 . 189 . 
281 
. 109 . 000 
B5EDUC 
. 
155 
. 
008 -. 278 . 417 . 226 . 032 . 
05 5 . 146 
B6ENGLISHL 
. 346 . 000 . 458 . 315 . 131 . 409 . 272 . 001 
B7 COMPUTRL 
. 
043 
. 581 -. 268 . 497 . 023 . 
847 
. 177 . 001 
B8 CURRTEXP . 023 . 125 . 043 . 
277 
. 009 . 822 . 019 . 0)-) 
R . 52 . 84 . 93 . 45 
Comparing the beta values of the Eastern and Central Provinces shows that they 
differ from one province to another. For example, the beta of EDUC is higher in the 
Central Province than in the Eastern Province. As a result, it may be inferred that 
wage differences in the Saudi Eastern private labour market are caused by province 
of origin. 
There are differences in magnitude between these two provinces. For example, NAT 
has more effect on wages in the Central Province than in the Eastern Province. In 
general, the beta values of the Central Province are higher than the beta values of the 
Eastern Province. Thus, wage differences between the Central and Eastern Provinces 
are confirmed by the difference in their beta values. 
The coefficient of determination, R2, is 93 per cent for the Central Province, 84 per 
cent for the Southern Province, 52 per cent for the Eastern Province and 45 per cent 
is for "Other" countries. The highest coefficient of determination is for the Central 
Province and the lowest is "Other" countries. It indicates that 93 per cent and 45 per 
cent of the variation in Ln Nf can be explained by the listed independent variables 
for the Central Province and "Other" countries respectively. 
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7.5.8 Wage Category 
The wage category base depends on an arbitrary cut-off point. It uses SR60.000 as an 
annual wage: if the annual wage level is equal to or larger than SR60,000. a worker 
is at the high wage level (formal sector), otherwise a worker is at the low wage level 
(informal sector). In Table 7.20 only three coefficients make a statistically 
significant unique contribution to the prediction of the wage variable in the higher 
category. These are NAT, AGECATT and EDUC. On the other hand, there are four 
different significant coefficients, except for NAT, in the lower category. Independent 
variables that affect the high wage level category differ from other independents that 
affect the low wage level. Even NAT has a different effect at each level. The beta of 
NAT at the upper wage level is higher than that at the lower wage level. 
Table 7.20 Wage Category 
Ln N" 
Lower Wage Category 
< SR60,000 
(Informal Sector) 
Higher Wage Category 
=> SR60,000 
( Formal Sector) 
B1 Sig B; Sig 
Constant 9.733 
. 000 10.771 . 000 
BI NAT -. 354 . 000 -. 436 . 000 
B2MARSTAT . 199 . 
015 
. 077 . 438 
B3 URBAN -. 219 . 
006 
. 
020 
. 838 
B4AGECATT . 023 . 
376 . 062 . 040 
B5 EDUC . 048 . 
094 . 067 . 
033 
B6 ENGLISHL . 140 . 
011 . 108 . 
089 
B7 COMPUTRL . 
029 . 
468 . 031 . 
494 
B8 CURRTEXP . 
009 . 
258 . 009 . 118 
R . 
25 . 
21 
The coefficient of determination, R2, is 25 per cent for the lower wage level and 2l 
per cent for the upper wage level. This indicates that 21 per cent and 225 per cent of 
the variation in Ln W" can be explained by the listed independent variables for the 
lower and higher wage levels, respectively, in the Saudi private labour market. 
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7.6 The Appropriate Econometrics Model 
In order to construct an appropriate econometric model for this study, three steps are 
necessary: 1) To build a model from suitable independent variables. 2) To segment 
the private labour market into Saudi and non-Saudi. 3) To apply the model from step 
(1) to the private labour market differentiated in step (2). These steps are explained 
in detail below. This should help in establishing a fairer wages structure and 
contribute to wages policy formulation for the Saudi private labour market. It should 
also help to further the Saudi government's aim of replacing non-Saudi employees at 
all levels by Saudi nationals (Saudiisation). 
7.6.1 Building the Appropriate Econometric Model 
In the previous sections of this thesis, up to eight independent variables have been 
used to predict Saudi private labour market wage levels. This study has identified a 
sub-set of independent variables that can produce a good regression wage model, by 
using some common methods, which sequentially add or remove variables from the 
model. There are some standard guidelines when taking the decision to enter or 
remove a variable, such as: 
1. Do not enter variables into the model if there are no more variables that result in 
a significant increase in R2. 
2. Do not remove a variable when removal of any variable in the model results in a 
significant change in R2. 
3. Choose the variable that has the smallest observed significance level for the test 
of its partial regression coefficient. In other words, if the partial regression 
coefficient for a variable has an observed significance level larger than 0.05, 
the variable cannot be used in the model. 
4. Choose the variable with the largest absolute value for the t statistic. 
5. Choose the variable with the smallest residual sum of squares. 
6. Consider all mentioned assumptions. 
Considering all above standard points, the MARSTAT and URBAN variables are 
removed and the ANLFTWAG variable is added. Table 7.21 shows three regression 
models: Model 1 is the regression model with constant and eight main variables, 
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Model 2 is produced by adding ANLFWAG to Model 1, and Model 3 results from 
the subtraction of MARSTAT and URBAN from Model 2. 
It is important to be aware that in multiple linear regression there are many statistics 
that are equivalent. For instance, choosing the variable that results in the largest 
increase in R2 is the same as choosing the variable that has the smallest observed 
significance level for the test of its partial regression coefficient. Moreover, choosing 
the variable with the largest absolute value for the statistic means choosing a variable 
that results in the smallest residual sum of squares. Thus, significant values and R2 
are used here for comparison among these three regression models. 
All Model 1 significant values make a statistically significant unique contribution to 
wage level in the Saudi private labour market, but R2 is still low. It is known that bv 
adding an independent variable to a regression model increases R2. In Model ', 
ANLFTWAG is added, increasing R2 by 18 per cent (from 56 % to 74%), which 
represents a big difference. The significant values of MARSTAT and URBAN in 
Model 2 are bigger than in Model 1. Model 3 deals with those two variables by 
removing them from Model 2. Model 3 gives the best result, with all its significant 
values being less than . 05 and R2 hardly changing. This model is therefore, the most 
suitable wage regression model. 
7.6.2 Segmenting Private Labour Market into Two Main Labour Markets 
As mentioned in Section 7.5, there are many standard segmented points or lines that 
may be used. In Sub-section 7.5.1, Nationality, as the segmented line, is used. Using 
the appropriate model with this segmented line would give more accurate results 
than using a non-appropriate model with the same segmented line that was reported 
in Sub-Section 7.5.1. 
7.6.3 Applying the Appropriate Model for Sub-Section 7.6.2 
Table 7.22 shows the final main independent variables that affect wage levels in the 
Saudi private labour market. The researcher believes that this result is the final and 
most significant result from the analyses in this chapter. For simplicity, policy 
makers involved in constructing any wage system or policy or in accelerating the 
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Saudiisation process should consider only those independent variables shown in 
Table 7.22. For more details and more results they should look at other tables in this 
chapter. 
Table 7.21 Comparing Various Regression Models 
Ln T' 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(Appropriate 
Model) 
B1 Sig B; Sig B; Sig 
Constant 9.996 
. 000 9.515 . 000 9.509 . 000 
Bj NAT -1.021 . 000 -. 567 . 000 -. 579 . 000 
B2MARSTAT 
. 132 . 124 . 080 . 238 ------ ------ 
B3 URBAN -. 167 . 
046 -. 0738 . 226 ------ ------ 
B4 A GECA TT 
. 
097 
. 000 . 059 . 005 . 067 . 001 
B5 EDUC 
. 082 . 005 . 043 . 064 . 025 . 049 
B6ENGLISHL . 272 . 000 . 138 . 002 . 134 . 003 
B7 COMPUTRL . 
122 . 003 . 072 . 029 . 083 . 010 
B8 CURRTEXP . 
024 . 000 . 032 . 000 . 033 . 000 
B9 ANLFTWAG ------ ------- . 0001 . 000 . 
001 . 000 
R . 
57 . 74 . 74 
To summarise, there are only three independent variables, A GECATT, CURRTEXP 
and ANLFTWAG, which affect wage levels in the Saudi labour market. Other 
variables, such as EDUC and ENGLISHL, that are thought to be very important in 
affecting wage level are unsufficient. On the other hand, in the non-Saudi labour 
market, EDUC and ENGLISHL are very important in affecting wage levels. 
Consequently, the Saudi government has for some time realised that the private 
sector prefers to employ non-Saudis rather than Saudis because of the former's 
higher skills and expectancy of lower wages. The high skills demanded by the 
private sector may be obtained by providing an efficient education system which is 
capable of producing citizens with the skills required to manage their own and the 
country's affairs. It has been suggested that the high wages demanded by Saudi 
employees could be satisfied if more Saudis were encouraged to enrol in further 
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education, and also by introducing wage policies that improve their productivitti- and 
satisfy their wage demands. 
Table 7.22 Applying the Appropriate Model for Sub-Section 7.6.2 
Saudi Non-Saudi ! 
Ln N' Bi Standardised 
Coefficients 
Sig Bi Standardised 
Coefficients 
Sig 
Constant 9.170 ---- . 000 8.165 ---- . 
000 
BJAGECATT . 
084 . 165 . 
037 
. 040 . 
097 . 059 
B2 ED UC . 
021 . 035 . 
568 
. 
072 
. 129 . 014 
B3 ENGLISHL . 083 . 
078 
. 
225 
. 
201 
. 191 . 
001 
B4 COMPUTRL . 
098 . 117 . 
061 
. 035 . 051 .35 
BS CURRTEXP . 
001 . 573 . 
000 
. 
001 
. 592 
000_ 
B6 ANLFTWAG . 035 . 
316 . 000 . 
027 
. 205 . 
000 
R2 . 
64 . 69 
In addition, the intercept of Saudi 9.170 in log form may explain the monthly grants 
given to all university students (Saudi and non-Saudi students). Why is this amount 
of money (SR800-1,000) given monthly to university students? This intercept may 
answer this question. Before doing so, an anti-log should be given for this amount 
(9.170). The anti-log amount is SR9,604.6. Thus, the predicted wage model shows 
that each employee needs at least SR9,604.6 annually, where all independents are 
constant. If this amount is divided by 12 months, then the monthly amount is 9,604.6 
/12 = SR800.4, almost equal to the monthly grant for each university student. 
14 On 
the other hand, the intercept for non-Saudis is 8.2. By following the same method, 
SR292 is needed monthly by each non-Saudi employee where all independents are 
constant. 
7.7 Logistic Regression Model 
7.7.1 Data Analysis Procedures 
Logistic regression, a multivariate statistical technique, is an appropriate technique 
when the dependent variable is dichotomous. It is one of the most widely used 
probability models. Both continuous and categorical variables can 
be used as 
predictor variables. The Logistic regression is used to evaluate the 
data and test the 
hypotheses related to the research questions. 
14 It known in Saudi Arabia that each university student is given a monthly grant of 
is SR800 for 
social studies and SRI, 000 for science studies. 
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7.7.2 Data 
The data and the abbreviation of variables used here will be the same as used in the 
previous regression models, but with some modification. The major change will be 
in the wage variable as a dependent variable which should be dichotomous. It was 
transferred to a dummy variable by using an arbitrary SR60,000 annual wage, as a 
cut-off between high wage level (formal sector) and low wage level (informal 
sector). In another words, any annual wage value equal to or larger than SR60,000 
takes the value I. and otherwise 0. 
NENGLSHL(1)* A new level of English level with only two values, high =1 
and low = 0. 
NCOMPTRL(1) * A new level of computer skills with only two values, high =I 
and low = 0. 
* Confirming that value =1 is considered. 
In addition, for simplicity, the ENGLISHL and COMPUTRL variables were 
transferred to two categorical values (high =1 and low = 0) to replace the four 
original categories (None, Beginning, Intermediate, and Advanced). 
7.7.3 Coefficients for the Logistic Model using the Whole Sample 
in the Eastern Province 
In Table 7.23, NAT, CURRTEXP, AGE, EDUCONT, NCOMPTRL (1) and 
NENGLISHL (1) are statistically significant predictors of being at the high wage 
level (formal sector) because their significant values are less then 0.05. MARSTA T 
(1) and URBAN (1) are not statistically significant as their significant values are 
larger than 0.05. 
The raw coefficients in column B of Table 7.23 are interpreted as estimates of the 
effect of a particular variable, controlling for the other variables 
in the equation. 
Each B coefficient, "represents the change in the natural logarithm of the odds ratio, 
which is harder to interpret than the odds ratio" (Kraska and Larkins. 1998, p. 
9). A 
positive B coefficient indicates that the predicted odds of being at the 
high wage 
level (formal sector) increase as the predictor increases, and a negative coefficient 
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indicates that the predicted odds decrease as the predictor increases. As shown in 
Table 7.23, all the independent variables have positive coefficients. Thus. the 
predicted odds of being at the high wage level increase as any independent variable 
increases. 
Table 7.23 Coefficients Estimates for the Whole Sample 
ncina I . nuictiii 
Rs"crrPCCinn Mnrnl 
Variables Bi Df Sig Ex p. B 
CONSTANT -12.541 1 . 
000 
. 
000 
NAT 1* 4.064 1 . 
000 58.180 
MARSTAT 1* . 514 1 . 259 1.672 
URBAN(1) * . 401 1 . 391 1.4933 
CURRTEXP . 
094 1 . 006 1.099 
AGE . 
078 1 . 008 1.081 
EDUCONT . 249 1 . 002 1.283 
NCOMPTRL 1* 1.506 1 . 000 4.510 
NENGLISHL 1* 1.191 1 . 
046 3.290 
Nagelkerke R Square . 
607 
* Confirming that value =1 is considered. 
The column labelled Exp. B in Table 7.23 presents the odds ratios or the 
exponentiated value of the raw regression coefficient for each of the variables. These 
values are interpreted as the change in the odds ratio associated with a one-unit 
increase in each predictor variable. An odds ratio greater than 1 indicates that the 
odds of being at the high wage level increase when the independent variable 
increases. A value less than 1 indicates that the odds of being at the high wage level 
decrease when the independent variable increases (ibid. ). All odds are greater than 1, 
which indicates that the odds of being at the high wage level (formal sector). 
increase when any independent variable listed increases. 
Negelkerke R value is used to assess how well the model fits. It is similar 
in intent to 
the R2 in a linear regression. Table 7.23 shows the Negelkerke 
R value. This 
indicates that 60.7 per cent of the variation in the outcome variable is explained 
by 
the Logistic regression model. 
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7.7.4 Coefficients for the Logistic Model using the Saudi Sample 
in the Eastern Province. 
Table 7.24 shows that CURRTEXP, EDUCONT, . N'COMPTRL (1) and 
NENGLISHL (1) are statistically significant predictors of being at the high wage 
level, since their significant values are less than 0.05. Age appeared to be an 
important predictor, but not statistically significant, of being at the high wage level. 
In addition, MARSTAT (1), and URBAN (1) are not statistically significant, as their 
significant values are larger than 0.05. 
Table 7.24 Coefficients Estimates for the Saudi Sample using Logistic 
Regression Model 
Variables B; Df Sig. Ex p. B 
CONSTANT -6.857 1 . 001 . 001 MARSTAT(l) * . 
958 1 
. 095 2.606 
URBAN(]) * . 834 1 . 169 2.303 
CURRTEXP . 137 1 . 
015 1.147 
AGE -. 002 1 . 963 . 
998 
EDUCONT . 256 1 . 011 1.291 
NCOMPTRL(1 * 1.258 1 . 011 3.520 
NENGLISHL (1) * 1.117 1 . 055 3.244 FNagelkerke R Square . 404 
* Confirming that value =1 is considered. 
The column labelled Bi in Table 7.24 shows that all the independent variables, 
except AGE, have positive coefficients. Thus, the predicted odds of being at the high 
wage level increase as any independent variable increases except AGE. On the other 
hand, the predicted odds of being at the high wage level decreases as A GE increases. 
The odds ratios or the exponentiated value of the raw regression coefficient for each 
of the variables are presented in the column labelled Exp. B in Table 7.24. All the 
odds ratios, except AGE, are greater than 1, which indicates that the odds of being at 
the high wage level or formal sector increase, when any of the independent variables 
listed increases. Again Negelkerke R is used to determine how well the model fits. It 
is similar in intent to the R2 in a linear regression. Table 7.24 shows that 40.4 per 
cent of the variation in the outcome variable is explained by the Logistic regression 
model. 
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7.7.5 Coefficients for the Logistic Model using the Non-Saudi Sample 
in the Eastern Province 
In Table 7.25, MARSTAT (1) and URBAN (1) are shown to be not statisticall, - 
significant as their significant values are larger than 0.05. On the other hand, both 
human capital variables, education (EDUCON7) and experience (CURRTEXP). 
with AGE, NCOMPTRL (1) and NENGLISHL (1) are statistically significant 
predictors of being at the high wage level (formal sector) because their significant 
values are less than 0.05. 
The raw coefficients of MARSTAT (1) and URBAN (1) raw coefficients, as shown 
in column Bi of Table 7.25, have negative signs. Therefore, the predicted odds of 
being at the high wage level decrease as any one of them increases. The predicted 
odds for other variables have positive signs which means that the probability of 
being at the high wage level increases with any one-unit increase. 
Table 7.25 Coefficients Estimates for the Non-Saudi Sample 
usine Logistic Regression Model 
Variables B1 Df Sig. Exp. B 
CONSTANT -17.074 1 . 415 . 000 
MARSTAT(1)* -. 348 1 . 652 . 706 
URBAN(1) * -. 574 1 . 
397 . 563 
CURRTEXP . 
094 1 . 
033 1.098 
AGE . 143 
1 . 000 
1.153 
EDUCONT . 
236 1 . 
097 1.266 
NCOMPTRL(1) * 2.264 1 . 003 
9.618 
NENGLISHL(1) * 4.252 1 . 
838 70.262 
Nagelkerke R Square . 
448 
* Confirming that value =1 is considered. 
The odds ratios value of the raw regression coefficient for each of the variables 
is 
presented in the column labelled Exp. B in Table 7.25. Most odds are greater than 1. 
which indicates that the odds of being at the high wage level (formal sector) increase 
when any independent variable listed increases. Table 7.25 shows also P egelkerke 
R 
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value. It shows that 44.8 per cent of the variation in the outcome variable is 
explained by the Logistic regression model. 
7.7.6 Probability of Being at the High Wage Level in Eastern Private Sector of 
Saudi Arabia. 
Given the coefficients in Table 7.23, the Logistic regression equation for the 
probability of being at the high wage level can be written as: 
prob ( being in high wage level) =1 1+ e-Z 
Where 
Z= -12.541+ 4.064NAT(1) + . 514MARSTAT(1) + . 401 URBAN(1) + 
. 094CURRTEXP + . 078AGE + . 249EDUCONT + 1.506NCOMPTRL (1) + 
1.191NEWGLSHL(1). 
Applying this to some cases in our sample, listed below, we find: 
Cases Number 1 9 53 
NAT Saudi =1 Non-Saudi =0 Saudi =1 
MARSTAT Married =1 Married =I Single =0 
URBAN Urban =1 Urban =1 Urban =I 
CURRTEXP 19 8 1 
AGE 25 35 26 
EDUCONT 14 14 12 
NCOMPTRL Low =0 High =1 Low =0 
NENGLISHL High =1 High =1 Low =0 
Z1= - 12.541+ 4.064(1) +. 514(1) + . 401C(1) +. 094(19) +. 078(25) 
+ 249(14) + 1.506(0) + 1.191(1) =. 831 
The probability of being at the high wage level for employee number 1 in our survey 
is estimated to be: 
prob ( being in high wage level) = l+ e1(. 831 ) 
--. 69 
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In general, if the estimated probability of the event is less than 0.5. we predict that 
the event will not occur. If the probability is greater than 0.5, it is predicted that the 
event will occur (SPSS, 1997). Thus, there is a probability of 0.69 that this Saudi 
employee with these characteristics will be at the high wage level. 
Z9 =- 12.541+ 4.064(0) + . 514(1) + . 401(1) +. 094(8) +. 078(35) 
+ 249(14) + 1.506(1) + 1.191(1) = -1.957 
prob ( being in high wage level) = 1+ e- 
1 
(-1.957 ) =. 124 . 124 . 
12 
Based on this estimate, this non-Saudi employee with these characteristics will not 
be at the high wage level. 
Z53 =- 12.541+ 4.064(1) +. 514(0) + . 401(1) + . 094(1) 
+ 078(26) +. 249(12) + 1.506(0) + 1.191(0) =-2.97 
Based on this estimate, this Saudi employee with these characteristics will not be at 
the high wage level. 
prob ( being in high wage level) = 
7.8. Conclusion 
I+ e-(-2.97) 
= . 045 . 05 
This chapter was divided into five sections. Section 7.2 considered most the major 
multiple regression assumptions, such as sample size, outliners, multicollinearity and 
heteroscedasticity. Both sample size and outliners assumptions were treated directly 
by simple and common methods. Multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity were 
corrected by the natural log and WLS methods. In Section 7.3, the OLS method was 
used to test how background variables affect wage level. All significant values 
except the MARSTAT significant value, were less than 0.05, which means that those 
variables make a significant contribution to the prediction of the wage variable. 
Moreover, a dummy variable was used to test in more detail how place of 
birth/province of origin affects wage level. Employees born in the Northern Province 
receive the highest wage effect and those born in the Eastern Province receive the 
lowest. Wages of employees born in the Western, Centre and Southern Provinces. 
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and in "Other" countries were lower than those born in the Northern Province, but 
they decreased gradually. Section 7.4 shows that education, experience. English level 
and computer skills are very important in determining wage levels. 
In Table 7.10, the significant column shows that all included independent variables 
except MARSTAT and URBAN are significant in contributing to the prediction of 
the wage level. Thus, their null hypothesis can be rejected. On the other hand, the 
null hypothesis of MARSTAT and URBAN cannot be rejected. The coefficient of 
determination is 0.499. This indicates that 50 per cent of the variation in Ln J can 
be explained by the listed independent variables. The findings of Section 7.5 
strongly support the segmented labour market theory. For instance, it was shown, as 
the theory predicted, that the human capital model holds up very well for the upper 
wage level, the formal sector and some high technology economic sectors, but has 
little explanatory power in identifying workers at low wage levels, and those in the 
informal and low technology economic sectors. Labour market segmentation can 
have important implications for public policy. Probably one reason why Saudiisation 
programmes have not succeeded as hoped, is that they have not been attuned to the 
realities of the labour market. For example, the policies designed to augment the 
human capital of informal sector employees are not likely to improve their wages. 
The findings presented in this section suggest that an employee's wage is greatly 
affected by which segment of the labour market he works in. Osterman (1977) added 
that movements between segments or the alteration of the regulation of segments 
could be important matters for public concern. Section 7.5 summarised the most 
important results of this chapter. Section 7.6 shows that EDUC and ENGLISHL, 
thought to be very important in affecting wage level, are not significant for Saudi 
employees, but are very important for non-Saudis. In Section 7.7, the Logistic 
regression model was used to determine what was the probability of employees 
being at either the high (formal sector) or low (informal sector) wage level. The 
probabilities of being at the high wage level for employees 1,9, and 53 in our survey 
are estimated to be 0.69,0.13 and 0.05 respectively. Moreover, the Saudi employee 
(case 1) has the probability of 0.69 of being at the high wage level, the non-Saudi 
(case 9) has only a 0.13 chance of being at the high wage level, and the Saudi 
employee (case 53) has little chance of being at that wage level. 
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Chapter Eight 
Low-Wage Workers and Fair Wage Policies in the Private Sector 
of Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province 
8.1 Low-Wage Workers 
8.1.1 Overview 
The determinants of wage inequality have been identified in the previous chapter of 
this thesis. This chapter concentrates on low-wage workers and the possible 
introduction of fair wage policies in the private sector. In the survey, , vage data were 
concentrated towards the lower end of the range, as seen in Figures 8.1,8.2 and 8.3. 
Thus the distribution of all workers, Saudis and non-Saudis, tends to be positively 
skewed (see Appendix F). These figures indicate that many non-Saudi employees and 
some Saudi employees are in the low wage level bracket. For instance, about 22 per 
cent of Saudi employees receive only SR2,000 per month, which is less than the mean 
(SR7,125) by SR5,125, and about 63 per cent of non-Saudi employees receive only 
about SR1,000, which is less than the mean (SR2,819) by SR1,819. Consequently. 
many employees in the Saudi labour market are low-wage workers. 
Moreover, Table 8.1, which displays secondary data compiled from several reports 
published by the General Organisation of Saudi Insurance, shows the numbers of low- 
and high-wage workers in the labour market from 1985 to 1999. It gives the cut-off 
point for the low-wage level as RS3,000. This table shows that the proportion of low- 
wage workers, as a percentage of the total number of workers, was very high (about 
81%) and had varied little over the selected years. The same situation applied to high- 
wage workers, who represented about 19 per cent of all workers. This situation should 
give the Saudi government cause for concern. 
In the near future, many low-paid non-Saudi jobs are likely to become available to 
Saudis under the Saudiisation process. Therefore, the Saudi government should pay' 
serious attention to low-wage jobs. In the past, many industrial countries 
focused a 
great deal of attention on low-wage workers. They believed that, 
by helping those 
workers, wage inequalities would be narrowed and their integration 
into normal 
society would be facilitated. Saudi policy makers could benefit 
from the lessons 
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learned by those countries. Their studies and experiences may assist in the creation of 
an acceptable transition from unemployment to work for many Saudis. 
Table 8.1: Low- and High-Wage Workers in the Saudi Labour Market 
Year Less than 3,000 SR 
% 
More than 3,000 SR 
% 
All 
1408 (1988) 3,221,867 81 743,842 19 3.965,709 
1409 (1989) 2,872,069 82 645,979 18 3.518,048 
1410 (1990) 2,667,034 82 599,572 18 3,226,606 
1411 (1991) 2,532,725 81 575,990 23 3,108,715 
1412 (1992) 2,554,191 81 586,253 19 3,140,444 
1413 (1993) 2,026,921 81 468,260 19 2,495.181 
1414 (1994) 2,020,085 81 476,128 19 2,496,213 
1415 (1995) 2,012,943 81 482,038 19 2,494,981 
1416 (1996) 2,003,177 80 494,707 20 2,497,884 
Sources: Several Reports of the General Organisation for Social Insurance. 
This section focuses on low-wage workers and their wage level in the private sector in 
Eastern Saudi Arabia. The issues to be considered in this section are: 
8.1.2 Low-wage workers in other countries 
8.1.3 Low-wage Saudi workers 
8.1.4 Characteristics of low-wage Saudi and non-Saudi workers 
8.1.5 A profile of low-wage workers in the Saudi labour market 
8.1.2 Who Are the Low-Wage Workers in Other Countries? 
There are many different definitions of low-wage workers. Acs, Phillips and 
McKenzie (2001) define the "working poor" as families whose earnings are less than 
twice the US federal poverty level, and in which the adults work an average of half- 
time or more during the year. These authors estimate that one in six non-elderly 
Americans lives in a poor working family. Almost all one-parent families with 
children and two-thirds of the working poor live in families with children and are in 
the low-wage workers category. 
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Can low-wage workers advance out of poverty? Authors who answer this question 
point out that the working poor are more likely to have children, less likely to be 
married, and tend to have significantly less education than those who are better off. 
Moreover, they have jobs that pay far less for equivalent work effort, are less stable, 
offer fewer benefits and have a lower status. 
In 2001, Carnevale and Rose used the Panel Study on Income Dynamics to show 
earning trends over several years and how long the low-wage workers remain in 
poverty over time. They define low-earners more narrowly as those who earn up to 
$15,000, roughly the poverty level wage for a family of three. The authors distinguish 
between groups of low-earners: 1) young workers living in non-poor families, 2) 
adults who are the second wage-earner in a family, and 3) prime-age adults who are 
primary earners in their families. 
Acs (1999) mentioned that there is no generally accepted and widely used definition 
of a "low-wage worker". He relies in his study on a very basic definition of the term. 
He indicates that any worker whose average hourly earnings in the previous calendar 
year, across all jobs, falls below $7.50 is deemed a low-wage worker. This definition 
sets the low-wage line 45 per cent above the minimum wage and about 30 per cent 
below the median wage for all workers in 1997. Acs referred to other studies, such as 
those by Edin and Lein (1997) and Pavetti and Acs (1997), who used $8 per hour to 
distinguish between "good and bad jobs". Acs' paper does not take into account non- 
wage characteristics of jobs. Moreover, in some definitions, discussions about low- 
wage workers include both workers and non-workers such as welfare recipients who 
would be low-wage workers if they had jobs. 
8.1.3 The Low-Wage Saudi Workers 
Although this group of workers in Saudi Arabia is very important, no particular 
studies of them have been undertaken. Therefore, a detailed study, such as the one in 
this thesis, of low-wage workers in the Eastern Province, should provide valuable 
information about such workers. It proved not to be an easy task to define who the 
Saudi low-wage workers were, as there are many obstacles to attempting such a study. 
In general, there is no one particular definition that fits all countries as each country 
depends on many different factors for defining its low-wage workers. 
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8.1.4 Characteristics of Low-Wage Saudi and Non-Saudi NVorkers 
In spite of there being no generally accepted definition, there are some characteristics 
that do help to determine who is a Saudi low-wage worker. These include: having a 
low level of skill and education; having only a few years of experience; being a new 
entry into the labour market; having a wage level about the same as non-Saudis, and 
one who works in the informal sector. 
Some of these characteristics have been examined, in detail, in the previous chapters. 
Section 7.5 indicates, however, that there are some very important independent 
variables, such as human capital variables, which do not affect the wage level in the 
Saudi labour market, particularly in the informal sector. Selecting some related 
segmented criteria may help to show that these important independent variables can 
help greatly in defining the low-wage worker in the Saudi labour market. In other 
words, if the human capital variables of the workers have a small or insufficient effect 
on the wage level, then they are low-wage workers; otherwise they are not. The 
segmented criteria are as follows: 
1. Nationality 
The Saudi labour market, as stated earlier, is segmented into two markets, Saudi and 
non-Saudi. In the Saudi market, all human capital variables, such as education, 
experience, computer skills and level of English have an effect on the wage level of 
the Saudi worker. On the other hand, only education and level of English have a 
positive effect on the wage level of non-Saudis. The experience and computer skills of 
low-wage workers have no positive effect on their wage level. 
2. Formal and Informal Sectors 
In Chapter Seven, the Saudi labour market is also seen to be segmented into informal 
and formal sectors. This segmentation depends on the employment category. 
For 
example, if a firm has less than 300 employees, then it is in the 
informal sector. 
otherwise it is in the formal sector. In the formal sector, both of the main 
human 
capital variables have a positive effect on the wage level. On the other 
hand, no effect 
is seen to be caused by the same human capital variables in the informal sector. 
The 
conclusion is that if there is any positive effect on the wage 
level by any human 
capital variables, then those workers are high-wage workers, othenvise they are not. 
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3. Wage Category 
In Chapter Seven, the labour market is segmented into high- and low-wage categories. 
Only the education variable makes a statistically significant contribution to the %%. a(-'e 
level in the higher category. In the low-wage category. human capital variables do not 
have a significant effect. This indicates that many Saudi workers with high 
qualifications work in low-wage jobs, which means their high qualifications have no 
effect on their wage level. 
8.1.5 A Profile of Low-Wage Workers in the Saudi Labour Market 
This section examines how many workers may be considered to be low-wage and 
how these workers differ from all other workers in terms of their education, skills, 
marital status, and type of jobs and nationality. 
First, it is necessary to attempt to determine what the low-wage level is. A useful 
conclusion, obtained from all previous definitions, concepts and tables, is that 
SR3,000 is a good indicator of the low-wage level. This level is used to discuss low- 
wage workers in the different cases presented below. 
1. Size of the Problem 
Table 8.2 shows that 51.8 per cent of all workers in the private sector of the Eastern 
Province are low-wage workers. Moreover, the distribution of Saudi and non-Saudi 
low-wage workers among all workers is 10 per cent and 41.8 per cent, respectively. 
This indicates that for four non-Saudi low-wage workers there is one Saudi low-wage 
worker. 
Table 8.2 Distribution of Low-Wage Workers Among all Workers Surveyed 
Worker Type Number Per cent 
All Workers 330 
All Low-Wage Workers 171 51.8 
Saudi Low-Wage Workers 33 10.0 
Non-Saudi Low-Wage Workers 138 41.8 
Table 8.3 shows that 20 per cent of all low-wage workers are Saudis and 80 per cent 
of this entire group are non-Saudis. Further, about 2 out of 10 are Saudi low-wage 
workers and about 8 out of 10 are non-Saudi low-wage workers. 
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Table 8.3 Distribution of Saudi and Non-Saudi Low-Wage Workers Among all 
Low-Wage Workers 
Worker Type Number Per cent 
Saudi Low-Wage Workers 33 20.0 
Non-Saudi Low-Wage Workers 138 80.0 
All Low-Wage Workers 171 100.0 
2. Level of Educational Attainment 
On average, in most countries, low-wage workers have considerably less education 
than workers in general. Surprisingly, in the private sector in Eastern Saudi Arabia. 
the story is different. Table 8.4 shows that while 32 per cent of low-wage workers 
have a high school qualification, 26 per cent of all workers have attained this level. 
Table 8.4 Level of Educational Attainment by Each Type of Workers % 
Low-Wage Workers All Workers 
Saudi Non- 
Saudi 
Total Saudi Non- 
Saudi 
Total 
Less than High school 12.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 5.0 7.0 
High School 45.0 29.0 32.0 33.0 21.0 26.0 
More than High School 43.0 65.0 60.0 57.0 74.0 67.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
The percentage of low-wage workers with more than a high school qualification is 60 
per cent, which is high. There is little difference between this percentage and the 
percentage of all workers with higher qualifications. Moreover, the difference 
between all workers and low-wage workers with less than high school qualifications 
is very small, which indicates that the results should receive more attention. This 
confirms the expectation that there are many workers with high qualifications at the 
low-wage level. 
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3. Level of Skill 
Table 8.5 Skill Levels of Each Type of Worker % 
Low-Wage Workers All 'Workers 
Saudi Non- 
Saudi 
Total Saudi Non- 
Saudi 
Total 
Skilled 36.0 56.0 53.0 49.0 67.0 60.0 
Semi-Skilled 55.0 38.0 41.0 42.0 29.0 34.0 
Unskilled 6.0 0.0 1.0 3.0 0.0 1.0 
Unknown 3.0 6.0 5.0 6.0 4.0 5.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
In general, low-wage workers have a considerably lower skill levels than better-paid 
workers. However, Table 8.5 shows that the situation in the Eastern Province of Saudi 
Arabia is different. Here, 53 per cent of low-wage workers are skilled and 41 per cent 
are semi-skilled, and out of a total of all workers, 60 per cent are skilled and 34 per 
cent are semi-skilled. These results indicate that many workers with high skills or 
qualifications have experienced difficulty in finding suitable employment; otherwise 
most of them would not be in low-wage jobs. This shows that the labour market in 
Saudi Arabia has a serious problem, in that skilled workers cannot find jobs which 
equate with their qualifications. 
4. Province of Origin/Place of Birth 
Taking into consideration the original place of birth of a worker might shed some 
light on the reason why there are so many low-wage workers in the Eastern Province. 
Table 8.6 shows there is a significant difference between workers born in different 
areas. While 14 per cent of low-wage workers are from the Eastern Province, only a 
small percentage of low-wage workers were born in other provinces. Thus, the idea 
that low-wage workers are usually from a particular province or area does apply in the 
Saudi private labour market. Here, discrimination exists among all workers. Saudi 
wage policy makers should realise that, of the many factors that can place workers in 
a low-wage group, place of birth/province of origin is one. 
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Table 8.6 Province of Origin/Place of Birth of Each Type of Worker % 
Low-Wage Workers All Workers 
Saudi Non- 
Saudi 
Total Saudi Non- 
Saudi 
Total 
Eastern Province 70.0 0.7 14.0 64.0 1.1 26.0 
Western Province --- --- --- 5.0 0.0 2.0 
Southern Province 6.0 1.5 2.4 4.0 0.0 1.6 
Central Province 0.0 0.7 0.5 10.0 0. 4.4 
Other Countries 24.0 97.0 83.0 17.0 98.4 63.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
5. Urbanisation 
Table 8.7 shows that most low-wage workers are located in urban areas where 
businesses are located, while 70 per cent of the total of low-wage workers are 
themselves from urban areas, and only 30 per cent of them are from rural areas. 
Table 8.7 Urbanisation of Each Type of Worker % 
Low-Wage Workers All Workers 
Saudi Non- 
Saudi 
Total Saudi Non- 
Saudi 
Total 
Urban 73.0 69.0 70.0 83.0 75.0 78.0 
Rural 27.0 31.0 30.0 17.0 25.0 22.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
The figures for all workers show a predominance of workers are who employed in 
urban areas. This suggests that Saudi planners should ease the pressure on the 
infrastructure by encouraging more firms to locate in rural areas, or at least away from 
the major cities. An example of a successful agricultural project is the one known as 
the Harrad project, which is located about 150 kilometres from the nearest city. 
6. Marital Status 
Table 8.8 shows that about a third of all low-wage workers, at the time of survey. 
were single. The situation of being a low-wage worker is not likely to be as great a 
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problem for them as it is for married workers. The latter (actually 65'o) are likely to 
have less chance than single persons of relocating to better paid jobs elsewhere. even 
if they are available, so their chances of advancement to a higher wage level in their 
present occupations is limited. 
Table 8.8 Marital Status of Each Type of Worker % 
Low-Wage Workers All Workers 
Saudi Non- 
Saudi 
Total Saudi Non- 
Saudi 
Total 
Single 39.0 33.0 35.0 20.0 28.0 24.0 
Married 61.0 67.0 65.0 80.0 72.0 76.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Out of the total number of workers, the difference between the number of single and 
married is greater than in the category of low-wage workers, but still the percentage 
of married is high (76%). Again it can be seen that the situation is dire, especially as 
married workers are likely to have families to support. Therefore, a policy that 
improves the wages of workers would be to their advantage. 
7. Job Category 
Table 8.9 shows the distribution of workers according to job category. The majority 
of these workers are in technical, administrative and production jobs. As there is a 
lower percentage in other jobs, policy makers need to encourage young workers to 
work in the less desirable jobs by introducing some incentives. 
Table 8.9 Job Category of Each Type of Worker % 
Low-Wage Workers Al l Workers 
Saudi Non- 
Saudi 
Total Saudi Non- 
Saudi 
Total 
Technical 18.0 38.0 34.0 35.0 43.0 3 9.0 
Administrative 46.0 14.0 20.0 34.0 15.0 2 3.0 
Accounting or Financial 6.0 8.0 8.0 12.0 
10.0 11.0 
Sales and Marketing 3.0 8.0 7.0 4.0 7.0 6.0 
Production Workers 15.0 16.0 16.0 12.0 12.5 12.0 
Others 12.0 16.0 15.0 4.0 12.5 9.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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There have been examples of government intervention in job placement. For example. 
it recently insisted on replacing non-Saudis with Saudis in je«ellerv shops. The 
success of this policy cannot be estimated at this time. 
8. Age Category 
Table 8.10 shows that in almost every age category there is a considerable percentage 
of low-wage workers. The highest are in the age category 25-29, with 27 per cent, and 
the category 30-34, with 23 per cent. This gives an indication that there are many 
younger workers in low-wage jobs. Age is related to experience and seniority. This 
suggests that with more years of experience, their wages should increase. The 
research for this thesis found this to be the case here in the Eastern Province, in 
particular in the formal sector. 
Table 8.10 Age Category of Each Type of Worker % 
Age Category Low-Wage Wor kers All Workers 
Saudi Non- 
Saudi 
Total Saudi Non- 
Saudi 
Total 
20-24 36.0 6.0 11.7 14.0 4.0 8.0 
25-29 36.0 25.0 27.0 29.0 18.0 23.0 
30-34 16.0 25.0 23.0 22.0 25.0 24.0 
35-39 6.0 15.0 13.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 
40-44 3.0 15.0 13.0 12.0 15.0 13.0 
45-49 3.0 9.0 7.6 4.0 13.0 9.4 
50-54 0.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 7.0 5.0 
55-59 --- --- --- 0.0 0.5 0.3 
60-64 --- --- --- 0.0 0.5 0.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
8.2 Wage Policies 
8.2.1 Overview 
The material presented in Chapters Six and Seven, and in the previous section, reveals 
that wage inequalities and low-wage workers exist in the Saudi labour market, and 
that these are the most serious problems facing the nationals, as they obstruct the 
Saudiisation process and raise the Saudi unemployment rate. Although Saudi Arabia 
has implemented many policies, as recommended in its Five-Year Development 
Plans, to further Saudi employment in the labour market, none have really been 
successful. This is obvious from the examples given below: 
211 
Table 8.11 Reactions to Wage and Saudiisation Policies % 
Employees Employers 
Policies oho 0/0 
Agree Disagree Agree Disagree 
1) Applying a minimum wage policy for all employees 34.8 34.8 1 -8.8 
(Saudi and non-Saudi) will assist Saudiisation. 
2) Applying a minimum wage policy for Saudis only 36.2 39.9 43.6 24.9 
will assist Saudiisation 
3) Improving wages of non-Saudi and Saudi employees 50.7 16.7 49.1 18. -' 
in the private sector will assist Saudiisation. 
4) Improving wages of Saudi employees only in the 79.7 1.4 72.3 6.1 
private sector will assist Saudiisation. 
5) Allowing wages of non-Saudi and Saudi employees 22.5 46.4 21.6 44. - 
to depend on supply and demand of labour will assist 
Saudiisation 
6) Allowing non-Saudi wages to be determined by 47.8 27.5 29.8 24.9 
country of origin will assist Saudiisation. 
7) Charging a high fee for hiring non-Saudis in future 58.7 19.6 47.0 26.0 
will assist Saudiisation. 
8) Allocating subsidies to employers for each Saudi 71.7 9.4 73.5 6.1 
worker hired will assist Saudiisation 
9) Imposing income tax on all non-Saudi employees will 74.0 7.2 49.8 21.6 
assist Saudiisation 
10) Encouraging foreign investment will assist 59.4 10.9 51.9 12.7 
Saudiisation 
11) Reducing government restrictions on small firms 62.3 7.2 61.3 7.2 
will encourage them to employ more Saudi employees 
12) Allocating low cost finance by the government to 79.0 2.8 73.0 3.4 
small firms with 70-100 % Saudi employees will assist 
Saudiisation 
13) Allocating low cost finance by commercial banks to 74.7 3.6 77.9 '. 3 
small firms with 70-100% Saudi employees will assist 
Saudiisation 
N. B. The figures for Agree and Disagree do not add up to 100 per cent. I his is 
because the number of both employers and employees who held no opinions (Neutral) 
on the subject were omitted from the table. 
1. For many years, the government of Saudi Arabia's economic philosophy has been 
to spend generously on human resources (education and training) with the aim of 
gradually replacing non-Saudi employees with the growing numbers of Saudis. 
The 
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hope was that this policy could solve the problem of Saudi unemployment. However. 
in the current economic climate, it is unlikely that this will come about without some 
enforced regulations and policies being introduced that will benefit the labour market. 
2. A few years ago, the Saudi government looked to the private sector for a solution 
to youth unemployment. In fact, the private sector has not achieved the government's 
aims. For example, the Sixth Saudi Five-Year Development Plan (1996-2000) aimed 
to absorb 659,900 Saudis into the private sector, as 340,000 new jobs were to be 
created and 319,000 expatriates were to be replaced. However, the economy fell short 
of the target, creating only approximately 25,000 extra jobs a year for Saudis (. t1EED. 
3 0th June 2000). 
Therefore, the reason for the lack of success in applying such policies is that none of 
the previous Saudi Five-Year Development Plans has correctly and clearly addressed 
the most important issue in the labour market - that is, wages in the private sector. 
The lack of suitable wages is the greatest obstacle facing Saudi youth seeking to be 
employed in the private sector. The Saudi private sector has been unwilling to pay 
Saudis the wages they demand, preferring instead to hire non-Saudi labour at a 
cheaper rate. On the other hand, there is little incentive for Saudis to work in low- 
wage jobs, usually held by non-Saudis, unless they have no other source of income. 
Chapters Six and Seven described the determinants of wage differentials and showed 
that there is a wide wage gap between Saudis and non-Saudis. Chapter Eight discusses 
possible wage policies that may help to reduce the wage differentials in the Saudi 
labour market. 
Furthermore, in order to increase the Saudi presence in the private sector, Saudi 
decision-makers should introduce policies that affect the wage gap both directly and 
indirectly and which would thus help to lower Saudi unemployment, such as applying 
a minimum wage, offering wage subsidies or employment tax credit with hiring 
incentives for the long-term unemployed, changing social insurance contributions to 
favour employment of the low paid, part-time workers and the long-term unemployed. 
imposing payroll taxes on non-Saudis, targeting the long-term unemployed with 
"active labour market policies", modifying the benefit system to ensure that 
individuals are better off in work than out of work, and making use of macroeconomic 
potential tools such as tax and government expenditure policies. 
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This section has focused on possible wage and Saudiisation policies in an attempt to 
suggest methods for decreasing wage inequalities, for speeding up Saudiisation. and 
for stimulating the economy. A goal for policies aimed at the "low-wage problem" 
should be, ultimately, to raise the wages of low-wage workers. The issues to be 
discussed in section two of this chapter are: 
8.2.2 Saudi wage and Saudiisation policies 
8.2.3 Optimal wage and Saudiisation policies 
8.2.4 Wage policy problems 
Various policies designed to raise the wages of low-wage workers and decrease «age 
inequalities were discussed in detail in Chapter Three. 
8.2.2 Saudi Wage and Saudiisation Policies 
The Saudi employees, and employers' attitudes towards various suggested wage and 
Saudiisation policies are summarised in Table 8.11 (see page 212), and will be 
discussed here in order to ascertain whether their attitudes are in favour of wage 
policies that might be the best method for reducing the high rate of Saudi 
unemployment. As 181 Saudi employers and 138 Saudi employees responded to the 
wage attitude questions, the results should be of considerable interest and value to 
Saudi employers and government economists. 
8.2.2.1 Minimum Wage Policies (Policies 1 and 2) 
Policy 1, where only about a third of both groups believed that having a minimum 
wage for all employees, Saudi and non-Saudi would assist Saudiisation. This can be 
explained by the fact that this measure would provide encouragement not only to 
Saudis, but to workers in general. However, Policy 2 received a similar amount of 
support from employees (36%) and only slightly better from employers (44%), even 
though it is confined to Saudis. 
Concerned at the condition of low-wage workers, many Saudi academic researchers 
and employees are calling for a mandatory minimum wage. This measure could tackle 
poverty due to low pay, and act as an incentive for those currently unemployed to 
seek jobs. However, many studies do not support this policy (see Chapter Three) since 
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it can result in an increase in the rate of unemployment as a result of higher labour 
costs, and because it can also mean the substitution of one cause of poverty (low 
wage) for another (unemployment). This suggests that a minimum wage cannot be 
assumed to be certain to aid Saudiisation 
Further studies concerning a minimum wage for Saudi workers could provide some 
useful information. The Saudi Labour and Workmen's Law gives the Council of 
Ministers the right to determine the minimum wage, either in general or with respect 
to a given area or occupation (Saudi Labour and Workmen's Law, 1969, p. 47). Up 
until now, there has been no minimum wage in Saudi Arabia's private sector. 
There is a case for Saudi Arabia's undertaking minimum wage studies as an 
indication of its seriousness about fully following the ILO requirements, as labour 
standards are an important issue for this organisation. The ILO required all members 
to establish a 'system of minimum wage' which covers all groups of wage earners 
whose terms of employment are such that coverage would be appropriate (ILO, 
Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970). Saudi Arabia was suspended in 1995 
from the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) insurance programmes 
because of the government's lack of compliance with internationally recognised 
workers rights standards (US Department of State, 1998). 
Zahran (1999) wrote a useful report about the minimum wage issue in Saudi Arabia. 
He met with academics and businessmen and asked them about their ideas and made 
suggestions regarding minimum wages and the Saudiisation process. In general, there 
were two views; one supported minimum wage legislation and believed that this 
would help in the Saudiisation process and the other group did not support a minimum 
wage and believed that it could be an obstacle to Saudiisation. Hammed Al-Mathy 
Vice President of the SABIC company in Al-Jubail, however, said that imposing a 
minimum wage might encourage national labour to work in the private sector. In 
addition, he suggested that this legislation should be implemented alongside other 
procedures, such as training programmes and improving education levels. 
According to Zahran (ibid. ), the Chair of the Construction Committee in the Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry of Eastern Province, Althabaub mentioned that minimum 
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wage legislation might give non-Saudis the opportunity to raise their wages. 
However, this might encourage employers to hire Saudi citizens, as long as they are 
paid the same wage. Alhamid, a member of Al-Shoura Council, said that there should 
be a reasonable time allowed for imposing a minimum wage in Saudi Arabia. 
Imposing a minimum wage might help to create more jobs for Saudis. Alhamid also 
pointed out that there many studies that support a minimum wage - for example, in 
Taiwan, where a minimum wage has been successfully applied. The problems of 
Taiwan and Saudi Arabia are similar in that there are limited jobs for national workers 
in their own country. In Saudi Arabia there are a considerable number of low-waged 
foreign workers. In Taiwan, many Philippinos and Indonesians work for a lower wane 
than indigenous workers. The Taiwan government pays $145 as a monthly wage 
subsidy to companies for each national hired. In addition, it intends to establish a 
training institution, where each trainee will be paid $290 monthly. A high minimum 
wage for non-national employees helps to encourage Taiwanese firms to hire national 
employees. Zahran has pointed out that Alhamid claimed that this legislation has 
assisted with the hiring of nationals and decreased unemployment in Taiwan. 
Other groups, according to Zahran, did not support a minimum wage for the following 
reasons. The owner of the Consulting Centre for Studies and Finance, Aldakhail, 
believes that it would hinder the Saudiisation process. Nevertheless, he supports wage 
subsidies from the Training Fund for on-the-job training. Alsahalwi, Dean of 
Industrial Management at King Fahad University, was of the opinion that imposing 
minimum wage legislation in Saudi Arabia's labour market might not help in the 
Saudiisation of the labour market. 
A valuable study by Athman, on the possibility of a minimum wage policy in Saudi 
Arabia, appeared in the Saudi Economic Magazine (2000). It referred to many issues 
which are relevant to the present study, such as: 
The Saudi Labour Force Council authorised a team from King Saud University to 
undertake a study related to this issue. 
- The minimum wage is one of many factors that could raise the cost of labour; 
which can result in less profit for a firm and, consequently, less employment. 
-A minimum wage encourages many students to leave school and go to work. 
Setting different levels of minimum wage could encourage man}, teenagers to stay 
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on at school. Different levels of minimum wage are applied in the UK and the US 
successfully. 
- Setting a minimum wage depends on the cost of basic necessities in Saudi Arabia. 
- Applying a minimum wage in Saudi Arabia depends on many factors. For 
instance, a minimum wage should be applied to some jobs that Saudis are not at 
present interested in undertaking. This should encourage Saudis to work in certain 
occupations, such as domestic/cleaning work, driving, retailing, hotels. security, 
restaurants and manual work. 
- There are differences in wages between the public and private sectors in Saudi 
Arabia. Public employees receive higher wages for working fewer hours, whereas 
in the private sector they receive lower wages for longer working hours. 
- The minimum wage needs to apply to both Saudi and non-Saudi workers. Work 
permits, allowances and transportation costs should be considered when applying 
this policy. These costs will distinguish between Saudi and non-Saudi minimum 
wage levels. 
Al-Hazemi (1999), General Secretary of the Saudi Manpower Council, confirmed that 
low wages cause greater turnover among Saudi employees. He indicated that transport 
firms face a shortage of Saudi drivers because wages are low. A National Training 
Fund would help to overcome many obstacles facing Saudi employers as it should 
result in more skilled labour becoming available. 
Al-Saudani and Al-Kair (2001) mentioned that there is a wage difference between 
Saudi and non-Saudi employees. They suggested that this wage gap might be 
narrowed by certain wage policies, such as a minimum wage. Moreover, they pointed 
out that the Al-Yamamah Magazine (2000) mentioned that some Saudis ask for a 
minimum wage to be adjusted so as to be in line with the cost of living. They 
suggested SR2,000 ($533) as a basis for a minimum wage. 
Saudi Arabia should follow the other countries such as those in Europe. The Council 
of Europe set a decency threshold at £228.68 ($360) per week in 1995 (Atkinson. 
Livesey and Milward, 1998). Moreover, George Bain, Chairman of the UK Low Pay 
Commission, said, "It heralds a fundamental change to the labour market in the UK. 
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There will be a floor to wages for the first time in this country. eradicating the worst 
cases of exploitation". 
In conclusion, it was found that the attitudes of both Saudi employees and employers. 
and others, in the above-mentioned studies, indicate that there is considerable 
opposition to applying a minimum wage to the whole Saudi Arabian labour market. 
This suggests that a minimum wage cannot be assumed to be the only means of 
furthering Saudiisation. 
8.2.2.2 Policies for Improving Wages (Policies 3 and 4) 
These policies indicate that there should be systematic adjustments to reforming the 
wage levels for workers (both Saudis and non-Saudis, or only Saudis) in the Saudi 
private sector. Reforming wage levels usually raises the current wage to a higher level 
or increases wage rates in a better systematic process. To this researcher's knowledge, 
no study has been made by government or private concerns regarding improving «zage 
levels in the private sector of Saudi Arabia, except for a few studies concerning the 
prospect of introducing a minimum wage. In most countries, the unions are involved 
mainly with wage rates, but in Saudi Arabia the law prohibits labour unions. This 
prohibition prevents employees being involved in wage reform in the private or the 
public sector. 
With regard to Policy 3, it is noted that about 50 per cent of employees and employers 
believe that improving the wages of non-Saudi and Saudi employees in the private 
sector will assist Saudiisation. At first glance it may seem odd that giving support to 
this policy could aid Saudiisation, but, on further consideration, it appears that by 
increasing/improving both sets of workers' wages the Saudis would no longer 
differentiate between their wages and those of non-Saudis, and that this, in turn, 
would make the jobs more attractive to Saudis than hitherto. 
Policy 4, which would improve wages only for Saudis, was supported 
by a greater 
numbcr (ovcr 70%) of both employees and cmploycrs. This appcars undcrstandablc. 
if 
Saudis are to be given more encouragement to take on such work and non-Saudis are 
to be given less encouragement. Certainly, more Saudis earning satisfactory wage 
would aid Saudiisation and, ultimately, decrease the under-employment of 
Saudis. 
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However, introducing such a policy could cause a widening of the wage gap between 
Saudis and non-Saudis, which is not in agreement with International Labour 
Organisation regulations. 
From the analysis of the reaction to Policies 3 and 4, it may be concluded that Saudi 
Arabia has not introduced wage policies for the following reasons: 1) Until now there 
has no study been carried out and no solution put forward as to how to narrow the 
wage differentials between Saudi and non-Saudi workers and to provide a basis for 
improving wages in the private sector. 2) These policies would not help Saudiisation, 
if they applied only to Saudis, because firms would be less inclined to employ them. 
3) Applying these policies only to Saudis would fall foul of the International Labour 
Organisation requirement of equal treatment in terms of wage rates (ILO, 
Discrimination Convention, 1958). 
8.2.2.3 Segmented Labour Market Policies (Policies 5 and 6) 
The labour market in Saudi Arabia has a dual nature, dealing in Saudi and non-Saudi 
labour. In this labour market, the Saudi workers, though with less experience and 
possibly lower productivity, demand higher wages than those paid to foreign workers. 
Saudis prefer white-collar jobs, and resist manual work, especially dirty and 
hazardous work. On the other hand, in the non-Saudi market, the workers are highly 
productive and accept low wages. In other words, each market has its own structure 
for the supply and demand of workers. 
The introduction of both Policies 5 and 6 would not help the Saudiisation process, as 
the private sector has been unwilling to pay Saudis the salaries they want and, 
consequently, has had to rely on non-Saudis. The current salary levels in the labour 
market of Saudi Arabia do not encourage Saudis to work in private firms and will not 
encourage them to take on the same job, for the same pay, as the expatriates. Many 
non-Saudis accept low wages because they can still earn more in Saudi Arabia than 
they could in their own countries. 
Policy 5, which is to allow the wages of non-Saudi and Saudi employees depend on 
the supply of and demand for labour in order to assist Saudiisation, received support 
from only just over 22 per cent of both employees and employers. This is 
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understandable, for if there is an abundance of workers available and no distinction 
can be made between non-Saudis and Saudis, employers would have no incentive to 
engage Saudis if they prefer non-Saudi workers. In such circumstances, the process of 
Saudiisation is unlikely to progress. 
In the case of Policy 6, almost 48 per cent of Saudi employees support the 
introduction of such a policy, but only 30 per cent of employers are in favour. The 
discrepancy could be explained by suggesting that some employers will be aware that 
the country of origin alone is not a reliable determinant of a potential employee's 
capabilities, and may present other difficulties, such as employees doing the same job 
in Saudi Arabia, but being paid at different rates, thus causing employee 
dissatisfaction, and also reluctance to take on jobs in the first place. 
8.2.2.4 A Tighter Immigration Policy (Policy 7) 
The Seventh Development Plan (2000-2004) shows that despite a tighter government 
policy aimed to reduce the continuous inflow of non-Saudis into the country. their 
numbers increased by 1.5 per cent over the period of the Sixth Development Plan 
(1995-2000). Hamad Ibn Abdullah Al-Hidaithy, Director General of Riyadh's Labour 
Office, pointed out that the increase in the number of non-Saudi workers might be 
even higher than this figure. He indicated that the private sector is employing Saudi 
youth at a weekly average rate of 1,800, and each month 8,000 graduates were 
employed with the help of the Labour Office. On the other hand, the office issues 
20,000 work permits weekly (Arab News, 21St October 2001). This figure indicates 
that non-Saudi workers enter the labour market at 11 times the rate at which Saudi 
workers are employed. The Saudi government employs many methods to curtail non- 
Saudi employment, including applying a high fee for work permits and requiring 
quotas or prohibitions for some professions. For instance, fees are required as follows. 
1) Entrance visas for work with private companies and establishments owned by 
Saudis and non-Saudis cost SR1,000 ($267) per person. 2) Fees for an entrance visa 
for visiting Saudi and non-Saudi companies are set at SR200 ($53.4) per person. 3) A 
work permit fee of SR100 ($26.7) is charged to all expatriate workers, and a residence 
permit is issued and renewed subject to obtaining a work permit. 4) A fee of SR500 
($133) is charged to every applicant for a residence permit. 5) The sponsorship 
transfer fees are as follows: a) SR2,000 ($534) for the first transfer; b) SR4.000 
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($1,068) for the second transfer; and c) SR6,000 ($1,602) for the third transfer. The 
government is preparing to prohibit non-Saudis from working in 147 professions 
(Arab News, 4th November 2002). These methods should help to prevent local 
employers from hiring non-Saudi workers for certain jobs in the private sector and. at 
the same time, create more job opportunities for Saudis. 
Policy 7 shows that employers are 11 percentage points less supportive of the policy 
than employees. This could be an obstacle to employing non-Saudis who are better 
qualified than Saudis. A positive reaction from 47 per cent of the employers is 
unexpected, because if Saudi employers feel it necessary to employ non-Saudis, this 
would increase their labour costs. The fact that only nearly 59 per cent of employees 
were in favour of such a policy is again surprising, as the application of this policy 
could mean fewer non-Saudis being employed and therefore more work being 
available to Saudis. It was expected that the employees' agreement with the policy's 
aim would be much higher. 
8.2.2.5 Subsidies Policy (Policy 8) 
The Saudi government, by means of the Human Resources Development Fund 
(HRDF) has started to apply wage subsidies. The role of the HRDF is to help ne« 
Saudi entrants to the labour market. The HRDF's main goal is to support the 
Saudiisation programme. Its objectives, as mentioned in its leaflet, are: 
1. To provide grants for qualifying, training and recruiting national manpower 
in the 
private sector; 
2. To contribute to the cost of qualifying and training national manpower 
in private 
sector jobs; 
3. To pay a percentage of the salaries of those who are recruited 
into the private 
sector, and 
4. To support the financing of field programmes. 
The methods employed by the HRDF to support training and recruitment are as 
follows. First, employment is tied to training for employees who need 
it: a) The 
HRDF pays 75 per cent of the employee's salary and allowances 
during the on-the- 
job training period, which does not exceed two years, and SRI . 00 (S400) monthly. 
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while the recruiting organisation bears the cost of training. b) The HRDF pays. for 
one year, 50 per cent of the employee's salary after being trained on the job. %%-here the 
support does not exceed SR2,000 ($533) monthly for each employee. 
Secondly, for direct employment of the newly trained employee the HRDF pays. 50 
per cent of the newly recruited employee's salary for two years, if he `she has been 
trained by one of the training centres recognised by the HRDF, who has not been 
employed before, and where the HRDF support does not exceed SR-2,000 (S--; 33) 
monthly for each employee. 
It also supports field programmes, projects, research and studies aimed at replacing 
foreign labour in the Saudi market. The HRDF's activities are funded from the SR150 
($40) which is added to the fund by every work permit (Igama) issued or renewed. Its 
programmes are applicable to all Saudi men and women. This policy may be criticised 
by questioning what will happen when the subsidy programme period is ended for the 
Saudi employee and employer. The director of this fund, Al-Sahlawi, mentioned that 
Saudi workers, at least in the short term, will be more expensive to employ than 
foreign workers in some areas, which would make the private sector better disposed 
towards Saudiisation. (Ba-Isa, 2002). He meant that, in the long term, the Saudi 
marginal labour product should increase and offset the high wage, and it may be 
possible for trained Saudi workers to provide a higher marginal labour product than 
the non-Saudi worker in the long term. 
Policy 8, if instigated, would subsidise employers for each Saudi worker hired, with 
the aim of assisting Saudiisation. Over 70 per cent of both employees and employers 
showed support for this policy. Reasons can be found to justify this high figure. 
Employers would have more incentive to employ Saudis, thereby increasing the 
Saudiisation of the workforce. For employees, it would make work available which 
was formerly done principally by non-Saudis. 
8.2.2.6 Income Tax Policy (Policy 9) 
The tax law is part of Saudi Arabia's attempt to reform its economy and diversify state 
revenues away from oil sales, which at present account for 80 per cent of its income. 
The IMF recommends that Saudi Arabia to speed up the implementation of a 
) 1) 
proposed income tax on non-Saudi workers, and also to extend the tax to Saudis 
(Arab News, 26th October 2002). In fact, on 6th of May 2002, a 10 per cent income tax 
for expatriates was proposed. Arab News reported that the Shoura (Consultative) 
Council approved draft legislation requiring foreigners to pay 10 per cent of their 
monthly salary in income tax. The Council suggests 10 per cent be levied on monthly 
earnings exceeding SR3,000 ($800). This tax would be imposed on all non-Saudi 
workers, except for nationals of countries with which Saudi Arabia has agreements to 
prevent double taxation. This draft legislation has to be approved by a majority of the 
Shoura members before it is presented to the Prime Minister for final endorsement. 
This policy seems to be an attempt to introduce various domestic taxes with the 
purpose of diversifying the government's income and increasing the Saudi 
employment rate in the country. However, it may be criticised on many grounds. For 
example, many non-Saudis, both semi-skilled and skilled, will go back to their own 
countries, and this could have a negative impact on the Saudi economy, unless it is 
possible to substitute qualified Saudis for expatriates during the two years before the 
government aims to implement fully this policy. Arab News confirmed the 
government's view that this policy may be seen as a way of bridging the gap between 
the wages of Saudis and non-Saudis, thus encouraging the employment of locals and 
reducing the jobless rate (ibid. ). 
The private sector may look differently at this income tax policy. It considers this 
policy as an obstacle imposed by the government. The employers will compare this 
policy with the various incentives provided by a number of neighbouring countries, 
notably the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where there is no income taxation on 
expatriates. As a result, this will definitely have a negative impact on both employers 
and the economy, and might make businesses move abroad where conditions are more 
attractive for generating profits. 
It should be made clear to the Shoura Council that though this policy may 
help to 
diversify the government's sources of income, on other hand it may not really help to 
decrease Saudi unemployment or improve the economy. 
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The reaction to the idea of imposing income tax on all non-Saudis (Polic\ 9) showed 
the largest difference between the views of employees (74% in favour) and employers 
(almost 50% in favour) i. e., 24 percentage points. The main reason for employers 
showing a lower amount of support could be that by taxing low-wage workers, fewer 
non-Saudis would seek employment in Saudi Arabia and, consequently, certain jobs. 
in particular menial ones, would not be filled, as Saudis are reluctant to do such work. 
8.2.2.7 Direct Foreign Investment (Policy 10) 
The Kingdom is serious about restructuring what is at present a state-dominated 
economy. Saudi Arabia's Council of Ministers approved a new Foreign Investment 
Law on April 10th, 2000. This new law allows foreigners to have 100 per cent 
ownership of projects, as well as of the property required for the project. It also 
provides the same incentives as those given to national companies. For example, 
projects that are 100 per cent foreign-owned will be eligible for loans from the Saudi 
Industrial Development Fund. Investors will also be able to hold investment licences 
in more than one type of activity and foreign investors and their non-Saudi workers 
will be sponsored under the auspices of the newly licensed firm. The corporate tax 
rate for foreign companies with profits over SR 100,000 is reduced from 45 per cent 
to 30 per cent (US-Saudi Arabian Business Council, 2002). Moreover, this is the first 
time the government has considered opening the natural gas sector to foreign firms. It 
has also worked on the appropriate laws and regulations to increase transparency. 
Would foreign investment help the Saudiisation programme or would it lead to more 
immigration? MEED (2000) reported that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has not 
had a significant impact on employment levels, a finding that was confirmed by a 
Saudi American Bank (SAMBA) study. Saudi Arabia has attracted only a total of 
about $5 billion in FDI over the past 25 years, creating 54,000 jobs. The government 
is hoping for further job creation in the petrochemical sector. In fact, having only a 
few large petrochemical projects is not providing an effective path for the creation of 
jobs. These projects are very capital intensive with a high degree of technology. On 
the other hand, it is more likely that opportunities for job creation will come from the 
small firms that will grow to support the large energy intensive projects (ibid. ). 
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Regarding Policy 10, the difference in view between the employees and employers 
was only about 7 percentage points, with 50 per cent of each group in favour of a 
policy being introduced to encourage foreign investment, as mean of furthering 
Saudiisation. Both parties will be aware that the government wants the private sector 
to be the main organ of growth, as there is much less scope for the public sector to 
absorb local entrants to the workforce. For the private sector to advance, foreign 
investment is needed to supplement any finance available from Saudi private sources. 
As stated above, foreign direct investment has not produced the hoped-for increase in 
either money or jobs over the past 25 years. The total number of jobs created byy joint 
ventures set up in the Kingdom is estimated at just 21,000 (ibid. ). However, an influx 
foreign capital will not necessarily result in new job opportunities for Saudis. This 
realisation probably accounts for the fact that neither employees nor employers gave 
Policy 10 their complete support. 
8.2.2.8 Small Firm Policies (Policies 11,12 and 13) 
The Saudi government has recently recognised lately the importance of small firms. 
Many discussions and meetings have underlined the importance of setting up small 
companies which will help to reduce the high Saudi unemployment rate. The Saudi 
Ministry of Finance and National Economy in conjunction with the World Bank 
organised a workshop on SMEs in Riyadh. At this gathering, Dr. Mohammed 
Abdelkarim Sulayman, head of Research Studies at the country's Manpower Council, 
talked about the need to support SMEs to boost Saudi national employment. He 
indicated that owing to their small capital and low wages they are unable to absorb the 
most major proportion of the national manpower. This encourages the recruitment of 
foreign workers at the expense of national workers, thus exacerbating the country's 
labour problem. (Al Khouri, 1999). 
Many studies indicate that the development of the SMEs sector is very important for 
job creation in the Kingdom. Small businesses make up 85 per cent of all business 
activity in the Kingdom and employ over three million people in the private sector. 
This sector needs to be enhanced by providing help in many areas, such as in securing 
bank loans, training workers, overcoming the scarcity of skilled labour. increasing 
productivity and marketing constraints, and reducing mismanagement (Bashir, 2002). 
These issues were commented on by Arab Netitws, which pointed out that small firm 
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owners were seeking exposure to overseas practices (ibid. ): that the Riyadh Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (RCCI) had been in an attempt with the Saudi Credit Bank: 
to arrange credit facilities ranging from SR100,000 ($26,666.66) to SR500.000 
($133,333.33) for a variety of small businesses; that Japanese teams had been brought 
in to explore SMEs manpower projects (Hassan, Arab News, 11thMarch 2002): that 
the Saudi government had agreed to set up an institution to provide financing for the 
SMEs; and that Saudi teams were to visit India to study the SMEs there (Hassan. Arab 
News, 7th October 2002). 
Policy 11, which would reduce government restrictions on small firms, so as to 
encourage them to employ more Saudi employees, was supported by a similar number 
of employees and employers, i. e., just over 60 per cent each. These small firms 
complain about the unnecessary amount of government interference in the 
organisation and daily progress of their firms. They find that the amount of paper- 
work which has to be completed and the frequent changes in legislation are both time- 
consuming and uneconomic. This situation is not limited to Saudi Arabia - man}, 
firms in the EU have the same complaints, that government interference restricts firm 
expansion and reduces profits. (as reported in several issues of the Financial Times in 
2001 and 2002). 
With regard to Policy 12, over 70 per cent of employees and employers supported this 
policy of supplying low-cost government finance to small firms. According to Javid 
Hassan, writing in Arab News on 11th March 2002, one of the major problems for 
small and medium establishment (SMEs) is inadequate financial support. 
In a survey by the SMEs Development Centre in 2000 of 60 per cent of the SMEs 
located in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, over 75 per cent of the enterprises 
surveyed reported problems in marketing. Therefore, help both with finance and 
information is essential for SMEs, as they are vital for job creation in the Kingdom 
and the furtherance of the Saudiisation programme. 
Policy 13, which aims to make low-cost commercial bank loans available to small 
firms with 70-100 per cent Saudi employees, to assist in furthering Saudiisation, met 
with well over 70 per cent support from both employees and employers. As was 
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reported in the discussion on Policy 12, small businesses are a major source of 
employment in the Kingdom, making up 85 per cent of all business activity and 
employing over 3 million of the sector's 4 million employees (Bashir. 2002). Clearly-. 
the government's introduction of this policy could assist small firms with their 
financial difficulties. Analysts cite the inability to secure bank loans, a lack of trained 
staff, the scarcity of skilled labour, productivity and marketing constraints, 
mismanagement and excessive overheads, as the main problems facing small 
businesses in the Kingdom (ibid. ) 
This policy would provide support and assistance that would enable these firms to 
expand their investments and become acquainted with the latest in business 
technology. This would reflect positively on the local market and, consequently, 
encourage small firms to employ more Saudis. 
In conclusion, it appears that small businesses in Saudi Arabia need to have more 
financial assistance from both government and private banks and have fewer 
restrictions imposed on their activities. These measures will help to speed up the 
Saudiisation process (Al-Khouri, 2002). 
8.2.2 Optimal Wage and Saudiisation Policies 
It is very difficult to choose which are the best or the most commonly suggested wage 
and Saudiisation policies, but by analysing these policies closely and studying their 
implications it might be possible to assess their relative merits. For simplicity, and as 
the first step, the suggested policies will be ranked, then put into categories of above 
or below the 50 per cent base line in order to show the importance of each policy. In 
other words, if Saudi positive attitudes towards any policy are above 50 per cent then 
this policy will be in the more strongly supported category; otherwise, it will be put 
into the less supported category. This will be taken as a guide to acceptance of the 
policy. The second step is to use the previously mentioned opinions, as discussed in 
Section 8.2.2, to help in identifying the more efficient policies. 
Table 8.12 shows strong support from both Saudi employees and employers for 
programmes and polices that help Saudi citizens to find suitable jobs. The survey 
indicates that Saudis in the Eastern Province are concerned about helping new 
227 
entrants. This table shows that both the Saudi employees and employers agreed 
strongly on six policies - 4,8,10,11,12 and 13 - which would improve wages for 
Saudis, introduce wage subsidies, encourage foreign direct investment, and support 
small firms (see the shaded boxes). Moreover, they gave some support to six other 
polices - 1,2,3,5,6 and 7- which introduce a minimum wage, increase wages for 
both non-Saudis and Saudis, improve segmented labour market policies. and tighten 
immigration controls. If Policies 9 (income tax policy) and 4 (improving , ages of 
Saudi employees) are excluded because of their controversial nature. and Polic`Y 7 is 
added because of its positive contribution to the Saudiisation process. then Policies 7, 
8,10,11,12 and 13 are the policies most recommended by Saudi employees and 
employers in the survey. In other words, a tighter immigration policy, a vage 
subsidies policy, a foreign investment policy and policies that assist small firms 
appear to be the most effective policies for the Saudi labour market. 
Table 8.12 Ranking the Wage and Saudiisation Policies 
E m lo ees' Reactio ns Employers' Reactio ns 
Ranking Policies % 50 % Base Ranking Policies % 50 % Base 
1 4 79.7 1 13 77.9 
2 12 79.0 Over 2 8 73.5 Over 
3 13 74.7 50 % 3 4 72.3 50 % 
4 9 74.0 4 12 73.0 
5 8 71.7 (Strong 5 11 61.3 (Strong 
6 11 62.3 Policies) 6 10 51.9 Policies) 
7 10 59.4 7 9 49.8 
8 7 58.7 8 3 49.1 
9 3 50.7 9 7 47.0 
10 6 47.8 Less than 10 2 43.6 Less than 
11 2 36.2 50% 11 1 33.1 50% 
12 1 34.8 12 6 29.8 
(Some 
13 5 22.5 (Some 
Support) 
13 5 21.6 Support) 
8.2.4 Wage Policy Problems 
The basic problem is that if wages are raised by any of the above recommended 
policies, Saudi firms may become less competitive, even in their own 
home market. 
Government subsidies could help, but a government cannot allow such subsidies, to 
continue without a time limit. 
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The wage policies suggested in this study are aimed at providing assistance for the 
Saudi unemployed, low-wage workers, and new entrants to the job market. Although 
suggested wage polices will raise wages directly or indirectly, neither a subsidy policy 
nor other suggested wage polices are intended to impose a higher «vage burden on 
firms in Saudi Arabia. However, any new wage regulation is an obstacle to the main 
aim of any firm, that is, of maximising profit. For instance, if a minimum wage is 
imposed by the government, many Saudi firms will lay off workers in order to cover 
their higher labour costs (labour wages). 
It seems that the only way forward is through government intervention. Any 
government with the ability to raise funds should be able to design good programmes 
or policies to stimulate the employment level of its labour market. However, the 
situation is difficult for Saudi Arabia, which, owing to its oil revenues, was once 
financially able to operate such programmes, but which has now accumulated a large 
deficit, and is therefore no longer able to fund these programmes adequately. 
Imposing taxes is the only solution left to the Saudi government to support such wage 
programmes. The Saudi government is now faced with the challenge of a huge deficit 
and a high level of unemployment. A huge deficit puts the government in a critical 
position with its citizens. It would have to impose a particular tax to support the 
policies referred to here, in order to create more jobs for Saudis. 
In determining how such programmes could be applied in the country, Stiglitz's 
(1993) classification of who is poor and who is a low-wage worker could provide the 
government with some useful insights. Programmes of the Saudi government should 
be aimed at reducing inequality by preventing poverty and providing a safety net for 
the very poor. The poor include those who are not working and those on low wages. 
Those not working can be grouped into at least three categories: people who cannot 
work, either because they are too old or too disabled; individuals who cannot 
find 
work because there is a shortage of jobs; and people who do not choose to work 
because the type of work is unattractive to them. Although most developed countries 
have assistance programmes that support such people, Saudi Arabia, as a middle 
income economy, only has pension funds that support the first category. Thus, 
it has 
to examine the scope for wider programmes in the light of its ability to 
finance them. 
For the time being, imposing tax is the main method of financing assistance 
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programmes. For instance, the Human Resources Capital Fund in Saudi Arabia gets 
its funds from Iqama fees. This fee is SRI 50 ($40), and is levied on each -work permit 
given to a non-Saudi worker. In addition, the Saudi government can raise more funds 
for assistance programmes by, for example, reallocating education expenditure. 
imposing value added taxes on consumption, or even imposing income tax. 
8.3 Conclusion 
Section 8.1 highlighted who the low-wage workers are, and their wage level, in the 
private sector of the Eastern Province. It showed that there is no universal definition 
of low-wage workers but that there are some characteristics that help to generalise 
who they are. Some of these characteristics are: low skills and education; few years of 
experience; recent entrants into the labour market; and employment in the informal 
sector. 
The profile section of low-wage workers in the private sector of the Eastern Province 
reveals that over 51.8 per cent of all workers are low-wage workers. Generally, five 
out of ten workers receive less than SR3,000 ($800) in the Eastern private sector. This 
group constitutes a significant share of the workforce in this province, and most lows - 
wage workers, unlike those in other countries, are skilled, married, live in urban areas 
and have a high level of education. Consequently, a reasonable goal for policies 
aimed at the "low-wage problem" is to raise the wages of low-wage workers. (Policies 
aimed at raising the wages of these workers are explained in detail in Chapter Three). 
This section confirmed that wage inequalities, an unsystematic wage structure, and 
low-wage workers exist in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. The section dealing 
with Saudi wage policy summarises the relevant literature and suggests policies and 
programmes that may help in confronting these important wage issues and 
unemployment. It focuses on several important wage polices that could decrease wage 
inequality and offer a reasonable wage for low-wage workers so as to lift them out of 
poverty. It is difficult to choose which are the best or the most effective wage policies 
for the Saudi labour market, especially if they are related to the other wage policies 
described in Chapter Three. Since 181 Saudi employers and 138 Saudi employees 
responded to the wage attitude questions, the results of this survey should be 
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beneficial to planners. The figures shown in Table 8.12 suggest that Policies 7.8.10. 
11,12 and 13 would be the most effective policies for the Saudi labour market. 
The final section of this chapter, which deals with basic labour market problems. is of 
major importance. If wages are raised, Saudi firms may become less competitive. 
even in their own home market. Government subsidies could help, but the government 
cannot allow such subsidies to continue indefinitely. Moreover, there is no intention 
to impose a higher wage burden on any firm in the Saudi private sector. It seems that 
imposing various taxes is the only solution left for the Saudi government, so as to 
enable it to provide adequate support for any wage policy that might stimulate 
employment, particularly of its own nationals. 
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
The statement of the problem indicates that the high cost of wages for emplovin,, 
Saudis relative to non-Saudis is an obstacle when seeking to further Saudiisation in 
the Saudi private sector. Therefore, many theories of wage inequality have been 
applied in an attempt to explain the main reasons why different emplo`-ees have 
different wages and which factors affect wages significantly. Among these theories. 
three have been prominent: 1) The human capital theory, which explains wage 
inequality in terms of individual qualities, 2) The segmented labour market theory, 
which uses various criteria to divide the market into segments, was applied to the 
Saudi labour market to determine whether a wage gap exists between the fom al and 
informal sectors, and 3) The discrimination theory, which maintains that if 
employees with the same economic qualifications receive different wages, the 
differences systematically correlate with the non-economic characteristics of the 
employees. 
Chapters Six and Seven showed that wage inequalities in the Eastern labour market 
and the factors affecting the wages in the formal sector often vary from those in the 
informal sector. Chapter Eight indicated that low-wage workers in Saudi Arabia 
differ from similar groups in other countries, and also analysed the wage and 
Saudiisation policies that are needed to decrease wage inequality. The present 
chapter resumes all these important results, as follows: 
9.2 Descriptive and Inferential (Analytical) Statistics 
This section summarises the results of the statistical analysis described in Chapter 
Six. 
9.2.1 Summary of Respondents' Background Variables 
The main findings relating to category and the continuous variables are summarised 
in Table 9.1. These are: 
1. Nationality: 66 per cent of the Saudi sample are at the upper wage level and only 
34 per cent are at the lower level. Hence, the percentage of Saudis at the upper 
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wage level is double the percentage of Saudis at the lower level. On the other 
hand, about 86 per cent of the non-Saudi sample are at the lower wage level and 
only 14 per cent of this sample are at the upper wage level. 
Table 9.1 Summary of Respondents' Background Variables Table 
Variables Cross-Tabu lation 
Saudi Wage Non-Saudi Parametric Test Non-Parametric 
% Wage Test 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
(1) 2 I (2) 
Nationality Test: Independent Test: %lann- 
Saudi 34.0 66.0 --- --- Sample Test WhitneN U Tc't 
Non-Saudi --- --- 86.0 14.0 Result: Result: 
si nificant Significant 
Marital Status Test: Independent Test: \lann- 
Single 51.9 48.1 94.3 5.7 Sample Test Whitney t' Test 
Married 28.8 71.2 82.7 17.3 Result: Result: 
Significant Significant 
Urbanisation Test: Independent Test: \lann- 
Urban 29.6 70.4 84.6 15.4 Sample Test Whitncý U Test 
Rural 52.2 47.8 85.9 14.1 Result: Result: 
Significant Significant 
A-egCategory Test: ANOVA Test: Kruskal- 
20-24 73.7 26.3 100.0 --- Wallis Test 
25-29 33.3 66.7 100.0 --- Result: Result: 
30-34 35.5 64.5 95.8 4.2 Significant Significant 
35-39 13.0 87.0 87.5 12.5 
40-44 6.3 93.8 78.6 21.4 
45-49 50.0 50.0 60.0 40.0 
50-54 33.3 66.7 71.4 28.6 
55-59 --- --- --- 100.0 
60-64 --- --- 100.0 --- 
Province of Origin/Place Test: ANOVA Test: 
Kruskal- 
of Birth 
Wallis Test 
Eastern Province 40.0 60.0 100.0 --- Result: Result: 
Western Province --- 100.0 --- --- Significant 
Significant 
Southern Province 15.4 84.6 100.0 --- 
Northern Province --- 100.0 --- --- 
Central Province 15.4 84.6 1000 --- 
Other Country 47.6 52.4 85.6 14.4 
Occupational Category Test: ANOVA Test: Kruskal- 
Wallis Test 
Professional or Technical 22.9 77.1 83.1 16.9 Result: 
Result: 
Administrator 44.7 55.3 79.3 20.7 Significant Significant 
Accounting or Financial 12.5 87.5 78.9 21.1 
Sales and Marketing 50.0 50.0 100.0 --- 
Production Worker 33.3 66.7 95.8 4.2 
Others 80.0 20.0 91.7 8.3 
l k K 
Level of Skill 
Test: ANOVA a - rus Test: 
Professional/Skilled 29.4 70.6 79.1 20.9 
Wallis Test 
Semi-Skilled 39.7 60.3 100.0 --- Result: 
Result: 
Unskilled 66.7 33.3 --- --- Not Significant 
Not Signiticant 
Unknown 12.5 87.5 100.0 --- earman's S t T Test: Pearson p : es Age (As a continuous 
--- Correlation rho 
Correlation 
variable) --- --- --- - Result: Result: 
Positive edium Positiv e Medium 
233 
This indicates that the first step in the further development of the tiaudiisation 
process is to take account of the present wage levels and to close the 
-gap 
between 
the upper and lower wage categories. Both parametric and non-parametric tests 
show that there is a statistically significant difference between the annual wages 
of Saudi and non-Saudi employees. 
2. Marital Status: Nearly 52 per cent of Saudis working at the lower «arge level are 
single and just over 71 per cent of married Saudis are at the upper wage level. For 
non-Saudis the picture is different. Here, 94 per cent of single persons and 83 per 
cent of married persons are at the lower wage level. This leaves only a small 
percentage of non-Saudis at the upper wage level. That there is a significant 
difference in the mean of the annual wage variable for single and married groups 
is shown when parametric and non-parametric tests are applied. 
3. Urbanisation: Table 9.1 shows that most of the Saudi employees who live in urban 
areas are at the upper wage level and more than half of the Saudi emploYees who 
live in rural areas are at the lower wage level. On the other hand, there is a small 
difference when non-Saudi employees are examined according to the urban/rural 
areas. Applying the parametric and non-parametric test to the sample shows that 
there is a significant difference between the current annual wage of urban and 
rural groups in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. 
4. Age Category: The table shows that 74 per cent of Saudi employees aged 20-24 
years are at the lower wage level and only 26 per cent of the same age category 
are at the upper one. Hence, the percentage of lower-paid Saudi employees is 
triple the percentage of higher-paid Saudi employees in the 20-24 years category. 
This indicates that most Saudis entering the labour market start with a low wage. 
The percentages are different for the 25-29 and over 29 age groups. The 
increasing percentages at the upper wage level and the decreasing percentages at 
the lower level for the higher age groups for Saudi employees indicate that Saudi 
employees in the Eastern Province are getting wealthier as they grow older, 
although this situation may not continue. Most non-Saudi employees, on the other 
hand, over the entire age range, are in the lower wage category. It is worthy of 
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note that the non-Saudi percentage also decreases at the lower wage level and 
increases at the upper wage level the longer they stay in the Eastern private sector. 
The ANOVA and its alternative test show that there is a significant difference in 
the mean scores of the annual wage variable for all age ranges. 
5. Province of Origin/Place of Birth: Saudi employees born in the Eastern Province 
scored the lowest at the upper wage level and had the highest percentages at the 
lower wage level. By contrast, Saudi from other provinces obtained the lowest and 
the highest percentages at the lower and upper wage levels, respectively. This was 
not the case with to non-nationals. Both parametric and non-parametric tests 
indicate that there are statistically significant differences with regard to the place 
of birth variable. This suggests the possibility of wage discrimination between 
various groups of Saudi employees. 
6. Occupational Category: Most Saudis who work either as professionals, 
administrators or accountants, and some who are senior production workers, are at 
the upper wage level, while the rest are at the lower wage level. On the other 
hand, most non-Saudi employees are at the lower wage level, no matter what kind 
of occupational category they are in. The ANOVA and its alternative test show 
that there is a difference in wages according to job (occupational) category. 
7. Level of Skill: At the upper wage level, the percentage of skilled and semi-skilled 
Saudis is higher than the percentage of unskilled Saudis. By contrast, the 
percentage of semi-skilled and "other" non-Saudis is higher than the percentage of 
skilled non-Saudis at the lower wage level. Both the parametric and non- 
parametric tests show that there is not a statistically significant 
difference in the 
continuous variable across the skill levels. 
8. Age (as a Continuous Variable): The Pearson product-moment and 
Spearman rank 
order correlation tests show the strength and direction of the 
linear relationship 
between age and wage variables. They show that there is a medium positi\ C 
correlation between age and wage variables. 
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9.2.2 Summary of Human Capital Variables 
1. Education: Table 9.2 shows that often the percentages of Saudis at the upper wage 
level are higher than the percentages of the same group at the lower wage level 
of all levels of education except the primary and Master degree levels. With 
higher educational qualifications, the percentage at the lower wage level usually 
decreases, whereas it increases at the upper wage level. On the other hand, a 
higher percentage of non-Saudis are at the lower wage level than the upper. 
With higher educational qualifications the percentage of non-Saudis at the lower 
wage level decreases and the percentage at the upper wage level increases. The 
ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis tests show that there is a statistically significant 
difference in the wage variable across education levels. 
2. Education (Continuous): Education is considered as a continuous variable. Its 
results are the same as for Education as a categorical variable. In addition, the 
Pearson and Spearman correlation tests show that there is a medium positive 
correlation between the wage variable and the number of years of education. 
3. Level of English: Table 9.2 shows that with a higher English level for both Saudi 
and non-Saudi, the percentage at the lower wage level decreases, but increases at 
the upper wage level. Both parametric and non-parametric tests show that there 
is a statistically significant difference in the wage variable across the four 
English levels. 
4. Level of Computer Skills: The percentage of those at the upper wage level 
increases with an increase in computer skills for both Saudi and non-Saudi 
employees, and the percentages decrease with an increase in computer skills for 
both nationalities at the lower wage level. The ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis tests 
show that there is a difference in wage levels in relation to the level of computer 
skills. 
5. Experience: The Pearson and Spearman correlation tests showN, that there is a 
medium positive correlation between wage variable and experience variables. 
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Table 9.2 Summary of Human Capital Variables 
Variables Cross-Ta bulation Parametric Non- 
Saudi Wage Non-Saudi Test Parametric 
% Wage Test 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
Education (Category) Test: Test: Kruskal- 
Primary 100.0 --- 100.0 --- ANOVA Wallis Test Elementary 38.5 61.5 100.0 --- High 48.9 51.1 96.6 2.4 Result: 
Diploma 28.1 71.9 88.9 11.1 Result: Significant 
Bachelor of science 6.3 93.8 81.6 18.4 Significant 
Bachelor of Art 45.5 54.5 84.2 15.8 
Master's Degree 66.7 33.3 60.0 40.0 
Ph. D. Degree 
--- --- --- 100.0 
Education (Continuos) Test: Test: 
Pearson Spearman's rho 
6 Years of Schooling 100.0 --- 100.0 --- 
Correlation Correlation 
9 Years of Schooling 38.5 61.5 100.0 --- 12 Years of Schooling 48.9 51.1 97.6 2.4 Result: Result: 
14 Years of Schooling 28.1 71.9 88.9 11.1 Medium Medium 
16 Years of Schooling 45.5 54.5 84.2 15.8 Positive Positive 
17 Years of Schooling 6.3 93.8 81.6 18.4 
19 Years of Schooling 66.7 33.3 60.0 40.0 
22 Years of Schooling --- 100.0 
Level of English Test: Test: Kruskal- 
None 100.0 --- 100.0 --- 
ANOVA Wallis Test 
Beginner 66.7 33.3 100.0 --- 
Intermediate 34.7 65.3 96.0 4.0 Result: Result: 
Advanced 12.2 87.8 68.1 31.9 Significant Significant 
Computer Skills Test: Test: Kruskal- 
None 69.2 30.8 97.6 2.4 ANOVA Wallis Test 
Beginner 50.0 50.0 95.7 4.3 
Intermediate 24.6 75.4 80.0 20.0 Result: Result: 
Advanced 18.8 81.3 71.8 28.2 Significant Significant 
Current Experience Test: Test: 
(Continuous Variable) 
--- --- --- --- 
Pearson Spearman's rho 
Correlation Correlation 
Result: Result: 
Medium Medium 
Positive Positive 
9.2.3 Segmented Labour Market Variables 
1. Firm Ownership: Table 9.3 shows that there are higher percentages of non-Saudi 
employees at the lower wage level than at the upper wage level 
in both Saudi and 
non-Saudi firms. On the other hand, only a slight difference is found 
between 
upper and lower levels among Saudi employees in Saudi firms. In addition, there 
15 For more information on years of schooling see Chapter Five. 
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are higher percentages of Saudi and non-Saudi employees who work in joint 
ventures at the upper wage level than there are at the lower wace level. Both 
parametric and non-parametric tests show that there is a statistically significant 
difference in the wage variable across the three firm ownership groups. 
2. Type of Firm: at the lower wage level, there is a high percentage of Saudi 
employees in the commercial, agricultural and services sectors only, but a hi ugh 
percentage of non-Saudi employees in all sectors. Hence, at the upper wage level. 
percentages of non-Saudi employees are low in all sectors except the industrial, 
and high percentages of Saudi employees are found in the industrial, financial and 
transportation sectors. There is a statistically significant difference in the wage 
variable across the sectors, as confirmed by parametric and non-parametric tests. 
3. Number of Employees: Table 9.3 shows that percentages of Saudi and non-Saudi 
both at the upper wage level are greater in the formal sector than in the informal. 
On the other hand, their percentages at the low wage level are greater in the 
informal sector than in the formal. The ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis tcsts 
confirmed that there is a statistically significant difference in the wage variable 
across the employees' groups. 
4. Firm Grade: In all grades, the percentages of non-Saudis at the lower wage level 
are higher than at the upper level. On the other hand, for Saudis, the percentages 
at the upper wage level are much higher than the percentages at the lower level 
except for low grade. Both parametric and non-parametric tests show that there is 
a statistically significant difference in the wage variable across firm grades. 
9.3 Regression Models 
This section provides more empirical evidence for the structure, determinants, and 
differences in wages in the Eastern Province private labour market by using the 
multiple regression models and the Logistic regression model. Sections 9-3-1 and 
9.3.2 show how background and human capital variables affect wage levels. Section 
9.3.3 takes the previously mentioned variables and places them in standard 
segmented lines. 
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Table 9.3 Summary of Segmented Labour Market Variables 
Variables Cross-Tabulation Parametric Non- 
Saudi Wage Non-Saudi Test Parametric 
% Wage Test 
Low High Low High 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
Firm Ownership Test: ANOVA Test: Kruskal- 
Owned by Saudi 49.4 50.6 91.8 8.2 Wallis Test 
Owned by Non-Saudi 
--- --- 80.0 20.0 Joint Venture 13.3 86.7 47.8 52.2 Result: Result: 
Significant Significant 
Type of Firm Test: ANOVA Test: Kruskal- 
Industrial 19.2 80.8 67.6 32.4 Wallis Test 
Commercial 62.5 37.5 90.0 10.0 
Agricultural 61.5 38.5 81.8 18.2 Result: Result: 
Finance and Insurance 25.0 75.0 100.0 ___ 
Significant Significant 
Transportation 
--- 100.0 80.0 20.0 Construction 
--- --- 97.3 2.7 Services 40.0 60.0 90.9 9.1 
Others 87.5 12.5 84.2 15.8 
Number of Employees (20) Test: ANOVA Test: Kruskal- 
=< 20 Employees 83.3 16.7 92.3 7.7 Wallis Test 
> 20 Employees 31.3 68.7 84.9 15.1 
Result: Result: 
Significant Significant 
Number of Employees (40) Test: ANOVA Test: Kruskal- 
=< 40 Employees 75.0 25.0 92.0 8.0 Wallis Test 
> 40 Employees 31.0 69.0 83.8 12.2 
Result: Result: 
Significant Significant 
Number of Employees (500) Test: ANOVA Test: Kruskal- 
=< 500 Employees 54.2 22.5 89.7 10.3 Wallis Test 
> 500 Employees 22.5 77.5 80.0 20.0 
Result: Result: 
Significant Significant 
Firm Grade Test: ANOVA Test: Kruskal- 
High 27.5 72.5 76.7 23.3 Wallis Test 
Medium 34.0 66.0 84.4 16.0 
Low 87.5 12.5 86.4 13.6 Result: Result: 
Unclassified 40.0 60.0 91.5 8.5 Significant Significant 
9.3.1 Summary of Respondents' Background Variables 
1. In Table 7.4, the linear regression model shows that the largest beta coefficient is 
B1, that is for Nationality (NAT). All significant values in this table except the 
MARSTAT significant value, are less than . 
05. which means that those variables 
make a significant contribution to the prediction of the wage variable. R` indicates 
that NAT, MARSTAT, URBAN, PBIRTH and AGE can explain 36 per cent of 
the variation in predicted wage variable. 
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2. Using a dummy variable for PBIRTH helps to determine which place of 
birth/province of origin, in the Saudi Arabian Provinces has the lareest effect on 
wage level. Tables 7.5 and 7.6 indicate that there is a wage difference between 
Saudi employees themselves that is due to place of origin. Saudi employees born 
in the Northern Province receive the highest wage while those born in the Eastern 
Province receive the lowest. The MARSTAT, DUMYSOTH and D UAI }'O THR 
coefficients do not contribute significantly to the model being considered. R2. the 
coefficient of determination, indicates that about 40 per cent of the variation in 
wage variable can be explained by the listed independent variables. 
3. Transforming the wage variable to the natural log gives good results. MARST. A T 
is insignificant, but after transformation it becomes significant. R2 is 41 per cent. 
This indicates that 41 per cent of the variation in the natural log wage variable can 
be explained by all the background variables. Comparing OLS and OLS using the 
natural log, Ln, for the wage variable, shows that some of the corresponding t-test 
scores rose higher, and R2 rose from 36 per cent to 41 per cent. This indicates that 
OLS using the natural log has provided a more efficient estimate of the slope 
parameters. 
4. Using Weighted Least Squares (WLS) to eliminate heteroscedasticity in our 
original background regression model gives good results. A comparison of OLS 
and WLS results shows that the corresponding t-test values rose higher, which 
indicates that the WLS transformation model has generated a more efficient 
estimate of the slope parameters, although R2 has fallen from 36 per cent to 31 per 
cent. 
9.3.2 Summary of Respondents' Background and Human Capital Variables 
1. All included independent variables, except for MARSTA T and URBAN, are 
significant in contributing to the prediction of the wage level. R` indicates that 
about 50 per cent of the variation in wage variable can be explained by the listed 
independent variables. 
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2. Using the natural log for the wage variable gives good results. The Ln wage 
regression model shows that all independent variables make a statistically 
significant contribution to the wage variable. A comparison of OLS with OLS 
using the natural log for the wage variable reveals that some of the corresponding 
t-test scores rose higher. This indicates that OLS using the natural log has 
provided a more efficient estimate of the slope parameters. It has also caused R to 
rise from 50 per cent to 57 per cent. 
3. Using Weighted Least Squares (WLS) to eliminate heteroscedasticity in the 
human capital regression model gives good results. A comparison of OLS and 
WLS results shows some of the corresponding t-test values are slightly higher and 
others less so, but R2 does not change. Thus, using the natural log for the wage 
variable gives more significant results than the WLS method. 
9.3.3 Segmented Labour Market 
1. Saudi and non-Saudi (Nationality): In the Saudi and non-Saudi markets, almost all 
previously mentioned independent variables, except for AGECATT, have some 
effect on the Saudi wage level, and only three independent variables (A GECA TT, 
EDUC, and ENGLISHL) affect the non-Saudi wage level. R2 for the Saudi 
market is higher than for the non-Saudi market. This indicates that more 
independent variables affect the Saudi wage level than the non-Saudi wage level. 
2. Job Category: Using the coefficient of NAT for all job categories makes a 
significant contribution to the prediction of wages as a dependent variable. 
On the 
other hand, the MARSTAT coefficient for the same job categories 
does not make 
a significant contribution in predicting the dependent variable. The contributions 
made by the other independent variables vary in significance. Comparing the 
beta 
values among the job categories reveals that they carry different weights 
from one 
job to another, but that the main one is the nationality beta. The 
highest R2 is 75 
per cent for the marketing job category and the lowest is 
54 per cent for the 
administrator category. In addition, there are more insignificant 
independent 
variables tan significant ones. This result should be paid more attention 
by those 
designing wage structures and setting a wage policy in the Saudi private market. 
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3. Job Skill: The NAT, EDUC and COMPUTRL coefficients have the most 
significant effect in the skilled and semi-skilled categories. On the other hand. 
there are no significant effects of the MARSTAT, URBAN and CURRTE. VP 
coefficients when applied to the models. The remaining coefficients of other 
independent variables only make a significant contribution to the skilled category. 
The determination coefficient of semi-skilled (60 %) is higher than R`' for skilled. 
In general, NAT, EDUC and COMPUTRL should be considered when 
introducing a new wage policy. Note that the unskilled and unknown sub- 
segments of the labour markets are excluded because the first contains only' a few 
cases and the second has a mixed skilled level that would produce unreliable 
results. 
4. Firm Ownership: NAT, AGECATT, EDUC and ENGLISHL coefficients appear 
to have the most significant effect on the Saudi and joint venture firm categories. 
On the other hand, the MARSTAT, URBAN and COMPUTRL coefficients 
proved to have no significant effect on these two categories. The coefficients of 
the other independent variables only make a significant contribution to the Saudi 
firm category. Thus, when comparing beta values, it may be seen that there is a 
wage difference between Saudi and joint venture firms. The coefficient of 
determination for both these firm categories shows that there is a 46 per cent for 
Saudi and 62 per cent for joint ventures variation in predicted wage level. This can 
be explained by the listed independent variables. Note that the non-Saudi category 
is excluded because it contains few cases. 
5. Economic Sector: When comparing the beta values across the various economic 
sectors it can be seen that they differ from one sector to another, but the highest 
beta value belongs to nationality in all sectors, and the highest beta Value for 
MARSTAT is in the agricultural sector. This confirms that wage differences exist 
in the economic sector. In addition, the highest determination coefficient. R2. is 66 
per cent for what is termed "other" sectors and the lowest is 32 per cent for the 
construction sector, which indicates that the independent variables have more 
effect in the "other" sectors than in the construction sector. 
242 
6. Employment Category: In the formal sector, all coefficients except , tL4RST, i T 
and URBAN make a statistically significant unique contribution to the prediction 
of the wage variable. However, in the informal sector, there are many coefficients 
which do not make any significant contribution, such as MARST4 T. URBAN'. 
EDUC and CURRTEXP. Beta values for the formal and the informal sectors 
confirm the wage differences between them. In the formal and informal sectors, 
determinations of 59 per cent and 64 per cent indicate that variations in the 
predicted wage variable can be explained by independent variables. 
7. Province of Origin/Place of Birth (Discrimination Theory): in the Southern 
Province, none of the coefficients makes a statistically significant contribution to 
the predicted wage variable except NAT. When comparing the beta values of the 
Eastern and Central Provinces, it can be seen that they differ from one another. 
This indicates that the wage difference might be due to employees' place of birth. 
The coefficient of determination (94 per cent) for the Central Province is higher 
than that of the Eastern Province (52 per cent). 
8. Wage Category: Most listed independent variables which affect the high wage 
level are different from those which affect the low wage level. The beta value of 
NAT at the higher wage level is higher than at the lower wage level. For lower 
and higher wage levels, the coefficients of determination in the Eastern private 
labour market of 21 per cent and 25 per cent respectively indicate that the 
variation in predicted wage level may be explained by listed independent 
variables. 
9. The appropriate econometric model shows that only AGECATT. CURRTEXP 
and ANLFTWAG affect wage levels in the Saudi labour market. EDUC and 
ENGLISHL were thought to be highly influential in affecting the Saudi «vage 
level but this proved not to be so. However, they did have a very substantial effect 
on the wage level in the non-Saudi labour market of the Eastern Province. 
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Table 9.4 The Significance of the Segmented Variables 
Variables Segmented 
Variables 
B, B2 B3 B4 BS B6 B- Bd R` 
Nationality Saudis --- S S NS S S S S 44 °° 
Non-Saudis --- NS NS S Si s NS ' NS 39 °. o 
Job Category Professional S NS NS S NS S S ti S9°° 
Administrative S NS NS S S NS NS S 54 °o 
Accounting and 
Financial 
S NS NS NS NS NS NS , ti S -1 °° 
Sales and 
_Marketing 
S NS NS NS NS NS NS ' NS `-`, °o 
Production S NS S NS S NS NS NS 65 00 
Others S NS NS NS NS NS NS S 560o 
Job Skill Skilled S NS NS S S S S NS 53 0° 
Semi-Skilled S NS NS NS S NS S NS 1 60 °o 
Firm Ownership Saudi Firms S NS NS S S S NS S 46 °o 
Joint Venture S NS NS S S S NS NS 62 °° 
Economic Industrial S NS NS S S S NS NS 60 'o 
Sectors Commercial S NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 54 °° 
Agricultural NS S S NS NS S NS S 64 Oo 
Construction --- NS NS NS S NS NS NS 32 °° 
Services S S NS S NS S NS NS 62 °° 
Other NS NS NS NS S NS NS S 66 °° 
Employment 
Category 
Less than 300 
Employees 
(Informal 
sector) 
S NS NS S NS NS S NS 64 % 
300 and more 
Employees 
Formal Sector) 
S NS NS S S S S S 59 °/o 
Province of 
Origin/Place of 
Eastern 
Province 
NS S NS NS S S NS NS 52 % 
(Discrimination 
Theory) 
Southern 
Province 
S NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 84 % 
Central 
Province 
S NS NS NS S NS NS NS 93 % 
Other Countries S NS NS S NS S S S 45 % 
Wage Category Lower Wage 
Category 
(Informal 
Sector) 
S S S NS NS S NS NS 25 % 
Higher Wage 
Category 
(Formal Sector) 
S NS NS S S NS NS NS 21 % 
Total S 19 5 4 12 15 13 7 8 
Total NS 4 21 22 14 11 13 19 18 
Ranking 1 7 8 4 
.. 
2 
,..... 
3 
..   
6 
_c   
5 
A An C'7 4T D 
Abbreviations: S= Significant, NS = Not Significant, is, = nera W IVi. , DZ - uclu ý< """" .,. "" -j 
beta of URBAN, B4 beta of AGECATT, B5 = beta of EDUC, B6 = beta of E. \"GLISHL, 
B. beta of 
COMPUTRL, B8= beta of CURRTEXP. 
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9.3.3.1 Ranking the Importance of the Variables 
Various statistical tests have been used in this study, the results of which are 
displayed. This section ranks the importance of the variables, and then goes on to 
discuss the application of some variables in line with related studies. The beta 
columns in Table 9.4 summarise the significance of each independent variable used. 
This table shows also how many times each variable proves to be significant and: 'or 
insignificant. Table 9.5, the significance level is used to rank the variables. The 
number of times a variable is proved significant is totalled, and the total is used to 
rank the variables. For example, B1 (NAT) is shown to be significant 19 times and 
insignificant only 4 times. Thus, the nationality variable is ranked as being in the 
first rank and it is, therefore, the most significant variable with regard to wage 
differentials in Saudi Arabia's Eastern private labour market. On the other hand, 
URBAN is only found to be significant 4 times, and so is placed in the last position. 
Comparing these results with others is of great value to this study. For instance: 
Nationality: the result of this study shows that there were significant differences in 
the wage based on an employee's nationality. These results match those of Heisler 
(1989) and Kadah (1996). Heisler described the labour force in Riyadh in 1986, and 
found that wages were significantly affected by the nationality variable in the capital 
of Saudi Arabia. Kadah found in his multi-regression model that the nationality 
factor played the most important role in the determination of an individual's earnings 
in Saudi Arabia. 
The rates of return to human capital variables compare with the findings of Becker 
(1964), Freeman (1975), Pascharopoulos (1981) and NCPA (1996), in showing that 
in general higher wages are obtained by those with higher levels of schooling and 
training and lower wages by those with a lower level of schooling and training. 
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Table 9.5 Ranking the Importance of the Variables 
Beta Ranking Number of 
Significant 
\ umber of 7 
Insignificant 
Nat Bl 1 19 4 
EDUC B5 2 15 11 
ENGLISHL B6 3 13 13 
AGECATT B4 4 12 14 
CURRTEXP B8 5 8 18 
COMPUTRL B7 6 7 19 
MARSTAT B2 7 5 21 
URBAN B3 8 4 22 
9.3.4 Logistic Model 
The Logistic regression model was used to determine the probability of who was 
likely to be at the high or low wage levels. Applying this regression to some cases in 
the sample, as listed in Table 9.6, gives these results: the probabilities of being at a 
high wage level for employee cases 1,9, and 53 in our survey, are estimated to be 
0.69,0.13 and 0.05 respectively. 
Table 9.6 Logistic Model Results 
Cases Number 1 9 53 
NAT Saudi =1 Non-Saudi =0 Saudi =I 
MARSTAT Married =1 Married =1 Single =0 
URBAN city =1 City =1 City= 1 
CURRTEXP 19 8 1 
AGE 25 35 26 
EDUCONT 14 14 12 
NCOMPTRL Low =0 High =1 Low =0 
NENGLISHL High =1 Hi =1 Low =0 
Logistic Regression Results . 69 . 
13 . 05 
Therefore, the Saudi employee (case 1) has a probability of 0.69 of being at the high 
wage level; whereas the non-Saudi (case 9) has only a 0.13 chance of being at the 
high wage level, and the Saudi (case 53) has little chance of being at the high wage 
level. 
9.4 Low-Wage Workers and Fair Wage Policies in the Private Sector in Eastern 
Province of Saudi Arabia 
1. Section 8.1 has shown that there is no particular definition which can be applied to 
low-wage workers. However, there are certain factors which may be used to 
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construct a generalisation, such as less skill and education. few years of 
experience, new entry into the labour market. and working in the informal sector. 
2. The profile of a low-wage worker used here reveals that over 5 1.8 per cent of all 
workers in the Eastern private sector of Saudi Arabia are low-wage workers. In 
general, five out of ten workers receive less than SR3,000 in this sector. Most of 
this group are skilled, married, live in urban areas, and have a high standard of 
education. This differs from the findings for similar groups in other countries. 
3. Consequently, a reasonable goal for policies aimed at the "low-wage problem" is 
to raise the wages of low-wage workers. Section 8.1 confirmed that wage 
inequalities and low-wage workers exist in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. 
In order to decrease wage inequality, a Saudi wage policy needs to be aimed at 
achieving a reasonable wage for current low-wage workers, so as to lift them out 
of poverty. However, it will be difficult to choose the wage policies best-suited to 
the Saudi labour market. A consideration of this study's findings regarding the 
attitudes of Saudi employers and employees towards wage policies would be of 
considerable assistance in producing/designing a generally accepted policy. Both 
Saudi employees and employers strongly support a tighter immigration policy, a 
wage subsidy policy, a foreign investment policy, and investment policies for 
SMEs as the most effective policies for the Saudi labour market. 
4. Finally, in attempting to solve the basic wage problems, it seems, from the results 
obtained in this study, that imposing various taxes is the only solution left for the 
Saudi government to support any wage policies aimed at stimulating employment. 
It is also confirmed that there is no intention to impose a higher wage burden on 
any firm in the Saudi private sector. Thus, Saudi firms should be enabled to 
become more competitive. 
9.5 Employment Measures and Policy Implications 
In Chapters Six and Seven of this study, human capital variables, such as education, 
English skills, computer skills and work experience, are shown to 
be the most 
important determinants of wage inequalities in the formal private sector of the 
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Eastern Province. The Kingdom needs to focus on these human capital variables 
with the aim not only of reducing wage inequality in this sector but also as a 
platform from which to launch other methods and policies, suggested earlier. for 
achieving the Saudiisation of the workforce. 
This study has also revealed in Chapter Eight that almost half the workers in the 
Eastern Province are low-wage workers. In fact, over 52 per cent of all workers in 
the private sector are low-wage workers. Moreover, most of the low-wage workers in 
the Eastern Province are married, live in urban areas, are skilled and have high 
educational qualifications. In these respects they differ from similar groups in other 
countries. This supports the idea, put forward earlier in this study, that some human 
capital variables are inadequate in determining wage levels in the informal private 
sector. In response to this unusual situation, the Saudi government should try to 
construct a policy that will increase the earnings of this type of low-wage worker. 
Determinants of wage inequality in the present study will provide valuable 
information in forming a policy for workers with low wages. 
As a result of this study's findings, several possible policy recommendations are 
discussed. If implemented efficiently, such policies should speed up the narrowing of 
the wage gap among workers in the formal sector, between the formal and the 
informal sectors, and between Saudi and non-Saudi workers, decrease the 
unemployment rate for Saudis and stimulate the Saudiisation process. In addition, 
the improved returns from labour should encourage new Saudi entrants to the labour 
market to take up jobs formerly held by non-Saudis. 
Section 8.2 showed that certain policies dealing with immigration, wage subsidies, 
and foreign investment, and those applicable to small firms, are suitable methods for 
achieving the government's aim of Saudiisation. It is recommended that a minimum 
wage policy should be included as well (though employers and employees were 
found to be only just over 30 per cent in favour). However, as regards a minimum 
wage being enforced for all workers, problems are envisaged, particularly with 
regard to Saudiisation. If a suitable minimum wage rate is introduced for both non- 
Saudis and Saudis, the cost of their labour would be the same. Therefore if for some 
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unspecified reason the employer preferred, or was hostile towards, the employment 
of non-Saudis, then obviously this would affect Saudi employment (Saudiisation). 
However, from a humanitarian point of view, and in accordance with the 
requirement of the International Labour Organisation, no distinction should be made. 
as both types of worker should be paid at the same rate for the same work. The main 
argument in favour of a minimum wage is that it will help reduce poverty. reduce 
wage differentials, and induce those who are voluntarily unemployed to enter the 
labour market so that they can be excluded from the proposed unemployment 
benefits suggested by the ILO (Shammary, Arab News, 2002). Firms will have a 
greater interest in retaining and training Saudi employees when they have to pay a 
minimum wage. Weighing up the needs of the state for Saudi nationals to be 
employed, a minimum wage for Saudis is essential. 
If small businesses, which provide the majority of employment in Saudi Arabia, find 
that the minimum wage puts too great a burden on their business, then government 
support is necessary in the form of subsidies. Clearly, paying subsidies is not a 
viable long-term prospect for any government; therefore, it should be viewed only as 
an interim measure. Other measures will need to be introduced to offset this 
expenditure. This could include the introduction of income tax as recommended by 
the IMF (Arab News, 26th October 2002), encouraging foreign investment (though 
employers were found to be only just over 50 per cent in favour), and encouraging 
the introduction of modern technology and innovative business practices. 
In addition, there are many other relevant suggestions, which may be put forward for 
guiding policies designed to improve significantly the employment and wage 
prospects of Saudi workers: 
1. All Saudis who can work should be helped to enter the labour market and succeed 
in it. They should be helped towards finding a good job that provides benefits. 
training, opportunities for advancement and a satisfactory wage. 
2. Providing more public subsidies for Saudi low-wage workers, such as childcare, 
good health facilities, and the opportunity for their children to receive a higher 
education. This policy should make it possible for such workers to have a better 
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standard of living, encourage people to gain work experience, and increase their 
human capital. 
3. Providing unemployment insurance systems that will enable more Saudi workers 
in the low wage category to receive financial support when temporarily out of 
work. This should enable them to re-enter employment when work comes 
available, quickly and effectively. Dr. Sameer Rizwan, advisor to the Director 
General of the International Labour Organisation for development policies said, 
"Saudi officials have informed the ILO of their plan to launch the programme" 
(Shammary, Arab News, 2002). This programme should, also, make it easier to 
ascertain the true extent of unemployment. 
4. Employers should be encouraged to hire Saudis with skills, and also those with 
low skills, with the object of training them, by introducing policies which would 
make training less costly for employees. 
5. Applying polices that would help low-wage workers to be trained on-site would 
help employers, who could hire and train them to improve the quality of available 
work. 
6. The role of low-wage jobs in the economy should be clear. Low-wage jobs do 
allow employers to supply goods and services to consumers at low cost. 
7. Changing mentalities and attitudes with regard to working long hours, refusing 
trainee jobs and demanding high wages. Restructuring some "foreigners' jobs" 
may help change Saudi attitudes. Certain jobs could be privatised. For example, 
truck-driving jobs could be redefined as small businesses by financing the driver 
to obtain his own truck. His wages become the difference between revenue from 
carrying freight and the costs of operating the truck, not hourly or monthly wages 
(Migration News, November 2001). 
8. Subsidising investments in labour-saving technology can also help to eliminate 
and redefine "foreigners' jobs". Automatic car washes, for example, serve this 
purpose (ibid. ). In general, the challenge is not only to create jobs, but also to 
develop new attitudes towards technical and blue-collar jobs, making them more 
socially acceptable. 
9. Providing database projects that would bring together the characteristics of' both 
employers and prospective employees: their numbers, nationalities, academic 
qualifications and the types of job and their location. Employers would be able to 
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state what jobs are available and their requirements. Job-seekers should have 
access to this database. This should solve the problem of an imperfect system of 
information regarding the labour market in the country. 
10. Encouraging Saudi investment in the home country, rather than overseas. 
11. Applying most of the recommendations for small firms in the private sector, and 
the Saudiisation of the workforce, as mentioned in the Seventh Five Years 
Development Plan (see Chapter One). 
12. Providing a similar National Insurance plan to cover all workers in the public. 
semi-public and private sectors. This would protect workers. It would provide 
them with unemployment benefits and free health services. 
Establishing a minimum wage is very important for the Saudi labour market. Further 
studies are needed in order to apply this policy to: 
- Saudi or non-Saudi workers, or both. 
- Both male and female. 
- Particular sectors, especially those attractive to Saudis. 
- Particular occupations. 
In conclusion, Saudi Arabia is faced with a number of problems, both financial and 
social, which need to be addressed. From this detailed study, it has been found that the 
government has reason to be concerned about the prospects of the reduction in oil 
revenues, which at present are the mainstay of the economy, the rise in the national 
deficit, and the lack of opportunities for employment for Saudis. Added to these 
problems, differentials in wage levels are unsatisfactory, and high qualifications do 
not necessarily correspond with appropriate levels of income. Dissatisfaction with the 
present wages offered for certain jobs discourages Saudis from doing them, and the 
number of non-Saudis is restricted by the number of work permits available for such 
jobs, which could adversely affect the economy. Therefore, as a way of addressing the 
troublesome situation and, at the same time, speeding up the government's aim of 
Saudiisation, the author of this thesis recommends the establishment of a minimum 
wage level, even though some economists have reservations about its effectiveness, as 
he believes that, in the Saudi situation, it should prove effective in the long term. In 
the West, particularly in the UK, the introduction of a minimum wage is only a recent 
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measure. However, industrialisation has only occurred in Saudi Arabia since the 1970s 
and has had to be carried out quickly, by means of the importation of foreign v orkers. 
both skilled and unskilled (the latter to take on necessary menial work). Therefore, the 
solutions to Saudi Arabia's present difficulties may not be the same as those which 
have been appropriate in the West. Different measures, or measures taken in a 
different order from that which has proved effective in countries with a long history of 
industrialisation, are required, and instead of leaving a minimum wage until a late in 
the day, the government of Saudi Arabia should introduce this step at a much earlier 
stage of industrial development. 
9.6 The Limitations of the Study 
The present study is limited in several respects. As a result of these limitations, further 
research is needed, as outlined below: 
1. Data availability: The data used in this study were collected by the researcher 
himself. In order to collect sufficient data, the researcher had to conduct 
fieldwork in Saudi Arabia that took over four months. Some of the data acquired 
for the questionnaire were considered by some respondents to be private and 
confidential. The researcher confronted this problem at both individual and firm 
levels. For instance, some Saudi administrators did not allow the questionnaires to 
be distributed to their employees. Moreover, some employees thought that the 
researcher had no right to ask these kinds of question. Therefore, the lack of 
response in some cases could have had some effect on the final results. However, 
the researcher believes this effect to have been minimal. 
2. Data Location: The survey was restricted to the labour market of the Eastern 
Province of Saudi Arabia. It would be more beneficial if future research could be 
based on a survey of the whole country. However, the centre of the Saudi oil 
industry and Saudi Arabia's major source of revenue is to be fond in the Eastern 
Province. This makes the study of this area of considerable importance to the 
economy of Saudi Arabia. 
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3. This study covers only male employees in the Eastern Province. It does not cover 
female employees because a very small percentage of females v ork in the private 
sector. Most of them work in education and the health services. 
4. In this study, industries, occupations and numbers of employees are broadly 
categorised. The findings may not apply fully to the entire of Saudi Arabian 
industrial scene or to wage determination processes elsewhere. For instance. more 
information is needed about the size of firms (assets, sales, capital and profit), and 
proportion of foreign capital invested. 
However, the findings of this thesis should prove invaluable for future policy makers 
and provide fertile ground for related studies encompassing the whole of Saudi 
Arabia's economy. The methods employed here should also prove of value to those 
researching employment problems elsewhere. 
253 
Bibliography 
Abdurhman, M. A. (1988), "A Comparison of Wage Levels in the Public and Private Sectors in Saudi Arabia". Journal of King Saud University. Vol. 13, No. 1. pp. 65-92 (in Arabic). 
Acs, G. (1999), Helping Low-Wage Workers: Policies for the Future, Washington. 
May. Washington, The Urban Institute. [online] Available from: Nv%w w. dohgoý . [accessed 4th January 2001 ]. 
Acs, G., Phillips K. R., and McKenzie, D. (2001), Playing by the Rules, but Losing 
the Game: Americans in Low-Income Working Families. In: Kazis, R. and 
Miller, M. S. eds. Low-Wage Workers in the New Economy. Washington: The 
Urban Institute Press, pp. 21-44. 
Al-Abaid, A. A. S, and Atiah, A. (1994), Economics of Saudi Arabia. Riyadh: Dar 
Alam Al-Katib (in Arabic). 
Al-Ajaji, A. (1995), Obstacles to the Employment of Male Saudi University 
Graduates by the Private Sector in Saudi Arabia. Unpublished PhD 
dissertation, George Washington University. 
Al-Bahlal, A. A. (1996), An Exploratory Analysis of Human Resource Planning in 
the Saudi Arabian Private Sector. Unpublished PhD dissertation, Liverpool 
John Moores University. 
Al-Dosary, A. S. (1991), Towards the Reduction of Foreign Workers in Saudi 
Arabia. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, Kalamazoo. 
Aleissa, I. M. (1989), The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia: Investment in Human 
Capital and the Economics of Higher Education. Unpublished PhD 
dissertation, University of Denver. 
Al-Farsy, F. (1999), Modernity and Tradition: The Saudi Equation. Channel Islands: 
Knight Communication Ltd. 
Al-Haj, T. (1997), Microeconomics Analysis. Amman: Dar Al-Massira (in Arabic). 
Al-Hajri, S. H. (1994), Job Characteristics, Job Satisfaction, Work-related Values, 
Organisation Commitment, and Job Involvement among Saudi Workers in the 
Private Sector. Unpublished PhD dissertation, Iowa State University. 
Al-Hammed, A. (1996), "Saudiisation with Its Cost and Production". X11-Astivaq 
Magazine, February, pp. 30-35 (in Arabic). 
Al-Hazemi, H. (1999), "Saudiisation". AI-Iktisad Monthly Economic Magazine, Vol. 
31, No. 310, pp. 38-40, Eastern Province: Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(in Arabic). 
254 
Al-Kahtany, A. S. (1998), Organisational Commitment: A Gross-A"ational 
Comparison of Arab and Non-Arab Employees in Saudi Petrochemical 
Companies. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of North Texas. 
Denton, Texas. 
Al-Khouri, R. (1999), "Kingdom Come". Yemen Times, 5th 11`h April. V'o1.9. 
No. 14,. [online] Available from: www. yementimes. com/99/iss]4'1&d. htm. [accessed 
20th December 2002]. 
Al-Qudis, S. (1989), "Returns to Education, Sectoral Pay Differentials and 
Determinants in Kuwait". Economics of Education Review, Vol. 8. No. 3. 
pp. 263-276. 
Al-Salamah, A. H. (1994), Employee Perceptions in Multinational Companies: A 
Case Study of the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation. Unpublished 
PhD dissertation, Durham University. 
Al-Saudani, A., and Al-Kair, A. (2001), "The Future of Saudiisation and the Growth 
of Labour Production". Public Administration Periodical, April, Vol. 41, No. 1, 
pp. 1-55 (in Arabic). 
Al-Saud, A. F. T. (2002), "Small and Medium Scale Enterprises Colloquium".. 11- 
Madinah Newspaper, 29th December, No. 14494 (in Arabic). 
A1-Towaijri, H. A. (1992), The Labour Market in Saudi Arabia: Family Effects, 
Compensating Wages Differentials, and Selectivity Bias. Unpublished PhD 
dissertation, University of Oregon. 
Arab News (2001), "Saudiisation Drive Paying Off'. 2 1St October, Jeddah. 
Arab News (2002), "IMF Urges Kingdom to Speed up Reforms". 26`h October. 
Jeddah. 
Arab News (2002), "More Jobs for Saudis Urged". 4t' November, Jeddah. 
Arabia. Riyadh: King Saud University Press (in Arabic). 
Arrow, K. (1973), "Higher Education as Filter". Journal of Public Economics. 
August, Vol. 2, pp. 193-216. 
Ashenfelter, 0 and Layard, R eds. (1986), Handbook of Labour Economies. 
Volumes I and II. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishing Company. INC. 
Athman, A. A. (2000), "The Policy of a Minimum Wage". Saudi Economic 
Magazine, Second year, Vol. 4, pp. 53-69 (in Arabic). 
Atkinson, B., Livesey, F., and Milward, B. (1998), Applied Economics. Hampshire: 
Macmillan Press Ltd.. 
255 
Bach, G. L. (1974), Economics: An Introduction to Analysis and Policy. 8th ed. Hall. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Backman, Jules (1959), Wage Determination. New York: Van Nostrand. 
Ba-Isa, M. Y. (2002), "3,500 Saudis Recruited under HRDF Programme: _Al- Sahlawi". Arab News, 9th June, Jeddah. 
Baron, J. N., and Bielby, W. T. (1980), "Bringing the Firms Back In: Stratification, 
Segmentation, and Organiztion of Work". American Sociological Review, Vol. 
45, pp. 737-65. 
Bartel, A. P. (1979), "The Migration Decision: What Role Does Job Mobility Pay? " 
American Economic Review, December, Vol. 69, No. 5, pp. 775-786. 
Bashir, A. W. (2002), "Small Firms Owners Seek Exposure to Overseas Practices" 
Arab News, 15th February, Jeddah. 
Becker, G. S. (1962), "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis". 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 70, No. 5, Part 2, Supplements, pp. S9-S49. 
Becker, G. S. (1964), Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with 
Special Reference to Education. New York: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Becker, G. S. (1971), The Economics of Discrimination. 2nd ed., Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Berndt, E. R. (1990), The Practice of Econometrics Classic and 
Contemporary. New York: Addison-Wesely Publishing Company. 
Bibb, R., and Form, W. (1977), "The Effects of Industrial, Occupational, and Sex 
Stratification on Wages in Blue-Collar Markets". Social Forces, Vol. 55, pp. 
974-96. 
Bin-Abied, A., and Al-Gawad, N. (1998), "Wages, Employment and the Public 
Budget". Riyadh: King Saud University, Business College, Research 
Department (in Arabic). 
Blair Area Chamber of Commerce (2001), "Business Development". BBC News, 27`h 
November. [online] Available from: www. blairchamber. org [accessed 10th June 
2001]. 
Boissiere, M. Knight, J. B. and Sabot, R. H. (1985), "Earnings, Schooling. Ability. 
and Cognitive Skills". The American Economics Review, December, Vol. 75. 
No. 5, pp. 1016-1030. 
Borjas, G. (1994), "The Economics of Immigration", Journal of Economic Literatur. 
December, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 1667-1717. 
256 
Borland, J., Hirschberg, J. and Lye, J. (1999), Computer Knowledge and Earnings: Evidence for Australia. Department of Economics. University of Melbourne. Australia. 
Bourland, B. (2002), "The Saudi Economy in 2002". Saudi Economi, Survey. 
. 20`t' February. 
British National Export Committee for Middle East Trade (BNEC) (1970). The 
Market for Household Goods in Saudi Arabia. Industrial Export Surve%. 
Brown, W. S. (1991), Introducing Econometrics. St. Paul, MN: West 
Publishing Company. 
Card, D. and Krueger, A. (1994), "Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study 
of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania". American 
Economic Review, September, Vol. 84, pp. 772-793. 
Carnevale, A. P., and Rose, S. J. (2001), "Who Are They? Do They Have a Way 
Out? " In: Kazis, R. and Miller, M. S. eds. Low-Wage Workers in the Nell, 
Economy. Washington: The Urban Institute Press, pp. 45-66. 
Chiswick, B. R. (1978), "The Effect of Americanisation on the Earnings of Foreign- 
born Men". Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 86, No. 5, pp. 897-921. 
Chiswick, B. R. (1986), "Is the New Immigration Less Skilled Than the Old? " 
Journal of Labour Economics, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 168-192. 
Dahlan, A. S. (1993), Saudi Arabia: Golden Business. Riyadh. 
Davidson, J. (1898), The Bargain Theory of Wages. New York: G. P. Putnam. 
De Araujo, T. P. (1994), Earnings, Education and Segmented Labour Markets in 
Brazil: A Comparison between Recife and Sao Paulo. Unpublished PhD 
dissertation, University of London, London. 
Dickens, W. T. and Katz, L. F. (1986), Inter-industry Wage Differences and Industry 
Characteristics. National Bureau of Economics Research, NBER Working 
Paper No. 2014, September. 
Dilnot, A., and McCare, J. (2000), The Family Credit System and Working Families 
Tax Credit in the United Kingdom. Paris: OECD Economic Studies. [online] 
Available from: www. oeck. org [accessed 15th June 2001]. 
Dustmann, C., Micklewright, J., Rajah, N. and Smith, S. (1996), "darning and 
Learning: Educational Policy and the Growth of Part-Time Work by Full- 
Time Pupils". Fiscal Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 79-103. 
Ehrenberg, R., and Smith, R. (1994), Modern Labour Economics. New York. 
257 
El-Beshir, Z. A., and Auda, A. A. (1980s), Labour Mobility in the Kingdom of Llud; Arabia. Riyadh: King Saudi University (in Arabic). 
Eurostat (1997), Minimum Wages. A Comparative Study. [online] Available from: 
http: //europa. eu. int [accessed 10th June 2001 ]. 
Fapohunda, O. J., and Lubell, H. (1978), Lagos. Urban Development and Employment. Geneva: International Labour Organisation, pp. 57-58. 
Financial Times. [online] Available from: www. news. ft. com/home uL' [accessed 6`' January 2003]. 
Fleisher, B. M., and Kniesner, T. J. (1984), Labour Economics: Theon., Evidence 
and Policy. 3rd ed. New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs. 
Freeman, R. B. (1975), "Overinvestment in College Training". Journal of Human 
Resources, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 287-311. 
Freeman, R. B. (1976), "A Cobweb Model of the Supply and Starting Salary of New 
Engineers". Industrial and Labour Relations Review, January, Vol. 29, No. 2, 
pp. 236-248. 
Freund, J. E. (1979), Modern Elementary Statistics. 5t' ed. Englewood Cliffs, Ne« 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, INC. 
Georgia Institute of Technology (1975), An International Compilation of Small- 
Scale Industry Definitions. Atlanta 
Gujarati, D. N. (1988), Basic Econometrics. 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill 
Publishing Company. 
Gujarati, D. N. (1999), Essentials of Econometrics. 2"d ed. New York: 
Irwin/McGraw-Hill Publishing Company. 
Hanoch, G. (1967), "An Economic Analysis of Earnings and Schooling". The 
Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp 310-329. 
Hansen, W. L. (1963), "Total and Private Rates of Return to Investment in 
Schooling". Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 71, No. 2, pp. 128-140. Harper 
Collins. 
Hashimoto, M. (1982), "Minimum Wage Effects on Training on the Job".. American 
Economic Review, December, Vol. 72, No. 5, pp. 1070-1087. 
Hassan, J. (2002) "Two Saudi Teams to Visit India to Study SMEs''. Arab News. 7`h 
October, Jeddah. 
Hassan, J. (2002), "Japanese Teams to Explore SMEs. Manpower Projects". Arab 
News, 11 `h March, Jeddah. 
258 
Heisler, D. W. (1989), Nationality and Wages in 1986 in Riyadh, Kingdom off- SaIdd Arabia. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Pennsvvlvania. 
Hicks, J. (1963), The Theory of Wages. London: Macmillan. 
Human Resources Development Canada, Wages Subsidies. [online] Available from: 
www. hrdc. dncc. eg ca/dept. guide. ei6 [accessed 10th November 2001]. 
Hussey, J. and Hussey, R. (1997), Business Research. Hampshire: Macmillan Press 
Ltd. 
Income Data Services of the 
"Employment in Europe". 
Submission to the OECD 
[accessed 15th June 2001]. 
Info-Prod Research (Middle East; 
from: www. infoprod. co. i1/count 
Economics Department of the OECD (1997). 
European Industrial Relations Review, National 
Secretary. [online] available from: www. oeck. ong 
º Ltd., Ipr (1999), Saudi Arabia. [online] Available 
ry/Saudi/htm [accessed 11 `h June 2001 ]. 
International Labour Organisation (1958), Discrimination (EmploymL'nt and 
Occupation) Convention, No. C 111, Geneva. 
International Labour Organisation (1972), Employment, Income and L: qualitl... 1 
Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya, Geneva. 
International Labour Organisation (1997), Twelfth Asian Regional Meeting Report of 
the Director-General, Bangkok. 
International Labour Organisation (1998), Employment of Filipino Workers in Saudi 
Arabia, Chapter 5, Government and Labour Law and Administration, Geneva. 
Jackson, J. M. (1970), Wages and Labour Economics. London: McGraw-Hill. 
Joint Economic Committee (1995), 50 Years of Research on the Minimum Wage. 
Congress of the United States, Talking Points, 15th February. 
Kadah, A. H. (1996), Determination of Individual's Earnings in Saudi Arabia. 
Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Oklahoma. 
Kallacheck, E., and Raines, F. (1976), "The Structure of Wage Differentials among 
Mature Male Workers". Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 35, pp. 484-506. 
Kallerberg, A. L., Wallace, M. and Althauser, R. P. (1981). "Economic 
Segmentation, Work Power, and Income Inequality". American Journal of 
Sociology, Vol. 87, pp. 651-83. 
Katz, L. F. and Krueger, A. B. (1992), "The Effect of the Minimum Wage on the 
Fast Food Industry". Industrial and Labour Relations Review. October. 
Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 6-21. 
259 
Katz, L. F. and Murphy, K. M. (1992), "Changes in Relative Wages. 1963-1987: 
Supply and Demand Factors". Quarterly Journal of Economics. February. 
Vol. 107, No. 1, pp. 35-78. 
Kraska, M. F. and Larkins, J. R (1998), "Factors affecting Taster Ser`geants' 
Completion of Community College of the Air Force AAS Degree 
Requirements". Journal of Industrial Teacher Education, Vol. 36. 
[online] available from 
www. scholar. lib. vt. edu/ejournals/JITY/v36n3/kraska. html. [accessed 2'0`h June 
2001]. 
Labour Standards Act (1938-1996), History of Federal Minimum l["age. [online] 
Available from: www. dol. izov/esa/public/nimwage/chan/html [accessed 17 November 
2000]. 
Lazear, E. (1979), "The Narrowing of Black-White Wage Differential is Illusory". 
American Economic Review, September, Vol. 69, No. 4. pp. 553-564. 
Lindauer, D. and Sabot, R. H. (1983), "The Public/Private Wage Differential in a 
Poor Urban Economy". Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 12, pp. 
137-152. 
Low Pay commission (LPC), UK. [online] 
Available from: www. lowpay. gov. uk/lowpay. [accessed 19`h February 2000]. 
Lubell, H. and McCallum, D. (1978), Bogota: Urban Development and Employment. 
International Labour Organisation, Geneva. 
Lynch, L. (1992), "Private-Sector Training and the Earnings of Young Workers". 
The American Economic Review, Vol. 82, No. 1, pp. 299-312. 
Mahdi, S. (2000), Saudiisation and the Structure of the Labour Market in Saudi 
Arabia. Economics Paper 24, University of Hertfordshire, UK. 
Marcouiller, D., De Castilla, V. R. and Woodruff, C. (1995), Formal Measures of 
the Informal Sector Wage Gap in Mexico, El Salvador, and Peru. Boston 
College, Department of Economics. 
Marshall, A. (1890), Principles of Economics. London: Macmillan. 
Marx, K. (1867), Capital (abridged). New York: Modern Library. 
Mattila, P. J. (1973), "The Effect of Extending Minimum Wages to Cover 
Household Maids". Journal of Human Resources, Summer. Vol. 8, No. 3. pp. 
365-382. 
Mazumdar, Dipak (1976), "The Urban Informal Sector". World Development. 
August, Vol. 4, No. 8, pp. 655-679. 
260 
Mazumdar, Dipak (1981), The Urban Labour Market and Income Distribution. A 
Study of Malaysia. New York: Oxford University Press and Washington: 
World Bank. 
McAllister, H. E. (1975), Elements of Business and Economic Statistics: 
Learning by Objectives. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Inc. 
McConnell, C. R. (1970), Perspectives on ff "age Determination: A Book of 
Readings. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
McConnell, C. R. and Bure, S. L. (1992), Contemporary Labour Economics. 3`d ed. 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Middle East Business Weekly (MEED) (2000), "Job, Job, Job". The 
. 
lfiJdlc Fast 
Business Weekly, 3 0th June. 
Migration News (2001), "Middle East: Renationalisation". Vol. 8, No. 11. 
Mill, J. S. (1878), Principles of Political Economy. 5 `h ed. New York: D. Appleton. 
Mince, J. (1976), "Unemployment Effects of Minimum Wages". Journal of Political 
Economy, August, Vol. 84, No. 4, Part 2, pp. S87-S104. 
Mincer, J. (1957), A Study of Personal Income Distribution. Unpublished PhD 
dissertation, Columbia University. 
Mincer, J. (1958), "Investment in Human Capital and Personal Income Distribution" 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 66, No. 4, pp. 281-302. 
Mincer, J. (1962), "On-the-Job Training: Costs, Returns, and Some Implications". 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 70, No. 5, Part 2, pp. S50-S79. 
Mincer, J. (1974), Schooling, Experience, and Earning. New York: National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
Mincer, J. (1976), "Unemployment Effects of Minimum Wages". Journal of 
Political Economy, Supplement, Vol. 84, No. 4, Part 2, pp. S87-S 104 
Ministry of Finance and National Economy (1992), Statistical Yearbook. Central 
Department of Statistics, Riyadh (in Arabic). 
Ministry of Finance and National Economy (1996), Statistical Yearbook. Central 
Department of Statistics, Riyadh (in Arabic). 
Ministry of Finance and National Economy (1999). Statistical Yearbook. Central 
Department of Statistics, Riyadh (in Arabic). 
Murphy, K. M. and Welch, F. (1990), "Empirical Age-Earnings Profiles". Journal of 
Labour Economics, April, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 202-229. 
261 
Nabti, F. G. (1980), Manpower, Education, and Economic Development in t; iLc 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Unpublished PhD dissertation. Stan lord 
University. 
Nachmias, C. F. and Nachmias, D. (1996), Research Methods in the Social 
Sciences. 5th ed., London: St Martin's Press. 
National Centre for Policy Analysis (NCPA) (1996), "Degree-Based Earnings Gap 
Grows Quickly". USA Today, Article by Beth Belton. 16th February. 
NCPA (1996), "Good-Bye Co11ee, Hello Job Market, Is College Worth It? " 
Investor's Business Daily, 12t June. 
Neal, D. (1996), Who Are the Low-Wage Workers?. Employment Policies Institute, 
Chicago: University of Chicago. 
NCPA (1997), "Workers Need Skill, Not College". Investor's Business Daily, 
Article by John Hood, 15th April. 
Neal, D. and Sherwin, R. (1998), Theories of the Distribution of Labour Earnings. 
NBER Working Paper Series, No. 6378. 
OECD (1995), OECD Economic Surveys: United Kingdom. Paris. 
OECD (1997), OECD Submission to the UK Low Pay Commission. Economic 
Department, Working Papers, No. 185, OCDE/GD (97) p. 206. 
OECD (2000), OECD Economic Studies, Vol. II, No. 31, Paris. 
Oosterbeek, H. (1997), "Returns from Computer Use: A Simple Test on the 
Productivity Interpretation". Economics Letters, Vol. 55, pp. 273-277. 
Osterman, P. (1975), "An Empirical Study of Labour Market Segmentation'". 
Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 28, pp. 508-23. 
Pallant, J. (2001), SPSS Survival Manual. Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open 
University Press. 
Park, Se-Il (1980), Wages in Korea: Determination of the Wage Levels and the Wage 
Structure in a Dualistic Labour Market. Unpublished PhD dissertation, Cornell 
University. 
PE INVUXON Ltd. (1998), Cost of Living Index. Richmond, Surrey, England. 
Polachek, S. W. (1993), The Economics of Earnings. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Presley, J (2000), The SABIERC Economic Report on Saudi Arabia. The Saudi 
British Bank and the Saudi Arabia Business Information and Economic 
Research Centre (SABIERC). 
262 
Psacharopoulos, G. and Layard, R. (1979). "Human Capital and Earnings: British Evidence and a Critique". The Review of Economic Studies. Vol. 3. No. 144. 
pp. 485-503. 
Psacharopoulos, G. (1981), "The Roles of Education, Skill and Parental Income in Determining Wages". Comparative Education. Vol. 17. No. 3. pp. 321-341. 
Raff, D. M. G. and Summers, L. H. (1987), "Did Henry Ford Pay Efficiency 
Wages? ". Journal of Labour Economics, Vol. 5. No. 4. Part 2. pp. S57-S86. 
Reid, F. (1979), "The Effect of Controls on the Rate of Wage Change in Canada". 
The Canadian Journal of Economics, May. Vol. XII, No. 2. pp. 214-2-27. 
Ricardo, D. (1911), The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (abridged; 
originally published in 1817). New York: Dutton. 
Richards, A. and Waterbury, J. (1996), A Political Economy of the Aliddlc East. ', `ý 
ed., Washington, DC: Westview Press. 
Rischall, I. C. (1999), The Roles of Education, Skill and Parental Income in 
Determining Wages. Hamilton, Ontario: McMaster University, Department of 
Economics, Canada. 
Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry (RCCI) (1995), It age Differentials in 
the Private Sector. Riyadh. 
Roscoe, J. T. (1975), Fundamental Research Statistics for the Behavioural Sciences. 
2nd ed., New York: Holt Reinehart & Winston. 
Sahelian Department (1989), Urban Informal Sector in the Sahel. Infrastructure 
Operations, Africa Region, Working Papers. 
Sahling, L. G. and Smith, S. P. (1983), "Regional Wage Differentials: Has the South 
Risen Again? ". Review of Economies and Statistics, February, Vol. 65, No. 1. 
pp. 131-135. 
Sahota, G. S. (1978), "Theories of Personal Income Distribution: A Survey'". Journal 
of Economic Literature, March, Vol. XVI, pp. 1-55. 
Said, M. (1995), "Public Sector Employment and Labour Markets in Arab Countries: 
Development and Policy Implication". Economic Research Forum, Working 
Paper, July, Vol. 2, No. 2. 
Said, M. (1999), "The Distribution of Gender Differentials and Public Sector Vage 
Premia in Egypt". Economic Research Forum, Working Paper Series No. 
9925. 
Sakellariou, C. N. (1995), Human Capital and Industry Tage Structure in 
Guatemala. Singapore: Nanyang Technological University. 
263 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) (1998). Prices and Cost of Livin, Annual Report, No. 34. Riyadh: Research and Statistics Department. 
SAMA (2001), Thirty-Seventh Annual Report 1422H (2001G). Riyadh: Research 
and Statistics Department. 
Santago, G., Corbo, V. and Stelcner, M. (1983). "Earnings Determination and 
Labour Markets". Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 12. pp. - -1-26( . 
Santos, M. (1979), The Shared Space: The Two Circuits of the Urban Economy ill 
Underdeveloped Countries. London: Methuen. 
Saudi British Bank (SABB) (2000), Prospects For The Saudi Economy: 2002. 
Riyadh: The Saudi British Bank. 
Saudi Chambers Council (1992), Economics of Small Firms. Riyadh (in Arabic). 
Saudi General Organisation for Social Insurance (1988-1996).. Annual Statistical 
Reports. Riyadh (in Arabic). 
Saudi Labour and Workmen Law (1981), Protection and Social Services. Chapter 
VII, Article No. 143, p. 47. 
Saudi Labour and Workmen Law (1981), Protection of Wages. Chapter VI, Article 
No. 115, p. 139. 
Schultz, T. W. (1960), "Capital Formation by Education". The Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 68, No. 6, pp. 571-583. 
Schultz, T. W. (1961), "Investment in Human Capital". American Economic 
Reviews, March, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 1-17. 
Shammary, H. (2002), "Move to Put Jobless on the Dole". Arab News, 26`h 
November, Jeddah. 
Sirageldin, I. A., Sherbin N. A. and Serageldin M. I. (1984), Saudi Arabia in 
Transition, The Challenges of a Changing Labour Market. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. - 
Sjaastad, L. A (1962), "The Cost and Returns of Human Migration". Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 70, No. 5, Part 2, pp. 80-93. 
Smith, A. (1973), The Wealth of Nations (first published in 1776). Reprinted Edition. 
New York: Random House. 
Spence, M. A. (1973), "Job Market Signalling". Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
Vol. 87, No. 3, pp. 355-374. 
264 
Spence, M. A. (1974), Market Signalling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes. Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
SPSS (1997), Professional Statistics T. 5. Chicago, IL. 
SPSS (1999), Advanced Models 10.0. Chicago. IL 
SPSS (1999), Regression Models 10.0. Chicago, IL. 
SPSS (1999), SPSS Base 10.0 User's Guide. Chicago, IL. 
SPSS (1999), SPSS Trends 10.0. Chicago, IL. 
Stiglitz, J. (1973), "Approach to the Economics of Discrimination". American 
Economic Review, May, Vol. 63, No. 6, pp. 287-295. 
Stiglitz, J. (1993), Economics. Norton, New York: Stanford University. 
Stockton, J. R. (1966), Business and Economic Statistics. Cincinnati: South-Western 
Publishing Company. 
Suliman, A. A. (1974), Wages and Labour Problesm in Saud Arabia. Al-Kaurtum: 
Al-Kaurtum University Press (in Arabic). 
Tansel, A. (1999), "Formal Versus Informal Sector Choice of Wage Earners and 
Their Wages in Turkey". Economic Research Forum, Working Paper Series 
No. 9927. 
Tansel, A. (1998), "Public-Private Employment Choice: Wage Differentials and 
Gender in Turkey". Economic Research Forum, Working Paper Series No. 
9913. 
Thailand (1994), Division-in-charge: Social Statistics Division. Social Research 
Branch, and Social Indicators Sector. [online] Available from: 
www. nso. o. th/eng/stat/repart/abIts. htm [accessed 5t' November 2001 ]. 
The Seventh Saudi Five-Year Development Plan (2000-2004). Riyadh: Ministry of 
Planning. 
The Sixth Saudi Five-Year Development Plan (1995-2000). Riyadh: Ministry of 
Planning. 
Tolbert, C. M. II, Horan, P. M., and Becker, E. M. (1980), "The Structure of 
Economic Segmentation: A Dual Economy Approach". American Journal of 
Sociology, Vol. 85, pp. 1095-1116. 
US Department of State (1998), Available online on: www. state. gov [accessed 10 
December 2002]. 
265 
US Department of State (1998), Saudi Arabia Country Report on Human Righr Practices for 1997, Released by the Bureau of Democracy. Human Rights and Labour, 3 0th January. 
US-Saudi Arabian Business Council (2002). U. S. -Saudi Energy and Econornh' Relations in Global Perspective, 22"d April. [online] Available from: w' . us- saudi-business. or tuwiir%speech htm 
UK Employment Rights Act (1996 s. 27), Meaning of [ages. Leh. Low Pay 
Commission, First Report. [online] Available from: 
www. lonay. Rov. uk/er/lonay /recommen. htm [accessed 19th November 2000]. 
Van der Gaag, V. J. and Vijverberg, W. (1989), Wage Determinants in Cole d'lvoire: 
Experience, Credentials, and Human Capital. Economic Development and 
Cultural Chance, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 371-381. 
Van der Gaag, V. J. and Vijverberg, W. (1988) A Switching Regression Model for 
Wage Determinants in the Public and Private Sectors of a Developing Country. 
The Review of Economics and Statistics, May, Vol. 70, No. 2. pp. 244-252. 
Walker, R. and Wiseman M. (1997), "The Possibility of a British Earned Income 
Tax Credit". Fiscal Studies, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 401-425. 
Welfare Information Network Website, Employment Subsidies. [online] Available 
from: www. welfarinfo. org/subpri. htm [accessed 11th November 2001]. 
Zahran, A. Z. (January 1999), "The Minimum Wage". Monthly Economic Magazine. 
Vol. 31, no. 310, pp. 26-36, Eastern Province: Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (in Arabic). 
Zikmund, W. G. (2000), Business Research Methods. 6`h ed. Fort Worth: 
Dryden Press and Harcourt College Publishers. 
266 
Appendix A: The Meaning of Wages in the C'K Employment Rights Act 1996 
s. 27 (ERA 1996 s. 27) 
(1) In this Part "wages", in relation to a worker, means any sum payable to the worker 
in connection with his employment, including- 
(a) Any fee, bonus, commission, holiday pay or other emolument referable to 
his employment, whether payable under his contractor or otherwise. 
(b) Statutory sick pays under Part XI of the Social Security Contributions and 
Benefits Act 1992, 
(c) Statutory maternity pay under Part XII of that Act, 
(d) A guarantee payment (under section 28 of this Act) 
(e) Any payment for time off under Part VI of this Act or section 169 of the 
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (payment for 
time off for carrying out trade union duties etc. ), 
(f) Remuneration on suspension or medical grounds under section 64 of this 
Act and remuneration on suspension on maternity grounds under section 68 of 
this Act, 
(g) Any sum payable in pursuance of and order for reinstatement of re- 
engagement under section 113 of this Act, 
(h) Any sum payable in pursuance of an order for the continuation of a 
contract of employment under section 130 of this Act or section 164 of the 
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, and 
(j) Remuneration under a protective award under section 189 of that Act, 
But excluding any payments within subsection (2). 
(2) Those payments are- 
(a) Any payment by way of an advance under an agreement for a 
loan or by way of an advance of wages (but without prejudice to 
the application of section 13 to any deduction made from the 
worker's wages in respect of any such advance), 
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(b) Any payment in respect of expenses incurred by the worker in 
carrying out his employment 
(c) Any payment by way of a pension, allowance or gratuit`- in 
connection with the worker's retirement or as compensation for loss 
of office, 
(d) Any payment to the worker otherwise that in his capacity as a 
worker. 
(3) Where any payment in the nature of a non-contractual bonus is (for any reason) 
made to a worker by his employer, the amount of the payment shall for the purpose of 
this Part- 
(a) Be treated as wages of the worker, and 
(b) Be treated as payable to him as such on the day on , hich the 
payment is made. 
(4) In this part "gross amount", in relation to any wages payable to a worker. means 
the total amount of those wages before deductions of whatever nature. 
(5) For the purposes of this Part any monetary value attaching to any payment of 
benefit in kind furnished to a worker by his employer shall not be treated as wages for 
the worker except in the case of any voucher, stamp or similar document which is- 
(a) Of a fixed value expressed in monetary terms, and 
(b) Capable of being exchanged (whether on its own or together 
with other vouchers, stamps or documents, and whether 
immediately or only after a time) for money, goods or services 
(or for any combination of two or more of those things). 
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Appendix B: Questionnaires 
Appendix B1: 
Employee's Questionnaire 
The Employees in Private Sector should complete this 
questionnaire 
upl l Ib, Ä, 
I l ý, I 91 JAW U vOL 
Covering Letter 
Dear Participant 
This questionnaire is part of my academic research for my Ph. D. degree in 
Economics from the University of Durham, United Kingdom. My purpose is to 
learn more about the wage structure in Saudi Arabia's private companies. You 
have been selected at random to participate in this survey - thus your 
opinions will represent the opinions of thousands of people much like yourself. 
The information you provide will contribute to an important study and may also 
be used to influence positively employment policies. I promise you 
confidentiality as under academic ethics your information will not be 
revealed and will only be used for the purpose of this study. Therefore, 
you don't have to give your name. 
I appreciate your willingness to help me in my research efforts. I believe that 
you will find the questionnaire both interesting and informative and I look 
forward to receiving your reply. 
Sincerely yours 
Researcher 
Abdullah Bohaimed 
University of Durham, United Kingdom. 
Imam University, KSA 
Correspondence address 
Abdullah Bohaimed 
Imam University, KSA, Al-Hassa 
College of Sharea's and Islamic Science 
Business Department, Economics Unit 
P. O. Box: 1730, Al-Hassa 31982 
Abdulla. bohaimedC&dur. ac. uk 
Abdullahuk@hotmail. com 
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Part One: Personal Information 
Please tick the appropriate box 
1- Nationali 
Saudi Non-Saudi 
2- Marital Status 
Single Married 
3- In what type of area do you live? 
Urban, Ci Rural, Small Town, Village 
4-A e. 
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65 or 
Over 
5- Province of OriLyin/P1ace of Birth. 
Eastern 
Province 
Western 
Province 
Southern 
Province 
Northern 
Province 
Central 
Province 
Other 
Province 
(Specify) 
6- Education level. 
Primary 
School 
Elementary 
School 
High 
School 
Diploma Bachelor 
of Science 
Bachelor 
of Art 
Masters 
Degree 
Ph. D. 
Degree 
7- Level of English. 
None Be inner Intermediate Advanced 
T 11 r Irv If-III "i  ö- Level oI computer JKlll. 
None Beginner Intermediate Advanced 
9- Occunational Cate¢nrv_ 
Professional 
or 
Technical 
Administrative Accounting 
or 
Financial 
Sales / 
Marketing 
Production 
Worker 
Other 
(specify) 
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10 - What is your current occupation? 
Professional and Technical Jobs Administrative Jobs 
Civil Engineer Welder General Manager Warehouse \fanaeer 
Architect Blacksmith Deputy General Secretar. 
Manager 
Electrical Engineer Administrator Computer Engineer 
Mechanical Engineer Mechanic Director of Computer Operator 
Finance 
Construction Inspector Maintenance Chief Accountant Pursuer representati\ e 
Surveyor Drawer/Artist Accountant Market Representative 
Production Manager Programmer Entry Clerk/Book Administrati%e Staff 
Keeper 
Project Manager Engineer Treasurer Operator 
Electrical Technician Inspector Purchases House Keeper Janitor 
Manager 
Aluminium Technician Filing s Sales Manager Cook/Chef 
Employees 
A/C Technician Electrical Purchases Teller 
Inspector Representative 
Machine Technician Farmer Sales Expeditor 
Representative 
Carpenter Machinist Public Relations Drier 
Manager 
Painter Heavy Branch Manager Porter Escort 
Equipment 
Driver 
Plumber/ Pipe Fitter Other Typist Other (Specit'\ 
(Specify) 
ii-1,, -v, -] of Ocennatinnal Skill_ 
Professional i 
Skilled 
Semi-Skilled Unskilled I Don't Know 
Please answer the following questions 
12 - How many years of experience do you have in your present position? 
......................................... 
Years. 
13 - How many years of previous experience before present occupation? 
......................................... 
Years. 
14 - What is your age? 
....................................... 
Years. 
15 - In which year did you start your first job? 
....................................... . 
16 - What is your country of origin? 
............................................. . 
17 - What is the name of your city or village? 
............................................. . 
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Part Two : Company Information (Firm) 
Please tick in the appropriate box 
1 -Firm Ownership 
Owned by Saudis Owned by non-Saudis Owned by Saudis and non-Sauds 
(Joint Venture 
2- Type of firm 
Industrial Commercial Agricultural 
Finance and 
Insurance Transportation Construction 
Other 
Serb ices (specif'. ) 
If".  n 
J- f1 roximate numner oz employees 
1- 10- 20-39 40-59 60-79 80-99 100 
-199 - -399 Or- more 
4- Please answer the following questions 
Yes do Some Don't 
know 
1- Is your wage (salary) transferred directly to your personal 
bank account? 
2- Do you receive your (salary) on a specific date every month? 
3- Do most employees in your company have a computer (PQ? 
4- Do most employees in your company have a mail box? 
5- Do you feel that your current job is secure? 
6- Do you get regular promotion? 
7 -Does your firm offer a continuous training programme for its 
employees? 
8- Does your firm offer training programmes for Saudi students? 
9- Is your firm listed in the Saudi Social Insurance Directory? 
10 - Does your firm consider itself to be a monopoly firm (there 
are few other firms in the market producing a similar product 
and services)? 
11 - Does your firm consider itself to be in competition (there are 
more firms in the market producing the same product and 
services)? 
12- Does your company use computers, communication facilities 
and the internet? 
Please answer the following guestiona 
5- What is the location of your firm! 
............................................... 
6- Does your firm have a clear official wage system? 
Yes No 
If you have answered NO please circle as many of the 
following reasons that apply 
- The firm follows the Saudi Labour-and or en Law. 2- The firm is small. 
3- The firm is new to the market. 
4- Other (please specify) 
............................................................................................... 
........................................................ 
(Y'ou can continue overleaf) . ...................... 
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Part Three : Salaries and Wages 
1- Please circle the figure that is closest to your salary. (In Saudi Rivals). 
Less t han 600 600 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200 2400 
2600 2800 3000 3200 3400 3600 3800 4000 4200 4400 4600 
4800 5000 5200 5400 5600 5800 5800 6000 6200 6400 6600 
6800 7000 7200 7400 7600 7800 8000 8200 8400 8600 8800 
9000 9200 9400 9600 9800 10000 10200 10400 10600 10800 11000 
11200 11400 11600 11800 12000 12200 12400 12600 12800 13000 13200 
13400 13600 13800 14000 14200 14400 14600 14800 15000 greate r than 
15000 other (specify ) ....... ... 
2- What should be the starting salary in the nrivntp cPrtnr9 
Less than 1000 1501 2001 3001 4001 5001 More Other 
1000 SR - - - - - - than (Specify) 1500 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 6000 SR 
SR SR SR SR SR SR 
1. Saudis with less than 
high school degree. 
2. Non-Saudis with less 
than high school degree. 
3. Saudis with high 
school degree. 
4. Non-Saudis with high 
school degree. 
5. Saudis with college 
degree. 
6. Non-Saudis with 
college degree. 
3- What kind of payment system does your firm follow in paying your wage? 
Time Rate ( daily, weekly, 
monthly) 
Piece Rate ( Piece, quantity of 
production) 
Other Rate or Other System 
( please specify) 
4- What is your current monthly wage (salary)? 
........................................... 
SR. 
5- What is your current monthly wage without fringe benefits? 
............................................. 
SR. 
6- How much was your startin (first) wage (salary)? 
....................................................... 
SR. 
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Part Four : Fringe Benefits 
Please tick the appropriate box: 
1- Does your firm offer fringe benefit for its employees? 
Yes No Some of the 
Employees 
1- Subsidised accommodation or accommodation 
allowance. 
2- Furniture allowance. 
3- Utility allowance. 
4- Loan. 
5- Subsidised travel tickets. 
6- Subsidised meals. 
7- Transportation allowance. 
8-Car. 
9- Gross reward when finishing labour contract period. 
10 - Encouragement reward and annual bonus. 
11- Social allowance for dependants. 
12- Unemployment compensation. 
13 - Health Insurance. 
14 - Cost of living allowance. 
15 - Scarcity allowance. 
16 - Overtime allowance. 
17 - Danger area allowance. 
18 - Higher wage than competitors. 
19- Annual leave. 
20 - Nursery. 
2- What is your firm's grade or level in the Saudi Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry list? 
Excellent 
Grade 
First Grade Second Grade Third Grade Other Grade Don't 
Know 
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Part Five: Wage/Salary Satisfaction. 
Please tick in the appropriate box: 
Strongly Agree No Disagree StrongIý 
Agree Opinion ! Disagree 
1. Regulations and procedures of your 
company pay structure are satisfactory. 
2. The way your supervisor/ director deals 
with your promotion is satisfactory. 
3. Your salary compensates for the working 
conditions of your job. 
4. Your salary compensates for the working 
hours of your job. 
5. Your salary compensates for the scheduling 
of shifts. 
6. Your salary compensates temperature 
inside the firm buildings. 
7. Your salary compensates for the nature 
and kind of job. 
8. The salary you obtain is satisfactory. 
9. Promotional chances available are 
satisfactory. 
10. Your salary is adequate for the 
responsibilities you have. 
11. Your salary covers your personal needs. 
12. Your family is satisfied with your sala 
13. The comparison of your salary with the 
salary of those who practise jobs similar to 
yours in other companies is satisfactory. 
14. The degree to which your supervisor/ 
director accepts your suggestions on company 
pay structure is satisfactory. 
15. The methods that supervisors follow to 
solve problems of late payments of salary are 
satisfactory. 
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This Section should only be completed by Saudi 
Employees 
Part Six : Saudiisation 
Please tick the appropriate box: 
Note: Saudiisation means substitute Saudis with non-S uidi 
Strongly Agree Don't know Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
1- Applying a minimum wage policy for all 
employees (Saudi and non-Saudi) will assist 
Saudiisation. 
2- Applying a minimum wage policy for 
Saudis onl will assist Saudiisation. 
3- Improving wages of non-Saudi and Saudi 
employees in the private sector will assist 
Saudiisation. 
4- Improving wages of Saudi employees 
only in the private sector will assist 
Saudiisation. 
5- Allowing Wages of non-Saudi and Saudi 
employees to depend on supply and demand 
of labour will assist Saudiisation. 
6- Allowing non-Saudi wages to be 
determined by country of origin will assist 
Saudiisation. 
7- Charging a high fee for hiring non- 
Saudis in future will assist Saudiisation. 
8- Allocating subsidies to employers for 
each Saudi worker hired will assist 
Saudiisation. 
9- Imposing income tax on all non-Saudi 
employees will assist Saudiisation. 
10 - Encouraging foreign investment will 
assist Saudiisation 
11 - Removing government restrictions on 
small firms will encourage them to employ 
more Saudi employees. 
12 - Allocating low cost finance by the 
government to small firms with 70-100 % 
Saudi employees will assist Saudiisation. 
13 - Allocating low cost finance by 
commercial banks to small firms with 70- 
100% Saudi employees will assist 
Saudiisation 
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14 - Please add any other information you would like to give concerning your 
company's pay structure, whether positive or negative, not already- addressed in 
this questionnaire. 
Note: if you would like to receive a summary report of the results of this 
study please write your name and address in the space provided: 
............................................. 
Researcher: 
Abdullah Bohaimed 
University of Durham, United Kingdom. 
Imam University, KSA 
Correspondence address: - 
Abdullah Bohaimed 
Imam University, KSA, AI-Hassa 
College of Sharea's and Islamic Science 
Business Department, Economics Unit 
P. O. Box: 1730, Al-Hassa 31982 
Abdulla. bohaimedna, dur. ac. uk 
Abdullahuk@hotmail. com 
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ADnendix B2: 
Employee's Questionnaire (In Arabic) 
The employee in private sector should fill in this 
questionnaire 
I 
ýJl 
äuß absir Jot s ýýaä1ý ý1. yý ýý5ý.: ý J ýnb}lý 
i 
. uu) aLr_. o AMI äI')) 1S-. 1c 
ö. J, l äý. l. ýlý ýýý äß+1r ý+ ýt.. a; yt `rc., cs 
J otýýS. &Jt ärýý Ir. rt. ýi Ub:. o ýL.;.., yl I, ýue J,: + 
(University of Durham ) 
ul.. ýl. ºý ýIS1.: Jº o. . býlºý ýJl, oý11 ýýri y . 1º ýºý, 
Jº . ý,. ttý Jol t `lhälý 
t, ý:. 9ýJ, º. ä, ýtýº , ý°yº ý° t, ý,......, ý1,, ý ýtS,.: Jº ý3 ýý'yº fir, y ýiº +,. 1ý; ýs ... f, 
SJ+ 
,º 
ýel. M.. º lrý x. 119 ýý. lbll . ýJý ä., ýlý. ýJl o. iýe js 
1 gut º 
at .: d Lw ýYol 1<1_11i -)JO-Y ýL6'j jLal) jwýl 
1A1' ýhý4l o. i-m är , 
äý1ý ä ýýý ý+ ýý ýt_.. ý. ryý ý. ýe ýlr- ý: 
l: ýlsi ýº ... 
i 
j týýtý i ý5. ý. º y IJU jaii JAW 
jam) Lý4 J-t-u a4i 
ý:., rLJý ,,. s, ýý 
, may. ý, i,, i 
;;, i .ý 
fL. 9ý 
j 
_), ý 
zot#L. 
. )_e-. 
VjJý ZtL-, c. 4üpj 
v, 
1730 -ý j 
31982: ;. ý 
ihm s; ýs! ý . ac. ukabduIIa. 
bohaimed(dur 
abdullahuk(ahotmail 
278 
ýýºol 
l L1Z¢Jl ý.: ýLr.,... ýý, oý üLý1,.: ý Lj c, tol tL°L+c1L 
ä.. ýCr! l J Lr yI 7z, 
i %2i: ß,, L-}'1 iLo J& 
ý--- ý-1 
Sýyý-. w ý,. ,ý 
Z.;, ýý ýýA. 
, 
ýp- ,- 
le 
,i ji L, ali 4ý ýL- -3 
,. AJ i- -i 
-65 -60 
64 
-55 
59 
-50 
54 
-45 
49 
-40 
44 
-35 
39 
-30 
34 
-25 
29 
-20 
24 
-15 
19 
. )^A41 ý)L<. -5 
tiJ1. Q..: Ji : vih: li :i ü+h11 Z., JA iib.: li ;j J: jI : ä14: 1i 
olýriý ýu (etc) *.? (ýýý) Ls ýyLý syllý h. 
__ "ý__ 
.!. 17ý. r .. ý J 
279 
LJ; 4ý1 ; iLul 
`ti. r' --r- 'º .-10 
w#-Le 
älä CAW L ;l Ott yl.. ý : Ar, ýls5lc ý, 
lmýSýýlýý, ýl 4ý ý.; ls 411 ýý, Ib 
-1 F 
ý, L4J3 i. )41ß ,; ý_, J. u- 11 
119 im l. a: U/ý! 
ZJ LJ ä. L.,, ý ýi º: ä lß yl 
-12 
....................................... 
13 
.r.................................... 
ý'ý,. r jA Li y- 14 
. ........................................ 
Clr. Z, l, a. - tic si i ji) 44+Ji : lv : ii., ;:  .; 
ý ,I- 15 
ys Li - 16 
............................................... 
280 
t4 J4. A; ý01 L... 4 I Jý 
-' .: -' : -'E 
--I 
(v`ý'ýJ J v`ý-j"-. I slSr:. f 'ü ) 
%100' 
( 'ý1".. ' - sLS rI ýý ý"'J , 
ýISJL üyll) 
% 100 :,.. ý. 
(: r+ýyý-ý s'sý: =yý-- 
ý.. aý_ v. 
ý ýi ..: 
ýL4 J. "; ýp (L.., jll ji) j- 
A 
Li L& 
S5-500 499-400 399-200 199-100 99-80 79-60 59-40 39 -20 19 -10 9- 11 
ý äßlUJI ZL"yº v ý,.. >º '). -3 
UL i 
L2 
j JA-3 
J. a+týl Jlsa J' ý: ý! als ýJ Lj. l_l .uL yL* -4 
Jul el) csls- N'-) 4-46_4 C7.1,, ýi. q ,i L* -7 
u V1,, ý. 4 Jo s,: Jl yu -8 alp 
ZdL. Aul poi; , J. }., ý. u ,iU-9 
. (j-t-ji i Jai i JLA si : _.. iL; j pAl Sr: J L& - 11 
-12 
kj l-J I a. 4 ý..,. T ß. a9 :ä Ur y La + 
281 
_'ryýJ 
1j)S: ý-JtJý 
4.. ýL1 4ýLr }ý ýJ 
%: 4ýLT) . ý... ut 
2200 2000 
4200 4000 
6200 6000 
8200 8000 
10400 10200 
12400 12200 
15000 jSº 
sýy-. ºº J4J4 e4 z)ý . ý.. r,, tº) sº 0-'-> i, i 
1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 600 
3800 3600 3400 3200 3000 2800 2600 2400 
5800 5600 5400 5200 5000 4800 4600 4400 
7800 7600 7400 7200 7000 6800 6600 6400 
10000 9800 9600 9400 9200 9000 8600 8400 
12000 11800 11600 11400 11200 11000 10800 10600 
15000 14800 14600 13400 13200 13000 12800 12600 
Jt, 
ý ............... . illa y. " ).. Ls ýý. 
1+ w .., 3', 
ýIiJl j L-ý. ý; ja- j-L!.. 
6000 y sý -5000 -4000 -3001 -2001 1501 1000 ý. ý L; 
y ,o u) 
J4) 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000- 1500- 1000 
Jý) J4) Jý) Jý) 
4yl"ýI 
ý'ýtýý Jeri -. 4i; i äS1: Jý 4^4 , s.. Ui eüiJi jo 
u-3 
cý: ý.;, ý ýý,, ' ýU> ýi =tiz; ý.... ý. 
IýJt, , ýVyt, , rýIý > ý, ýºi , 'Sfi Pth' (ý, ý-ý, ý`'1--ýýýr) ýýý ý%' rý 
ur 
cs; olj- _ _J ý_J s*th :1 »' yº -4 
ýý, ................................ 
c(.......... ä.:,. *Uj 
Jý). ................................. 
V, 4t 4,4-: Jl .r.. -6 
J4) " ................................ 
282 
:L; 
91. º' JL4. A. l! äJIJº wo Ii.: d ºr. qlº Z. I ýiý äS1.: Jº a. ýi; ý,. ý -1 
JAI 
U) 4A i1{ýý .JU. I>ý . J1rti 
yL 
1iJ ý. J: ý3i -3 
4 
5 
ýi AI? Ls zjý. Lp -. dLr!. j -6 
-8 
04L<., - 10 
iLNI J '? 
0)'+'c - 11 
i ji J'Wl . "ý"j sl > , 
1t°-ýt 12 
J 
ºý ,, ý. ýý - 13 
Ja, - 14 
o,. U J. L - 15 
jL. O! J. ij - 16 
17 
jam s. Ul ji j_q-Ji j a. ic . )Look 18 LP 
ü 5ý: ý vLir:. Jý 
19 
4ilßýaý p- 20 
c: S, : Jº 1ý : wt: Jº : ýtt: aJº aýta. Jº äjJ; Jº LA (;... 4º Jý ) -S 
Ji 
zliwi Ll)jjl 4, ul I yý. ji j. -)WI 
283 
ootP 
: 
-1 
La ). ld 4.. Ls wl: r ý,.. rLa 6; ý La 
ji _lal lL J,. lica i uL_, ialý t .ýý .ý .v-2 
2 
lgl, A; ýj Ja : dLctý 
J, >i .... L 
4 
J_ i vj&A o)l, s L, ' 6 
4i -8 
, aye J i. )U)l 
9 
10 
j 12 
)t., Y t, J .; P) 
13 
s, ýyI vUr :J4 ýa-A--6 
oyr J) )j-Y 
sr: sý 
284 
1sä9 : "'ye.. J/ ý.., j1i I. ia 
Lp- 
Jj_jt -1 
s'ý--ý' ý ý'W' ýs sýyý... ýý ýý,. 
w ,; ý; ý. w. -1. 
ö. ) J , -i ö. ) l, j ul_., 
a. ýU j L;, " qtr JAI . fit :.. ý..,, y -Z 
-3 
oý_ ß. _J1 ä....; oil, j plc . lclr. r ý.!?. + ýlýi = lhÄi y 
0ýý.. 11 i. )U j plc LC L-. j 
j. ý. 
ß. 1h1') 
i. ýUj 
01c, 
is'" JAWI LL 
4. -. i. 36 j aLc- -u-L ip- 
list u 4U>. J I Dili J Lc, -g 
Llc wo L. -, Ji plc 
9 
i 
__j 
J. ýy6 l t. -j I- 10 
.ý . L. vý ýt.. ý. -Pi BIS,: ýº ý. I ýIcl, ýyl ý}. ý. -+ als lý1 -ii 
12 
. uý..., ýýyý. ºIýý11ý%100%704---ýý, s 
JI ö . alº ýt..,.. ýpj zits 
U 4. " º ZJuLc yl F'"' $I,; L`. -' -13 
býý; str. ýL -,, ý .) Ise 0' 
100 /070A .: ý 
285 
4j 
a 
jý -. ý--1 lu ;, ýj- 
ý, Z-LZ ýý-11 -, 
'r J 1, f 4Jj! oak.. J$ Pyý; 
Jj. j % LýJ j ý: lrýIJ y. i ý;. ýJi i . Ja 
ý, ý . mss fý 
a; ýSý, ý . üý : ýrýý ý,. 
S, ac, Pyý.. Jiý X, ý +ý 
ze 
cl. r syý 
}/ "Je .. i wL' 
)-011 ÄA, 
1730 :. ýý j)-º-ý 
31982 
(. + sji) . ac. ukabdulla. 
bohaimed)dur 
abdullahuk(ihotmail 
286 
Appendix B3: 
Employer's Questionnaire 
The owner of the firm or the person in charge of the firm should complete this 
questionnaire 
Covering Letter 
Dear Participant 
This questionnaire is part of my academic research for my Ph. D. degree in 
Economics from the University of Durham, United Kingdom. My purpose is to 
learn more about the wage structure in Saudi Arabia's private companies. You 
have been selected at random to participate in this survey - thus your 
opinions will represent the opinions of thousands of people much like yourself. 
The information you provide will contribute to an important study and may also 
be used to influence positively employment policies. I promise you 
confidentiality as under academic ethics your information will not be 
revealed and will only be used for the purpose of this study. Therefore, 
you don't have to give your name. 
I appreciate your willingness to help me in my research efforts. I believe that 
you will find the questionnaire both interesting and informative and I look 
forward to receiving your reply. 
Sincerely yours 
Researcher 
Abdullah Bohaimed 
University of Durham, United Kingdom. 
Imam University, KSA 
Correspondence address 
Abdullah Bohaimed 
Imam University, KSA, Al-Hassa 
College of Sharea's and Islamic Science 
Business Department, Economics Unit 
P. O. Box: 1730, Al-Hassa 31982 
Abdulla. bohaimed(a, dur. ac. uk 
Abdullahuk@hotmail. com 
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The owner of the firm or the person in charge of the firm should fill in this 
questionnaire 
Part Two : Company Information (Firm) 
Please tick in the appropriate box then answer the other questions 
1- Ownership 
Owned by Saudis Owned by non-Saudis Owned by Saudis and non-Saudis (Joint Venture 
2- Location 
Dammam Al Khubar Al Dhahran Al Jubaill Al Kaf i Al Qatif Ras Tannora Ab ai 
Al Safaniay Safwa Sihat Al Hofuf Mubarraz Salwa Haradh Other s iecifN ) 
3-Tvveoffirm 
Industrial Commercia Agricultural 
Finance and 
Insurance Transportation Construction Services Other 
(specify) 
4- Grade or level of firm in the on Saudi Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry list 
Excellent 
Grade 
First 
Grade 
Second 
Grade 
Third Grade Other Grade 
(specify) 
Don't Know 
- App roximate number of em io ees 
1-9 10-19 20-39 40-59 60-79 80-99 100 -199 200 -299 300 -399 400 -499 500- 
more 
6- Does your firm have a clear official wale system? 
Yes No 
If you have answered NO please circle as many of the 
following reasons that apply 
5- The firm follows the Saudi Labour and Workmen Law. 
6- The firm is small. 
7- The firm is new to the market. 
8- Other (please specify) 
................................................................................................................... 
............................................................................. 
(You can continue overleaf) 
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7- Please answer the following questions 
"es No Some Don't 
knoll 
1- Is your wage (salary) transferred directly to your 
personal bank account? 
2- Do you receive your (salary) on a specific date every 
month? 
3- Do most employees in your company have a computer 
PC ? 
4- Do most employees in your company have a mail box? 
5- Do you feel that your current job is secure? 
6- Do you get regular promotion? 
7 -Does your firm offer a continuous training programme 
for its employees? 
8- Does your firm offer training programmes for Saudi 
students? 
9- Is your firm listed in the Saudi Social Insurance 
Directory? 
10 - Does your firm consider itself to be a monopoly firm 
(there are few other firms in the market producing similar 
products and services)? 
11 - Does your firm consider itself to be in competition 
(there are more firms in the market producing the same 
product and services)? 
12- Does your company use computers, communication 
facilities and the internet? 
9- noes your firm offer fringe benefits for its emalovees? 
Yes No Some of the 
Employees 
1- Subsidised accommodation or accommodation 
allowance. 
2- Furniture allowance. 
3 -Utility allowance. 
4- Loan. 
5- Subsidised travel tickets. 
6- Subsidised meals. 
7- Transportation allowance. 
8- Car. 
9- Gross reward when finishing, labour contract period. 
10 - Encouragement reward and annual bonus. 
11- Social allowance for dependants. 
12- Unemployment compensation. 
13 - Health Insurance. 
14 - Cost of living allowance. -- -- - 15 - Scarcity allowance. 
AM - Vv'%I LIIII [LIIVYY [l li ý. l-" 
17 - Dan raren allowance. 
19- Annual leave 
than com tors. 
20 - Nursery 
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9- Please answer all questions ((This question should onlN- Completed by Saudi respondents)) 
Note: Saudiisation means substituting Saudis with non-Saudis. 
Strongly Agree Don't Disagree Strongly 
Agree Know Disagree 
1- Applying a minimum wage policy for 
all employees (Saudi and non-Saudi) will 
assist Saudiisation. 
2- Applying a minimum wage policy for 
Saudis onl will assist Saudiisation. 
3- Improving wages of non-Saudi and 
Saudi employees in the private sector 
will assist Saudiisation. 
4- Improving wages of Saudi employees 
only in the private sector will assist 
Saudiisation. 
5 -Allowing Wages of non-Saudi and 
Saudi employees to depend on supply 
and demand of labour will assist 
Saudiisation. 
6- Allowing non-Saudi wages to be 
determined by country of origin will 
assist Saudiisation. 
7- Charing a high fee for hiring non- 
Saudis in future will assist Saudiisation. 
8- Allocating subsidies to employers for 
each Saudi worker hired will assist 
Saudiisation. 
9- Imposing income tax on all non- 
Saudi employees will assist Saudiisation. 
10 - Encouraging foreign investment will 
assist Saudiisation 
11 - Removing government restrictions 
on small firms will encourage them to 
employ more Saudi employees. 
12 - Allocating low cost finance by the 
government to small firms with 70-100 
% Saudi employees will assist 
Saudiisation. 
13 - Allocating low cost finance by 
commercial banks to small firms with 
70-100% Saudi employees will assist 
Saudiisation 
10- Nationality 
Saudi Non-Saudi 
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I1_ UUL. 4- , 1..... Ia k- LL - _,, - ." .. 
11"1. º711VY1u LJwi L 11r, nota I LII1 s a1a i n the private sector. ' Less 1000 1501 2001 3001 4001 5001 More Other 
than - - - --- than (specif% 1000 1500 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 6000 
SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR 
1. Saudis with less than 
high school degree. 
2. Non-Saudis with less 
than high school 
degree. 
3. Saudis with high 
school degree. 
4. Non-Saudis with high TT 
school degree. 
5. Saudis with college 
degree. 
6. Non Saudis with 
college degree. 
12 - Please add any other information you would like to give concerning your 
company's pay structure, whether positive or negative, not already addressed in 
this questionnaire. 
............ .... ..... ... . .0... 0 ..... 0 ... 0 ... . .. .0... 00.. .0... .0.. 0.... ......... ........... ........... 
... ......... ......... ... ... ... ...... .... .... . ... ... ...... ...... .... . ........................ ... ...... 
................................................................................. (You can 
continue overleaf) 
Note: if you would like to receive a summary report of the results of this 
study, please write your name and address in the space provided: 
............................................ 
Researcher: 
Abdullah Bohaimed 
University of Durham, United Kingdom. 
Imam University, KSA 
Correspondence address: - 
Abdullah Bohaimed 
Imam University, KSA, Al-Hassa 
College of Sharea'a and Islamic Science 
Business Department, Economics Unit 
P. O. Box: 1730, Al-Hassa 31982 
Abdulla. bohaimed(&dur. ac. uk 
Abdullahuk@hotmail. com 
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Appendix B4: 
Employer's Questionnaire (In Arabic) 
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Appendix C: List of Abbreviations 
AGE Age 
AGECATT Age Category 
ANLFTWAG Current and Starting/First Wage Variables 
ANLFTWAG Current and starting/first wage variables 
COMPUTRL Level of Computer Skill 
CURRTEXP How many years of experience do you have in your present 
position? 
DUMYCNTR Dummy variable for the Central Province 
DUMYEAST Dummy variable for the Eastern Province 
DUMYNRTH Dummy variable for the Northern Province 
DUMYOTHR Dummy variable for the Others Province 
DUMYSOTH Dummy variable for the Southern Province 
DUMYWEST Dummy variable for the Western Province 
EDUC Education Level 
EDUCONT Education Years 
ENGLISHL Level of English 
FIRMGRAD What is your firm's grade or level in the Saudi Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry List?, or Firm classification 
FIRMOWNR Firm Ownership 
FIRMTYPE Type of Firm 
JOBGATT Occupational Category 
JOSSKILL Level of Occupational skill 
MARSTAT Marital Status 
NA T Nationality 
PBIRTH Province of Origin/Place of Birth/ Original Province of the 
Individual/ Place of Origin 
PREVEXP How many years of previous experience before present 
occupation? 
URBAN In What Type of Area Do you Live? (Urban or Rural) 
W Annual Wage 
WWFB What is your current monthly wage without fringe benefits? 
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Meaning of Transformed Variables Abbreviations 
EMYCAT20 Employees Category: Number 1 means less than 20 emplov-cc, and 
number 2 means more than 20 employees. 
EMYC40AT40 Employees Category: Number 1 means less than 40 emplo\ ecs and 
number 2 means more than 40 employees. 
EMYCAT500 Employees Category: Number 1 means less than 500 employees 
and number 2 means more than 500 employees. 
Ln W Natural Annual Wage 
W2CT Annual Wage for Two Levels: Number 1 means Lower Wage 
Level and Number 2 means Upper Wage Level 
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Appendix D: Tables for Chapter Six 
6.2. Respondents' Background Information Table 
6.2.1. Nationality of Employees 
II. W2CT*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table 
W2CT*Nat Cross-tabulation 
W2CT NAT Total 
Saudi Non-Saudi 
Lower Wage Level 1 46 165 ' 11 
Higher Wage Level =2 91 27 118 
Total 137 192 329 
III-I. W*NAT Independent Sample Test Table 
Indenendent Samnle Test 
Levene's Test 
for Equality 
of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig t df Significant Mean 
2-tailed Difference 
W Equal variance 44.278 . 000 
10.306 327 . 000 
56140.529 
Assumed 
56140.52'9 
Equal variance 9.573 210.531 . 
000 
not assumed 
III-II. W*NAT Mann-Whitney U Test Table 
Test Statistics' 
W 
Mann-Whitney U 4827 
Significant (2-tailed) . 
000 
a. Grouping Variable: NAT 
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6.2.2. Marital Status 
II. W2CT*MARSTAT*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table 
Saudi I W2CT 
Total 
Non- W2Ct 
Saudi 
Total 
W2CT*MARSTAT*NAT Cross-tabulation 
NAT MARSTAT Total 
Single `Tarried 
1 Count 14 32 46 
% within MARSTAT 51.9% 28.81o : 1. ) °° 
2 Count 13 79 92 
% within MARSTAT 48.1% 71.21o 66. '° 0 
Count 27 111 13 8 
% within MARSTAT 100.0% 100-000 100.000 
1 Count 50 115 165 
% within MARSTAT 94.3% 82.7% 85.90o 
2 Count 3 24 
-17 % within MARSTAT 5.7% 17.3 °o 14.10o 
Count 53 139 1O2 
% within MARSTAT 100.0% 100.0% 100.000 
III-I. W*MARSTAT Independent Sample Test Table 
IndeDendent Sample Test 
Levene's Test 
for Equality 
of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig t df Significant Mean 
(2-tailed) Differenc 
e 
W Equal variance 23.578 . 000 -4.522 
327 . 000 -31609.72 
Assumed 
Equal variance -5.711 217.974 . 000 -20701.8 
Not assumed 
111-11. W*MARSTAT Mann-Whitney U Test Table 
Test Statistics' 
W 
a 
Mann-Whitney U 5973.000 
000 ignificant (2-tailed) 
Grouping Variable: MARSTAT 
Soo 
6.2.3. Urbanisation 
II. W2CT*URBAN*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table 
W2CT*URBAN*NAT Cross-tabulation 
NAT UR BAN Total 
Urban Rural 
Saudi W2CT 1 Count 34 12 46 
% within MARSTAT 29.6% a 
2 Count 81 11 9 
% within MARSTAT 70.4% 47.80o 66.71o 
Total Count 115 23 1; 8 
% within MARSTAT 100.0% 100.0% 100.000 
Non- W2Ct 1 Count 121 165 165 
Saudi % within MARSTAT 84.6% 85.9 85.9° c 
2 Count 22 27 -7 
% within MARSTAT 15.4% 14.1% 14.11o 
Total Count 143 192 _ 192 
% within MARSTAT 100.0% 100.0° 100.000 
III-I. W*URBAN Independent Sample Test Table 
Independent Sample Test 
Levene's Test 
for Equality 
of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig t df Significant Mean 
(2-tailed) Difference 
W Equal variance 10.669 . 001 3.620 
327 
. 000 265 38.267 
Assumed 
Equal variance 4.450 164.692 . 
000 26538.267 
not assumed 
111-11. W*URBAN Mann-Whitney U Test Table 
Test Statisticsa 
w 
Mann-Whitney U 5961.000 
ienificant (2-tailed) 1 . 
000 
a. Grouping Variable: URBAN 
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6.2.4. Aze Category 
H. W2CT*AGECATT*NAT Cross-Tabulation 
W2CT*AGECATT*NAT Cross-tahulation 
NAT AGECATT 
vY 
i oral 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-19 50-54 55-59 60-64 
Saudi W2CT 1 Count 14 13 11 3 1 3 1ý 46 % within MARSTAT 73.7% 33.3% 35.5% 13.0% 63% 50.0% 33.3°° -- 33.6°. 2 Count 5 26 20 20 15 3 2 - - 91 % within MARSTAT 26.3% 66.7% 64.5% 87.0% 93.8% 50.0% 66. '°°° - - 66.4° Total Count 19 39 31 23 16 6 3 13" 
% within MARSTAT 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% - -- I° Non- W2CT I Count 8 35 46 28 22 15 10 - 1 165 Saudi % within MARSTAT 100% 100% 95.8 87.5% 78.6% 60.0% , 1.4% - 100% 85.900 2 Count - - 2 4 6 10 4 1 -- 2- % MARSTAT - - 4.2% 12.5% 21.4% 40.0% 28.6"//o 100° --- 14.1'. 1 FTOtal Count 8 35 48 32 28 25 14 1 I 192 
within MARSTAT 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% I00% 100 :° 100% 
III-I. W*AGECATT*NAT ANOVA Table 
ANOVA 
w 
df F Significant 
Between Groups 8 4.731 . 000 
Within Groups 320 
Total 328 
111-11. W*AGECATT*NAT Kruskal-Wallis Test Table 
Test Statistics 
w 
Chi-Square 16.720 
Df 8 
_Significant . 
033 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: AGECATT 
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6.2.5. Province of Origin/Place of Birth 
II. W2CT*PBIRTH*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table 
W2CT* PBIRTH*NAT Cross-tabulation 
NAT PB IRTH Total 
Eastern Western Southern Northern Central Other 
Province Province Province Province Pro%ince countr. 
Saudi W2CT 1 Count 32 - 2 10 . 16 
% within MARSTAT 40.0% - 15.4% - 15.4%, 0 4-. 7 °° 333°. 
2 Count 48 5 11 5 11 11 91 
% within MARSTAT 60.0% 100% 84.6°/. 100°,. 84.6% 52.4% 66.41". 
Total Count 80 5 13 5 13 21 13' 
% within MARSTAT 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 10000 100! 0 
Non- W2CT 1 Count 2 - 2 - 1 160 165 
Saudi % within MARSTAT 100% 100% 100% 85. V o 85.900 
2 Count - -- - - - 27 2- 
% within MARSTAT - - - - I 14.4°° 14.1! 0 
Total Count 2 - 2 - 1 187 192 
% within MARSTAT 100% - 100% - 100% 10000 100°. 
III-I. W*PBIRTH*NAT ANOVA Table 
ANOVA 
w 
df F 
Between Groups 5 19.740 
Within Groups 323 
Total 328 
111-11. W* PBIRTH*NAT Kruskal-Wallis Test Table 
Test Statisticse'b 
w 
Chi-Square 83.321 
Df 5 
Significant . 000 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: PBIRTH 
Significant 
. 000 
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6.2.6. Occupational Category 
II. W2CT*JOBCATT*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table 
W2CT*JOBCAT*NAT Cross-tabulation 
NAT Professional Administr- Accounting Sales and Production Other I otal 
of Technical ative or Financial Marketing Vs Drker 
Saudi W2CT 1 Count 11 21 2 3 {4 36 
% within MARSTAT 22.9% 44.7% 12.5% 50°° 333°. RO"° 33.6". 
2 Count 37 26 14 3 10 1 91 
% within MARSTAT 77.1% 553% 87.5% 50% ýtl"° bt. ý°. 66. '00 
Total Count 48 47 16 6 i5 13' 15 
% within MARSTAT 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100'. 100". 
Non- W2CT 1 Count 69 23 15 13 23 2: I6ý 
Saudi % within MARSTAT 83.1% 79.3 78.9% 100% 95.8°: 91. -00 1 85.9'. 
2 Count 14 6 4 - 1 2 
°/. within MARSTAT 16.9% 20.7% 21.2% - 4.200 83': I 14.1% 
Total Count 83 29 19 13 24 24 192 
% within MARSTAT 100% 100% 100% 100% IMO O 100° ° 1000. 
III-I. W*JOBCATT*NAT ANOVA Table 
ANOVA 
w 
df F Significant 
Between Groups 5 3.767 . 000 
Within Groups 323 
Total 328 
111-11. W*JOBCATT*NAT Kruskal-Wallis Test Table 
Test Statistic? ' b 
w 
Chi-Square 83.321 
Df 5 
Significant . 000 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: JOBCATT 
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6.2.8. Level of Occupational Skill 
II. W2CT*JOB SKILL*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table 
W2CT*JOBSKILL*NAT Cross-tabulation 
NAT JOBSKILL Total 
Professional/ Semi- Unskilled l nknown 
Skilled Skilled 
Saudi W2CT 1 Count 20 23 21 46 
% within MARSTAT 29.4% 39.7% . 66.7% 0 12.5. O 33.3* 
2 Count 48 35 1 91 
% within MARSTAT 70.6% 60.3% 33.3% 8-. 500 66.4" ° 
Total Count 68 58 3 8 13- 
% within MARSTAT 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0°° 100.0°. 
Non- W2CT 1 Count 102 55 - 8 16ý 
Saudi % within MARSTAT 79.1% 100.0 - 100.0°0 
2 Count 27 - - - ý' 
% within MARSTAT 20.9% - - --- 14.10,. 
Total Count 129 55 - 8 192 
within MARSTAT 100.0% 100.0% - 100.0 100.0% 
III-I. W*JOBSKILL*NAT ANOVA Table 
ANOVA 
W 
df F Significant 
Between Groups 3 . 674 . 569 
Within Groups 325 
Total 328 
111-11. W*JOBSKILL*NAT Kruskal-Wallis Test Table 
Test Statisticsa b 
w 
Chi-Square 2.027 
Df 3 
Significant . 567 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: JOBSKILL 
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6.2.9 Age 
III-I. W*AGE Pearson Correlation Table 
Correlation 
Age 
AGE Pearson Correlation 1.0 
. 208** Sig. (2-Tailed) 
. 000 N 329 328 
W Pearson Correlation 
. 208** 1.0 Sig. (2-Tailed) 
. 000 N 328 329 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
III-II. W*AGE Spearman's rho Table 
Correlation 
Age «' 
AGE Pearson Correlation 1.0 . 203** 
Sig. (2-Tailed) . 000 
N 329 328 
W Pearson Correlation . 203 ** 1.0 
Sig. (2-Tailed) . 000 
N 328 329 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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6.3 Human Capital Variable Tables 
6.3.1 Education (as Category Variable) 
II. W2CT*EDUC*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table 
W2CT*EDUC*NAT Cross-tabulation 
NAT EDIýC Total 
Primary Elementar High Diploma Bachelor Bachel Master Ph. D. 
School y School School of -or of Degree Degree 
Science Art 
Saudi W2CT 1 Count 1 5 22 9 2 52 - 41, % within MARSTAT 100% 38.5% 48.9% 28.1% 63% I 45. S° ° 66.7° ° - 33.6* 9 
2 Count - 8 23 23 30 h1 - 91 % within MARSTAT -- 61.5% 51.1% 71.9% 93.8% 54.5°° 33.3°° - 66.40° 
Total Count 1 13 45 32 32 11 3 - 13- 
% MARSTAT 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100"x. - 10080 
Non- W2CT 1 Count 5 4 40 32 62 16 6- 165 
Saudi % within MARSTAT 100% 100% 97.6 88.9% 81.6% 84.20o 6000 - 85.900 
2 Count - -- 1 4 14 3 4 1 2" 
within MARSTAT - - 2.4% 11.1% 18.4% 15.8% 40°%ö 100°e 14.1 
Total Count 5 4 41 36 78 19 10 1 192 
% within MARSTAT 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100"0 10011. 
III-I W*EDUC*NAT ANOVA Table 
ANOVA 
W 
df F Significant 
Between Groups 7 2.171 . 037 
Within Groups 321 
Total 328 
111-11 W*EDUC*NAT Kruskal-Wallis Test Table 
Test Statisticse' b 
w 
Chi-Square 26.811 
Df 7 
Significant . 000 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: EDUC 
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6.3.11. Education (as Continuous Variable) 
Ili. W2CT*EDUC*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table 
W2CT*EDUC*NAT Cross-tabulation 
NAT EDt'C Total 
6 9 12 14 16 1" 19 
Saudi W2CT 1 Count 1 5 22 9 5 - tt~ % within MARSTAT 100% 38.5% 48.9% 28.1% 45.50o 63°o 66. "° " - 33. t. " o 
2 Count - 8 23 23 6 30 1 - 91 % within MARSTAT - 61.5% 51.1% 71.9% 54.5% 93.8% 33.3°° 66.4". 
Total Count 1 13 45 32 11 32 3 - 13- % within MARSTAT 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% . - 1006 
Non- W2CT 1 Count 5 4 40 32 16 62 6 - 165 
Saudi % within MARSTAT 100% 100 97.6% 88.9% 844.2% 81.6, /0 600o - 85.900 
2 Count - - 1 4 3 14 4 1 27 
% within MARSTAT - - 2.4% 11.1% 15.85 18.400 40°'o 10000 14.1% 
Total Count 5 4 41 36 19 76 10 1 192 
% within MARSTAT 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 1 00°o 114100 100"" 
III-Ii. W*EDUCONT Pearson Correlation Table 
Correlation 
w 
EDUCONTý 
W Pearson Correlation 1.0 . 162** 
Sig. (2-Tailed) . 000 
N 329 329 
EDUCONT Pearson Correlation . 162** 1.0 
Sig. (2-Tailed) . 000 . 
N 329 330 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
III-IIi. W*EDUCONT Spearman's rho Table 
Correlation 
W EDUCONT 
W Pearson Correlation 1.0 . 227** 
Sig. (2-Tailed) . 000 
N 329 329 
EDUCONT Pearson Correlation . 227** 
1.0 
Sig. (2-Tailed) . 000 
N 329 330 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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6.3.2. Level of English 
II. W2CT*ENGLISHL*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table 
W2CT*ENGLISHL*NAT Cross-Tabulation 
NAT ENGLISHL Total 
None Beginner Intermediate danced 
Saudi W2CT I Count 3 12 26 S 46 
% within MARSTAT 100% 66.7% 34.7% 12.2% 100'. 
2 Count 
- 6 49 36 91 
% within MARSTAT - 33.3% 65.3% 87.8.0 66.4°o Total Count 3 18 75 41 13- 
% within MARSTAT 100% 100% 100% 100% 100'. 
Non- W2CT 1 Count 4 17 95 49 165 
Saudi % within MARSTAT 100% 100% 96% 90 68 1°ö 85  . . 2 Count - - 4 213 % within MARSTAT - - 4% 31.9 0/. 
Total F Count F 4 17 99 72 192 % within MARSTAT 100% 100% 100% 100% 100"ß'. 
III-I. W*ENGLISHL*NAT ANOVA Table 
ANOVA 
W 
df F Significant 
Between Groups 3 13.190 . 000 
Within Groups 325 
Total 328 
111-11. W*ENGLISHL*NAT Kruskal-Wallis Test Table 
Test Statisticsa' b 
w 
Chi-Square 47.003 
Df 3 
Significant . 000 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: ENGLISHL 
109 
6.3.3 Level of Computer Skills 
II. W2CT*COMPUTRL*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table 
W2CT*COMPUTRL*NAT Cross-tabulation 
NAT COIPt TRL lotal 
None Beginner Intermediate 1 . Ad%anced 
Saudi W2C 1 Count 9 15 15 6 4. r 
T % within MARSTAT 69.2% 50% 24.6° ° 18.8°. 3;. 1' " 
2 Count 4 15 46 26 91 
% within MARSTAT 30.8% 50% '5.4° o 
. 
81-3"'o 66-909 
Total Count 13 30 61 31 136 
% within MARSTAT 100% 100% 100% 100% 100°: 
Non-Saudi W2C 1 Count 40 45 52 ýK 16ý 
T % within MARSTAT 97.6% 95.7% 80% ; 1.8°ý° 85.9° " 
2 Count 1 2 13 11-- 
% within MARSTAT 2.4% 4.3% 20% 28.2% 13.1 to 
Total Count 41 47 65 39 192 
% within MARSTAT 100% 100°0 1000 0 )° ° 1008 0 
L 
III-I. W*COMPUTRL*NAT ANOVA Table 
ANOVA 
w 
df F Significant 
Between Groups 3 18.001 . 000 
Within Groups 324 
Total 327 
111-11. W*COMPUTRL*NAT Kruskal-Wallis Test Table 
Test Statisticsa b 
w 
Chi-Square 11.863 
Df 1 
Significant . 001 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: COMPUTRL 
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6.3.4. Experience 
III-I. W*CURRTEXP Pearson Correlation Table 
Correlation 
Ct'RRTEXI' 
w Pearson Correlation 1.0 . 302** Sig. (2-Tailed) 
. 000 N 329 329 
CURRTEXP Pearson Correlation 
. 302** 1.0 Sig. (2-Tailed) 
. 000 N 329 330 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
III. I1. W*CURRTEXP Spearman's rho Table 
Correlation 
W CURRTEXP 
W Pearson Correlation 1.0 . 282** Sig. (2-Tailed) . 000 
N 329 329 
CURRTEXP Pearson Correlation . 282** 1.0 
Sig. (2-Tailed) . 000 . 
N 329 330 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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111-11. W*PREVEXP Pearson Correlation Table 
Correlation 
Ni' 
w Pearson Correlation 1.0 
Sig. (2-Tailed) 
N 329 
PREVEXP Pearson Correlation 
. 302** Sig. (2-Tailed) 
. 000 N 329 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
III-IIi. W*PREVEXP Spearman's rho Table 
Correlation 
PREVF\P 
. 301 
. 000 
329 
1.0 
330 
NN' PREVEXP 
W Pearson Correlation 1.0 
. 282 ** Sig. (2-Tailed) 
. 000 N 329 329 
PREVEXP Pearson Correlation 
. 282** 1.0 
Sig. (2-Tailed) . 000 N 329 330 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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6.4 Segmented Labour Market Variables 
6.4.1 Firm Ownership 
II. W2CT*FIRMOWNR Cross-Tabulation Table 
W2CT*FIRMOWNR*NAT Cross-Tabulation 
NAT FIRMOWNR Total 
Owned Owned by Joint 
by Saudis Non-Saudis Venture 
Saudi W2CT 1 Count 38 -- 8 46 % within 49.4% - 133"/. 33.6 
MARSTAT 
2 Count 39 -- 52 91 
% within 50.6% - 86.7% 66.4% 
MARSTAT 
Total Count 77 - 60 13- 
% within 100% - 100% 100"x. 
MARSTAT 
Non-Saudi W2CT 1 Count 146 8 11 165 
% within 91.8% 80% 47.8% 85.9/. 
MARSTAT 
2 Count 13 2 12 2' 
% within 8.2% 20% 52.2% 14.1% 
MARSTAT 
Total Count 159 10 23 192 
% within 100% 100% 100% 100% 
MARSTAT 
III-I. W*FIRMOWNR ANOVA Table 
ANOVA 
W 
111-11. W*FIRMOWNR Kruskal-Wallis Test Table 
Test Statisticsa' b 
w 
Chi-Square 85.747 
Df 2 
Significant . 000 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: FIRMOWNR 
ii-, 
6.4.2. Type of Firm 
II. W2CT*FIRMTYPE*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table 
W2CT*FIRMTYPE*N. 4T Cross-tabulation 
NAT FIRM TYPE 10tal 
Industr- Comm Agricu Finance Transpo- Constru- Ser-, icrs Other% 
ial e-rcial Itural and nation ction 
Insuranc 
e 
Saudi W2- 1 Count 15 5 8 - 1 
CT % within 19.2% 60.5% 61.5% 25% - - 40*9 8-30" 33.6'e MARSTAT 1 
1 
2 Count 63 3 5 3 1 - 91 % within 80.8% 37.5% 38.5% 75% 100% 
r 
- 60*o 1-1.504, NIARSTAT 
Total Count 78 8 13 4 1 - 25 % within 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% - 1000ý41 1 looe, looe. NIARSTAT i I 
Non- W2- 1 Count 23 27 18 1 4 36 40 16 165 
Saudi CT % within 67.6% 90% 81.8% 100% 80% 9000 84.2 "e0 
MARSTAT 
2 Count 11 3 4 - 1 4 3 2-, 
% within 32.4% 10% 18.2% - 200,0 2. -0. 9.1116 15.800 14.100 
MARSTAT 
Total Count 34 30 22 1 5 3- 44 19 192 
% within 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 10000 100 100% 10000 
MARSTAT 
III-I. W*FIRMTYPE ANOVA Table 
ANOVA 
W 
df F Significant 
Between Groups 7 14.281 . 000 
Within Groups 321 
Total 328 
111-11. W*FIRMTYPE Kruskal-Wallis Test Table 
Test Statisticse' b 
w 
Chi-Square 85.747 
Df 2 
Significant . 000 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: FIRMTYPE 
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6.4.3 Number of Employees 
Ili. W2CT*EMYCAT20*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table 
W2CT*EMYCAT20*NAT Cross-Tabulation 
NAT ENl C. A T20 Total 
1 
S di au W2CT 1 Count 5 41 46 
% within MARSTAT 833% 313% 33.6°ö 
2 Count 1 90 91 
% within MARSTAT 16.7% 68.7/o 66.40o 
Total Count 6 131 13- 
% MARSTAT 100% 100% 100% 
Non-Saudi W2CT 1 Count 24 141 165 
% within MARSTAT 92.3% 84.9% 85.90, "0 
2 Count 2 25 2- 
1 % within MARSTAT 7.7% 15.1% 14.1 % 
Total Count 26 166 192 
% within MARSTAT 100% 100% 100°"o 
IIii. W2CT*EMYCAT40*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table 
W2CT*EMYCAT40*NAT Cross-Tabulation 
NAT ENV CAT40 Total 
1 2 
Saudi W2CT 1 Count 6 40 46 
% within MARSTAT 75% 31% 33.6% 
2 Count 2 89 91 
% within MARSTAT 25% 69% 66.4% 
Total Count 8 129 137 
% within MARSTAT 100% 100% 100% 
Non-Saudi W2CT 1 Count 46 119 165 
% within MARSTAT 92% 83.8% 85.9% 
2 Count 4 23 27 
% within MARSTAT 8% 16.2% 14.1% 
Total Count 50 142 192 
% within MARSTAT 100% 100% 100% 
IIiii. W2CT*EMYCAT500*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table 
W2CT*FMYCAT500*NAT Cross-Tabulation 
NAT ENYCAT500 Total 
1 2 
Saudi W2CT 1 Count 26 20 46 
% within MARSTAT 54.2% 22.5% 33.6% 
2 Count 22 69 91 
% within MARSTAT 45.8% 77.5% 66.4% 
Total Count 48 89 13- 
% within MARSTAT 100% 100% 100°x. 
Non-Saudi W2CT 1 Count 105 60 165 
% within MARSTAT 89.7% 80% tiý. ý"% 
2 Count 12 15 
% within MARSTAT 10.3% 20% 14.1% 
Total Count 117 "'S 192 
% within MARSTAT 100% 100% 100010 
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III-I. W*EMYCAT ANOVA Table 
ANOVA 
w 
df FI Significant 
Between Groups 11 8.129 . 000 Within Groups 317 
Total 328 
111-11. W*EMYCAT Kruskal-Wallis Test Table 
Test Statisticsa b 
W2CT 
Chi-Square 85.747 
Df 2 
Significant . 000 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: EMYCAT 
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6.4.4 Firm Grade 
II. W2CT*FIRMGRAD*NAT Cross-Tabulation Table 
W2CT*FIRMGRAD*NAT Cross-Tabulation 
NAT FI RMGRAD Total 
High Mediu Low 
m UnknoA, n 
Saudi W2CT I Count 22 15 7 2 46 
% within 27.5 34 87.5 40 33.6 
MARST 
A 
2 Count 58 29 1 3 91 
% within 72.5 66 12.5 60 66.4 
MARST 
AT 
Total Count 80 44 8 5 13- 
% within 100 100 100 100 100 
MARST 
AT 
Non- W2CT I Cou nt 33 38 19 75 165 
Saudi % within 76.7 85 86 91.5 85.9 
MARST 
AT 
2 Count 10 7 3 7 27 
% within 23.3 16 14 8.5 14.1 
MARST 
AT 
Total Count 43 45 22 82 192 
% within 100 100 100 100 100 
MARST 
AT 
III-I. W*FIRMGRAD*NAT ANOVA Table 
ANOVA 
w 
df F 
Between Groups 5 12.716 
Within Groups 323 
Total 328 
111-11. W*FIRMGRAD*NAT Kruskal-Wallis Test Table 
Test Statistic? ' b 
W2CT 
Chi-Square 53.947 
Df 5 
Significant . 005 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: FIRMGRAD 
Significant 
. 000 
, 1/ 
6.5 Current and First Salary Variables 
III-I. W*ANLFTWAG Pearson Correlation Table 
Correlation 
NN' AN"LFTJ{: -t G_ 
W Pearson Correlation 1.0 . 321** Sig. (2-Tailed) 
. 000 N 329 316 
ANLFTWAG Pearson Correlation 
. 321** 1.0 Sig. (2-Tailed) 
. 000 N 316 317 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
111-11. W*ANLFTWAG Spearman's rho Table 
Correlation 
W . -1.1'LETJi: tG 
W Pearson Correlation 1.0 . 841 **ý. 
Sig. (2-Tailed) . 000 
N 329 316 
ANLFTWAG Pearson Correlation . 841 ** 1.0 
Sig. (2-Tailed) . 000 . 
N 316 317 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix E: Figures for Chapter Seven 
Figure 7.1 
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Figure 7.3 
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual 
1.00 
Dependent Variable: natural log for anlsalry 
75 
.0 o 
. 
50 
0 
E 
U 
. 25 
U 
Q) 
0- 
x 0.00 
0.00 . 
25 
. 50 . 
75 
Observed Cum Prob 
Figure 7.4 
4 
cu 
3 
U) 
2 
aý N 
1 
cu 
c 
c0 
c -1 0 
CO 2 -2 0) 
-3 
1.00 
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: natural log for anlsalry 
° 
o° 
° 
°°°° 
°% 
O° 
° °° 
°° 
ö °OC8 °°° DO 
00 ® ö 
$ 
cF6 °11, O °°° 
oö cl 
°a 
_z 
° 0a C6 m 7 
. 
6, 
B 0 ° 
p° 
0 °c&° 
ö° 
0 
Rp 
pm 
b 
° °° 
°'4' °D o 
o lb ° °® ° 
. 
013 013 °Eoa 
13 
° pO °°% 0 C ° Qý 
0° 
°%° 
° 
ý°Qa°B °B0ö°°o 
°° 
° 
Ep dp 0% C) ß 
B ° 
°°D °° 
0° o° °° 
ö o°o0 
C3 
0 0 
-3 -2 -1 012 
Regression Standardized Predicted Value 
15 
320 
Figure 7.5 
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Figure 7.7 
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Appendix F: Figures for Chapter 
E 
Figures 8.1 Histogram for Saudi Employees 
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Figure 8.2 Histogram for Non-Saudi Employees 
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Figure 8.3 Histogram for Saudi and Non-Saudi Emplovees 
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